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 Géopolitique Mondiale

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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Jeu 19 Juil 2018 - 7:12

Геополитика.ru a écrit:

21ST-CENTURY GEOPOLITICS OF JAPAN



Japan, as the Asian geographic analogue of Great Britain, is a strategic outlier in the Eurasian supercontinent by virtue of its location, which has in turn greatly influenced its political decisions across the centuries and shaped it into an historically thalassocratic power. The Oriental state prudently chose to implement selective Westernization following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which allowed it to grow by leaps and bounds ahead of its regional competitors and ultimately emerge as a Great Power in its own right. Japan’s grand strategy was to literally become the Great Britain of Asia, and to that end it sought to carve out its own empire in the Eastern Hemisphere through brutal conquest and a divide-and-rule strategy which would ultimately enable it to replace its European counterparts as the uncontested hegemon in this part of the world.

The World War II-era “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere” was the high point of Japan’s “traditional” geostrategic ambitions, after which it was humiliatingly occupied by the US until the present day following the two devastating nuclear bombings in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. From 1945 onwards, Tokyo has been Washington’s “Lead From Behind” partner in East and Southeast Asia, being encouraged by the US to take on a leading regional role in order to give America a “local face” behind which it could project its dominance. It’s for this reason why the US appointed Japan to become the main player in the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and actively supported its efforts to invest in the former territories that had briefly constituted its imperial realm during the Second World War.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent rise of China as a Global Power (inadvertently aided and abetted by US investments) saw Japan’s role progressively transform from a solely economic-institutional “Lead From Behind” capacity to a military one, with Tokyo only just recently “reinterpreting” its post-war constitution in order to allow the deployment of military troops abroad and sale of military equipment to foreign partners. For all intents and purposes, the US is tacitly encouraging Japan to “more peacefully” follow in its pre-World War II-era footsteps in reasserting its traditional Rimland ambitions in East and Southeast Asia, though for as much as this might lead one to believe that Tokyo is still acting as a total puppet of Washington, its leadership has surprisingly begun a fast-moving rapprochement with Moscow.

This seemingly inexplicable turn of events is but one of the many paradigm shifts taking place all across the globe and in every single sphere as the Multipolar World Order gradually enters into being, and the consequences of this comprehensive change are expected to impact on the grand strategies of each Great Power, Japan included. It’s therefore of heightened relevancy to examine the 21st-century geopolitics of the country, though taking care to note that all future developments concerning this state are much more dependent on domestic trends than they are for most other players. That being the case, the analysis will begin by examining how Japan’s domestic situation influences its foreign policy, after which it will then elaborate more on the external manifestations of Tokyo’s grand strategy. The final part of the research will then summarize the prevailing trends that one can expect from Japan’s 21st-century geostrategy.

Demographic Die-Out

Japan’s population is dying out, and fast. The number of senior citizens is surging, while child births are way below replacement level. To make matters worse, Japanese young adults are eschewing sex for a variety of socio-cultural reasons, mostly thought to have something to do with the typically stressful life of urban workers and the convenience that the near-ubiquity of technology provides in “satisfying” carnal desires and creating the easily manageable illusion of a “relationship”. If the present trends continue, then Japan is expected to suffer one of the most profound population losses ever for a peacetime population in the coming decades, which has led to many observers becoming extraordinarily concerned about the country’s overall future. Considering Japan’s global importance as the world’s third-largest economy, this could be expected to have major implications for all of its partners, both fellow Great Powers and developing states alike.

Robotic Replacements

There is, however, a chance that no dire scenarios will unfold so long as Japan is successful in replacing its shrinking population with robots. It may sound futuristic but it’s already happening, at least when it comes to the economy. “This Company’s Robots Are Making Everything—and Reshaping the World”, a very insightful article published by Bloomberg in mid-October 2017, provides an eye-opening look at just how important the Japanese robotics company Fanuc has been in making this happen. It’s by and far the world leader in this field, having already captured a quarter of the global market. In addition, nearly one-third of all the world’s industrial robotics orders last year were Fanuc sales to China, which interestingly tightens the complex economic interdependency between these two rivals and shows just how important of a driver this company is for the global economy at large. Accordingly, it’s only natural then that Fanuc takes the lead in replacing Japan’s dwindling human workforce with robots in the future, since it’s already replacing the labor force of other countries as it is.

So long as there’s a stable and inversely proportional relationship between the decrease in Japan’s population and the rise of its industrial robotic sector, then theoretically speaking, there isn’t much for Tokyo to worry about on the structural level. Instead of fretting about what to do with its newfound unemployed masses like the rest of the world is doing, Japan could just work on retraining its citizens to fill the crucial non-robotic niches that are still left in its economy. It remains likely that the world will nevertheless eventually employ some combination of “universal basic income” (UBI) and virtual reality (VR) to placate the population along the lines of the long-term scenario forecast in the author’s work about “The Geopolitics Of The Techno-Civilizational World Order”, but Japan will probably have the least difficulty in doing this because of the “natural” rate at which the country is transitioning to it anyhow.

Without any undemocratic subversive behavior on the part of the Japanese elites, their country is already moving towards the dystopian outcomes associated with “Agenda 21”, but with the key difference being that Japan will experience minimal social disruption so long as its food and energy needs continue to remain provided for. The first of course deals with feeding the remaining human population, which shouldn’t be too troublesome if their numbers continue to diminish and technological advances in industrial-scale urban agriculture continue. As for the latter, no robotic-driven civilization-society can function without reliable energy supplies, and it’s here where many believe that Japan will forever remain dependent on geopolitical processes beyond its control in the Mideast, though the reality of the matter is that Tokyo has sought to preemptively avoid this crippling vulnerability through alternative energy advancements and a game-changing rapprochement with Moscow.

