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 Wikileaks,fuites et révélations

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 0:00

Citation :
WikiLeaks : le jeu trouble de l'Iran sur le théâtre afghan
le Monde | 02.12.10 | 22h31

Téhéran s'infiltre à Kaboul. A l'instar du scénario irakien, l'Iran étend son influence chez son voisin afghan –avec lequel il partage une frontière de 900 km – à mesure que les Américains s'enlisent dans une guerre sans issue immédiate. Les télégrammes diplomatiques américains obtenus par Wikileaks et consultés par Le Monde, se font l'écho de cette percée iranienne, à la fois militaire (soutien à des groupes insurgés) et politique.

Historiquement, Téhéran a toujours soutenu la minorité chiite afghane (environ 10% de la population), notamment durant la résistance antisoviétique. Mais depuis 2001, le jeu iranien a gagné en subtilité. Il s'étend au-delà de la carte chiite. Téhéran courtise désormais sans complexe personnalités, partis politiques, voire groupes armés issus de la majorité sunnite.

Se confiant à l'ambassadeur américain en poste à Kaboul, Karl Eikenberry, un proche du président Hamid Karzaï confiait ainsi en février 2010 que les ambitions iraniennes étaient motivées par "une guerre d'objectifs" et non plus simplement – comme par le passé – par des "sympathies religieuses".

SOUTIEN À DES TALIBANS SUNNITES

L' "objectif" de Téhéran ? "Contrer l'influence occidentale en Afghanistan" répond le conseiller du président afghan. Et à cette fin, le soutien à des talibans sunnites – pourtant jadis farouchement anti-chiites - n'est plus tabou. "L'Iran aide des factions de talibans à condition qu'elles ne soient pas affiliées au mollah Omar", le chef du mouvement taliban.

Le proche de M. Karzaï précise que les diplomates iraniens en poste à Kaboul ne nient même plus l'existence de ce soutien. "Avant, ils démentaient leur implication, raconte-t-il à l'ambassadeur américain. Mais depuis six mois, ils ne nient plus une telle assertion, ils restent silencieux". Inutile de feindre la protestation…

Le même conseiller de M. Karzaï fournit quelques détails sur les modalités de cette intervention iranienne. Il explique que de jeunes hommes afghans sont "autorisés à franchir la frontière vers l'Iran", où ils sont recrutés et entraînés avant de "retourner se battre contre le gouvernement afghan et les forces de la coalition".

INGÉRENCE GLOBALE

L'ingérence n'est pas que de nature militaire. Elle est globale. Selon ce proche du président Karzaï, l'Iran accueille très généreusement des étudiants afghans. L'Afghanistan compterait aujourd'hui 7 000 diplômés d'universités iraniennes (dont certains ont étudié durant la guerre civile pré-2001). L'officiel afghan ajoute que l'Iran forme également des "milliers" de religieux (chiites) venus d'Afghanistan. De retour au pays, ces derniers, relève-t-il, continuent de bénéficier d'un soutien financier iranien, notamment sous la forme d'un salaire mensuel.

Et la classe politique ? Dans son câble de février 2010, l'ambassadeur Eikenberry rappelle qu'un an plus tôt, le même conseiller de M. Karzaï avait admis que les Iraniens "versaient au palais présidentiel des sommes limitées d'argent de manière épisodique et imprévisible".

Selon un autre câble daté de septembre 2009, le président Karzaï s'était personnellement ému auprès l'ambassadeur Eikenberry de rumeurs de financement iranien au profit d'Abdullah Abdullah, son principal concurrent à l'élection présidentielle de l'été. "Je lui ai répondu qu'à notre avis l'Iran a donné de l'argent à tous les candidats", écrit l'ambassadeur. Et il ajoute : "M. Karzaï n'a pas exprimé de désaccord".


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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 0:23

Citation :
ID: 164775
Date: 2008-08-04 16:13:00
Origin: 08RABAT727
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: SECRET
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0727/01 2171613
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041613Z AUG 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8947
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000727

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

SIPDIS

STATE FOR PM, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/24/2028
TAGS: MARR, MASS, PGOV, PREL, PTER, KCOR, KPKO, MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S MILITARY: ADEQUATE, MODERNIZING, BUT
FACING BIG CHALLENGES

Classified By: Classified by Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4
(a) and (b).

1. (C) Summary: The Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (FAR) are
modernizing but remain weighed down by long-standing
problems. King Mohammed VI, who in 1999 inherited a military
in need of professionalization, has implemented some needed
reforms, but much remains to be done. Civilian control, if
ascribed to the person of the King, is complete, but there is
no real Defense Ministry. Outside the FAR, there is only a
small administration. The military remains plagued by
corruption, an inefficient bureaucracy, low levels of
education in the ranks, periodic threats of radicalization of
some of its soldiers, political marginalization, and the
deployment of most of its forces in the Western Sahara.
There have been some indications of pending changes in the
leadership. In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust
military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
the future. The health of the relationship is evident by
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and
Morocco's purchase of sophisticated weapons from the U.S. to
include 24 F-16s this year. We anticipate that the
U.S.-Moroccan military relationship will continue to flourish
but Morocco's ability to absorb its new high-end military
purchases and restrictions on high quality Moroccan
information sharing with our attaches represent two
challenges ahead. This mission-coordinated report draws
heavily on valuable reporting and analysis from the embassy's
military components, the Defense Attache Office and the
Office of Security Cooperation. End Summary.

------------------
All the King's Men
------------------

2. (C) As Commander-in-Chief of the Moroccan Royal Armed
Forces and Minister of Defense, King Mohammed VI maintains a
highly centralized role over the military. No troop
movements, exercises, or even travel of officers domestically
or abroad happens without the King,s approval. As a result
of the 1971 and 1972 coup attempts by the Moroccan Army and
Air Force respectively, the Palace increased control over the
military, marginalized it from policy making, and restricted
its interaction with foreign military interlocutors and the
press. The Alaouite dynasty depends upon, among other
things, a strong military, the leadership of which, however,
must remain sufficiently docile so as not to arouse
suspicions of disloyalty. The only civilian structure
responsible for the FAR is not a Defense Ministry but rather
an entity under the Prime Minister responsible for the
Administration of the National Defense. It is headed by
Minister-delegate Abderrahmane Sbai, whose role is
essentially restricted to that of comptroller. As far as we
can tell, political-military policy on issues such as
peacekeeping appears centered in the Foreign Ministry. All
other major defense matters are decided in the Palace.

3. (C) Over the past decade, Morocco has transitioned from a
conscript to an all-volunteer military force of approximately
218,000 soldiers. Of the three services, the Army is
dominant with approximately 175,000 personnel. There are
approximately 13,000 personnel in the Air Force and 7,800 in
the Navy. Though nominally subordinate within the military
structure but answering directly to the King, the
Gendarmerie, which consists of approximately 22,000
personnel, conducts paramilitary, royal guard, and internal
and border policing missions. Though a few legacy conscripts
remain in the military, professional reforms have made
voluntary military service an attractive career option for
Moroccans with opportunities for a steady income and some
upward mobility. The average military salary for enlisted
soldiers is approximately 2,000 dirhams (USD 270) per month.
An officer's starting salary is approximately 6,000 dirhams
(USD 850) per month. With benefits, such as free housing,
these are reasonably competitive in the Moroccan context.

4. (C) The top military commanders include Military
Inspector General and Army Commander, Lieutenant General (Lt
Gen) Abdelaziz Benanni; Operations Chief Lt Gen Boughaid
Arroub; and Gendarmerie Commander Lt Gen Housni Benslimane.
Benanni, who has become mired in suspicion of corruption,
will reportedly be retired soon. Arroub, who came out of
recent retirement, is tipped by some to succeed Benanni.
Arroub, historically pro-French, appears to have become
increasingly pro-U.S. in the last 5 years. Another rising
star in the FAR is General Mohamed Larbi Tamdi, who is
responsible for army logistics and force sustainment. There
is some military staff in the Palace, likely influent, about
which little is known.


5. (C) King Hassan II and his son, King Mohammed VI, have
maintained the Gendarmerie as a force relatively independent
from the FAR since 1972, in part as a check against a
military coup. While it most visibly serves as a State
Police/Highway Patrol, it has a wide range of units. Its
commander, Lt Gen Benslimane, likely reports in some way
directly to the King. He also leads the Moroccan National
Soccer League, making him a popular figure inside and out of
military circles. While there is no direct proof of
Benslimane being involved in corrupt activity, low ranking
Gendarmerie assigned to highway patrols are expected to pay
approximately 4,000 dirhams (USD 540) to their immediate
supervisors with extralegal earnings from motorists above
which they can keep for themselves, according to one credible
anecdote.

--------------------------------------------- --
Military Operations Dominated by Western Sahara
--------------------------------------------- --

6. (C) The FAR is composed of over 200,000 soldiers and
outclasses most militaries in Africa but has significant room
for improvement. Along with concerns regarding aging
equipment and an overtaxed force, the FAR is plagued by
institutional corruption, leadership that will not step
aside, and low morale among mid-level officers. The FAR is
preoccupied with operations in the Western Sahara region with
between 50 and 70 percent of its total strength deployed
there at any one time. The force in Western Sahara -- a
landmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- is
considered to be stretched thin with a reported estimated
operational readiness rate of just 40 percent. Morocco does
not consider the POLISARIO -- the ethnically Sahrawi
resistance based in Tindouf, Algeria, seeking to make the
Western Sahara an independent state -- to be a conventional
military threat. However, the FAR remains vigilant in
guarding against a renewed POLISARIO insurgency effort.
Morocco built a berm or sand wall along the eastern and
southern borders of the Sahara in the 1980s, which
effectively eliminated the POLISARIO's ability to launch hit
and run raids, leading to the 1981 cease-fire, which has been
fully respected. The POLISARIO continues to maintain a
small, lightly armed presence at a few desert crossroads in
the small remaining part of Western Sahara outside the berm.
Despite occasional expressions of concern, the GOM almost
certainly is fully conscious that the POLISARIO poses no
current threat that could not be effectively countered. The
POLISARIO has generally refrained from classic terrorist
bombings, etc. Although the specter is sometimes raised,
there is no indication of any Salafist/Al Qaeda activity
among the indigenous Sahrawi population.

