Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb

Invité

Rappel du premier message :

le Terrorisme est certainement un ennemi commun entre le Maroc est l'Algerie. encore plus eguise chez nos voisins. un appel a la cooperation contre le Terrrorisme a ete deja lance par Sa Majeste le Roi, a l'occation des derniers Attaques d'Alger.

sur terre, comment imaginez vous une guerre Magrebine contre le terrorisme ??? et pensez vous que l'ANP et les FAR commbatront dans les memes Rangs cet ennemi imprevisible???

Merci youssef. 6 jours d'interrogatoires c'est pas le monde des bisounours avec les notres. Il a du tout dire Smile

Citation :: EXCLUSIF. COMMENT LE MAROC A DÉJOUÉ SUR SON TERRITOIRE UN REMAKE DES ATTENTATS DE PARIS

Les neuf membres de la cellule terroriste démantelée vendredi dernier voulaient reproduire le même scénario des attentats de Paris dans plusieurs villes du Maroc. Ils attendaient le Nouvel An pour passer à l’acte. Révélations.

Le Maroc a échappé à une série d’attentats programmés dans plusieurs villes pendant les fêtes du Nouvel An. Les neuf membres de la cellule terroriste, démantelée vendredi dernier, projetaient de perpétrer des actes terroristes à Tanger, Fès, Béni Mellal, Kénitra et Nador, suivant le même modus operandi que les auteurs des attentats du 13 novembre à Paris. Parmi les personnes interpellées, deux d’entre elles, respectivement M.L. et A. M., ont des frères qui combattent pour Daech à Raqqa en Syrie.

«Ces derniers étaient non seulement au courant des attentats qui se préparaient au Maroc, mais s’apprêtaient, avec la bénédiction de Al Baghdadi, à envoyer de Syrie un artificier daechien pour confectionner au Maroc des ceintures explosives», apprend le360 d’une source proche du dossier.

Autre révélation importante, le pistolet et le révolver saisis lors de l’arrestation des neuf membres de la cellule terroriste par les éléments du BCIJ provenaient de Belgique. Un autre lot d’armes, également en provenance de Belgique, était attendu par les membres de la cellule démantelée.

Un plan diabolique

Quelles sont les cibles des membres de cette cellule ? Les endroits à grande affluence. Les boîtes de nuit ainsi que les lieux publics à Tanger et à Fès. Les ceintures explosives devaient être «impitoyablement efficaces» dans des espaces clos comme les boîtes de nuit à succès dans la ville du Détroit.

A Kénitra, cette cellule visait les agences de transferts de fonds, ainsi que les éléments des services de sécurités (policiers, gendarmes…), en vue de les déposséder de leurs armes. Pour les autres villes, des kidnappings de notables étaient préparés à Kasbat Tadla pour demander des rançons et pouvoir disposer des ressources financières nécessaires pour assurer la logistique de leurs funestes projets.

Loin des grandes villes

Les neuf membres de la cellule démantelée ont opté pour des villes loin des grands centres pour les fêtes du Nouvel an comme Casablanca, Rabat, Marrakech ou Agadir. Ils espéraient ainsi faire face à un dispositif sécuritaire léger et échapper à la vigilance des services de sécurité et de renseignement. Des calculs qui se sont révélés faux puisque le démantèlement de cette cellule atteste encore une fois que les services de sécurité sont aux aguets sur tout le territoire. Un dispositif sans faille jusque-là et fort heureusement.

Rappelons que lors de l’arrestation des neuf membres de la cellule terroriste, les unités au sol du BCIJ ont bénéficié d’une couverture aérienne de la Gendarmerie royale qui a déployé des hélicoptères dans la région de Béni Mellal.

Par Mohammed Boudarham

http://www.le360.ma/fr/societe/exclusif-comment-le-maroc-a-dejoue-sur-son-territoire-un-remake-des-attentats-de-paris-59786

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Sois généreux avec nous, Ô toi Dieu et donne nous la Victoire

Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb - Page 30 Signat10

lemag a écrit:: Libye – Les terroristes menacent le Maghreb avec du gaz Sarin

Londres : C’est l’ancien ponte du régime de Mouammar Kadhafi, le Colonel Ahmed Gaddaf addam, qui en a fait la révélation.

Les groupes ‘terroristes’ en Libye, daech et les autres factions, auraient réussi à mettre la main sur un stock d’armes chimiques, ultra-dangereuses, dans un entrepôt de l’ancienne armée de Kadhafi, situé dans le sud de la Libye.

Selon le Colonel Ahmed Gaddaf Addam, cousin et ancien très proche collaborateur de Mouammar Kadhafi, ses armes chimiques seraient composées de la très dangereuse substance volatile, le gaz Sarin.

Gaddaf Addam, interviewé par le quotidien londonien saoudien, Ashark Al-awsat, a indiqué que les groupes terroristes ont commencé à acheminer les stocks de ces armes chimiques vers les villes libyennes du nord, y compris vers Tripoli et qu’à partir de ces villes, ils pourraient opérer des attaques chimiques contre les cibles qu’ils désigneraient, en Libye, au Maghreb et même en Europe.

En fin, l’ancien ponte du l’ancien régime libyen a allégué que c'est pour cette raison que les pays occidentaux mettent fortes pressions pour la passation de l’accord de Skhirate au Maroc, pour la formation d'un gouvernement d'union nationale en Libye.

#ليبيا | قذاف الدم: متطرفو ليبيا استولوا على غاز السارين.. والغرب غض الطرف . https://t.co/H6nGpqYCtR
— صحيفة الشرق الأوسط (@aawsat_News) 17 Décembre 2015
A noter que le gaz Sarin est une substance inodore, incolore et volatile, de la famille des organophosphorés, un neurotoxique pour l'homme et l'animal. Même à très faible dose (10 parties par milliard) il peut être fatal.

On estime qu'il est environ 500 fois plus toxique que le cyanure. Il passe facilement la barrière des poumons et est absorbé par la peau d'où il passe directement dans le sang. Quand il ne tue pas, il laisse de graves séquelles neurologiques. Il a été utilisé comme arme chimique, avant d'être considéré comme une arme de destruction massive par les Nations unies (résolution 687). À ce titre, sa production et sa conservation sont interdites depuis 1993.

Citation :: La Chambre chargée des affaires de terrorisme à la Cour d'appel de Salé a prononcé, vendredi, des verdicts allant de l'acquittement à six ans de prison ferme à l'encontre de trois accusés, dont deux ressortissants turcs.

http://www.h24info.ma/maroc/un-ressortissant-turc-condamne-6-ans-de-prison-pour-terrorisme-au-maroc/41735

KEEP CALM JUBA

http://www.yawatani.com/index.php/societe/11282-un-titre-choc-du-magazine-americain-foreign-policy-sur-le-maroc a écrit:: Un titre choc du magazine américain ‘Foreign Policy’ sur le Maroc
New York : Le magazine américain a accusé le Maroc d’être ‘’au cœur du terrorisme mondial’’ et a comparé le nord du royaume à la région de Helmand en Afghanistan.

En effet, par un titre choc et calomniant, le bimestriel ultra conservateur américain, ‘Foreign Policy’ a attaqué le Maroc et sa région nord du Rif, en lui collant la grave accusation d’être ‘’au cœur du terrorisme mondial’.

Dans un article, signé par une collaboratrice de la chaîne française, France 24, la journaliste leela jacinto, Foreign Policy a titré ‘Morocco’s Outlaw Country Is the Heartland of Global Terrorism’ (traduction libre : Le Maroc – Pays hors la loi, au cœur du terrorisme mondial).

Dans son écrit stigmatisant tout un pays et la population de toute une région, celle du Rif, le magazine américain a indiqué qu’il faille chercher les causes des attentats terroristes qui ont frappé ‘‘les capitales occidentales’’, au nord du Maroc. Les accusés sont les rifains.

Dissimulant la faillite du système social européen qui a raté l’intégration d’une jeunesse européenne, quoiqu’issue de l’immigration, Foreign Policy, a choisi de faire porter le chapeau de ce phénomène terroriste purement européen, au Maroc, le pays des arrière-grands-parents de ces jeunes européens.

Pire encore, le magazine américain a poussé la caricature au point d’aller comparer la région nord du royaume, le Rif, à la région de Helmand en Afghanistan.

Cette province afghane, contrôlée par les talibans et par les mafias de l’opium et où l’Otan mène des opérations militaires, ressemblerait au Rif, a écrit Foreign Policy.