The Russian Rapprochement

The geopolitical dimension of Japan’s energy policy has seen it rapidly improve relations with Russia, which were stagnant for decades because of the US-manufactured issue that Tokyo refers to as the “Kuril Islands Dispute”. The contours of this conundrum are outside the scope of this analysis, but it’s relevant to say that it took Japan’s flexibility on the issue to rejuvenate ties with Russia, which are currently on the rise and better than at any time in the post-war period. Russia is receptive to Japan’s outreaches because it needs investment in its resource-rich but underpopulated Far East, and likewise, Japan needs reliable access to these said resources, be they agricultural, mineral, or especially energy. Altogether, the dynamics of the Russian-Japanese partnership represent a dual balancing act for both parties that was described at length in the author’s 2016 work about how “Russia’s Diplomatic Balancing Act In Asia Is To The Benefit Of Its Chinese Ally”, with the obvious caveat being that Tokyo isn’t doing this to aid Beijing even if that’s indeed the inadvertent outcome of what’s happening.

Carrying on, Russia is seen as a reserve of immense energy wealth which could easily power Japan’s future robotic society for decades to come, and without any of the attendant geostrategic risks that come from importing resources from the conflict-prone Mideast across the bottlenecked Strait of Malacca and then through the contentious waters of the South China Sea. Russia is therefore conceptualized as Japan’s neighboring “battery”, though one which will only share its power provided that Tokyo concedes to accept Moscow’s sovereignty over the Kuril Islands, albeit possibly through the unique NISEC sub-state socio-economic sharing arrangement that the author suggested last year. On a larger level, the Japanese-Russian rapprochement is geostrategically advantageous for Tokyo because it gives the island nation a bit more maneuverability for negotiating with the US, and it also sends a signal to China that Japan is interested in an apolitical non-hostile presence along its northeastern continental borderland. This plays into the prestige that Japan is trying to cultivate as it reestablishes itself as a Great Power and attempts to lessen the complete strategic dependence that it’s historically had on the US since the post-war military occupation.

The Race For Resources

Russia can be very useful for powering Japan’s energy-intensive robotic society in the future, but these automated replacement workers won’t do anything for the country’s economy unless they have raw materials to work with in producing items for export. The Russian Far East can only provide some of what’s needed, and definitely not on the scale that the Japanese economy requires, which is why Tokyo has had to scour the world for the necessary resources. This has seen the country establish a post-war economic presence in Southeast Asia with the encouragement of the US, as well as engaging in sizeable investments all across Africa after the end of the Cold War. The parallel rise of China during this latter period meant that the world’s most populous country was now competing for the same number of finite physical resources, therefore turning this relaxed search mission into a pressing race against Japan’s historic rival.

Trade Route And Transit State Tango

Prospecting resources and developing new marketplaces is one thing, but accessing them is another, and that’s why the world is presently in the midst of an intense period of competitive connectivity. China’s One Belt One Road global vision of New Silk Road connectivity is slated to transform the declining unipolar global system into an emerging Multipolar World Order, and Tokyo is simply unable to compete with Beijing because of the disparity in scale between their two economies. It’s for this reason why Japan decided to partner with India in pioneering the so-called “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor”, also known as the “Freedom Corridor”, in order to collectively pool their existing resources and economic complementarities in carving out a niche for themselves in the Greater Indian Ocean Region. The specific geopolitics of the wider Chinese-Indian New Cold War that this is a part of were examined in detail in the author’s book-length article series on the topic for the Islamabad-based political consultancy firm CommandEleven, but it’s enough for the casual reader to understand that there’s a complex tango going on between Japan and China for access to trade routes and transit states.

The partnership with India obviously allows Japan to strengthen its presence in the Indian Ocean, while the one with Russia interestingly provides Tokyo with the chance to become the East Asian “gatekeeper” along the Northern Sea Route to Europe. Altogether, Japan’s strategic cooperation with these two Great Powers is predicated on the self-interested idea of securing its access to crucial trade routes and transit states, though this also in and of itself gives Tokyo influence over regions that are strategically important for Beijing as well. The ideal outcome would be that these two East Asian powerhouses join forces in strengthening Silk Road Globalization through a combination of active cooperation and friendly competition with one another institutionalized through Japan’s prospective membership in the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the possible establishment of the megaregional Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) economic deals. Heavy US influence on Japan will probably preempt this from happening, however, and therefore lead to Tokyo continuing to function as one of the key pillars in the “China Containment Coalition” that’s being built all across the Indo-Pacific.

The antagonistic scenario that the US is pushing Japan towards with China is the same as what it’s doing vis-à-vis the EU and Russia, though in a different manner accommodating for the changed situational relations between them. Instead of deceptively emphasizing a “zero-sum” outcome when it comes to competitive connectivity projects and the race for resources, the US is promoting a “zero-sum” mentality in relation to “values”, having spared no expense or effort to convince the EU elites that Russian “values” are purportedly incomparable with Western ones and therefore constitute a “threat”. The whole point of this massive disinformation operation on both ends of Eurasia is to prevent the ultimate Great Power convergence between the EU and Russia on the Western half and China and Japan on the Eastern one, which would collectively result in most of the supercontinent being liberated of unipolar influence when accounting for the multipolar impact of Russia’s “Ummah Pivot” in the “Greater Mideast” and China’s Silk Road success in ASEAN. India is of course the geostrategic exception in this model, but it would likely be forced to fall into line with the Multipolar World Order in this scenario or otherwise risk hemispheric isolation as the US’ last main outpost.

The Intricacies Of The Japanese-Chinese Competition

Accepting that the current trends indicate that the US-provoked Japanese-Chinese competition will probably extend into the indefinite future, the most responsible thing that can be done is to examine the intricacies of this New Cold War rivalry from a thought-provoking perspective uncommon to most analyses on this topic. Instead of focusing on the advantages that China has in this rivalry like a lot of analysts have already done, it’s worthwhile exploring the topic from the reserve angle in looking at it from Japan’s perspective in order to identify what possible advantages Tokyo might have as well. For instance, the Japanese “Maritime Self-Defense Force” already functions as a blue-water navy even if it does so unofficially, and there’s a chance that it could give China a serious run for its money in any potential clash between the two. Added to that is Japan’s robotic prowess, which could lead to pivotal military advances in the future that might decisively shift the balance of power between the two.