7. (C) While the border between Morocco and Algeria is
closed, and relations remain cool, we do not believe that
Algeria poses an imminent conventional military threat to
Morocco. Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and
"wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerian
attack, but the FAR does not have troops deployed along the
border. Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,
hundreds of kilometers away from the border, from which they
could deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursion
into Morocco. Any confrontation between the two countries
would likely take place through the proxy of the POLISARIO,
which Algeria has supported materially in the past and could
do so again if hostilities between Morocco and the POLISARIO
recommenced.

------------
Peacekeeping
------------

8. (C) Motivated to win over other countries to its claims
to Western Sahara, Morocco is active in United Nations (UN),
engages in peacekeeping activities, and occasionally sends
troops to assist friendly countries. Morocco is an
experienced contributor to UN peacekeeping efforts, deploying
to countries like Angola, Bosnia, Cambodia, Haiti and
Somalia. It currently has over 1,500 peacekeepers deployed
to Cote d,Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Morocco also supports a military hospital in Kosovo
under NATO command. Morocco has sent medical personnel to
Niger to assist with famine relief and recently re-deployed
military forces to Senegal for an annual five-month &cloud
seeding8 operation for drought relief. Peacekeeping
contributions in recent years have been tarnished by
allegations of sexual wrongdoing in the DRC and Cote
d,Ivoire.

--------------------------------------------- ---
Corruption Remains the Single Greatest Challenge
--------------------------------------------- ---

9. (C) Corruption is prevalent at all levels of Moroccan
society and the military is also plagued by it, particularly
at the highest levels. This may partly reflect a grand
bargain struck by King Hassan II following at least two
nearly successful coups in the 1970's: remain loyal, and you
can profit. (Those whose loyalty was in question were
subject to sometimes decades of harsh imprisonment.)
Credible reports indicate that Lt Gen Benanni is using his
position as the Commander of the Southern Sector to skim
money from military contracts and influence business
decisions. A widely believed rumor has it that he owns large
parts of the fisheries in Western Sahara. Benanni, like many
senior military officers, has a lavish family home that was
likely built with money gleaned from bribes. Leadership
positions in regional sectors are a significant source of
extralegal income for military leaders. There are even
reports of students at Morocco's military academy paying
money to increase their class standings in order to obtain
positions in lucrative military postings. Command in the
southern sector, i.e., Western Sahara, given the predominance
of military activity there, is considered to be the most
lucrative of the sectors in this regard. Because command in
the southern sector is also considered critical to high level
advancement in the FAR, positions there are highly sought
after. Consequently, positions in this sector are often
jealously "guarded" by a number of influential families in
the military. The GOM seems to be looking for ways to stop
corruption, especially among the formative military ranks of
Colonel and below, but not much is being done to stop the
corruption in the general officer ranks.

-------------------------------------------
Retiring High Level Officers Also a Problem
-------------------------------------------

10. (C) Senior officers refusing to retire to allow younger
officers to move up the ranks has become a significant
problem for the FAR. Officers nearing the mandatory
retirement age do not want to retire since this would mean
relinquishing bribes, money-skimming, and some related
sources of income. Even for those officers not &on the
take,8 giving up government positions and paychecks is
economically difficult for a sustained retirement. This
"gerontocracy" problem, coupled with the King's notorious
micro-management of the military has had a negative impact on
the morale of mid-level military leaders.

--------------------------------------------- ------
Radicalization: Under Control But Lingering Menace
--------------------------------------------- ------

11. (C) Though now viewed as a minor problem, reporting
suggests that small numbers of FAR soldiers remains
susceptible to Islamic radicalization. The GOM first
encountered this problem following the 2003 Casablanca
bombings when investigators identified military members as
co-conspirators. Following the bombings, the FAR undertook
steps to identify extremists and implement preventative
measures, such as closing prayer halls on military bases, to
address the problem. Subsequently, Morocco,s internal
security services have identified and apprehended several
military and gendarmerie personnel in other terrorist cells,
some of whom had stolen weapons from their bases for
terrorism. Acknowledging this threat in a speech to the
armed forces in May 2008, the King stated his desire to
"immunize" the armed forces from the threat of radicalization
and to promote the values of tolerance and moderation in the
ranks. During this same time frame the military forced 30
officers to retire early, allegedly because they were deemed
potentially radical and hostile to the Government.
Subsequently, the FAR removed all mosques from army bases and
deployed military counterintelligence, i.e., 5th Bureau,
undercover officers to monitor local "off-post" mosques for
potentially radical activities. These officers refer cases
to the Gendarmerie if criminal charges can be pursued.

---------------
Winds of Change
---------------

12. (C) Since the 1970's the military itself has been
perceived as the greatest threat to the throne and internal
security in Morocco, not surprising given Morocco's own
history and the broader context of the coup-ridden Middle
East and Africa. Of late, however, there is a general

perception that the relationship between the Palace and the
FAR is beginning to change to one of greater trust. The
King's growing confidence is partly signaled by a recent
significant increase in military spending, particularly for
modern hardware, although this is primarily a function of the
GOM's perceived threat from Algeria and the fact that it is
cost prohibitive at a certain point to maintain older
military equipment. The GOM increased the military's
operating budget to more than USD 2 billion in 2007,
significantly more than in previous years. Likewise, the FAR
is undergoing a significant modernization process, paying
over USD 2 billion for 24 F-16 aircraft and over USD 300
million for T-6 training aircraft from the U.S. The GOM has
commercially financed these transactions, thus far, but the
upfront payments have come from the treasury, which has also
committed to cover monthly payments. The King recently
allowed armed military flights north of Ben Guerir (located
approximately 200 kilometers south of Rabat), an act not
permitted in the past due to the King,s desire to keep the
military far away from the Palace in Rabat. The GOM is also
looking to make significant purchases of M-1 Abrams battle
tanks in the future.

--------------------------------
U.S.-Moroccan Military Relations
Strong but Could Be Better
--------------------------------

13. (C) In general, the U.S. and Morocco share a robust
military relationship with prospects for even closer ties in
the future. The health of the relationship is evidenced by
increased U.S.-Moroccan military training exercises and the
aforementioned military sales. Morocco has also increased
its activities under a partnership arrangement with the Utah
National Guard, which regularly deploys to Morocco to conduct
joint training and humanitarian relief operations. We have
submitted draft proposed language for the Moroccans to
consider for an Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement
(ACSA) and a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), and have
received comments on the ACSA draft from the GOM. In the
future, the Embassy hopes to see improvements in the FAR's
information sharing and accessibility to military units and
facilities with our Defense Attache Office. Although the FAR
regularly dialogues with our attaches, quality information is
lacking. The FAR also does not recognize the Embassy Attache
circle, an organization of Military Attaches from various
countries residing in Morocco who elect a president to
discuss issues of collective concern with the FAR. It is
apparent that the Palace continues to tightly control the
FAR's interactions U.S. and other foreign governments.

---------------------------
AFRICOM Viewed with Caution
---------------------------

14. (C) Previous interactions with GOM officials indicate
that military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing a
headquarters element in Morocco. However, Morocco has
offered to send a military liaison officer to the AFRICOM
headquarters in Germany and has offered to assist U.S.-led
efforts engaging with African countries. Morocco has also
approached AFRICOM representatives to solicit AFRICOM support
in providing chemicals needed for their cloud-seeding
operations in Senegal and providing logistics to assist with
a proposed locust control program.

-------
COMMENT
-------

15. (C) The Mission is optimistic that the U.S.-Moroccan
military relationship will continue to improve, but there are
potential speed bumps in future. We anticipate that
cooperative joint training exercises will continue to occur
at a robust pace, although the vast majority of this activity
will likely take place in Morocco because of continued
restrictions on the travel of FAR personnel. While we
anticipate that the Palace will continue to modernize the
military, with the notable possible acquisition of M-1 Abrams
tanks, we are increasingly concerned that Morocco, not used
to the high operating costs of these high end items (and
other budgetary pressures) may make it increasingly difficult
for the Moroccans to make payments on purchases. If payments
become a problem for the GOM, this could sour relations
temporarily. While we believe that there are some signs of
the King's increased confidence in the FAR, we believe that
the monarchy still calculates that the military represents
the biggest potential threat to the crown. FAR officers
will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making

input and restricted from engaging in detailed discussions
about Moroccan military strength and intentions with foreign
military officers, including our attaches.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
No

_________________
“Once you have tasted flight, you will forever walk the earth with your eyes turned skyward, for there you have been, and there you will always long to return.”
― Leonardo da Vinci

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 1:26

Si ceux ci sont les rapports que l'US embassy remet a Washington alors je comprend mieux certaines choses, mais ce que m'a vraiment schoke' c'est:
Citation :
Previous interactions with GOM officials indicate that military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing a headquarters element in Morocco.
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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 1:52

Il vaudrait mieux pour nous qu'ils s'installe en Algérie pour garder un œil sur eux....
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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 1:56

Ils sont deja la bas.
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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 2:04

C'est pas avec une station d'écoute qu'il pourront agir rapidement sur le terrain, il faut des moyens sur place...Je parlais d'Africom !
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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 2:11

Moi, c'est plutôt ce passage qui m'a choqué :
Citation :
The force in Western Sahara -- a landmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- is
considered to be stretched thin with a reported estimated operational readiness rate of just 40 percent.
Neutral

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 8:56

Citation :
WikiLeaks : “La Russie est un état mafieux” prévient l’Espagne

« La Russie utilise ses mafias pour vendre des armes aux Kurdes et déstabiliser la Turquie » : voilà encore un câble diplomatique qui ne va pas faire plaisir ni à l’Espagne (d’où vient la citation), ni aux Russes, ni aux Turcs…

C’est le juge espagnol Jose Gonzalez qui rapporte aux autorités américaine son sentiment sur la Russie… « C’est un état mafieux ou l’on ne peut pas différencier ce que fait le gouvernement de ce que font les groupes du crime organisé. »

Gonzalez, qui a enquêté sur le crime organisé russe en Espagne pendant une décennie, a également affirmé que le dissident russe Alexandre Litvinenko, avait bien été empoisonné par « l’Etat Russe à travers sa branche du crime organisé ».