""The northern Rif mountains have been home to hash-peddlers, smugglers, and outlaws for centuries. Now they’re a breeding ground for Europe’s jihadi terrorists.""

Et les rifains, selon lui, sont une population aussi autarcique et religieusement radicalisée que le sont les talibans. Et sont des bandits depuis des siècles et autant anti-monarchiques que sont les talibans anti-Etat Afghan.

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""Qu'importe que je sois de mauvaise foi puisque je lutte pour une cause juste.
Qu'importe que je lutte pour une cause injuste puisque je suis de bonne foi""

Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb - Page 30 VUO9YX1

“L'histoire n'est que la géographie dans le temps, comme la géographie n'est que l'histoire dans l'espace.”

http://www.medias24.com/MAROC/NATION/163886-Tanger-le-terroriste-venait-de-Ndjamena.html

Citation :: Tanger: le terroriste venait de Ndjaména

Un déploiement sans précédent des forces spéciales du BCIJ a permis l’arrestation ce vendredi matin à Tanger d’un ressortissant tchadien qui planifiait des attentats.

Agé de 33 ans, Yabou Dbaye a été arrêté un peu avant 10 heures ce vendredi matin 13 mai au café Schengen qui se trouve sur la corniche de Tanger à quelques mètres des restaurants KFC et McDonald’s et du café Kandinsky.

La zone résidentielle et touristique est très fréquentée à toute heure du jour et de la nuit. Elle abrite de nombreux cafés et restaurants, des hôtels et des résidences touristiques. A quelques dizaines ou centaines de mètres de là se trouvent les hôtels Royal Tulip, César, Ramada et Ibis notamment.L

LIRE EGALEMENT: Le Maroc a échappé à un nouveau "16-mai"

Signe peut-être que la BCIJ préparait une opération d’envergure, les agents de sécurité des hôtels environnants avaient pour consigne depuis quelques jours de noter les numéros des plaques minéralogiques de tous les véhicules qui stationnent à proximité des établissements hôteliers.

Au cœur de Tanger

La BCIJ a déployé une centaine d’hommes fortement armés et aux visages revêtus de cagoules vers 10 heures du matin avant que des éléments lourdement armés ne s’engouffrent dans le café Schengen et ressortent quelques minutes plus tard avec l’homme recherché.

Celui-ci était habillé en costume-cravate et sa tête était cachée sous une cagoule à la vue des passants et des objectifs des photographes et des caméras. Selon l’Intérieur, l’homme préparait une série d’attentats contre des sites touristiques et des missions diplomatiques étrangères.

La circulation sur l’artère principale a été interrompue pendant quelques minutes et des dizaines de badauds ont assisté à la sortie du terroriste présumé du café Schengen accompagné des hommes en noir.

Yabou Dbaye serait arrivé à l’aéroport de Casablanca en provenance du Tchad le 4 mai dernier selon le communiqué du ministère de l’Intérieur.

Cette information indique que Daech qui est implanté sur la côte libyenne et qui cherche à faire le lien avec les pays du Sahel et le nord du Nigéria, vise désormais le Maroc à partir de cette zone.

Des vidéos appelant à des attentats au Maroc ont été diffusées au cours de ces derniers jours par des militants terroristes affiliés à Daech. La Libye partage plus de 900 km de frontière terrestre avec le Tchad. Le sud-est du Tchad est par ailleurs frontalier avec le nord-ouest du Nigéria où Boko Haram est implanté.

Depuis plusieurs semaines, l’envoyé spécial des Nations Unies en Libye Martin Kopler souligne que «la lutte contre l’EI ne peut plus attendre».Dans un entretien au Monde du 21 avril dernier Kopler insistait : «Le processus politique avance à la vitesse de l’escargot, tandis que l’expansion de l’EI est bien plus rapide».

Depuis l’automne dernier, des attentats ont touché le Tchad, le Mali, le Burkina Faso et la Côte d’Ivoire tandis que le Sénégal et le Gabon resserrent leur coopération sécuritaire avec le Maroc. Français et Américains disposent de forces spéciales en Libye qui travaillent à la recherche d’alliés sur un terrain divisé entre de très nombreuses factions et dans un environnement où les armes foisonnent. La Tunisie de son côté construit une barrière de 200 km de long à sa frontière avec la Libye.

Roland Lombardi, consultant indépendant, associé au groupe d’analyse de JFC Conseil a écrit:: .....à l’inverse de ce que nous avons trop tendance à croire, les « gros poissons » du trafic de drogue et du grand banditisme ne font pas bon ménage avec les terroristes. Ainsi, pour démanteler les réseaux terroristes, l’aide de services de renseignement du Maghreb (marocains et algériens notamment) a sans doute était précieuse, mais il ne serait pas étonnant que des informations cruciales recueillies émanent de caïds (qui sont par ailleurs à des années lumières du salafisme) souhaitant simplement retrouver une certaine tranquillité dans leur quartier afin de protéger et assurer leur lucratif business…

##Lien

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/moroccos-jihadist-paradox-unraveled

Citation :: Morocco's Jihadist Paradox, Unraveled
When tourists are involved, authorities in Morocco have seemed hesitant to describe attacks as acts of terrorism. On Oct. 5, for instance, Moroccan authorities were reluctant to label a knife attack in Casablanca as an act of terrorism, noting instead that the perpetrator, who injured three Dutch tourists and a police officer, was mentally disturbed. Similarly, authorities attributed a November 2015 knife attack on German tourists in Fez to the two assailants' drug use. But, as we've seen in past attacks, an attacker's mental health issues or criminal activities do not preclude support for extremist groups.

That Moroccan authorities would try to downplay any ideological motive in attacks on tourists is not surprising. Tourism there is an important industry, attracting some 10 million visitors each year. The country's leaders, aware of the devastating effects that jihadist attacks have had on tourism in Tunisia and Egypt, doubtless want to avoid casting the same pall over their own country. Despite their worries, however, Morocco faces a much lesser jihadist threat than do its neighbors in North Africa.
Morocco's Jihadists

With an estimated 1,200 to 1,500 fighters in Syria and Iraq, Morocco is one of the leading sources of foreign fighters for the Islamic State and other jihadist groups in the region. This is by no means a new phenomenon; Moroccans have left their country to fight jihad in conflicts as diverse as the wars in Afghanistan, Bosnia, Chechnya and Iraq. In the early 1990s, fighters returned from Afghanistan to found a jihadist group called the Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group, which strove to establish an Islamic polity in Morocco. Moroccans, moreover, have been involved in transnational jihadist groups such as al Qaeda since their inception. But the Moroccan contingent has consistently lacked the same level of tradecraft that jihadists from other countries have exhibited — though they often trained at the same camps. Consequently, its members have not risen to the upper ranks of these groups as Egyptian and Libyan jihadists have.

The so-called Sinjar records, a trove of personnel files that the U.S. military retrieved from an al Qaeda safe-house in northern Iraq, shed some light on this tendency. According to the records, Libya and Saudi Arabia supplied far more fighters than Morocco did, especially relative to their populations. Even so, Morocco was a leading country of origin for al Qaeda fighters in Iraq. In addition, of the nationalities represented in the Sinjar records, Moroccans were most likely to volunteer as suicide bombers, something that 91 percent of fighters from Morocco listed as their desired duty. This propensity for suicide bombing meant that fewer Moroccans survived to take the skills they acquired in Iraq back home.
A History of Lackluster Attacks

As a result, terrorist attacks in Morocco have long evinced a lack of competent planning or effective execution — even during al Qaeda's heyday. For instance, despite its scale, the group's May 2003 suicide bombing campaign in Casablanca claimed only 33 victims, although 14 bombers hit an array of soft targets in the city, including a restaurant, a hotel and a Jewish community center. In April 2007, Moroccan jihadists were ready to launch another suicide bombing wave in Casablanca, but authorities interrupted the plot. When police surrounded the building where four of the plotters were hiding on April 10, three of them blew themselves up, and a sniper killed the fourth. Two other suspects linked to the cell attempted an attack near the U.S. Consulate while on the run a few days later, but the only fatalities in the poorly executed operation were the bombers themselves. Even the deadlier attacks that have rocked Morocco — for example an April 2011 bombing in Marrakech that killed 17 people, most of them tourists — have been simple strikes on soft targets, not the larger, more sophisticated attacks seen elsewhere in the region.