That said, the above factors are only applicable when it comes to military affairs, but the likelihood of a hot conflict between the two isn’t too probable for a variety of reasons, partly having to do with the complex economic interdependence between them but also the US’ mutual defense obligations to Japan. Both parties are vulnerable to Hybrid War disruptions in the shared transit states constituting their respective competitive connectivity projects in mainland ASEAN (the “Greater Mekong Subregion”), the Mideast and Central Asia, and East Africa, but China will always be more at risk than Japan because of how much it depends on these routes in order to secure its own domestic stability. The inverse proportional relationship between Japan’s declining population and rising robotic replacements means that Tokyo could theoretically weather any transit state disruptions much better than China, which has staked its entire 21st-century future on the New Silk Roads in order to sustain domestic growth and prevent the socio-political unrest that would inevitably accompany any Hybrid War-inflicted economic downturn.

Veiled Vulnerabilities

Despite its salient strategic advantage in being comparatively (key word) less dependent on transit state volatility than China, Japan isn’t exactly in a position to directly press its advantage against its rival if times got tough for Beijing. Neither side can afford a trade war against the other, which in any case would be more devastating for Japan than for China because of the monopoly that the People’s Republic enjoys on rare earth mineral production. Japan needs these resources in order to sustain its technological-robotic future, so it’s not in a position to tempt China to cut off its exports like it temporarily did in 2010 in connection with a flare-up of the East China Sea dispute. Nor, for that matter, could Japan afford for Chinese cobalt and coltan companies in the Congo to decline selling this necessary component for electric vehicle batteries, cruise missiles, and almost every ubiquitous modern-day technological gadget such as smartphones. After all, China controls roughly 60% of the global cobalt market, the demand of which is expected to spike by two-thirds in the next decade, and securing reliable access to this indispensable resource is a pressing priority for Japan.

Another veiled vulnerability affecting Japan’s 21st-century geostrategy is closer to home in the form of the Ryukyu Islands, of which anti-American Okinawa is a part. This island chain only became part of Japan relatively recently in the late 19th century, and the population of its most militarily important island resents the American bases there which are responsible for insufferable noise and a spree of high-profile crimes include rapes and murders. The locals don’t want the US to remain in their homeland, but are powerless to evict them due to the overriding influence that Washington has over Tokyo and the near-impossibility of this ever happening. Nevertheless, an asymmetrical measure that China could in theory employ (key conditional, as there isn’t any existing proof of this) would be to encourage the anti-American protest movement and help it develop to the level of an autonomous, “federalist”, or even separatist one despite the improbable odds of it actually succeeding. The point, though, would just be to cause maximum disruption at one of Japan’s most sensitive military locations in the hopes of provoking an escalating spiral of violence that could partially distract Tokyo from whatever hostile proxy action it would be engaged in against China at the time (e.g. trade war).

Prevailing Trends

All told, there are several prevailing trends that are forecast to guide Japan’s 21st-century geostrategy. In the order that they were introduced in this analysis, these are:

* Japan’s demographic die-out and replacement with robotic workers;

* The Russian-Japanese rapprochement to secure reliable energy supplies for Tokyo’s continued technological-robotic rise;

* The race for finite manufacturing resources in the “Global South” regions of mainland ASEAN (the “Greater Mekong Region”), South Asia, and East Africa, as well as the need to develop Japanese-friendly markets in this part of the world and the Mideast-Central Asia;

* The resultant competition with China for the aforesaid, and the disruptive role of American influence in turning Tokyo into Beijing’s chief Asian rival instead of its natural strategic partner in jointly advancing Silk Road Globalization in the Multipolar World Order;

* Japan’s advantageous geostrategic position in being comparatively less affected by future American-managed Hybrid Wars in the Greater Indian Ocean Region;

* and Tokyo’s veiled vulnerabilities in being dependent on China’s export of rare earth minerals to power its technological-robotic industries and the risk that Beijing could clandestinely destabilize the Ryukyu Islands through various degrees of pro-autonomy movements all the way up to separatism.

Concluding Thoughts

The simplified points mentioned above demonstrate the phased logic that goes into Japan’s grand strategy and explain some of its more recent moves, whether the surprising decision to enter into a rapprochement with Russia or the somewhat overdue one to partner up with India in the Greater Indian Ocean Region. Everything ultimately comes down to Japan’s seemingly inevitable transition into becoming the world’s first large-scale techno-robotic civilization, however, as it’s from this core trend that all the others are derived to some degree or another. Altogether, the bigger picture behind Japan’s 21st-century geostrategy should allow one to get an idea about the structural limitations inherent to its “China Containment Coalition” actions, as there’s only so much that Tokyo can do and so far that it can go against Beijing before it begins to feel the consequences from the People’s Republic discretely suspending the sale of rare earth minerals to the island nation and/or supporting a destabilizing Ryukyu autonomy campaign.  

The already existing and multidimensional system of complex economic interdependency, coupled with both sides’ near-equal naval capabilities, acts as a form of checks and balances between the two Asian Great Powers and could ideally be reframed in such a way as to convince Japan’s decision makers and strategists of the mutually disadvantageous nature of the Chinese-Japanese rivalry that their American military occupier encouraged them to aggravate over the past couple of years. A reconceptualization of the relationship between these two related civilization-states could inject fresh thinking into this dynamic and demonstrate how beneficial the win-win possibilities of bilateral Silk Road cooperation are in comparison to the lose-lose “zero-sum” game that the US is provoking between them. The US wants to continue using Japan as its “unsinkable aircraft carrier” in perpetuity so that it can “contain China”, but reversely, the failure of this policy would “unchain China” by accelerating the global trend towards a Multipolar World Order.          