Le câble diplomatique envoyé en février 2010 depuis l’ambassade américaine de Madrid, prétend que « certains partis politiques en Russie fonctionnent main dans la main avec le crime organisé (…) Le Parti libéral-démocrate, ou LDP, a été créé par le KGB et son successeur, le SVR, et abrite de nombreux grands criminels ».

Le câble suggère ensuite que les autorités russes ont utilisé la mafia pour mener des opérations « qu’un Etat ne peux pas mener en tant que gouvernement », comme « des ventes d’armes aux kurdes ».

« Chaque personne qui tente de lutter contre le pouvoir ou le FSB est mis sous les barreaux, racketté ou tué » explique le juge espagnol.

Loin d’être un problème localisé, Gonzalez affirme également penser que la mafia exerce son influence sur le Bélarus et la Tchétchénie et a un « contrôle énorme » sur des éléments essentiels de l’économie mondiale, y compris l’aluminium.

Jssnews.com

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 8:58

Samyadams a écrit:
Moi, c'est plutôt ce passage qui m'a choqué :
Citation :
The force in Western Sahara -- a landmass roughly two thirds the size of California -- is
considered to be stretched thin with a reported estimated operational readiness rate of just 40 percent.
Neutral

Cessez-le feu oblige...

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 9:51

ils ramassent des infos que chaque serveur de café repete a longueur de journée,franchement si c´est ca la diplomatie US,si inefficiente et banale,je comprends mieux pourquoi l´USA perd de vitesse au detriment de la Chine Cool
enfin,j´apprecie que nos militaires ne parlent pas a eux,ils ne leur font pas de confiance,j´aurai cru que tout le monde l´ouvre mais la ca m´enchante.

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 10:31

Yakuza a écrit:
ils ramassent des infos que chaque serveur de café repete a longueur de journée,franchement si c´est ca la diplomatie US,si inefficiente et banale,je comprends mieux pourquoi l´USA perd de vitesse au detriment de la Chine Cool
enfin,j´apprecie que nos militaires ne parlent pas a eux,ils ne leur font pas de confiance,j´aurai cru que tout le monde l´ouvre mais la ca m´enchante.

ils seraient passé sur le forum, il aurait appri plus de chose Rolling Eyes

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 10:44

Citation :
Morocco does
not consider the POLISARIO -- the ethnically Sahrawi
resistance based in Tindouf, Algeria, seeking to make the
Western Sahara an independent state -- to be a conventional
military threat.

Voila pour ceux qui surestimaient le polisario d'un point de vue militaire.

Citation :
we do not believe that
Algeria poses an imminent conventional military threat to
Morocco. Nonetheless, the FAR has contingency plans and
"wargames" in training exercises for a possible Algerian
attack,
but the FAR does not have troops deployed along the
border. Instead, the FAR remains stationed in garrisons,
hundreds of kilometers away from the border
, from which they
could deploy in the unlikely event of an Algerian incursion
into Morocco.

1) Les FAR ne se font aucune illusion sur l'ennemie réel.

2) La constructions des caserne permettra le déploiement de troupe plus proche de la frontière

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 12:26

Alloudi a écrit:


ils seraient passé sur le forum, il aurait appri plus de chose Rolling Eyes

si quelqu'un avait ramené "ces informations de café" sur ce forum , il aurait été dégagé par Yakuza ou par Fremo Very Happy ..

avec comme un commentaire comme celui-là "post effacé, pas de rumeurs ou d'infios de café ici !!!"
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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 15:00

Citation :
While we
anticipate that the Palace will continue to modernize the
military, with the notable possible acquisition of M-1 Abrams
tanks
, we are increasingly concerned that Morocco, not used
to the high operating costs of these high end items (and
other budgetary pressures) may make it increasingly difficult
for the Moroccans to make payments on purchases
. If payments
become a problem for the GOM, this could sour relations
temporarily. While we believe that there are some signs of
the King's increased confidence in the FAR, we believe that
the monarchy still calculates that the military represents
the biggest potential threat to the crown. FAR officers
will, therefore, continue to be distanced from policy making

+ d'info sur le dossier "Abrams"...en fin!!! mais a ce que je vois, on serai plutot ·pauvres· pour le mantien de cets joujous... pas ca
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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 15:06

Tabrisius a écrit:

+ d'info sur le dossier "Abrams"...en fin!!! mais a ce que je vois, on serai plutot ·pauvres· pour le mantien de cets joujous...

Ce serait la Turbine et le blindage en uranium qui poseraient le plus de soucis a l'entretient.

Maintenir 200 Abrams, c'est aussi cher que de maintenir 100 hélicoptères. En plus que les turbines prennent du sable et de la poussière et que les lames se cassent. Wink

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 16:28

Le 04/01/2010 Depuis Rabat:

Citation :
Excerpt from document
(S) Summary: General Ward of Africa Command visited Rabat on December 30 to sign the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and continued military cooperation. During meetings with Inspector General Bennani and other Moroccan general officers, General Ward and the Ambassador requested overflight clearance for the P-3 (Reftel);


Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXRO0327
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0005/01 0041658
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 041658Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1017
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO PRIORITY 0136
RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY PRIORITY 0015
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3857
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0456
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 0034
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000005
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT, PM, AF/W AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/04/2030
TAGS: MARR, PTER, MOPS, PREL, SNAR, GV, MO
SUBJECT: GEN. WARD SIGNS CISMOA; DISCUSSES AQIM, ACSA,
GUINEA, NARCOTICS AND FUTURE COOPERATION
REF: STATE 130969 (NOTAL)
RABAT 00000005 001.2 OF 003
1. (S) Summary: General Ward of Africa Command visited Rabat on December 30 to sign the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and continued military cooperation. During meetings with Inspector General Bennani and other Moroccan general officers, General Ward and the Ambassador requested overflight clearance for the P-3 (Reftel); asked for an assessment of the threat posed by AQIM; urged Morocco to keep Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara in Morocco a long time; and said he looked forward to returning to sign the ACSA.
General Bennani and his senior staff reacted positively to the overflight request and said they would examine it in more detail. They thought Guinean Defense Minister Konate was
weak, and, unlike other senior Moroccan officials, they downplayed the importance of narcotics transiting Morocco.
End Summary.
2. (C/NF) Commander, U.S. Africa Command, General William E. Ward visited Rabat on December 30, 2009 to meet with Inspector General of the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces (CHOD)
General de Corps d,Armee Abdelaziz Bennani for the purpose of signing the Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) between the U.S. and
Moroccan militaries. Accompanied by Africa Command Foreign Policy Advisor Dr. Raymond Brown, General Ward and his party met with the Ambassador and other members of the country team.
General Ward reinforced the strong relationship between the U.S. and Moroccan militaries and predicted the agreement would lead to continued and expanded cooperation
between the two nations in the future.
--------------------------------------------- ---
Communications Interoperability and Security MOA
--------------------------------------------- ---
3. (SBU) General Ward expressed satisfaction with his visit to Morocco, following recent visits to Algeria, Libya and Mali and serving to show equality in dealing with the
militaries of a region that does not tend toward regional cooperation. He further expressed admiration and satisfaction with the mission,s work supporting U.S. Africa Command,s goals and objectives, particularly in the areas of security cooperation, international development and economic stimulation. He again explained the purpose of his command as orchestrating security activity on the continent in support of national policy and objectives, and declared his support for all other agencies, work in Africa.
4. (C/NF) At the signing ceremony, General Bennani warmly welcomed General Ward,s visit both professionally and personally, expressing his esteem for the vision and progress
with U.S. Africa Command. He emphasized that King Mohammed VI had designated him to sign the CISMOA on behalf of Morocco, with the understanding that the agreement was
integral to the full utilization of the F-16 by the Moroccan Royal Air Force, but also with a vision to future cooperation for integration of technologies and weapons systems for the
navy and army. He further reiterated previous statements that the King wished the Moroccan Royal Armed Forces to be on par with American forces in order to permit full integration and interoperability should the commanders-in-chief of both countries decide to employ their forces in a coalition or combined operation.
5. (C/NF) General Ward returned the warm greetings and stated that the agreement was both a symbol of the relationship between the two countries and signal of their commitment to mutual security. He affirmed that the agreement would have broad application across the entirety of the Moroccan military, and would open doors to future technologies and cooperation not yet envisioned in mutually beneficial ways to guarantee stability and peace.
6. (C/NF) General Ward explained that teams would visit Morocco in January and February to discuss implementation of the CISMOA and implementation meetings would take place three
times per year thereafter. General Ward said that he looked forward to returning to Morocco to sign the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) as soon as it has received
the necessary clearances from the Department of Defense, and RABAT 00000005 002.2 OF 003
General Bennani responded that he looked forward to General Ward,s next visit and to his participation in the next signing ceremony.
----
AQIM
----
7. (S) Turning to regional issues, General Ward asked General Bennani how he saw the regional threat from Al Qu,aida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and
narcotics traffickers. Bennani responded that narcotics were not making their way into Morocco. However, AQIM posed a serious threat to countries like Mauritania and Mali that
could not counter the terrorists. General Bennani explained that he was intimately familiar with Mauritania,s geography and topography and that the country was not capable of
controlling its territory. Brigadier General Abdellah Hamdoun, the Director of Military Intelligence, offered that Mali lacked the means to counter AQIM. General Ward then
briefed General Bennani, Air Force Commander Major General Ahmed Boutaleb and other general officers on the U.S. plan to gather intelligence about AQIM in Mali and Mauritania and
requested overflight clearance for a U.S. EP-3 aircraft.
General Bennani responded positively, saying it was important to box in AQIM. General Boutaleb added that the Air Force and the General Staff would study the overflight request and respond quickly.
------
Guinea
------
8. (S) General Ward next noted that Morocco was hosting some important guests. General Bennani asked if he was referring to President Sarkozy or former President Chirac. General
Ward replied he was referring to Guinean junta leader Dadis Camara and Guinean Minister of National Defense Sekouba Konate, asking about their conditions. Surprisingly, Bennani
had no information about either and did not even know that General Konate was in Morocco )- although he had attended the Moroccan military academy and had strong ties to Moroccan leaders. General Ward strongly urged that Morocco keep Dadis Camara as long as possible. General Bennani noted that Camara was in Morocco on humanitarian terms, and responded only that many African leaders come to the Mohammed V Military Hospital in Rabat for free medical care. General Hamdoun suggested that Konate was weak and might not be fit to serve as head of state for an extended period.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (C) General Bennani, who can be very prickly, appeared upbeat throughout the ceremony and related discussions. The CISMOA brings a level of U.S. scrutiny and procedure to the
control and dissemination of the cryptographic and keying material associated with U.S. weapons systems that can appear intrusive to a sovereign nation. However, the General seemed thoughtful as he digested the discussion of the upcoming implementation and programmatic activities that would take place in the coming months and years. He and the rest of the senior military leadership seemed totally uninformed about patients at the military hospital. Moreover, General Bennani,s comments about narcotics transiting Morocco were
at odds with comments from key civilian leaders who express significant concern about this matter.
10. (C) In sum, General Ward,s visit accomplished the necessary act of signing the document integral to full and timely implementation of the F-16 program in Morocco, and
reinforced the already strong relationship between the U.S. and Moroccan militaries. The upcoming year will see a full slate of security cooperation activities between the two
militaries, building to the delivery of the first F-16 in July 2011. End Comment.
11. (U) General Ward has cleared this message.
12. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
RABAT 00000005 003.2 OF 003
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
KAPLAN