Relative to other countries in the region, such as Tunisia, Algeria and Egypt — not to mention Libya and Mali, where jihadists have seized and controlled territory — militant attacks in Morocco are rare. Considering the volume of fighters that Morocco has contributed to the jihadist cause over so many decades, the dearth of spectacular terrorist assaults in the country may seem surprising. After all, the country suffers from the same economic and demographic problems that fuel jihadism in nearby countries. But Morocco for the most part has managed to suppress its jihadist threat.
What Sets Morocco Apart

One of the main factors helping to keep Morocco's jihadists in check is the competence of its security forces. The country's powerful intelligence agency, national police force, paramilitary police and Central Bureau of Judicial Investigations (Morocco's version of the FBI) work closely with their American and European counterparts, receive extensive training and are highly proficient. Moroccan intelligence has even helped to avert attacks elsewhere with the information it collects and shares. After the 2003 Casablanca bombings, an anti-terrorism law gave Moroccan security forces greater legal leeway to combat jihadism, and since then, authorities have been aggressive in pre-empting attacks and rounding up suspects. The legislation known as the Law to Combat Terror was strengthened in 2011, and in 2015, Morocco made it illegal for its citizens to attempt to travel to Syria or Iraq to join the Islamic State. Moroccan authorities have also developed sophisticated programs to help identify returning jihadists, monitor suspected returnees and counter the ideology of jihadism with theology. The programs have proved remarkably effective, especially when compared to the efforts of other countries in the region.

Because of Morocco's robust security environment, it is difficult for jihadist groups to establish operations in the country, despite the large number of militants who hail from within its borders. Even the Islamic State has struggled to deploy operatives in Morocco to conduct the kinds of attacks it carried out in Paris and Brussels. In fact, rather than attacking in Morocco as it has done elsewhere in the region, the Islamic State's affiliate in the Sahel region, led by Adnan Abu Walid Sahraoui, has merely issued an audio message calling for attacks there. Much like other jihadist groups' embrace of the leaderless resistance strategy, such a call is an admission of weakness by the Islamic State that indicates its inability to operate in Morocco.

These factors help explain why raids by security forces on suspected terrorist cells or grassroots attacks such as the Oct. 5 incident in Casablanca constitute the bulk of recent jihadist activity in Morocco. Barring some sort of dramatic political crisis that topples the Moroccan government and monarchy, this pattern will not change any time soon. Considering the country's economic and demographic challenges, the number of jihadists who have been radicalized there, and the waves of fighters returning from battle in Iraq and Syria, jihadism will remain a low-level threat in Morocco, as it will in European countries such as France and Belgium. But given the Islamic State's limited transnational terrorist tradecraft, the increasing pressure it is under and its ever-diminishing access to the outside world, the group will be hard-pressed to launch a spectacular terrorist attack in Morocco.

https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/intelligence-agencies-are-running-al-qaeda-camps-in-north-africa-un-consultant-exclusive-6e19eec5d834#.dsirqr4m5

Citation :: Intelligence agencies are running al-Qaeda camps in North Africa — UN consultant (EXCLUSIVE) – INSURGE intelligence
Nafeez Ahmed

By Nafeez Ahmed

This exclusive is published by INSURGE INTELLIGENCE, a crowdfunded investigative journalism project for the global commons. Support us to keep digging where others fear to tread

An unpublished report by a government advisor and UN consultant, obtained exclusively by INSURGE intelligence, accuses Western and Algerian security services of complicity in al-Qaeda terrorist activity across North Africa.

The academic report focuses on damning evidence that a devastating al-Qaeda terrorist attack on the Tigantourine gas plant near In Amenas, Algeria, was orchestrated by Algeria’s secret services, with the knowledge of US, French and British intelligence.

A draft copy of the report, due to be published later this month, has been seen exclusively by INSURGE intelligence.

Escalating instability in North Africa is being blamed on the re-emergence of an offshoot of al-Qaeda — al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). Despite French military efforts, the group is re-consolidated in northern Mali, and has orchestrated terror strikes from Burkino Faso to the Ivory Coast.

Yet the new draft report by a UN consultant, prepared by the International State Crime Initiative (ISCI) at Queen Mary University of London, uncovers remarkable evidence that the Phoenix-like return of AQIM is thanks to the unwavering covert support the terror group receives from one of the West’s staunch allies in the ‘war on terror’: Algeria.
Terror ties

The as-yet unpublished report highlights evidence of such support from the In Amenas attack between 16 and 20 January 2013, which resulted in the deaths of 39 foreign nationals, including three Americans, six Britons, five Norwegians, and one French.

The Tigantourine gas plant is operated jointly by BP, Norway’s Statoil and the Algerian state-owned Sonatrach, producing 12% of Algeria’s natural gas.
Algeria’s In Amenas gas plant (Reuters)

The attack was the single largest terrorist killing of ‘Westerners’ since the London bombings of 7 July 2005.

The Queen Mary University of London report is authored by social anthropologist Jeremy Keenan, Visiting Professor at the Queen Mary University’s Law School.

Keenan, who has authored over 200 peer-reviewed scholarly articles and six books on the Sahara-Sahel region, is an advisor on regional security issues to NATO, the US State Department, the EU, the UN, the British Foreign Office, and international oil companies.

The report reveals startling evidence that the attack was secretly organised by the DRS, Algeria’s notorious secret intelligence service. The idea was to convince Algeria’s Western allies to continue supporting the regime’s domestic and regional counter-terrorism programmes, amidst growing international scepticism about their success.

Algeria’s DRS maintained intimate ties with the terrorists behind the In Amenas attack, many of whom have been longstanding agents of the Algerian security services, the report says.

US, British and French intelligence services are aware of these connections, but are covering them up to protect their considerable oil and gas interests in the country.

Among the report’s most alarming revelations is that over the last decade, Algeria’s DRS has run a secret al-Qaeda training camp in the Tamouret region, with the knowledge of Western government security agencies.
Al-Qaeda camp — run by Algeria’s secret state

Over several years, Prof Keenan obtained direct eyewitness evidence from locals about the secret al-Qaeda camp in Tamouret, including from an AQIM member who trained there.

Its purpose is to recruit, indoctrinate and train marginalised youth from across North Africa into committing atrocities in Algerian communities — after which they would usually be executed.
Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) fighters in a propaganda video filmed in the Sahara (Wikipedia Commons)

According to Keenan’s eyewitness sources, the camp was visited almost daily “by high-ranking army and DRS officers… including General Rachid ‘Attafi’ Lallali, the head of the DRS’ External Security Directorate (DDSE).”

The camp was also directly supplied with arms and ammunition from Algerian army depots.

Detailed information on the identities of camp recruits, including DNA data, was routinely shared with Western intelligence agencies according to sources familiar with the camp.

Trainee terrorists at Tamouret were schooled in sniping and throat-slitting. The camp was provided with a continual supply of prisoners — mostly criminals and dissenting soldiers — purely for the purpose of being killed during training.

Over a seven month period, one eyewitness said, about 180 murders had taken place at the camp during such routine practice sessions.
In Amenas — a DRS operation

Keenan’s report for the International State Crime Initiative points to disturbing evidence of Algerian intelligence services’ direct sponsorship of al-Qaeda terror.

On 27 August 2015, senior DRS commander General “Hassan” Abdelkader Aït Ouarabi was arrested by Algerian authorities. The arrest was based on allegations from three terrorists captured at the In Amenas gas facility, who claimed they had received arms from General Hassan.

On the same day as Gen Hassan’s arrest, the US Director of National Intelligence (DNI), James Clapper, flew into Algiers for high-level government meetings.

The FBI had also been given access to the three terrorists making these allegations before July 2013.

Corroborating this information, the report refers to the testimony of former DRS captain, H. Haroune, and a former captain and instructor in the Special Forces under DRS command at the time, A. Chouchan. The two former DRS operatives have claimed that “General Mediène [then DRS chief] ordered the attack on In Amenas (presumably planned to be a hostage-taking mission that the army would resolve as it did at Gharis in 2003).”
Hostages raise their hands during the al-Qaeda attack on the In Amenas gas plant in January 2013 (Reuters)
What did BP know?

Astonishingly, the report reveals that before the attack, BP and Statoil had a three year contract with a transport services company, BAAT SARL, owned by Mohamed Ghadir, the brother of al-Qaeda terrorist Abdelhamid Abou Zaïd — the head of AQIM in the Sahara, and chief of the DRS-run AQIM training camp at Tamouret.

At the London inquest last year, BP was never questioned about this contract, despite it involving a company tied to the very al-Qaeda group that attacked the gas plant.

In the years preceding the attack, Keenan himself — in his capacity as a security consultant — repeatedly warned BP that the facility would be attacked by Islamist terrorists with the covert support of the Algerian government.