As it stands, there aren’t any indications that Japan desires to redirect its grand strategy away from “zero-sum” unipolarity and towards win-win multipolarity, however it nonetheless can’t be ignored that Tokyo is indeed behaving in a relatively independent fashion by continuing to restore its relations with Moscow. Washington obviously isn’t too happy about this, though at the same time, the pragmatic strategists in the US’ permanent military, intelligence, and diplomatic bureaucracies (“deep state”) understand the necessity of this move and appreciate how its optics could be manipulated by savvy propagandists in an attempt to instigate suspicion between Moscow and Beijing, capitalizing on the fact that Russia hasn’t publicly explained its grand strategic balancing act. Looking forward, it’s expected that the Chinese-Japanese competition will continue all along the Greater Indian Ocean Region, merging with the Chinese-Indian one of which it’s now inextricably a part, in order to add critical mass to the Asian component of the New Cold War.

#Source

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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Dim 26 Aoû 2018 - 14:41

OrientalReview a écrit:

America’s About To Unleash Its NOPEC Superweapon Against The Russians & Saudis


The US Congress has revived the so-called “NOPEC” bill for countering OPEC and OPEC+.

Officially called the “No Oil Producing and Exporting Cartels Act”, NOPEC is the definition of so-called “lawfare” because it enables the US to extraterritorially impose its domestic legislation on others by giving the government the right to sue OPEC and OPEC+ countries like Russia because of their coordinated efforts to control oil prices. Lawsuits, however, are unenforceable, which is why the targeted states’ refusal to abide by the US courts’ likely predetermined judgement against them will probably be used to trigger sanctions under the worst-case scenario, with this chain of events being catalyzed in order to achieve several strategic objectives.

The first is that the US wants to break up the Russian-Saudi axis that forms the core of OPEC+, which leads to the second goal of then unravelling the entire OPEC structure and heralding in the free market liberalization of the global energy industry. This is decisively to the US’ advantage as it seeks to become an energy-exporting superpower, but it must neutralize its competition as much as possible before this happens, ergo the declaration of economic-hybrid war through NOPEC. How it would work in practice is that the US could threaten primary sanctions against the state companies involved in implementing OPEC and OPEC+ agreements, after which these could then be selectively expanded to secondary sanctions against other parties who continue to do business with them.

The purpose behind this approach is to intimidate the US’ European vassals into complying with its demands so as to make as much of the continent as possible a captive market of America’s energy exporters, which explains why Trump also wants to scrap LNG export licenses to the EU. If successful, this could further erode Europe’s shrinking strategic independence and also inflict long-term economic damage on the US’ energy rivals that could then be exploited for political purposes. At the same time, America’s recently unveiled “Power Africa” initiative to invest $175 billion in gas projects there could eventually see US companies in the emerging energy frontiers of Tanzania, Mozambique, and elsewhere become important suppliers to their country’s Chinese rival, which could make Beijing’s access to energy even more dependent on American goodwill than ever before.

If looked at as the opening salvo of a global energy war being waged in parallel with the trade one as opposed to being dismissed as the populist piece of legislation that it’s being portrayed as by the media, NOPEC can be seen as the strategic superweapon that it actually is, with its ultimate effectiveness being dependent of course on whether it’s properly wielded by American decision makers. It’s too earlier to call it a game-changer because it hasn’t even been promulgated yet, but in the event that it ever is, then it might go down in history as the most impactful energy-related development since OPEC, LNG, and fracking. #Source

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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Lun 1 Oct 2018 - 17:59

ALASTAIR CROOKE - Strategic Culture Foundation a écrit:

The ‘Pivots’ to the Coming Era Can Already Be Discerned


In his autobiography, Carl Jung tells of “a moment of unusual clarity”, during which he had a strange dialogue with something inside him: In what myth does man live nowadays, his inner-self enquired? “In the Christian myth: Do you live in it?” (Jung asked of himself. And to be honest with himself, the answer that he gave was ‘no’): “For me, it is not what I live by.” Then do we no longer have any myth, asked his inner-self? “No”, Jung replied, “evidently not”. Then what is it, by which you live, his inner-self demanded? “At this point the dialogue with myself, became uncomfortable. I stopped thinking. I had reached a dead end”, Jung concluded.

Many today, feel similarly. They feel the void. The post-war era – perhaps it is the European Enlightenment phenomenon, itself – that has run its course, people believe. Some regret it; many more are disturbed by it – and wonder what is next.

We live in a moment of the waning of two major projects: the decline of revealed religion, and - simultaneously - of the discrediting of the experience of secular Utopia. We live in a world littered with the debris of utopian projects which - though they were framed in secular terms, that denied the truth of religion - were in fact, vehicles for religious myth.

The Jacobin revolutionaries launched the Terror as a violent retribution for élite repression -- inspired by Rousseau’s Enlightenment humanism; the Trotskyite Bolsheviks murdered millions in the name of reforming humanity through Scientific Empiricism; the Nazis did similar, in the name of pursuing ‘Scientific (Darwinian) Racism’.

The American millenarian ‘myth’, then and now, was (and is), rooted in the fervent belief in the Manifest Destiny of the United States, and is, in the last resort, nothing other than one particular example in a long line of attempts to force a shattering discontinuity in history (through which human society would then subsequently, be re-made).

In other words, all these utopian projects – all these successors to apocalyptic Judaic and Christian myth - saw a collective humankind pursuing its itinerary to a point of convergence, and to some sort of End Time (or End to History).

Well … we do not live these myths now: Even secular utopia will no longer ‘do’. It will not fill the void. The optimistic certitudes connected with the idea of linear ‘progress’ have become particularly discredited. So, by what will we live? This is no esoteric debate. These are questions of history, and destiny.

The élites decry anything ‘alt’ - as ‘populism’ or ‘illiberalism’. Yet they decline to see what is before them: Certain values are emerging. What are they? And from where do they come? And how might they change our World?

The most obvious ‘value’ is the emerging global desire to live in, and by, one’s own culture -- to live, as it were, in a differentiated cultural way. It is a notion of cultures, autonomous and sovereign, which seek to re-capture a particular culture – in its traditional setting of history, religiosity, and ties of blood, land and language. The immigration issue, which is rending Europe apart, is the obvious example of this.