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 16:38

Le 31/12/2009 depuis Rabat:

Citation :
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Guinean DCM Fode Camara (strictly protect; no relation to Dadis Camara) told PolOffs on December 30 that despite Dadis Camara's apparent desire to depart Morocco (Ref A), he is in no condition to travel and will not be able to resume control of the country.


Full Document
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VZCZCXRO9054
OO RUEHTRO
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ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 311455Z DEC 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1009
INFO RUEHRY/AMEMBASSY CONAKRY IMMEDIATE 0013
RUEHOU/AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU IMMEDIATE 0593
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RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 0987
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RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY PRIORITY 1181
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0454
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS PRIORITY 0055
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 001018
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR AF, AF/W, NEA, NEA/MAG, AND INR/AA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2020
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, PREL, PINR, GV, MO
SUBJECT: GUINEA LATEST: DADIS AND BEYOND?
REF: A. RABAT 1009
B. RABAT 0988
RABAT 00001018 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4(b) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: Guinean DCM Fode Camara (strictly protect; no relation to Dadis Camara) told PolOffs on December 30 that despite Dadis Camara's apparent desire to
depart Morocco (Ref A), he is in no condition to travel and will not be able to resume control of the country. Minister of National Defense Sekouba Konate and an assistant, Mr. Bah,
along with Minister of Communications Idrissa Cherif have been in Rabat to visit Dadis, but Konate planned to return to Guinea by December 31, possibly to present to the Guinean
people a case for his assumption of power in place of Dadis.
The next ten days would be telling and potentially chaotic for the country, according to Fode Camara, but with the assistance of the international community, Konate should be
able to control the army and avert violence that could have regional implications. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) Guinean DCM Fode Camara told PolOffs on December 30 that Dadis Camara was in no condition to travel and would not be able to control Guinea again. Fode said that Dadis
Camara still had a bullet in his head, suffered from impaired vision and speech, and was not fully aware of his surroundings. Fode Camara himself admitted that he had not seen Dadis; according to him only Konate and Bah were allowed into his room. Regarding earlier news reports that Dadis was preparing to speak to the Guinean people, Fode Camara said
that if Dadis could speak to the media, he certainly would have by now. Evidently Dadis also suffered from heart problems unrelated to the gunshot wounds.
3. (S/NF) Konate evidently was not in the best of health, either, and sought medical consultation while here in Rabat.
Reportedly a heavy drinker, Konate suffered from liver problems consistent with his intake of large amounts of alcohol. On December 30, senior Moroccan military officials separately questioned Konate's fitness to lead, calling him weak.
4. (S/NF) For Fode Camara, Konate's travel to Rabat allowed him to return to Guinea and report on the basis of his first-hand knowledge that Dadis was unable to continue in his
role as leader of Guinea, paving the way for Konate to assume power for a transitional period. Were Konate to attempt to take control without having undertaken the trip to Rabat to see Dadis, he would have been perceived as a traitor to Dadis and have no legitimacy before the Guinean people and army.
Konate would then have Cherif and Claude Pivi, another CNDD leader, arrested, Fode Camara said.
5. (S/NF) Fode Camara went on to say that Cherif was behind demonstrations being planned for Conakry, while Pivi, who was from the same ethnic group as Dadis, might organize supporters on an ethnic basis and incite clashes with other groups. Given that ethnic and national boundaries are not coterminous, this could affect neighboring countries and
plunge the entire region into chaos (Ref B), asserted Fode Camara. With the help of the United States and European countries, Konate would be able to take power and control the
army, which lacked discipline and had too many crooks and militias, but Fode Camara did not specify what sort of assistance from the international community would be
necessary.
6. (S/NF) Comment: Fode Camara urged intervention, both to keep Dadis out of Guinea and to support an effort by Konate to take power in the country, in order to forestall
devastating ethnic violence. His argument that Dadis would RABAT 00001018 002.2 OF 002
have made a public statement by now if he could have is compelling, while his comment that Konate would have other CNDD leaders arrested suggests that the fate of Guinea does
not depend on Dadis alone. Dadis has amassed militias and enjoys some popular support (Ref B), and for Fode his return would undoubtedly lead to violence and unrest. His continued
absence, however, might not preclude it. End Comment.
7. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
KAPLAN

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 16:45

Le 10/11/2009 Rabat:
Citation :
Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: The United States and Morocco maintain several security dialogues. Bilateral engagement includes discussions of border control and related issues,
military-to-military consultations, and a State Partnership Program with the Utah National Guard.


Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0904/01 3141416
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 101416Z NOV 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0817
INFO RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
Content
S E C R E T RABAT 000904
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR PM - CPETRONE AND NEA/RA - SSOUCEK
E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2019
TAGS: MARR, PREL, MASS, MO
SUBJECT: U.S.-MOROCCO SECURITY DIALOGUES
REF: STATE 112900
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (c).
1. (S/NF) Summary: The United States and Morocco maintain several security dialogues. Bilateral engagement includes discussions of border control and related issues, military-to-military consultations, and a State Partnership Program with the Utah National Guard. In addition to the formal Defense Consultative Committee, we also have a formal defense intelligence-sharing agreement. These dialogues support U.S. foreign policy goals in Morocco and help ensure the country is a stable ally in the region. End summary.
----------------------------------------
Security Dialogue with Interior Ministry
----------------------------------------
2. (SBU) In early October, a multi-agency U.S. engagement team met with a Ministry of Interior delegation led by the Assistant Director of Migration and Border Security for two
days of frank, wide-ranging discussions. The dialogue addressed trafficking in persons, migration, counterterrorism, drug trafficking/counternarcotics, regional threats, human rights, and assistance/development efforts.
Established by informal agreement to collaborate, the talks marked the beginning of what is expected to become a regular, ongoing dialogue on these crucial issues, with the next
meeting anticipated in late November.
------------------------------
Defense Consultative Committee
------------------------------
3. (C) Morocco and the United States have maintained formal military-to-military discussions for many years under the auspices of a bilateral Defense Consultative Committee (DCC).
Discussions take place every 18 months; the next iteration is scheduled to be held December 3-4 in Washington, DC. In some ways pro forma, both sides share an interest in making
these consultations more ubstantive and using them to advance negotiations on a status of forces agreement (SOFA) and other agreements.
------------------------------
Intelligence Sharing and TSCTP
------------------------------
4. (S/NF) The U.S. and Morocco also maintain a long-standing military intelligence sharing agreement. Renewed every five years, the agreement is accompanied by annual consultations in Morocco and/or the U.S. about how to improve intelligence sharing. Moreover, the Directors of Military Intelligence meet at least annually in the context of the Trans-Saharan Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP).
---------------------------
Financial Management Review
---------------------------
5. (SBU) Hosted by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency and the Moroccan Ministry for the Administration of National Defense, senior staff meet annually to review fiscal aspects
of foreign military sales/foreign military financing (FMS/FMF). There is no formal agreement, but the review is part of the FMS/FMF process. The most recent Financial Management Review was held in June.
---------------------------------
Theater Security Cooperation Plan
---------------------------------
6. (SBU) In the context of the Theater Security Cooperation Plan (TSCP) and under the auspices of Africa Command, senior field grade officers from the Moroccan military's operations directorate and AFRICOM officials hold an annual bilateral planning conference to review strategic plans and policies.
Predating the establishment of Africa Command, the TSCP and associated conference are long-standing vehicles that govern the Office of Security Cooperation's engagement in Morocco.
-------------------------
State Partnership Program
-------------------------
7. (U) The National Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) links Utah with Morocco to promote and enhance bilateral relations. The partnership began in 2004 and includes
military-military, military-civilian, and civilian-civilian engagement, with two annual planning conferences each year.
Utah National Guard Adjutant General Tarbet visits annually during unit-level exchange exercises and holds meetings with Moroccan military officials. His next visit is scheduled for
March 2010.
-----------------------------------------
Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative
-----------------------------------------
8. (SBU) The GOM has been invited formally to participate in the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), through which the U.S. intends to provide training and other support so the Moroccan military can sustain and continue to develop its peacekeeping operations capacity. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs will coordinate Morocco's GPOI request, and the Mission maintains regular dialogue with MFA officials in working to finalize the program.
-------
Comment
-------
9. (SBU) Morocco has been an exemplary partner in the struggle against terrorism, and our military and political cooperation is growing. Morocco serves as a regional model for economic and political reform, and continued U.S. political/military assistance and engagement will help
advance the positive changes underway and ensure the country remains a stable ally and a leader in the North Africa region. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Kaplan

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 16:55

Le 24/06/2009 Rabat:

Citation :

Excerpt from document
(C) Summary and Introduction: In June 23 conversations with Charge mostly devoted to Western Sahara and Algeria (septel), Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and external intelligence (DGED) chief Mansouri underscored the GOM,s commitment to work with the USG on regional issues.


Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
O 241821Z JUN 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 0307
INFO ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
MAGHREB COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY DAKAR IMMEDIATE
Content
S E C R E T RABAT 000540
NOFORN
STATE FOR NEA, NEA/IPA, AF/W AND NEA/MAG
STATE ALSO FOR SPECIAL ENVOY MITCHELL
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2019
TAGS: PREL, PTER, PINR, KPAL, IS, MU, IR, MO
SUBJECT: FM AND DGED CHIEF DISCUSS MIDDLE EAST AND OTHER
REGIONAL ISSUES
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons. 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary and Introduction: In June 23 conversations with Charge mostly devoted to Western Sahara and Algeria (septel), Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri and external intelligence (DGED) chief Mansouri underscored the GOM,s commitment to work with the USG on regional issues.
Fassi Fihri said he was leaving that night for the Arab League ministerial in Cairo and going on to the G8 Trieste meeting with the Quartet. He regretted the Secretary's surgery would
keep her from Trieste but hoped he could see Senator Mitchell and other members of the USDEL there. Mansouri praised the President,s Cairo speech and shared his perspectives on
recent developments in Mauritania and Iran. End Summary.
---------------------------------------------
Foreign Minister Focuses on Middle East Peace
---------------------------------------------
2. (C) Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb Fassi Fihri said the thought Netanyahu's acceptance of Palestinian statehood was at least &something,8 but so
caveated on Jerusalem, demilitarization, and settlements as to be in practice useless. It was, however, at least a start and he confirmed that Morocco was willing to continue its
quiet discussions with the GOI. The Israelis had not been able to make their scheduled U/S-level meeting with MFA Secretary General Amrani, but the side meeting had been rescheduled for later in the week in Barcelona. Fassi Fihri also committed that Morocco would continue to engage publicly with Israel through the UPM (Sarkozy's Mediterranean Union)
and other Mediterranean mechanisms.
--------------------------------------------- ----
Mansouri Also Has Mauritania and Iran on His Mind
--------------------------------------------- ----
3. (C) In a separate conversation with Charge that evening, Director General for Studies and Documentation (DGED or external intelligence chief) and de facto national security
adviser Mohamed Yassine Mansouri, speaking, &as a Muslim and Moroccan,8 praised the President,s speech in Cairo as &hope for all mankind.8 He pledged continued close
continuation and cooperation on issues in the region.
4. (S/NF) On Mauritania, citing the murder that day of an Amcit teacher, he underscored the sensitivity of the security situation. This was why it was not feasible to dissolve the
state council, whose mandate now was strictly security, with all matters related to the upcoming elections and the peace process in the hands of the civil authorities. He blamed
Col. Vall for stirring up the trouble that caused the current hiccup in the reconciliation process, but believed Senegal and other partners could manage to help the Mauritanians to
resolve it.
5. (S/NF) On Iran, Mansouri, citing no particular source, expected imminently a very severe crackdown on the opposition. Such immutable hard-line attitudes in the Iranian regime had contributed to Morocco's decision to sever relations, he declared. Mansouri also warned that the U.S. should not focus on the potential ouster of the supreme leader but rather on the necessity of removing President Ahmadinejad. Rolling Eyes
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 17:10

Le 06/08/2009 Rabat:

Citation :

Excerpt from document
(C) Summary: On July 28, a Sale court sentenced Moroccan-Belgian Abdelkader Belleraj to life in prison (instead of the death penalty requested by prosecutors) for running an international terrorist network. The 34 other defendants on trial with Belleraj received sentences ranging from one to 30 years.


Full Document
ClassificationSECRET//NOFORN Header
VZCZCXYZ0002
PP RUEHWEB
DE RUEHRB #0679/01 2181914
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 061914Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0538
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS 3210
RUEHLE/AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG 0115
Content
S E C R E T RABAT 000679
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT, NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/06/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PTER, KISL, MO
SUBJECT: LANDMARK TERRORISM CASE RAISES HUMAN RIGHTS
QUESTIONS
REF: A. 08 RABAT 0311 (NOTAL)
B. 08 RABAT 0178 (NOTAL)
C. 08 RABAT 0222 (NOTAL)
D. RABAT 0543 (NOTAL)
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
1. (C) Summary: On July 28, a Sale court sentenced Moroccan-Belgian Abdelkader Belleraj to life in prison (instead of the death penalty requested by prosecutors) for running an international terrorist network. The 34 other defendants on trial with Belleraj received sentences ranging from one to 30 years. While Belleraj and some of his associates undoubtedly had links to terrorism, the link is much less clear for six Islamist politicians, who received sentences ranging from two to 25 years. These six politicians have come to be known in the public and the press as "political detainees" because of allegations that they were arrested for their political affiliation rather than any real connection to terrorist acts. Human rights activists monitoring this case have condemned the trial and the verdict. A family member of one of the politicians sentenced to 20 years called the trial a "farce" and wondered, in the context of celebrations of King Mohammed VI's ten years of rule, "How can this be possible in the new Morocco?" End
Summary.
----------
Background
----------
2. (C) In February 2008, Minister of the Interior Chakib Benmoussa publicly announced the dismantling of a dangerous terrorist network, masterminded by Moroccan-Belgian
Abdelkader Belleraj. Belleraj was arrested for possessing an arsenal of firearms, allegedly to be used to assassinate Moroccan ministers, members of the military, and Jewish citizens. He is suspected of having committed at least six assassinations in Europe, as well as conducting arms trafficking, money laundering, robberies and other crimes (Ref A). The 34 other men arrested in connection with the network were charged with crimes such as "disturbing the
national security of the State" and "conspiracy to plot and carry out terrorist acts," the highest crimes under Moroccan terrorism laws.
-------------------
The Six Politicians
-------------------
3. (C) While there is little doubt that Belleraj and some of his associates have committed grave crimes, the public and media have labeled six of the defendants "political
detainees" because of allegations that they were arrested for their political affiliation rather than for having any real connection to terrorist actions or intentions. While the Embassy and other diplomatic missions do not dispute the prima facie threat from Belleraj, who has a long history of relations with Islamic radicals from Ayatollah Khomeini to Osama bin Laden, there appears to be little evidence that the six politicians had any involvement in planning terrorist
acts. Nevertheless, the GOM persisted in trying all of the accused together under the anti-terrorism laws enacted after the May 2003 suicide attacks in Casablanca, dismissing
repeated attempts by lawyers to separate the trials of the six from the larger group. As a result, the politicians were charged, like the other members of the group, with involvement in terrorist activity, including plotting against the regime, being a member of an armed group with the objective of destabilizing the nation, and threatening public safety -- among the most severe crimes under Morocco's terrorism laws.
4. (U) Five of the politicians affiliated with Islamist-inspired political parties at the time of their arrest were sentenced to 20 and 25 years in prison.
Maelainin Laabadla, a Sahrawi member of the national council of the Islamist-inspired Party of Justice and Development (PJD), headed the PJD's commission on the Western Sahara;
Mustafa Moatassim served as Secretary General of the Civilized Alternative (Al Badil Al Hadari), a small, Islamist-inspired political party which was disbanded two days after his arrest; Mohamed Marouani and Amine Regala had been, respectively, the Secretary General and party spokesperson of the unauthorized party of the Nation (Al Oumma), an Islamist organization that had been seeking party status; and Abdelhafid Sriti worked as a television
correspondent for Hezbollah's Al Manar.
5. (SBU) The sixth politician, Hamid Najibi, a member of the national council of the Unified Socialist Party (PSU), and the only politician not affiliated with an Islamist party,
received a suspended sentence of two years. International reaction to the heavy sentences of the politicians has been mostly shock, especially given the skepticism increasingly voiced by the press and public regarding the case.
---------------------------
Political Links to Belleraj
---------------------------
6. (C) In the early 1990's, under the reign of King Hassan II, at least four of the six politicians belonged to an organization called Islamic Choice, an Islamic cultural and
political organization. For ideological reasons, Islamic Choice eventually dissolved and then split into two smaller Islamist political parties, the Civilized Alternative and the Nation. According to Moroccan government officials, Belleraj and his co-conspirators hoped to use these parties as the foundation of a new political wing of their network, and then, under the guise of political activity, use them to destabilize Morocco (Ref B).
7. (C) At the time of the arrests, the Civilized Alternative had been formally recognized by the GOM, and, according to Sidi Ali Maelainin, the brother of Mr. Laabadla, had been
encouraged as an alternative to the Islamist-inspired PJD, until the terrorist network was uncovered. The Nation had applied for and was awaiting approval as a political
organization at the time of the arrests in February 2008.
Because it had not yet received an official refusal, it was on the verge of becoming a party by default, Maelainin said.
He speculated that the GOM opposed the recognition of the Nation because it could open the way for Sheik Yassine's Islamist Justice and Good Works Organization (al-Adl wa
al-Ihsan or AWI) to enter politics -- a move strongly opposed by the Palace.
--------------------
A Message to the PJD
--------------------
8. (C) Relatives of the politicians, and increasingly the press, suggest that the arrest of the six political defendants was designed to deter the proliferation of Islamist politicians and political parties, rather than terrorist acts. As reported, shortly after the arrests of
the six politicians, even the PJD acknowledged that the arrests may have been intended as a message to stay in line (Ref C). The PJD has denounced the verdicts against the politicians, suggesting that such punishments evoke the authoritarian reign of Hassan II and the &Years of Lead.8
9. (C) According to Abdelaziz Nouyidi, a prominent human rights attorney and member of the defense team, the arrest and trial of Islamist political figures was timed to send a clear message to the political parties in the lead up to the June 2009 local elections. "The Palace wanted to remind the Islamists to stay within the bounds established by the King,"
he said, continuing that an alliance between the PJD and the left would not be welcome. Nouyidi speculated that the inclusion among the defendants of Hamid Najibi of the Unified
Socialist Party signaled the Palace's displeasure at the prospect of such an alliance.
---------------------------
Evidence and Irregularities
---------------------------
10. (C) According to human rights NGOs, defense attorneys and European diplomats familiar with the case, the state's evidence against all 35 of the accused consisted of the defendants' statements to the police in which they implicate themselves and others, and two seizures of weapons which were allegedly intended to be used to conduct ssassinations and other terrorist acts. The defendants initially affirmed their statements before a preliminary judge, but then retracted them before the trial judge, saying they had been
obtained under duress or had been altered.
11. (S/NF) The judge's written decision on the case has not yet been made available, and it is, therefore, not clear what, if any, other evidence the GOM may have against the
accused. The Moroccan Government provided to the Regional Affairs Office photographs of the seized weapons which included guns, ammunition, silencers, and balaclavas.
Despite repeated requests, the GOM did not provide satisfactory evidence to the Mission of a connection between the politicians and the terrorist network. Daniel Bernard, Belgian Legal Advisor to the Government of Morocco, who has closely followed this case, speculated, "Maybe there is something behind the accusations" of the six politicians, but if so, the Moroccan Government has not divulged it to anyone.
12. (C) Calling the trial and prosecution of his brother "a farce," Sidi Ali Maelainin outlined for PolOff other irregularities in the case. The judge had repeatedly refused to allow the defense access to files, to call witnesses or to introduce evidence, he said, accusations confirmed by
Bernard. In addition, nearly all the defendants alleged that their statements had been altered by the police. The Charge raised these concerns in his June 24 meeting with Human
Rights Council Chairman Ahmed Herzenni, who acknowledged the irregularities and promised to review the trial following delivery of the verdict (Ref D).
-------------
No Fair Trial
-------------
13. (C) Calling the trial "pre-cooked," Johan Jacobs, Counselor at the Belgian Embassy, said there is "no doubt" the trial was unfair. Not a single person had been
acquitted, he observed, an unlikely outcome given the large number of defendants. He also questioned how an impartial judge could reach a verdict and determine sentences for 35 different individuals less than 12 hours after the closing