Keenan suggests that BP’s inexplicable lack of concern about the matter was because the firm had been given security assurances from Algerian or Western authorities that AQIM would not attack the plant.

BP did not respond to request for comment.

Gary Rose, an emergency response advisor who worked at the In Amenas facility, said that BP’s onsite security “was incredibly poor and relied totally on the untested and unknown capabilities of the Algerian military.” Rose narrowly avoided the attack having left the site two days earlier.

Rose, who gave evidence at the London Inquest, was especially damning about BP’s approach. The firm “did nowhere near enough to protect the facility, even with the most basic and credible scenarios in their own emergency response plans…

“The risk assessment process was flawed, inadequate and done from a view of process safety not human safety. Physical security was constantly breached by the local staff and was out of direct expatriate control, the physical barriers and warning/protection systems were wholly inadequate. I know exactly what systems we did and did not have, and management on site were aware of all the failings too. After the fall of Libya there should have been a massive review of security, but instead we handed over more control to poorly trained Algerian security guards. We were all aware of bandits and arms trafficking in the desert regions but were just relying on the Algerian military to manage this, maybe by force or maybe by negotiation?”

According to Rose, the most appropriate way of dealing with the risk would have required abandoning the site to conduct a full review and reinforcement.

But shutting down and abandoning the facility, or any other such facilities, “was never an option due to the huge amount of revenue and European reliance on external hydrocarbons: it’s economy over safety and that’s how the petroleum industry works.”
Complicity in Algeria’s reign of terror

The draft report by Queen Mary University’s ISCI refers to recent revelations from Habib Souaïdia, a former Algerian army officer.

According to Souaïdia:

“… he had been informed by many of his former colleagues [in the Algerian Special Forces] that the leaders of some of the jihadist groups sowing terror in Tunisia ‘take their orders from Algiers.’”

In 2015, Tunisia experienced two major terrorist attacks, in which a total of 61 civilians were killed by gunmen with ties to Algeria.

Souaïdia reported that mobile phones and SIM cards of AQIM jihadists killed in Tunisia’s Mount Chaambi border area, obtained by the Tunisian army, “revealed their communications with DRS officials in Algiers, including their phone numbers and even their nicknames.”

In late 2013, the information about the SIM cards was handed over to US intelligence, which demanded Algeria’s army chiefs put a stop to the support for jihadists in Tunisia. But, Keenan says, a related US concern was to prevent information on the DRS’ dealings with terrorists falling into the public domain:

“The reason for that was because US intelligences services and the DRS had been working together as close allies in the so-called war on terror since 2002 and would inevitably, and quite correctly, be seen as having been complicit in whatever ‘false-flag’ and other such questionable operations had been conducted by the DRS since 2002.”

The AQIM-backed insurgency in Mali was also being supported by Algeria’s intelligence services. A Nigerian military officer told Keenan that AQIM forces in Mali were being supplied food and fuel by the DRS.

Throughout the DRS’ sponsorship of regional al-Qaeda terrorist activity, the US, Britain and France have worked closely with the very same DRS on regional ‘counter-terrorism’ — despite being privy to damning intelligence on Algeria’s double-game.
Algerian soldiers
The Clinton files

Direct confirmation of high-level US knowledge of the Algerian regime’s relationship with the terrorists behind the In Amenas attack came from emails leaked from Hillary Clinton’s private server, published by Wikileaks in March 2016.

An email dated 17 January 2013 to Clinton from her aide Sidney Blumenthal, noted that the alleged leader of the In Amenas attack, AQIM terrorist Mokhtar Belmokhtar [MBM], had a secret agreement with Algerian intelligence. Under the agreement, Belmokhtar would pursue al-Qaeda destabilisation operations in Mali and the Western Sahara:

“According to sources with access to the Algerian DGSE [the DRS], the Bouteflika government reached a highly secret understanding with Belmokhtar after the kidnapping in April 2012 of the Algerian consul in Gao (Mali). Under this agreement Belmokhtar concentrated his operations in Mali, and occasionally, with the encouragement of the Algerian DGSE, attack Moroccan interests in Western Sahara, where the Algerians have territorial claims.”

Mokhtar Belmokhtar was also, according to Keenan’s eyewitness sources, in charge of logistics for the al-Qaeda training camp in Tamouret, which he visited every two weeks.
Hillary Clinton

A further email dated 19 January 2013 from Blumenthal to Clinton reported that French intelligence had learnt from a source “with access to the highest levels of the Algerian army” that:

“… officers of the Algerian DGSE [DRS] are looking to secretly meet Belmokhtar or one of his lieutenants in northern Mauritania in the immediate future. They have been ordered to find out why Belmokhtar violated their two-year-old secret agreement and launched attacks inside Algeria.”

There is no evidence that such a meeting actually took place, suggesting that the DRS was not really interested in finding the answer.

In any case, Clinton forwarded Blumenthal’s email to Robert Russo, her assistant in the US Department of State — which means the US government was aware of the agreement between AQIM’s Belmokhtar and Algerian intelligence.

Keenan points out that these emails must be placed in context with the evidence that the DRS itself had sponsored the In Amenas attack in the first place:

“We therefore had a situation in which the presidency, the army high command and, most likely, western oil companies, knew there was a secret agreement with MBM not to attack installations within Algeria. The DRS, which would have been the agency that made the deal with MBM, would have assured the presidency and army command that such an agreement had been made. What neither the presidency, army nor foreign oil companies knew, although they may have suspected, was that they had effectively been double-crossed by the DRS.”

In either case, it seems that the State Department was aware that Algerian intelligence was sponsoring Islamist terror across North Africa.

When asked what the State Department did with the information it had received via Hillary Clinton, a spokesperson, Pooja Jhunjhunwala said:

“As a matter of policy, the Department of State does not comment on materials, including classified documents, which may have been leaked.”

However, when asked about the State Department’s position on public record evidence of Algerian intelligence support to jihadists supplied by Prof Keenan — who has previously consulted on regional security issues for the State Department — she simply declined to comment.
Cover-up?

Much of this information was passed on by Keenan to the London Inquest into the attack on the Tigantourine gas plant. Yet the Inquest, which delivered its verdict in February 2015, excluded this evidence from the proceedings. Keenan himself was blocked from giving evidence at the Inquest.

The Addendum to the Queen Mary University report includes the full text of a letter dated 30 April 2015 sent by Prof Keenan to Detective Constable William Wixey of the SO15 Counter Terrorism Command, summarising his available evidence.

Keenan’s letter offered to provide access to multiple witnesses, two of whom would be non-Algerian citizens, who would expose the leader of the In Amenas attack as an “agent” of Algeria’s secret intelligence service.

On 13 May, DC Wixey replied to Keenan’s letter to explain that the Coroner’s office was “of the view that they do not wish to take this matter further at this stage.”

The Metropolitan Police failed to respond to a request for comment on the decision to block Keenan’s evidence from the Inquest.

In addition to blocking Keenan’s evidence, the British government used Public Interest Immunity — the withdrawal of information on grounds of ‘national security’ — to suppress the disclosure of key documents at the Inquest on what the government knew, and when.

The use of Public Interest Immunity was “very suspicious,” London Inquest witness Gary Rose said:

“Now we are not able to know what is being withheld and there is little that can be done about that.”

In his report for Queen Mary University, Prof Keenan concludes that the government had sought not only to cover up “its own incompetency with regard to the FCO”, but also to avoid questions about the government’s “possible complicity in [Algerian] state crimes.”

The government’s goal was to withhold any information alluding to British intelligence collusion with the DRS, including evidence that MI6 had been “complicit in activity that could be construed as criminal.”

In the absence of a further inquiry, there seems little prospect that the questions Keenan raises will be answered by officialdom. Yet his forthcoming report goes some way toward uncovering the real reasons that the threat of terrorism is escalating in North Africa.

Newsweek a écrit:: ISIS EXPANDS INTO THE SAHEL, AFRICA’S MIGRATION HUB

Standing in front of tens of fighters clad in headscarves and sunglasses and carrying AK-47s in an unknown location, Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi reads in Arabic from a scrap of paper in a video posted online in late October. After more than a minute of Sahrawi talking, the video cuts to a shot of multiple gloved hands held in the middle of a circle in a gesture of solidarity. The speaker recites a pledge of allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, the purported leader of the Islamic State militant group (ISIS), who is described in Arabic as “Commander of the Faithful” and the “Caliph of the Muslims.” The others respond in an affirmative chorus, offering Baghdadi their service and loyalty.