What this ‘value’ is intimating however, is not simple tribalism, but also a different way of envisaging sovereignty. It encompasses within it the idea that sovereignty is acquired, through acting, and thinking sovereign. That sovereign power grows out from the confidence of a people having its own distinct and clear history, its intellectual legacy and its own spiritual storehouse on which to draw – by which to differentiate itself.

We are talking here, of a secure ‘alive’ culture being the root to both personal and communal sovereignty. It is a clear rejection of the idea that ‘melting pot’ cosmopolitanism, can procreate any true sovereignty.

It is, of course, the converse to the globalist notion of a ‘mankind’ converging on common values, converging on a single, neutral, apolitical ‘way of being’. ‘Man’ - in that way - in the old European tradition, simply did not exist. There were only men: Greeks, Romans, barbarians, Syrians, and so on. This notion stands in obvious opposition to universal, cosmopolitan ‘man’. The recovery of this type of thinking, for example, lies behind Russia and China’s Eurasian notion.

A second emerging value is derived from the global disenchantment with the western style of mechanical, single-track thinking that attenuates all things to an (supposedly empirically derived) singularity of meaning, which, when seated in the ego, lends an unshakeable sense of one’s own certainty and conviction (to the West European thinker, at least): ‘We’ speak ‘truth’, whereas others, babble and lie.

The obverse – the old European tradition – is conjunctive thinking. Do guilt, injustice, contradiction and suffering exist in this world? They do, proclaims Heraclitus, but only for the limited mind that sees things apart (disjunctively), and not connectedly, and notcon-tuitively linked: a term which implies not a ‘grasping’ for meaning but, rather, to be gently and powerfully ‘grasped’ by meaning.

What has this to do with today’s world? Well this is how the neo-Confucianist, Chinese leadership think today. The idea of Yin and Yang, and their latency for creating and being in harmony, still underlies Chinese notions of politics, and conflict resolution. Ditto for Shi’a philosophy and Russian Eurasianism. This used to be how Europeans thought, too: For Heraclitus, all polar opposites co-constitute each other, and run into harmony in ways that are invisible to the human eye.

This ‘other’ perspective precisely lies behind the multilateral Global Order value. The acceptance of a multi-aspectual quality to any person, or people, escapes the prevailing obsession to reduce every nation to a singularity in value, and to a singularity of ‘meaning’. The ground for collaboration and conversation thus widens beyond ‘the either-or’ - to the differing strata of complex identities (and interests). It is, in a word, tolerant.

Then there are other values: Pursuit of justice, truth (in a metaphysical sense), integrity, dignified, manly conduct and knowing and accepting who you are. These were all eternal values.

And here is the point: The disappearance in modernity of any external norm or ‘myth’, beyond civic conformity, which might guide the individual in his or her life and actions; and the enforced eviction of the individual from any form of structure (social classes, Church, family, society and gender) has made a ‘turning back’ to that which was always latent, if only half remembered, somehow inevitable.

The yearning for these ancient norms – even if only poorly understood, and articulated - represents a ‘reaching down’ into those ancient ‘storehouses’, still lingering at the deepest levels of the human being -- A ‘turning back’ to being ‘in, and of’ the world, again. This is happening in diverse modes, across the globe.

Of course, ‘the Ancient’ cannot be an ad integrum return. It cannot be the simple restoration of what once was. It has to be brought forward - as if ‘a youth’ who is coming ‘home’ again – the eternal return – out of our own decomposition; from amidst our ruins.

True, but nonetheless these new-old ideas will impinge, will challenge the existing liberal world. Our present economic framework largely was inherited from Adam Smith. And what was it if nothing other than a direct translation of the political philosophy of John Locke and John Hume (Smith’s close friend)? And what was Locke and Hume’s thinking, if not the narrative, in political and economic terms, of the Protestant victory over the Catholic idea of a religious community – in the wake of Westphalia?

Inevitably then, different values dictate different models: What sort of models do the emerging values then foreshadow? Firstly, we can see a shift in the non-West, away from ‘identity and gender’ blurring, and a return to a differentiated clarity in these aspects, to the centrality of family, and of the need to give esteem to all, whatever their place, in the hierarchy of life. In governance, as in economics, the guiding ‘value’ is a different understanding of power. The Latin Christian myth of love, turning the other cheek, humility, and retreat from worldly-power stands in contradistinction to the ancient notion of ‘manly’ conduct that preached something quite different: Resist injustice, and pursue your ‘truth’. It was therefore naturally political, and was possessed of an ethos in which power was a normal attribute.

This ancient expression of power has arisen today through the insight that a people which is mentally ‘active’ has activated its vitality and has cultural strength, may prevail against a hugely richer and better armed state – yet one, that has put its people into gentle sleep - and robbed it of vitality.

Thus, whether in governance or in economics, the structures are likely to reflect the principles of autonomy and the re-sovereigntisation of nation and people, and the notion that the organisation of society was always intended to be the natural field for the self-expansion of a man or a woman – a man capable of finding his own power, and finding himself – as his own project.

What is striking is that we see that these last twin principles (which may seem ostensibly in tension), precisely are instantiating themselves in current politics - albeit coming from totally different quarters: In Italy, the Five Star movement (seen as Leftish) is in government with the Lega (viewed as Rightish).

Of course many will say simply TINA (there is no alternative). But plainly there is – and that ‘train’ is already arriving at our station now.

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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Ven 9 Nov 2018 - 17:15


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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Jeu 22 Nov 2018 - 21:48


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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Lun 3 Déc 2018 - 13:32


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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Jeu 13 Déc 2018 - 16:27

https://www.defenseone.com/politics/2018/12/small-wars-great-power-trumps-africa-reset-could-change-us-militarys-role/153485/?oref=DefenseOneTCO

Citation :

From Small Wars to Great Power, Trump’s Africa Reset Could Change US Military’s Role

By Katie Bo Williams


The U.S. is cutting 10 percent of its counterterrorism troops in Africa. Will China and Russia fill the gap?