arguments. Shocked He told PolOff that some of the evidence used in the trial had been provided by Belgium and was written in French and Dutch. Even though the evidence provided by
Brussels was accurate and, in some cases damning, Jacobs wondered how the trial could be fair if neither the defense nor the prosecution could understand it. When the defense
requested to have the files translated into Arabic, the court ruled that only parts of the files could be translated, orally, during court proceedings. This is a peculiar way of honoring a defendant's right to know the evidence against him, he said, adding, "Some of these guys have real proof against them, but that does not change the fact that the trial was unfair." Sidi Ali Maelainin called the lack of a fair trial "frightening." In the context of national
celebration of the reforms initiated by King Mohammed VI over the last ten years, he wondered, "How can this be possible in the new Morocco?"
-------
Comment
-------
14. (C) The GOM,s heavy-handed approach taken by the GOM in this case illustrates Morocco's willingness to use its counterterrorism laws to marginalize Islamist-inspired
political activities. The nearly universal belief that the verdict of this trial was predetermined by the Ministry of the Interior -- a not unlikely scenario -- highlights the lack of trust many Moroccans have in the justice system.
Equally troubling for Morocco's governance reform outlook is the plausible prospect that at least six defendants were tried and convicted for political reasons unrelated to zealous counter-terrorism objectives. If true, this would represent a manipulation of the courts not only for security goals but also to affect legitimate political activity -- a step backward in the political and democratic progress the Kingdom has realized in the past decade. Although the GOM has made great progress in respecting human rights under King Mohammed VI, there is still room for improvement, particularly in respecting non-establishment viewpoints. End
Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 17:22

Le 09/06/2009 Rabat:
Citation :

Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: On May 26, CODEL Burr discussed the threat from violent Islamic extremists with Morocco,s external intelligence chief Mohamed Yassine Mansouri, the
Director General of Studies and Documentation (DGED). The discussion focused on Al Qaeda,s declining influence in Iraq; growing danger in Yemen, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan
and Pakistan; Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,s (AQIM,s) current posture; and Iran.


Full Document
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Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000479
NOFORN
SIPDIS
STATE FOR H, S/CT, NEA/RA AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2029
TAGS: OREP, PTER, PINS, PHUM, AG, IR, MR, MO, WI
SUBJECT: CODEL BURR HEARS ABOUT COUNTERTERRORISM, DEMOCRACY
PROMOTION, IRAN AND WESTERN SAHARA
RABAT 00000479 001.2 OF 002
Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b, c and d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: On May 26, CODEL Burr discussed the threat from violent Islamic extremists with Morocco,s external intelligence chief Mohamed Yassine Mansouri, the
Director General of Studies and Documentation (DGED). The discussion focused on Al Qaeda,s declining influence in Iraq; growing danger in Yemen, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan
and Pakistan; Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb,s (AQIM,s) current posture; and Iran. Mansouri opined that Mauritania,s stability was more important than democracy,
and he urged the USG to be more flexible. Mansouri again called for the return of the two Moroccans who remain at Guantanamo. The CODEL next called on Mustapha Mansouri (no
relation), President of the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Parliament. He also pressed the Senators on Western Sahara, mentioning the recent congressional letter to the
President and raising the specter of a vast, anarchic ungoverned space extending across the Sahara. Only Western Sahara, under Morocco,s control, was an exception. Senator
Burr seconded the importance of the U.S.-Moroccan relationship and assured Mansouri that he would be welcome on Capitol Hill. End Summary.
2. (S/NF) On May 26, Senators Richard Burr, Saxby Chambliss, Lindsey Graham and John Thune; Representative John Kline; staffers James Smythers and Jennifer Wagner; Charge and RAO Director met for two hours with Director General of Studies and Documentation (DGED) (external intelligence chief) and de facto national security advisor Mohammed Yassine Mansouri and his senior advisors. Senator Burr began by highlighting USG appreciation for the GOM,s exemplary cooperation and the number of terrorist and foreign fighter cells dismantled.
-----------
AQ and AQIM
-----------
3. (S/NF) Mansouri began his briefing by asserting that Al Qaeda (AQ) is losing influence in Iraq; yet Yemen, Somalia, Lebanon, Afghanistan and Pakistan represent growing dangers. Suspect
Mansouri then turned to AQIM, saying that it is active in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, Mauritania, Niger and Nigeria. He said the DGED estimates AQIM,s total strength
at 1,000 to 1,200 mostly Algerian fighters, with the number of foreign members growing. He estimated there are 35 to 40 Libyans. Mansouri opined that AQIM is involved in arms trafficking, narcotics smuggling and kidnapping.

--------------------------
Algeria and Western Sahara
--------------------------
4. (S/NF) Asked about Moroccan-Algerian cooperation to combat AQIM, Mansouri said, &We have a grave problem with Algeria.8 Morocco appreciated Secretaries Rice and Clinton,s efforts to improve relations, but the key would be resolving the Western Sahara issue. Mansouri wished Ambassador Christopher Ross, the UN Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, the best of luck.
----------
Mauritania
----------
5. (S/NF) Mansouri said that Morocco continued to be concerned about Mauritania,s stability. He estimated that AQIM had approximately 60 operatives in Mauritania.
Underscoring that respect for institutions is important, he said Morocco attached greater importance to Mauritania,s stability than to democracy there and urged the USG to show
greater flexibility. We noted that we believed it was possible to have both democracy and stability in Mauritania.
----
Iran
----
6. (S/NF) Asked about Morocco,s decision to sever ties with Iran, Mansouri explained that Morocco was uncomfortable with Iran,s support for Hezbollah and Hamas. However, it was Iran,s proselytizing and interference in Morocco,s internal
affairs that had resulted in the break
. He predicted that President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad would be re-elected. He warned that Iran could have a nuclear bomb within three to four years and that it was becoming more influential in Yemen,
Somalia and elsewhere in Africa. He urged the U.S. to be very cautious.

RABAT 00000479 002.2 OF 002
----------
Guantanamo
----------
7. (C) Mansouri took the opportunity to request again the return of the two Moroccans who remain in detention at Guantanamo.
----------------
On to Parliament
----------------
8. (C) From the DGED, the CODEL went to Parliament to meet with President of the Chamber of Deputies Mustapha Mansouri for an hour. Mansouri, accompanied only by staff,
underscored familiar points about the strong bilateral relationship. He focused on the Western Sahara, thanking the CODEL for the recent letter from 229 Members of Congress to
the President, urging U.S. support for Morocco,s autonomy proposal. Mansouri said the conflict was really a legacy of the Cold War and of Algeria,s continued attachment to
Eastern, socialist models. He feared that loss of the Western Sahara would open a vast, anarchic ungoverned space, with no real borders extending thousands of miles east from
the Atlantic. Only Western Sahara, under Morocco,s control, was an exception. Mansouri said self-determination could mean autonomy or integration but not independence.
9. (SBU) The discussion moved from Western Sahara to more give and take. In response to Mansouri,s request for greater cooperation between the Moroccan Parliament and the
U.S. Congress, Senator Burr invited President Mansouri to Washington. Senator Burr also expressed support for Ambassador Ross. Senator Graham and Senator Chambliss expressed their appreciation for Morocco,s cooperation on counterterrorism. Senator Thune congratulated Mansouri on strengthening the Moroccan Parliament, and he urged continued
efforts to develop checks and balances. Senator Graham applauded the growing role of women in Moroccan politics.
Representative Kline too highlighted the role of women and the 2004 Family Code. Mansouri responded that democracy requires an educated population.
10. (C) Comment: CODEL Burr learned a lot abou t Moroccan-U.S. cooperation in a short time, especially concerning counterterrorism and democracy promotion. They learned more about Western Sahara, and they clearly heard Director General Mansouri,s concerns about Iran and Mauritania. Three of the five Members of Congress had not visited Morocco previously, and Senator Burr had not been here in over 10 years. This time the Chamber President did not invite other legislators, which we will urge for future meetings. CODEL Burr did not have an opportunity to clear this cable. End Comment.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************
Jackson

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 17:35

Citation :