The location of the video is unknown, but based on Sahrawi’s previous movements, it is likely to have been shot in Mali or Burkina Faso, two countries in Africa’s Sahel region: a vast arid belt stretching from across the continent from Senegal in the west to Eritrea in the east.

While the video was not particularly remarkable, what was more surprising is what came after. On October 30, ISIS’s semi-official media channel, Amaq, posted a statement online, saying that it had received a pledge of allegiance from “Katibat al-Mourabitoun” under Sahrawi’s leadership. The acknowledgement makes Sahrawi’s the first recognized ISIS splinter group in the Sahel, a region awash with al-Qaeda affiliates and a key transit point for migrants dreaming of reaching Europe—conditions that could make the region an ideal recruiting ground for ISIS.

Sahrawi has been a major player in the region’s recent violent history. He was born in Algeria according to jihadi policy group the Counter Extremism Project, though his surname suggests ties to Western Sahara —a contested region inhabited by the Sahrawi people, which is at the center of a wrangle between Morocco and the indigenous, Algerian-backed Polisario Front.

He has had stints in multiple jihadi groups in the Sahel region. When the conflict in northern Mali broke out in 2012 —in which a multiplicity of Islamist and ethnic Tuareg groups seized power of the country’s vast northern region—Sahrawi was thought to occupy a prominent role in the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (known by its French acronym, MUJAO), a splinter of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

Following French intervention in Mali in 2013, which routed the Islamists and restored nominal government control throughout the country, MUJAO reportedly merged with the Masked Men Brigade, another AQIM-linked group led by veteran Algerian jihadi Mokhtar Belmokhtar. The resultant group was known as Al-Mourabitoun, or ‘The Sentinels’.

Sahrawi’s defining moment came in May 2015. In an audio message released to Mauritanian news site Al-Akhbar, Sahrawi called on “all jihadi groups” to give their allegiance to Baghdadi, in order to “unite the voice of the Muslims” and “defend against the enemies of Islam.” Coming from such a senior figure, the statement was interpreted as a pledge of Al-Mourabitoun’s affiliation to ISIS. This was affirmed in a second audio message released days later, in which Sahrawi declared he was the “emir” or leader of Al-Mourabitoun; that the group had no ties to AQIM; and that he had decided to pledge allegiance to ISIS based on “various religious recommendations.”

The pledge provoked an angry response from Belmokhtar, who issued a statement saying that Sahrawi’s pledge was invalid since it had not been approved by the group’s shura council—its decision-making body—and reaffirming his allegiance to al-Qaeda’s global leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Belmokhtar’s Al-Mourabitoun reportedly clashed with Sahrawi’s group—which called itself the Islamic State in Greater Sahara (ISGS)—and planned the assassination of its leader, according to the Long War Journal.

Following the dispute, Sahrawi went quiet for more than a year. Presumably, he and his followers separated from the wider Al-Mourabitoun group and formed their own militia, but without any recognition from ISIS’s headquarters in Syria. It wasn’t until September that ISGS claimed its first attack : an assault on the Markoye customs post in Burkina Faso, close to the borders with both Mali and Niger, that left one customs official and one civilian dead. The group has since been linked with at least two further attacks: one in northern Burkina Faso, near the Malian border, in which three soldiers were killed overnight on October 12; and an attempted jailbreak on October 17 at the Koutoukalé prison in southwestern Niger, a high-security facility thought to hold militants from Nigerian militant group Boko Haram and AQIM, which was repelled by security forces.

Sahrawi’s official acceptance from ISIS means that all future attacks perpetrated will be linked to the group based in Syria and Iraq, according to Ryan Cummings, director of African security analysts Signal Risk. “Attacks orchestrated by Sahrawi will be claimed by ISIS via Amaq as an extension of the group’s operations in the Sahara,” he says.

But Cummings notes that ISIS has not gone so far as to declare a wilayat —or province—in the Sahel, as they have done, for example, in Nigeria, following Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to Baghdadi in 2015.

The reluctance to declare an official ISIS province in the Sahara is probably attributable, at least in part, to al-Qaeda’s near-total dominance of the jihadi scene across the Sahel region, and indeed most of sub-Saharan Africa. While ISIS fighters have threatened to breach the Sahel from Libya and Boko Haram have perpetrated attacks in Niger, al-Qaeda is unquestionably the foremost jihadi franchize in sub-Saharan Africa. It has had an official branch in the Sahel since 2006, when the then Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat—an offshoot of a militant Islamist group formed in the early 1990s that was involved in Algeria’s civil war—pledged its allegiance to al-Qaeda, later rebranding itself as AQIM. It ranks include battle-hardened jihadis trained in Afghanistan, alongside former al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden, and the group has governing experience in northern Mali, having held substantial territory in the country for several months before the French counter-insurgency.

That legacy means it will be difficult for ISGS to displace AQIM in the region, says Andrew Lebovich, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Sahrawi has his own networks and his own people, but it’s not an easy area to operate in. AQIM has spent many years recruiting locally, marrying into prominent families and establishing its own networks, loyalties and support structures,” he says. “It is by no means uncontested terrain.”

A potentially big lure for ISIS in the Sahel region is its status as one of Africa’s main migration hubs. Niger, in particular, has become a transit point for West African migrants, a large proportion of whom are heading towards Libya and attempting to cross the Mediterranean into Europe via Italy. Between February and September, the International Organization of Migration (IOM) has recorded at least 270,000 migrants passing through Séguedine, a passing point for migrants en route to Libya through Niger.

The United Nations’ Special Envoy for the Sahel, Hiroute Guebre Sellassie, warned in November 2015 that up to 41 million young people in the region were at risk of radicalization or forced migration due to a lack of educational and economic opportunities.

The head of the IOM’s Niger operation, Giuseppe Loprete, says that migrants passing through the country are “definitely vulnerable” to the influence of extremist groups. “They have nothing, they transit in areas that are very dangerous,” says Loprete. He adds that attacks on Niger’s border with Mali are now taking place “almost every day” and that militants can easily move between countries in the region. “Borders are porous, everybody can come in and out, just by going around the border control without being checked or anything. It’s easy for [the militants], they know the area very well,” he says.

For now, the focus for ISGS will be on gathering resources and followers. Cummings speculates that the group will have to establish a routine pattern of attacks in a specific area for ISIS to consider declaring a wilayat in the region: he highlights the Oudalan province in northern Burkina Faso, bordering both Mali and Niger and where the group’s activities seem to be concentrated, as an at-risk area.

Lebovich doesn’t rule out the possibility of large-scale attacks by the group in the future, as it seeks to establish itself as a player alongside AQIM. The latter has been linked to three major attacks in the past year: the November 2015 assault on the Radisson Blu hotel in Mali ; the attack on a cafe and hotel in Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, in January; and the siege of a beach resort in Ivory Coast in March. It wouldn’t be outside the realms of possibility, once ISGS has recruited more fighters, for it to seek to compete in such attacks.

“These groups have tended to mix different kinds of attacks in order to create space to operate, generate income and maintain their style of operations,” says Lebovich, “Anything is possible.”

#Link

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Citation :: Trois principes clés de Daesh battus en brèche par les oulémas du Maroc

25 novembre 2016 à 19h49

25 novembre 2016 à 19h49
Par Nadia Lamlili
@nadialamlili

La Rabita Mohammadia des oulémas du Maroc, un think thank religieux placée sous la tutelle du roi du Maroc, a rendu publique mardi 22 novembre une série de travaux académiques qui déconstruisent le discours de Daesh sur le califat et "l’État islamique".

Pour la première fois, des théologiens arabes battent en brèche les bases coraniques que les prêcheurs de la haine utilisent pour semer la terreur dans le monde. Sept cahiers scientifiques ont été publiés, mardi 22 novembre, sur le site web de la Rabita. Un travail extrêmement fourni, riche en références religieuses et dont Jeune Afrique a récapitulé les trois principales conclusions.

1/ Le jihad ne signifie pas la guerre
Le jihad est l’un des aspects les plus mal compris et les plus déformés de l’islam, souvent associé au massacre et au terrorisme. Or, une lecture attentive des textes montre que le jihad ne signifie pas forcément la guerre.

« Le plus grand jihad est un combat individuel vis-à-vis de soi-même pour s’ouvrir au monde et élargir ses connaissances », précisent les oulémas.