The Trump administration has declared a new era of Great Power competition, shifting U.S. national security priorities from counterterrorism after almost two decades to long-term strategic threats from countries like Russia and China.

But in Africa — a contested battlefield where those adversaries are vying for strategic influence — policy experts warn that the U.S. hasn’t been playing the game. The Pentagon has escalated counterterrorism strikes and special operations missions across the continent in a quietly expanding mission. Some lawmakers and former officials for years have warned that the U.S. has relied too heavily on elite operators for short-term tactical missions that aren’t underpinned by an holistic strategy or complemented by non-military efforts and, in Africa, that dynamic is particularly stark.

Gen. Tony Thomas, the head of U.S. Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, told a conference audience in Austin earlier this month that “there has been a realization that [Africa] is a great power competition area.” China in particular is expanding its military footprint on the continent, partly by leveraging its expanding economic activities via a sweeping infrastructure program called the Belt and Road Initiative, and partly by building on decades of financial and political involvement in several countries. Russia also has sought to gain a foothold across the continent with military cooperation agreements and arms deals, and in September announced an agreement to build a logistics base in Eritrea, on the Red Sea.

“Basically we are missing the boat in Africa,” said Mary Beth Long, a CIA veteran and former assistant secretary of defense for International Security Affairs. “We’re not even clear from an intelligence standpoint on what the underpinnings of a strategy would attempt to address and in part that’s because we have inadequate resources dedicated to the African continent.”

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National Security Advisor John Bolton is scheduled to unveil the Trump administration’s new strategy for the continent in a speech to the conservative Heritage Foundation on Thursday. It is expected to focus on countering near-peer adversaries rather than counterterrorism. The White House is not expected to ask for more funding for diplomacy, intelligence gathering or foreign aid, according to NBC News.

The announcement comes just weeks after the Pentagon said it would be cutting 10 percent of its troop presence in Africa over the next several years, including half of the counterterrorism forces operating in West Africa. The Defense Department said in a statement that the goal was to “realign our counter-terrorism resources and forces operating in Africa over the next several years in order to maintain a competitive posture worldwide.”

The move raised some eyebrows in the policy community and on Capitol Hill. “A withdrawal by the United States is a win for China,” said Paul Nantulya, a research associate at the Africa Center for Strategic Studies, a congressionally-funded Pentagon think tank.

“It’s a vitally important theater for [great power competition],” said Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, when asked about the troop cuts. “Alternatives should be looked at.”

But others say that the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Africa isn’t so directly linked to the broader strategy of competing against Russia and China. That bigger picture, they say, is more about sustained economic and policy engagement that is the purview of the State Department and USAID—agencies tasked with building sustained engagement with potential allies.

“What they’re attempting to do is rebalance their efforts on a worldwide basis and I don’t see it directly related to Chinese and Russian involvement, I see it related to terrorist involvement, trying to identify where they can be more effective,” said Sen. Jack Reed, R.I., the top Democrat on the Senate Armed Services Committee, told Defense One this week.

For others, the drawdown is concerning from a counterterrorism perspective. Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., called the planned drawdown in Africa “an incredibly bad move,” arguing that as Islamist extremists are defeated in the Mideast, they will reemerge in unstable places in Africa.

“I think the war’s moving to Africa,” he said. But: “If you have to pick and choose [between countering nation-state threats and countering terrorist threats], you’re making a mistake…. If you start picking and choosing, taking soldiers from counterterrorism, counterinsurgency and move them over, you’re basically putting yourself at risk.”

In some parts of Africa, the counterterrorism mission remains untouched. In Somalia, U.S. military and intelligence forces are battling al-Shabaab fighters with airstrikes and ground operations alongside and in support of Somali commandos. This year, there have been 37 U.S. airstrikes in Somalia — more than in any previous year, according to data maintained by The Long War Journal. U.S Africa Command, or AFRICOM, has announced seven major strikes in the past four weeks, each alleging to have killed multiple al-Shabaab members.

The total U.S. force presence in Africa is about 7,500 troops, AFRICOM head Gen. Thomas Waldhauser told Congress earlier this year. (It was about 6,000 in 2017). Most operate from Camp Lemonnier, a permanent and growing U.S. base in Djibouti, which is used as a staging ground and command center for special operations missions across the continent, and across the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait, in Yemen. Special Operations Command Africa has around 1,200 troops spread across about a dozen countries, advising local security forces combating extremist groups.

The death of four American soldiers in a deadly ambush in Niger last fall inflamed scrutiny on U.S. security operations in West Africa, where the presence of U.S. soldiers, though advertised on AFRICOM’s website, surprised many Americans.

Lawmakers on Capitol Hill have been grappling broadly with the role of special forces under the new great power strategy. What is their job? Will they be diverted from or under-resourced for important counterterror missions? Lt. Gen. Rich Clarke, President Trump’s pick to succeed Thomas at SOCOM next year, told the Senate Armed Services Committee last week that SOCOM is positioned to be an important player under the new framework. By working with allies and partners that Russia and China do not have, he said, “we can counter some of their malign activities.” But he offered no specifics and the uncertainty continues to percolate.

“There’s this inherent tension in the [National Defense Strategy],” said Judd Devermont, who currently leads the Africa program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and who served as the national intelligence officer for Africa from 2015 to 2018. “The overall NDS talks about great power competition as a new focus, but if you look at the Africa elements on the NDS, combatting the malign influence — that’s the last piece of that entire paragraph. So I think AFRICOM is still making this transition, trying to adjust the way it thinks about the prioritization of terrorism versus great power competition.”

“I think it’s an open question. What does combating China and Russia mean in Africa?”

Trump’s new Africa strategy is a clear effort to address that tension. It is expected to call for strengthening ties with countries that are likely targets for U.S. competitors and adversaries, and countering the ability of those countries to gain footholds in unstable areas through economic investment. Although the strategy will call for continuing key counterterror partnerships, like with Somali forces, according to NBC News, the focus is shifting away from countering extremist groups to long-term, strategic nation-state threats. But it’s difficult to see what the U.S. might do differently, at least from a military perspective, without more resources, policy experts say. The Trump administration already is building partnerships with African governments and experts say trying to counter Russia and China’s individual engagements would create opportunities for host countries to play the powers off of one another.