Le Palais Royal au sommet de la corruption au Maroc, d'après les États-Unis


L'influence et les intérêts commerciaux du roi [Mohamed VI] et de certains de ses conseillers" sont perceptibles "dans chaque grand projet immobilier au Maroc". Le conseiller commercial des Etats Unis, rattaché au Consulat américain à Casablanca, est arrivé à cette conclusion, en décembre de l'année dernière, après s'être réuni séparément avec des représentants du secteur ayant eu affaire, de près ou de loin, au palais royal.
Dans une note secrète du 11 décembre de l'année dernière le conseiller commercial signale le nom de ses sources et raconte avec toutes sortes de détails l'histoire d'un homme d'affaires qui, pour le compte d'un consortium international, souhaitait invertir 220 millions de dollars (162 millions d'euros) dans un projet immobilier. Pour ne pas porter préjudice aux sources du conseiller, EL PAÍS omet de donner les noms de ses interlocuteurs et des sociétés mentionnées dans la note américaine.
L'homme d'affaires obtint un permis de construire du gouverneur de la région où il voulait invertir, mais peu après le palais "l'encouragea vivement" à s'associer avec lui à travers une société appartenant à la famille royale. L'investisseur rejeta la proposition et dut supporter trois mois de paralysie du projet".
Au bout d'un moment la société appartenant au palais proposa alors à l'homme d'affaires de lui organiser une visite dans un pays du Golfe Persique ou il avait de nombreux contacts pour essayer d'encourager l'investissement étranger au Maroc. En échange de ce service il serait "le seul propriétaire" de son projet immobilier au Maroc. Il accepta la proposition.
Corruption
La délégation marocaine qui voyagea à ce riche pays du Golfe était dirigée par l'un des plus hauts cadres d'une des sociétés appartenant à la famille royale. Lors d'une réunion avec les investisseurs de la place le cadre marocain leur expliqua que seules trois personnes au Maroc étaient habilitées à prendre les décisions sur les grands investissements immobiliers: Fouad Ali el Himma, grand ami du souverain et leader du Parti Authenticité et Modernité (PAM) ; Mounir Majidi, secrétaire particulier de Mohamed VI, et le roi lui-même. "Parler avec quelqu'un d'autre est une perte de temps", leur dit-il. La PAM est le parti qui gagne les dernières élections municipales en juin 2009.
Après le retour de la délégation au Maroc, la société appartenant au palais reçu des instructions de ses propriétaires de mettre presque complètement en oeuvre l'accord conclu avec l'homme d'affaires qui souhaitait investir au Maroc. Elle ne lui demanda qu'une participation de 5% dans son projet. "Les principales institutions et les procédures de l'Etat marocain sont utilisées par le palais pour faire pression et demander des pots de vin dans le secteur immobilier", déclare un célèbre homme d'affaires au conseiller commercial. "Même si la corruption était pratiquée du temps du roi Hassan II, ces habitudes ont acquis un caractère plus institutionnel avec le roi Mohamed VI".
Le conseiller prend ces commentaires pour de l'argent contant dans son rapport. Ils sont étayés par les observations que lui fait un ancien ambassadeur des États-Unis au Maroc "qui continue à avoir des relations étroites avec le palais". Ce dernier confie au conseiller que certains proches de Mohamed VI font preuve "d'une honteuse gloutonnerie". "Ce phénomène sape sérieusement la bonne gouvernance que les autorités du Maroc s'efforcent de promouvoir", ajoute-il.
Entreprises espagnoles
Même Luís Planas, l'ambassadeur d'Espagne à Rabat pendant les six dernières années (2004-2006), reconnut les difficultés pour investir au Maroc lors d'un déjeuner, en mars 2006, avec Thomas Riley, son homologue américain. Après avoir évoqué le lancement d'un plan espagnol de 200 millions d'euros pour encourager les petites et les moyennes entreprises espagnoles à traverser le Détroit de Gibraltar, Planas expliqua qu'il serait sans doute utile mais il lança aussi un avertissement : A cause de son manque de transparence, le Maroc est un pays qui donne à réfléchir quand il s'agit de faire des affaires.
La Consulat des États-Unis à Casablanca fut lui aussi victime de la corruption quand il voulut acheter un terrain pour disposer de plus de place, d'après la note qu'il envoya au Département d'État en mars 2008. "Plus de 30 endroits ont été identifiés, mais une vingtaine ont du être enlevés de la liste parce que les vendeurs ne voulaient pas signer un contra légal". "D'autres ont refusé de vendre car ils attendaient que les prix montent". "Parmi ceux qui étaient disposés à vendre nombreux étaient ceux qui voulaient de l'argent sous la table (...)".
/www.elpais.com

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 17:41

Citation :

Maroc: Une Armée marginalisée et inefficace



Les Forces Armées Marocaines "sont toujours éclaboussées par la corruption, l'inefficience bureaucratique, leur bas niveau d'éducation, certains de leur soldats courent le risque de tomber dans le radicalisme, elles sont politiquement marginalisées et le gros de leurs effectifs sont déployés au Sahara Occidental". "Elles se modernisent mais elles continuent à être lestées par de vieux problèmes". L'ambassadeur des États Unis au Maroc, Thomas Riley, a élaboré, en août 2008, un rapport exhaustif et confidentiel de neuf feuillets sur l'armée marocaine avec l'aide des attachés de défense et de sécurité. C'est une véritable radiographie des Forces Armées Royales aujourd'hui encore très mal connues.
Les effectifs des trois armées s'élèvent à 218.000 hommes -10.000 de moins que ceux qui sont sous les drapeaux en Espagne- dont la moitié, voire même 70%, se trouvent au Sahara. Seules 40% de ces unités déployées dans cette ancienne colonie espagnole, un pourcentage assez bas, sont réellement opérationnelles. Les jeunes qui s'enrôlent comme soldats touchent 2.000 dirhams par mois (180 euros) et les officiers en début de carrière 6.000 dirhams (540 euros). A cela il faut ajouter un logement de fonction ce qui les place "dans une situation relativement confortable dans le contexte marocain".
Auteurs de deux coups d'État malheureux au début des années soixante dix, les militaires marocains sont encore étroitement surveillés. "Nous pensons que la monarchie estime toujours qu'ils représentent la plus grande menace pour la couronne". "Les officiers continuent à être écartés de la prise de décisions politiques et même leur participation à des débats sur la force militaire du Maroc est restreinte". Leurs relations avec les officiers des armées étrangères, y compris les attachés militaires américains, son aussi réduites. Du coup la qualité de l'information sur les Forces Armées Royales laisse à désirer. Laughing
L?approbation du roi
Ce manque de confiance royal à pour conséquence "qu'il n'y a pas de mouvements de troupes, de man½uvres ni de voyages officiels, à l'intérieur ni à l'extérieur du pays, sans l'approbation du roi". Au Maroc il n'y a pas de Ministère de la Défense mais une petite administration civile, qui dépend du premier ministre, dont le rôle est de contrôler la gestion. Le Ministère des Affaires Étrangères s'occupe, quant à lui, de la participation marocaine dans des opérations de maintien de la paix. "Toutes les autres questions en rapport avec la défense se décident au palais royal", précise Riley.
L'ambassadeur est cependant de l'avis que "certains symptômes montrent que la confiance du roi dans les Forces Armées s'accroît". Pour preuve "la hausse significative des dépenses militaires" avec, par exemple, l'achat de 24 chasseurs bombardiers américains F-16. "Récemment le roi a autorisé les vols militaires au nord de Ben Guérir [la plus grande base militaire marocaine à 200 kilomètres au sud de Rabat], ce qui n'était pas permis jusqu'à présent car le souverain souhaitait que les militaires restent éloignés du palais de Rabat".
Le principal défi auquel doivent faire face les Forces Armées c'est la corruption, d'après Riley. Elle touche surtout les niveaux supérieurs de la hiérarchie militaire. Elle a une origine historique car, après les deux coups d'État frustrés, Hassan II déclara aux militaires : "Soyez loyaux et vous pourrez en tirer profit". "Des rapports dignes de foi signalent que le lieutenant général Benanni tire justement profit de son poste de commandant en chef du secteur sud". Il en tire "des revenus des contrats militaires et exerce son influence sur les décisions du monde des affaires". "Une rumeur très répandue veut qu'il soit le propriétaire d'une bonne partie des pêcheries au Sahara Occidental". "Comme d'autres officiers vétérans Benanni possède une fastueuse résidence familiale qui fut probablement construite avec l'argent recouvré des pots de vin".
Pénétration islamiste dans les armées
"Une position de leader dans une région est, pour la hiérarchie militaire, une source importante de revenus non légaux", affirme l'ambassadeur. "Il y a même des rapports sur les élèves de l'académie militaire marocaine qui soudoient pour améliorer leur classement scolaire et obtenir ainsi [à leur sortie d'école] des postes militaires lucratifs". "Des postes de commandement dans le secteur sud, c'est-à-dire au Sahara Occidental, sont considérés parmi les plus lucratif étant donnée la concentration, là bas, de l'activité militaire (...)". "Le Gouvernement du Maroc semble chercher des formules pour freiner la corruption dans les rangs des militaires en formation, en commençant par les colonels et jusqu'au bas de la hiérarchie".
Un problème mineur, comparé à la corruption, est la pénétration islamiste dans les armées. Certaines informations "suggèrent qu'un petit nombre de soldats sont susceptibles de tomber dans l'islamisme radical". Après les attentats de 2003 à Casablanca, qui firent 45 morts, les enquêteurs "ont identifié des militaires" faisant partie de la conspiration. Plus tard la police arrêta "plusieurs militaires et gendarmes faisant partie d'autres cellules terroristes dont l'une vola des armes dans une base (...)".
Parmi les mesures préventives prises pour empêcher la propagation de l'islamisme radical dans l'armée figurent "l'élimination des mosquées dans toutes les casernes (...) et le déploiement de la contre intelligence militaire, appelée le Cinquième Bureau, avec ses agents secrets pour surveiller les activités radicales dans les mosquées" proches des bases militaires.
elpais[/quote]

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 17:48

Le 19/02/2008 Rabat:
Citation :

Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: S/CT Amb. Dell Dailey and NEA DAS Gray visited Morocco February 7-8 to discuss enhancing security cooperation and especially countering the flow of Moroccan
foreign fighters into Iraq. Amb. Dailey asked the highest level of concerned GOM officials to assert pressure on Syria to take further steps to halt the transit of foreign fighters, to share passenger data for international flights originating in Morocco, and to enhance bilateral security coordination.