Autre notion déconstruite, le jihad dans son sens guerrier, qui ne peut être décrété que lorsque les musulmans se sentent attaqués. De la guerre de Badr (l’an 624 après J.C) à celle d’Al-Ahzab (627 ap J.C) en passant par celle d’Ouhoud (l’an 625 ap J.C), tous les combats menés par le prophète Mahomet étaient dictés par un impératif de défense et n’ont jamais visé des populations pacifistes, selon la Rabita.

Sa doctrine : Ne jamais commencer les hostilités, combattre seulement ceux qui combattent et œuvrer le plus possible pour la paix. « Et s’ils inclinent à la paix, inclines-toi vers celle-ci (prophète) et place ta confiance en Allah, car c’est Lui l’Audient, l’Omniscient », souligne le verset 61 de la sourate « Al Anfal ».

Pour justifier ses massacres, Daesh avance qu’elle est en guerre contre les mécréants (les non musulmans). « Argument fallacieux », selon les oulémas du Maroc car « il n’y a point de contrainte dans la religion ». Évoquant plusieurs versets coraniques, ils précisent que la clémence divine doit être privilégiée dans tous les cas et que tout appel à la guerre doit être décrété par « un calife » doté de sagesse et de clairvoyance. Ce qui fait défaut chez les émirs de Daesh et Boko Haram.

2/ Daesh est un État extrémiste et non islamique
Au moment de l’avènement de l’islam, la création « d’un État islamique » n’était pas l’objectif des musulmans. Ces derniers étaient plus préoccupés par la diffusion des valeurs de piété, de solidarité et d’unicité de Dieu. Certains chercheurs musulmans avaient, néanmoins, admis que la façon dont le prophète gérait les affaires de sa « Oumma » comportait « une forme d’État ».

Pour les oulémas du Maroc, la création d’un « État islamique » doit prendre en considération à la fois ce mode de gouvernance du prophète et les notions modernes de droits individuels : le droit à la vie, le droit à l’apprentissage, le droit à la différence, le droit à la sécurité, l’égalité devant la justice… « Un État qui coupe les têtes est un État extrémiste et non islamique », lit-on dans ces rapports.

Dans sa conception moderne, un État se définit aussi par sa politique internationale. « Or, une entité qui n’a d’autre stratégie que de semer la peur dans le monde, exacerber les haines et créer le chaos au nom de l’islam ne peut en aucun cas être considérée comme un État », lit-on dans les rapports de la Rabita.

3/ L’impôt imposé aux non musulmans est obsolète
Lorsque les daeshiens ont envahi des régions chrétiennes en Syrie et en Irak, ils ont décrété le retour de la « Jizya », un impôt individuel imposé dans les premiers temps de l’islam aux juifs et aux chrétiens en contrepartie de l’engagement des califes musulmans à les protéger. Ils étaient appelés « dhimmis », c’est-à-dire les protégés (en arabe, dhimma veut dire engagement ou lien contractuel).

Sauf que Daesh a fait de cette « Jizya » un outil de massacre et de torture, obligeant les populations ne pouvant pas la payer à se convertir de force à l’islam au risque de mourir. « Une tentative minable de légitimer par les textes une opération de vol organisé », affirme la Rabita. « Car le concept de la ‘Jizya’ est devenu complètement obsolète de nos jours. Nous vivons dans un monde d’égalité, de citoyenneté et de primauté du droit et il ne peut y avoir de différence entre un musulman et un non musulman ».

En outre, pour exiger cet impôt, il faut que l’entité qui le décrète assure une protection infaillible aux populations non musulmanes et les autorise à exercer librement leur culte. Ce qu’un État « terroriste » comme Daesh n’est pas en mesure d’assurer.

jeuneafrique.com

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“Le monde ne sera pas détruit par ceux qui font le mal, mais par ceux qui les regardent sans rien faire.” Albert Einstein.
Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb - Page 30 8-photos-incroyables-qui-vous-feront-revivre-limpressionnante-Marche-Verte_feat

Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb - Page 30 8-photos-incroyables-qui-vous-feront-revivre-limpressionnante-Marche-Verte_feat

Terrorisme-cellule d'el Jadida: Le BCIJ poursuit de dangereux éléments algériens :

Citation :: Kiosque360. Selon le journal Al Massae dans son édition du mardi 31 janvier, les interrogatoires des membres de la cellule terroriste démantelée à El Jadida, qualifiée de "dangereuse" par le BCIJ, ont permis de découvrir une cellule dormante au Maroc.

Les membres de cette cellule terroriste dormante communiquaient avec des éléments à l’intérieur et à l’extérieur du pays, sur la base d’une stratégie étudiée, pour la contrebande d'armes qui provenaient de la Libye et transitaient à travers le territoire algérien avant d'arriver au Maroc.

L’enquête du BCIJ se poursuit à l’encontre de trois présumés coupables de nationalité algérienne. Ils sont suspectés d'entretenir des liens avec une personne interpellée dernièrement à Tanger par les éléments du BCIJ et de la DST et soupçonnée d'appartenir à l’organisation terroriste Daech.

Les personnes recherchées, de nationalité algérienne, se sont associées à des Marocains pour commettre des actes terroristes dans les lieux touristiques, des établissements hôteliers, des casernes militaires et des établissements diplomatiques, dans différentes villes du pays.

Les membres de cette cellule comptaient réitérer les actes commis durant les attentats du 16 mai 2003.

http://fr.le360.ma/politique/terrorisme-cellule-del-jadida-le-bcij-poursuit-de-dangereux-elements-algeriens-105939

En gros : L'occident a des choses à apprendre du modèle marocain de lutte anti-terroriste...
Les polzs sont une organisation terroriste...
Faites pas ch....er le Maroc avec vos histoires de droits de l'homme clown

Citation :: The Age of Hyper-Terrorism and ‘Low Cost’ Terrorism

Michael Rubin

On February 13, 2016, while speaking at the Munich Security Conference, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls reflected on the terrorist attacks in Paris over the previous year. “We have entered…a new era characterized by the lasting presence of ‘hyper-terrorism,’ he declared, adding, “There will be attacks. Large-scale attacks. It’s a certainty. This hyper-terrorism is here to stay. The force of the ideological fascination is formidable, and if we have changed eras, it is because this hyper-terrorism is in the heart of our societies.”

Valls’ declaration was hyperbolical: After all, terrorism is hardly a new problem. It existed throughout the Cold War and before and it has been a fact of life in failed states and conflict zones ever since. What is new is both the technology terrorists have at their disposal and the ease of transportation which terrorists enjoy. It was, however, refreshing to hear the French premier note the “force of ideological fascination” because too often political leaders and diplomats—especially in Europe and the United States—de-emphasize the ideological components of terrorism in favor of addressing grievances. While the question of what motivates terrorism—ideology or grievance—need not be an either-or answer, it is disingenuous to dismiss ideology. After all, religious terrorism in Egypt predated the partition of Palestine and there appears to be no correlation between poverty and lack of education and terrorism. Quite the contrary: It is often wealthier countries and better-educated segments of society which breed terrorists.

But was Valls correct that hyper-terrorism is here to stay? The reason France and Belgium have been hit so hard is not because terrorism is inevitable, but rather because their counterterrorism has been ineffective. Acquiescence is counterproductive. France and Belgium, other European countries, and the United States could enhance their counterterror strategies by learning from Morocco’s experience.

Morocco suffered numerous terror attacks over the decades, both from Marxist groups like the Polisario Front and more recently from Al Qaeda-inspired groups. In 2003 and 2007, terrorists struck in Casablanca, for example, and, in 2011, a terrorist bomb left in the Argana café here in Marrakech killed 17. In addition, several thousand Moroccans traveled to Syria or Iraq to join the Islamic State.

And yet, despite finding itself in one of the world’s most volatile regions, Morocco’s security improves even as the government preserves, and in many cases liberalizes, individual protections and respect for human rights, even if problems do remain Over the past 14 years, for example, Morocco has thwarted almost 350 attacks. Morocco succeeds with a holistic approach to counter-terrorism. With regard to religiously-motivated terrorism, the Moroccan government recognizes that they must engage Al Qaeda and the Islamic State in a battle of religious interpretation.. Here, the model provided by the Mourchidat program is important to emulate. Islam has a long, rich history and established theological record of interpretation. There is nothing un-Islamic or anti-religious about defending those who dedicate their life to the study of its theology against populists who might want to assume positions of leadership without having the humility or desire to learn. Morocco’s religious leadership helps countries like Mali, Tunisia, and even Egypt recover and shows that it is possible to counter, if not reverse, the radicalism promoted by countries like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran, and now Turkey.