“I don’t know what you would actually do to shift your focus in Africa beyond what we’re already doing,” Devermont said.

The impact of the planned 10-percent U.S. troop reduction in Africa is also difficult to assess. According to the Defense Department, the emphasis in West Africa would shift from “tactical assistance to advising, assisting, liaising and sharing intelligence.”

Rep. Adam Smith, D-Wash., the incoming chairman on the House Armed Services Committee, suggested that French troops in West Africa could mitigate the risk that a peer competitor could backfill U.S. troop withdrawals.

“In West Africa, the French have been helpful [and] we’re beginning to shore up some of the governments in that part of the world, [like] Mali and Niger,” Smith said, during a roundtable with defense reporters on Wednesday. “So if we’re reducing the number of troops in West Africa because we have partners that are able to meet our mission, that’s great.”

The chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Sen. Jim Inhofe, R-Okla., argued that Africa’s sheer size makes small, individual deployments like the kinds that are being cut inefficient anyway. He is pushing for the permanent stationing of a Security Force Assistance Brigade, or SFAB, that he says would offer flexibility of mobility on a continent that is so geographically enormous and culturally and politically diverse.

“You don’t know if it’s going to be a Zimbabwe problem or an Ethiopia problem, but wherever it is, it’s going to be a long way from the last one, so if you have a dedicated troop ready to spring that could actually get people there better—if you can respond by quicker by using that method, it could be an improvement,” he said.

Broadly, some see a link between combating extremist groups and countering nation-state competitors.

“You have indigenous movements that are not threatening to the United States per se, but continue to destabilize a region that makes them susceptible to other large power plays,” said Long.

In the center of Africa, in nations that are struggling with indigenous conflict, “the Chinese are heavily engaged in influencing operations, but also locking in [natural] resources that we need and other developing nations need access to in order to continue to feed our technology development,” she said.

But, she said, if the de-emphasis on the counterterror mission is in exchange for more support to stabilization efforts like focused investment or boosted support for diplomatic initiatives, the drawdown might square with the overall strategy.

Chinese military, financial, and diplomatic engagement on the continent has been steadily rising for decades, experts say. The Belt and Road Initiative has “very clear security and military underpinnings that has lead to an expansion of China’s military footprint on the continent,” said Nantulya. In 2015, Beijing passed a law allowing for the foreign deployment of the Chinese Army and other security institutions outside of its national borders. In 2017, China opened a military base just miles from the U.S. base at Djibouti and is exploring others across the continent. China also has several commercial ports on the African coast that experts say could help Beijing towards its strategic goal of a blue water Navy. China also is increasing its support for the UN-approved African Union peacekeeping mission in Somalia, providing communications, unmanned aerial vehicles and other technical support. Perhaps most interestly, Nantulya says, China is providing combat medicine personnel to countries like Ethiopia and Sudan—suggesting an increasing militarization of its role on the continent.

“The fact that they’re going into combat medicine, they’re sending medical orderlies into these different countries to conduct managing casualties—they’re doing much more than just evacuations [of Chinese nationals] and humanitarian assistance,” Nantulya said.

Russia’s investment in Africa is far less sustained. Devermont suggested that Moscow is “looking for opportunities where the U.S. is leaving or not there and selling themselves as a more reliable partner,” offering arms sales and military advisors. In the resource-rich but unstable Central African Republic, Russia is helping train local security forces. The paramilitary firm Wagner Group, believed to have ties to the Kremlin, operates in CAR and Sudan. Moscow’s bid for influence is of particular concern in war-torn Libya, Long said, where Moscow has forged close relations with warlord Khalifa Hifter and signed oil deals with the U.N.-backed government.

Experts are quick to caution that just like in the United States, Africa is not at the top of the priority list for China and Russia. But for Africans, Devermont noted, the return of great power competition isn’t a negative thing. Nor, he says, are Russia and China the only game in town. The UAE, Japan, South Korea, North Korea, and other nations are engaging in Africa.

“[Africans] don’t see this as zero-sum,” he said. “It provides new resources, gives them new leverage, lessens dependence. It’s very difficult for us to talk to the Africans about ‘you’re with us’ or ‘you’re with them’—that’s not the paradigm the Africans are going to subscribe to.

“We’re talking with one set of talking points and the Africans have very different ones.”
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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Jeu 13 Déc 2018 - 17:02


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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Mar 18 Déc 2018 - 17:05


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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Ven 28 Déc 2018 - 18:46

The RAND Corporation a écrit:

Is This the Beginning of a New Cold War?


It has become increasingly common for observers of world affairs to contend that the United States and China have either entered into or are poised to embark on a new Cold War, adducing trade frictions as the latest evidence that the two countries have intrinsically incompatible approaches to domestic governance and conceptions of world order. While the contours of a long-term contest between Washington and Beijing are undoubtedly forming, especially in the economic realm, the analogy is problematic.

The United States seriously weighed the possibility of a nuclear exchange with the Soviet Union in which hundreds of millions might have perished. The core of U.S.–China competition, however, centers on the structure of the world economy and the mastery of frontier technologies. The Trump administration regards “Made in China 2025” as a challenge to U.S. national security; China regards that blueprint as the basis for its transition out of low-end manufacturing.

The Soviet Union had pretensions to a universal ideology and fomented revolution across the world. China, too, believes in its own exceptionalism, and is “exporting” some elements of the surveillance apparatus that it is developing to cement the Communist Party's grip on power—telecommunications company ZTE, for example, is helping Venezuela develop a system to monitor its citizens—but it has yet to manifest a missionary zeal.

The Soviet Union was firmly opposed to and largely excluded from the U.S.-led order. China, however, has been one of the principal beneficiaries of that system, and has thus far contested it selectively, not frontally.