Full Document
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INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4669
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RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS
RHEFDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000150
SIPDIS
SIPDIS
NOFORN
STATE FOR S/CT AND NEA/MAG
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PTER, EAIR, PINR, PREL, OVIP, MO
SUBJECT: EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION ON FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b), (c) and (d).
1. (S/NF) Summary: S/CT Amb. Dell Dailey and NEA DAS Gray visited Morocco February 7-8 to discuss enhancing security cooperation and especially countering the flow of Moroccan
foreign fighters into Iraq. Amb. Dailey asked the highest level of concerned GOM officials to assert pressure on Syria to take further steps to halt the transit of foreign fighters, to share passenger data for international flights originating in Morocco, and to enhance bilateral security coordination. The Moroccans were sympathetic to the requests and promised to study the request for increased passenger data. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri noted that Syria already required visas for Moroccans and other Arabs. During a briefing for Amb. Dailey, Morocco's external intelligence service warned of a possible deterioration of security
conditions in Mauritania
. End summary.
2. (S) On February 7, S/CT Coordinator Dell Dailey and NEA DAS Gordon Gray began their full schedule of briefings with Minister of Interior Chakib Benmoussa and senior officials from his Ministry. The Ambassador, DCM and Counselor for Regional Affairs also participated. As Ambassador Dailey did in each of his briefings, he explained that devastating suicide attacks by foreign fighters were the biggest killer in Iraq. Praising Morocco's positive steps and very good cooperation on counterterrorism, he said he hoped the cooperation could increase.
3. (S) Ambassador Dailey explained what we had learned from documents seized on September 13, 2007, debriefings and liaison partners about some 800 foreign fighters in Iraq. He noted that 40 percent of the 800 hailed from the Arabian Peninsula and, surprisingly, another 40 percent hailed from North Africa, with Libya accounting for 22 percent.
Ambassador Dailey explained that in general the foreign fighters traveled to Syria by air and then entered Iraq on foot after linking up with a facilitator in Damascus and
spending 1 to 3 weeks in Syria. Ambassador Dailey then cited successes using a passenger name recognition (PNR) program in the Caribbean.
--------------------
How Morocco Can Help
--------------------
4. (S) Acknowledging that Syria has taken some steps to stem the flow, Ambassador Dailey made three requests of the GOM:
1) that the GOM pressure Syria to strengthen visa requirements, 2) that the GOM and the USG exchange airline passenger lists for all flights and not just for those bound
for the United States, and 3) that we look at ways to reinforce U.S.-Moroccan cooperation.
5. (C) Minister Benmoussa responded that Morocco's analysis of the facts was similar. He said Morocco was cognizant of the networks moving foreign fighters to Iraq, Algeria and the
Sahel. He acknowledged that these terrorists represent a serious threat to Morocco and, therefore, Morocco is actively working with the U.S. and other partners to control the
networks. Minister Benmoussa pointed out that the GOM has dismantled some networks and that approximately 60 Moroccans had been arrested before they could depart Morocco. Another 70 Moroccans are being watched and/or sought in the country and the region. He noted that Moroccans also use routes to and through Algeria and the Sahel. He concluded that we could have an "experts meeting" to examine our already elevated cooperation and the PNR program in particular.
(Note: Morocco already provides exhaustive data on passengers
traveling on U.S. bound flights. End note.)
RABAT 00000150 002 OF 003
---------------------------
Moroccan Intelligence Chief
---------------------------
6. (S/NF) In a smaller meeting with Mohamed Yassine Mansouri, Chief of the Directorate-General for Studies and Documentaton, Morocco's external intelligence service, General Dailey gave a summary of his presentation on foreign fighters. Mansouri responded that Morocco was not surprised
by the number of Libyans but was surprised by the number of its own nationals in the foreign fighter pipeline, particularly of Moroccans from Casablanca.
Mansouri assured
Ambassador Dailey that he agreed on the three requests. He said cooperation among countries of origin is critical, adding that Morocco believes Syria is now willing to strengthen cooperation. (Note: Separately, Mansouri's
deputy, Brigadier General Abdeljabbar Azzaoui, told us that Morocco's leverage over Syria was limited.
End note.)
Mansouri stated that Morocco hopes that the improving situation in Iraq will diminish the flow of foreign fighters.
7. (S/NF) Mansouri cautioned, however, that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is a new regional reality and that if AQ fails in Iraq, the Maghreb will become its principal
target.
Already, terrorist methods in Algeria mirror methods used in Iraq, and Morocco has reason to believe that AQIM has successfully used rockets in Algeria for the first time.
Mansouri underscored that Maghreb countries are just beginning to cooperate. He noted that he had just accompanied Minister of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation Taieb Fassi Fihri to Mauritania, which has the will but not the means to combat terrorism. Mansouri said no Maghreb country, with the possible exception of Morocco, can begin to control its frontiers.
8. (S/NF) Turning to Western Sahara, Mansouri said the terrorist threat there is real. He was very careful to say that the GOM does not think the POLISARIO is a terrorist organization, but some members of the POLISARIO have joined AQIM. Morocco is particularly concerned that should Algeria and the POLISARIO install themselves outside the berm in the no man's land in Western Sahara, this could become a base for terrorist training and operations, which Morocco could not tolerate.
9. (S/NF) Immediately prior to the meeting with DG Mansouri, DGED experts, led by Azzaoui, Morocco's most senior intelligence officer, gave Amb. Dailey and accompanying delegation an overview briefing of the terror threat across the Maghreb region, including an assessment of the command structure of Algeria-based AQIM, the successor to the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC) which has waged a brutal jihadist insurgency against the GOA since the early 1990s. They briefed in detail on the extensive Moroccan efforts over the past few years to disrupt the Iraq foreign fighter pipleine.
10. (S/NF) DGED analysts said they were particularly concerned about the situation in Mauritania and forecasted an increase in Islamist terror activity intended to destabilize
the country and ultimately topple the Nouakchott government. Jihadists in Mauritania would seek in step up attacks on Mauritanian security forces, senior government officials, and
foreign interests, they warned.
11. (S/NF) During the final session with the DGED, their analysts noted that 139 Moroccan foreign fighters had attempted to go to Iraq since 2003. The DGED had seen a resurgence in the foreign fighter pipeline in 2006. Their analysis showed that 65 percent of Moroccan foreign fighters hailed from Casablanca, 19 percent from Tetouan, 11.5 percent from Tangier, and 4 percent from Taroudant. They confirmed
that 40 Moroccans had definitely reached Iraq, and 38 of them had participated in suicide missions.
The DGED alos emphasized that Moroccan cells cooperated with individuals and cells in Denmark, Sweden, Spain, Saudi Arabia and Syria.
----------------------------
Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri
----------------------------
12. (C) Dailey and Gray accompanied by Ambassador also briefed Foreign Minister Taieb Fassi-Fihri February 8. MFA Chief of Staff Bourita and Western Hemisphere Director Tazi
sat in. Dailey praised the reforms undertaken by King Mohammed VI and said they gave people hope. He asked the Minister to request that Syria tighten entry controls and
apply particularly close scrutiny to young travelers. He also urged Morocco to take advantage of USG capabilities to screen passenger manifests for flights to Turkey and Syria,
as is already being done for flights to the U.S.
13. (C) Fassi Fihri appreciated the briefing, recalling meeting Fran Townsend at the NSC, who told him Morocco's CT cooperation with the USG was the best in the Arab world. He
noted that the GOM was interested in the distinction whether Moroccans went specifically to blow themselves up, or simply to fight and perhaps get training. There was no overall
headquarters organizing this in Morocco, but he had heard there was a Moroccan in Iraq with al-Qaeda doing organizing.
He insisted that Syria already requires visas from Moroccans and other Arab entrants. He undertook to communicate concerns to the Governments of Turkey and Syria. Most
transit was through Europe, however.
14. (C) In the Maghreb, he assessed cooperation with Tunisia had improved in the last month. At the behest of friendly governments, Morocco was cooperating with Libya. The
Algerians cooperate, but at a mi nimal level. More confidence could lead to improved cooperation. He had recently returned from Mauritania, where the President was very concerned about the situation. The Mauritanians told him Islamists from there don't go to Iraq, but stay in Mauritania to cause trouble. He understood that terrorists were searching for specifically French citizens to kidnap -- they let Italians go. Regionally, the AMU can be a source of cooperation. In the aftermath of their meetings with the Europeans (5 5, EU)
the ministers agreed that the next meeting would discuss security cooperation.
15. (C) TFF noted the young man who targeted the Consulate in Casablanca had been intending to go to Iraq, but his leader had been arrested and he acted in desperation. He lamented that potential extremists pay too much attention to al-Jazeera. Very Happy
16. (C) Ambassador Dailey and DAS Gray have cleared this
message.
*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************
Riley

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MessageSujet: Re: Wikileaks,fuites et révélations   Ven 3 Déc 2010 - 18:00

Le 02/03/2007 Rabat
Citation :

Excerpt from document
(S/NF) MFA Africa Chief Abdelatif Bendahane (strictly protect) told Polcouns Feb. 26 that the GOM had been approached by the president of Niger for assistance in dealing with a group of terrorists. They had entered Niger from inside Algeria, not far from the Libyan border.


Full Document
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INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 4341
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Content
S E C R E T RABAT 000419
SIPDIS
NOFORN
SIPDIS
NEA/MAG, AF FOR RSA
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2017
TAGS: PTER, PTBS, MOPS, AL, MO, NG
SUBJECT: GOM SAYS NIGER ASKS FOR HELP VS TERROR GROUP
INFILTRATING FROM ALGERIA
Classified By: Polcouns Craig Karp. Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).
(S/NF) MFA Africa Chief Abdelatif Bendahane (strictly protect) told Polcouns Feb. 26 that the GOM had been approached by the president of Niger for assistance in dealing with a group of terrorists. They had entered Niger from inside Algeria, not far from the Libyan border.
(Comment: These could be possibly newly branded Al-Qaeda in the lands of the Islamic West, i.e. ex-GSPC, but he did not specify.). The Niger government has sent a letter asking the GOM for arms and other material assistance to deal with these
terrorists.
Bendahane was transmitting this to his Minister and anticipated some type of positive response, but asked that this be kept close hold as he was not authorized to
convey it
. Suspect He implied, less credibly, that the Algerians somehow knew what this group was up to.
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
******************************************
Riley

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