States that wish to counter terrorism successfully cannot shortchange hard power. Morocco’s security services do not handicap themselves unnecessarily with deference to political correctness when it comes to monitoring suspected radicals or radical organizations. . To monitor those proselytizing radicalism and those attracted to them is not Islamophobic; rather, it protects Muslims. After all, the chief victims of radical Islamism are moderate Muslims. The Islamic State has killed more Muslims than Christians, Yezidis, and Jews. Likewise, while newspapers cover ‘green-on-blue’ violence in Afghanistan, often left unreported is the fact that the rate of ‘green-on-green’ attacks are three-times as high.

Intelligence is crucial. Mass immigration and dislocation means that passports and nationalities no longer coincide with ideologies or value systems. European passport holders can be just as much a threat to security as those holding citizenship in conflict-zone countries. Germany, for example, became a destination of choice beginning in the 1950s for Islamists fleeing secular dictatorships in Egypt, Syria, and Turkey. As a result, many of the umbrella organizations in Europe were founded by the Muslim Brotherhood and Milli Görüs, both of which discouraged assimilation into Western liberal society. European intelligence services and their American corollaries must understand that there cannot be any site frequented by radicals that is immune to monitoring. Western intelligence services must also realize Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated advocacy groups use Western sensitivity to accusations of discrimination and racism to keep radical organizations open. Intelligence and monitoring will become even more important as those who fought for the Islamic State seek to return to their countries of origin with skills acquired on the battlefield.

Border security is also important. There is a direct correlation between nationalities fighting with the Islamic State and nationalities which receive visa waivers or visas on demand in Istanbul’s airport. Hence, several thousand Moroccans and Tunisians, and hundreds of Russians and Frenchmen migrated to the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, but only a few dozen Algerians even though history shows that Algerians are just as prone to radicalism. Had Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan been serious about countering the Islamic State and the Nusra Front (now known as Jabhat Fateh al-Sham), he would have insisted that anyone under the age of 40 years-old from nationalities contributing to the Islamic State apply for visas in advance.

Terrorism is a tactic. Countries sponsor it as part of their asymmetric warfare strategy and groups engage in it when its potential benefits outweigh its costs. But terrorism can also be risky. Every attack leaves behind forensic evidence which intelligence agencies can exploit. Holding terrorists accountable—killing them if need be—and ensuring their sponsors suffer economically and perhaps militarily for proxy use raises the cost of terrorism and can temper its use. Good intelligence, meanwhile, can interdict those attacks which terrorists and their sponsors do plan. Confronting ideologies can de-legitimize them. Islamic history is full of such theological battles. The Khawarij challenged the Caliph Uthman and subsequently the Umayyads. Seljuq Muslims faced a terror campaign waged by the Nizari Ismailis. To simply suggest the inevitability of ideological fervor is malpractice.

Indeed, the chief problem in the fight against terrorism is not simply those that would murder in the name of religion, but rather the lack of seriousness with which European states are prepared to counter the challenge. Simply put, Europe has become the weak link. Recruitment for the Islamic State, for example, does not occur in the mosques of Meknes and Marrakech, but rather online from Molenbeek and Manchester. Too many Western officials still prefer to view terrorism as a criminal issue rather than a military matter and thus fear taking preventive action to shut down this channel of recruitment. Whereas many in Europe look at the Maghreb as posing a terror threat, the truth might be opposite: European refusal to curtail incitement and its moral equivalence with regard to ideology is increasingly endangering the Maghreb.

It is possible to counter hyper-terrorism. Indeed, it is nothing new. And, if terrorism is ‘low cost’ then the proper response is to raise the cost for those who would engage in it. European defeatism, however, has no place in the war against terror.

aei.org

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“Le monde ne sera pas détruit par ceux qui font le mal, mais par ceux qui les regardent sans rien faire.” Albert Einstein.
Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb - Page 30 8-photos-incroyables-qui-vous-feront-revivre-limpressionnante-Marche-Verte_feat

Invité

Soyons honnêtes les uns envers les autres et assumons le fait que le Maroc est devenu une cible maghrébine majeure et que le fait que les attentats échouent à chaque fois est en effet grâce au forces spéciales au BCIJ et BGST. Dieu, la patrie , le roi !

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Programme

Citation :: Conference Program
8:30 a.m.: Opening Remarks
Dr. John Hamre
President and CEO, CSIS

8:40 a.m.-9:40 a.m.: Views from the Region
Rear Adm. (Ret.) Kamel Akrout
National Security Senior Adviser to the President of Tunisia

Amb. El Haouès Riache
Ambassador-Counselor for International Security Issues, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Algeria

Amb. Mohamed Salah Tamek
Delegate General of the Penitentiary and Reintegration Administration, Morocco

Moderator:
Mr. Haim Malka
Senior Fellow and Deputy Director, Middle East Program, CSIS

9:45 a.m.-11:15 a.m.: Understanding the Threat
Dr. Michaël Ayari
Senior Analyst for Tunisia, International Crisis Group

Dr. R. Kim Cragin
Senior Research Fellow for Counterterrorism, National Defense University

Dr. Mohammed Masbah
Research Fellow, Crown Center for Middle East Studies, Brandeis University

Moderator:
Ms. Nancy Youssef
National Security Correspondent, The Wall Street Journal

11:30 a.m.-12:45 p.m.: Government Strategies
Mr. Arezki Daoud
Chief Executive and Lead Analyst, MEA Risk LLC

Dr. Ahmed Driss
President-Director, Center of Mediterranean and International Studies, Tunisia

Moderator:
Ms. Alexis Arieff
Africa Policy Analyst, Congressional Research Service

1:15 p.m.-2:15 p.m.: What Does Success Look Like?
The Hon. John McLaughlin
Former Deputy Director and Acting Director, Central Intelligence Agency; Distinguished Practitioner in Residence, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University

Lt. Gen. Michael Nagata
Director, Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, National Counterterrorism Center

The Hon. Christine Wormuth
Former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense; Director, Adrienne Arsht Center for Resilience, Atlantic Council

Moderator:
Dr. Jon Alterman
Senior Vice President, Zbigniew Brzezinski Chair in Global Security and Geostrategy, and Director, Middle East Program, CSIS

2:30 p.m.-3:30 p.m.: Keynote Address
The Hon. Gerry Connolly
Congressman for Virginia's 11th District

Citation :: Le malien Iyad Ag Ghali, djihadiste et intouchable

Rebelle touareg du nord Mali devenu djihadiste, Iyad Ag Ghali a le parcours d’un personnage de roman. Passé par l’armée de Kadhafi et proche des services de renseignements algériens (DRS), celui que l’on surnomme “le lion du désert” est désormais inscrit sur la liste des terroristes recherchés par les Etats-Unis. Ses réseaux tentaculaires le placent pourtant hors de toute atteinte et le rendent incontournable dans la crise malienne.

Tout le monde sait aujourd’hui où se trouve Iyad Ag Ghali, le charismatique leader du mouvement islamiste Ansar Dine officiellement désigné comme terroriste par le département d’Etat américain. Réfugié dans le sud algérien, notamment vers la ville de Tinzawaten où il possèderait une maison, l’homme navigue régulièrement à travers les dunes jusqu’à la ville d’Abeybara dont il est originaire au Mali. Tout le monde sait où il est, oui, mais rien ne se passe. Et pour cause, malgré la fuite d’Iyad après l’opération Serval, celui que l’on surnomme « le lion du désert » n’a rien perdu de son influence. Ses puissants réseaux qui vont de Kidal aux redoutables services de renseignement algérien (DRS) en passant par le pouvoir de Bamako en font, plus que jamais, un homme sous protection, incontournable pour résoudre la crise malienne.

De Kadhafi au DRS

Né vers 1955 dans une famille noble d’éleveurs de la tribu des Ifoghas au nord-est du Mali, Iyad Ag Ghali a un parcours digne de l’Odyssée. Agé d’à peine vingt ans dans les années 1980, il prend la route de la Libye comme de nombreux touaregs qui fuient le chômage et les terribles sécheresses qui dévastent la région. Là-bas, le futur chef rebelle enchaîne les jobs à la sauvette, jardinier, gardien de voitures, avant d’intégrer, comme des milliers d’autres touaregs, la légion islamique de Kadhafi. « A l’époque, s’enrôler dans l’armée libyenne représentait une possibilité de se former au combat dans l’optique d’une future rébellion » explique Pierre Boilley, directeur du Centre d’étude des mondes africains qui a connu Iyad Ag Ghali. Au Liban, où on l’envoie combattre les milices chrétiennes, puis sur le terrain tchadien, Iyad s’initie donc à l’art de la guerre.