The United States and the Soviet Union each presided over blocs of ideologically aligned satellites. Today, however, few countries are inclined to “choose” the United States or China, even those that are nervous about the latter's ambitions in the Asia-Pacific region; instead, as Japan and India demonstrate, many are strengthening their diplomatic and military ties with Washington while boosting their trade and investment ties with Beijing. It is unlikely that they would participate in an effort to contain China.

Finally, Washington and Moscow had little in the way of economic or cultural exchanges. Two-way trade between the United States and China, by contrast, totaled U.S.$635 billion last year and is on track to reach U.S.$650 billion this year. The two countries are also bound together by a dense network of global supply chains. In the 2017-2018 academic year, moreover, there were over 363,000 Chinese students enrolled at U.S. colleges and universities, accounting for roughly a third of all international students studying in the United States.

The purpose of noting the Cold War analogy's limits is not to diminish the scope of the China challenge, but to suggest that the United States will need to manage it differently than it did the Soviet threat. Washington may have to reconcile the inevitability of intensifying competition with the imperative of sustained cooperation, without knowing what long-term equilibrium it seeks to achieve with Beijing—a long-term undertaking that could test its psychological resilience and strategic dexterity in equal measure.

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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Sam 5 Jan 2019 - 21:42

Je vous conseille vivement cette émission de Arte "Le monde selon Xi Jingping",ou comment la Chine va être une grande puissance économique et militaire dans un futur proche.
Ça trace la vie de Xi Jingping, et les différentes stratégies de la Chine pour être la première puissance mondiale, notamment sur le plan militaire et spatial.



Le Maroc devrait faire sa place des maintenant avec ce pays, l'avenir est a l'Est les amis ! L'Europe est out en déliquescence, il faut se détacher de ce continent sans pour autant couper les ponts, et mettre les gaz vers la Chine, l'Inde, la Corée du Sud.

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MessageSujet: Re: Géopolitique Mondiale   Mar 15 Jan 2019 - 21:53

The Hill a écrit:

Engagement vs. Competition: The China Policy Debate


The US can't 'out-China' China





With trade talks between the United States and China slated for January, Washington's longstanding hope that Beijing's growing integration into the world economy would temper its illiberalism at home and produce a “responsible stakeholder” abroad has faltered.

While the two countries shared until recently an encouraging, if abstract, commitment to achieving a “new model of great-power relations,” they now make little effort to conceal their growing distrust of one another.

There is a growing consensus within the U.S. foreign policy establishment that the United States is engaged in a long-term, intensifying strategic competition with China.

Less clear, though, is what ultimate relationship the United States should seek and can plausibly achieve with its resurgent competitor. One reason for that uncertainty is the difficulty of determining where to place China along the ally-to-adversary continuum.

The two countries did $635 billion in trade last year and are additionally bound together by a complex network of global supply chains. China accounts for roughly a third of all international students who are enrolled in U.S. colleges and universities, and initiatives such as the Schwarzman Scholars program are allowing future U.S. leaders to study in China.

By contrast, there was little in the way of economic, cultural or people-to-people exchanges between Washington and Moscow during the Cold War.

An inability to classify China precisely limits, if not precludes, America's ability to formulate a coherent strategy because it leaves open potential end states ranging all the way from cooperative coevolution to armed conflict.

It is telling, observes the Atlantic Monthly's Uri Friedman, that ambiguity about the path forward extends even to perhaps the most prominent advocate of a more confrontational approach toward China, the president himself:

“Sometimes it seems as if he's hunkering down in the trenches for a prolonged economic cold war, other times as if he's prepared to call the whole thing off and resume being best friends with Xi if the two sides can strike a deal.”

One goal that President Trump has consistently articulated is righting the U.S. trade balance with China (Washington recorded its largest-ever deficit with Beijing this October, $43.1 billion).

Even if achieved, though, a reduction in that figure would do little to narrow the disparity between U.S. and Chinese growth rates or forestall the day when China matches or even surpasses the United States in most benchmarks of national power.

While it may be tempting to employ tariffs and other trade restrictions to hobble China, such measures will also cut the U.S. growth rate—no matter how China chooses to retaliate—not only because Washington and Beijing are highly economically interdependent, but also because the latter is the most important motor of global growth.

This type of beggar-thy-neighbor tack is, therefore, unsustainable. In any case, the most important gauge of U.S.-China competition is not the bilateral trade balance but comparative success in developing markets.

While the United States has taken some encouraging steps to strengthen its geoeconomic posture—most recently standing up an agency, the International Development Finance Corporation, that has twice the budget cap of its predecessor, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and is permitted to invest in debt as well as equity—it does not have a cohesive plan to compete in this domain.

The Trump administration's focus on securing bilateral trade deals and balancing trade flows one country at a time is unlikely to stem or even keep pace with the growth of Chinese influence. Nor will efforts to compel middle countries to “choose” Washington or Beijing.

Both supporters and critics of the administration's China policy agree that Washington will be unable to compete with Beijing over the long run or spur it to undertake market-oriented reforms unless it enlists a broad coalition of powerful economies in its efforts.

The United States could leverage multilateral arrangements to expand its access to third markets, strengthen international norms surrounding trade and investment and incentivize China to adhere to those norms by collaborating when it does and mobilizing concerted international pressure when it does not.

The United States also could renew its internal sources of competitiveness, especially the ecosystem of innovation that has long enabled it to be at the forefront of developing and harnessing frontier technologies.

U.S. observers increasingly depict engagement and competition as alternative policy approaches to China. Yet both remain essential instruments: the former, to continue building avenues of collaboration in sustaining an open system of trade, slowing the progression of climate change and addressing other pressing global challenges; the latter, to marshal collective action against unfair Chinese economic practices and assure America's partners and allies of its economic resilience and enduring strategic commitment to the Asia-Pacific region.

Ultimately, though, there is only so much that the United States can—or should attempt to—do to prevent China's emergence as a potential peer. It should aim not to “out-China” China but instead become a more dynamic version of its best self.

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