C’est en combattant aguerri qu’il revient au pays lorsque Kadhafi démantèle la légion en 1987. Il troque alors son uniforme militaire pour celui de la rébellion touareg dont il va devenir une icône. A la tête du Mouvement populaire pour la libération de l’Azawad (MPLA), il lance sa première action d’envergure le 28 juin 1990 : un assaut contre la gendarmerie de la ville de Ménaka. Plusieurs policiers maliens meurent pendant l’attaque. Un fait d’arme qui lui vaut d’être reconnu comme un combattant redoutable. Au point de s’attirer l’oeil de l’Algérie, puissance régionale incontournable qui considère le nord Mali comme sa zone d’influence et craint de voir s’exporter les vélléités autonomistes sur son territoire. Après avoir longtemps réprimé les touaregs aux côtés de l’armée malienne, Alger s’engage en effet, dans une stratégie d’infiltration de ces mouvements. Stratégie dont Iyad sera la pierre angulaire.

Lorsque la diplomatie algérienne impose sa médiation dans le conflit malien et organise des négociations à Tamanrasset en 1991, les hommes du DRS choisissent de miser sur le jeune et ambitieux leader. Interlocuteur du gouvernement malien lors de ces pourparlers, Iyad accepte de signer l’accord de paix de Tamanrasset alors qu’aucun des objectifs de la rébellion n’est atteint. Un acte qui lui vaudra d’être considéré par beaucoup de maliens comme l’homme qui a ramené la paix au nord Mali, et par beaucoup de rebelles comme un traître passé sous la coupe de l’Etat. Le camps touareg se divise. Iyad, qui d’une pierre deux coups a acquis le soutien d’Alger et la confiance des autorités maliennes, fonde le Mouvement national de l’Azawad (MNA), un mouvement composé majoritairement de touaregs modérés.

Un entrepreneur politique

Progressivement, il plonge dans le fondamentalisme religieux. Déjà acquis au discours antioccidental cultivé dans les camps d’entrainement libyens, il se radicalise. Difficile d’expliquer ce virage. Si certains doutent de la sincérité de sa foi, beaucoup évoquent un épisode décisif. Entre 1997 et 1998, des missionnaires salafistes pakistanais affiliés au courant Jamaat al-Tabligh qui prône un islam rigoriste débarquent à Kidal. Pendant de longues heures, Iyad discute avec eux et devient leur disciple. A leur contact, il change. « Il ne s’habillait plus qu’en blanc, ne buvait plus d’alcool » explique le chercheur Pierre Boiley. « Il dormait même dans les mosquées » affirme un homme politique malien. Son épouse, Anna Walet Bicha, valeureuse combattante aux côtés de la rébellion des années 1990, se voile de noir. Selon un ancien officier des services de renseignement à Bamako, Iyad effectue même une courte retraite au Peshawar. Tout en adhérant aux thèses fondamentalistes dont il se réclame officiellement à partir de 2003, le fin stratège peaufine son image d’islamiste « light » en prenant soin d’affirmer son rejet des attaques suicides et du terrorisme.

Ce positionnement, associée aux bonnes relations qu’il entretient avec Alger font de lui l’intermédiaire privilégié de Bamako pour la libération des otages capturés par le Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et le combat (GSPC), ancêtre d’AQMI manipulé par les services algériens. En 2003, il parvient à faire libérer quatorze touristes européens enlevés en Algérie par la katiba d’Abderrezak el Para, un personnage controversé soupçonné d’être lié au DRS. Le business des otages devient une activité régulière très lucrative pour Iyad qui touche d’importantes commissions à chaque négociation.

Une aubaine pour l’Algérie qui voit son protégé devenir une figure politique incontournable au Mali et qui compte bien s’en servir. Dans cette logique, plusieurs sources font une lecture particulièrement médusante des agissements d’Iyad lors de la rébellion touareg de 2006. Aux avant-postes de la guérilla, le chef touareg fonde, cette année-là, un nouveau mouvement, l’Alliance démocratique pour le changement (ADC) soutenu par l’Algérie. En encourageant ainsi un nouveau soulèvement au nord Mali, Alger fait pièce à son rival libyen qui tente à l’époque d’ouvrir un consulat à Kidal. La rébellion, conduite contre les bases militaires de Kidal, Ménaka et Tessalit ne dure que 24h. Alger accuse alors Kadhafi d’être à l’origine des révoltes et obtient rapidement le départ des libyens. Mais selon Jeremy Keenan, anthropologue britannique spécialiste des touaregs, le plan va plus loin. Iyad et le DRS auraient conclu un accord secret prévoyant que les rebelles lancent ensuite des attaques contre le GSPC. C’est chose faite en juillet et octobre 2006, moyennant rémunération pour Iyad et ses hommes. Ces opérations permettent alors de réactiver la problématique djihadiste au Mali et de justifier l’intervention américaine dans la région dans le cadre de la GWOT (Global War on Terror), avec Alger comme partenaire privilégié, explique Keenan. Pur fantasme ou fragments de vérité ? Reste que c’est de nouveau sous le parrainage de l’Algérie que se tiennent les négociations avec le gouvernement malien. Comme en 2003, Iyad ressort son costume de faiseur de paix pour faire aboutir les accords d’Alger, en juillet 2006.

Fin stratège, Iyad Ag Ghali doit en partie sa longévité à sa capacité à jouer sur de nombreux tableaux. En 2007, il se rend en personne auprès l’ambassadeur américain Terence McCulley et réclame l’assistance des Etats-Unis lors d’opérations spéciales contre Aqmi. A l‘époque, l’homme prône déjà l’imposition de la charia mais affirme à l’ambassadeur que les populations du nord Mali ne sont pas très réceptives à l’extrémisme. Le jeu est subtil. « C’est un véritable entrepreneur politique. Il peut changer d’alliance du jour au lendemain selon les rapports de force » explique un diplomate français.

Des désirs contrariés

Admiré et redouté à la fois, Iyad fascine et se rend indispensable. Même le président ATT sait, à l’époque, à quel point il peut lui être utile. « ATT avait une ligne directe avec Iyad qui était un relai extrêmement précieux pour lui au nord Mali » affirme le même diplomate. Pourtant, son influence croissante est source d’inquiétudes et Iyad se voit nommé consul à Djeddah en novembre 2007. « Grave erreur » confie un ancien officier du renseignement malien. « Nous avions sous-estimé son degré de radicalisation à l’époque ». Les contacts qu’il noue sur place avec des groupes salafistes lui valent de se faire expulser du territoire en 2010.

De retour au Mali avec son nouveau carnet d’adresse, il gravite autour de personnalités liées à Aqmi et fait son retour sur le marché des otages qui lui rapporte gros. Son nom apparaît notamment à plusieurs reprises en 2013 lors de la libération des otages d’Areva capturés à Arlit au Niger. L’enlèvement implique en effet non seulement le chef d’Aqmi Abou Zeid, mais également Abdelkrim le Targui, leader touareg de la katiba Al-Ansar et cousin d’Ag Ghali. A la mort d’Abou Zeid en 2011, Abdelkrim le Targui et Iyad qui est alors recherché se chargeront des otages cachés… en Algérie. Pour de nombreuses sources, ces derniers auraient avant tout servi de monnaie d’échange contre l’impunité d’Iyad et de ses hommes jusqu’à aujourd’hui.

A la fin de l’année 2011, la colère gronde à nouveau au nord du Mali. La chute de Kadhafi entraine le retour au bercail de nombreux touaregs maliens ayant combattu pour l’armée du « Guide ». Lorsqu’une autre grande figure de la rébellion, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga, tente de fédérer ces combattants avec d’autres rebelles locaux pour former le MNLA, Iyad revendique le leadership. Sans succès. Les membres de la nouvelle rébellion se méfient de cet homme tortueux jugé trop proche d’Aqmi, de l’Algérie, et dont les manœuvres dans les années 1990 ont provoqué l’éclatement du camps rebelle.

Qu’à cela ne tienne, le 15 décembre 2011, il créé son propre mouvement, Ansar Dine, autour d’un noyau de fidèles et de certains membres d’Aqmi. A la même époque, Iyad essuie un deuxième revers. Lorsqu’il aspire à la chefferie traditionnelle des Ifoghas, le patriarche Intallah Ag Attaher lui préfère son fils, Alghabass Ag Intallah. A la tête d’Ansar-Dine, Iyad reprend pourtant vite du galon grâce à ses nombreux soutiens. En plus de l’appui logistique et financier que lui prodigue l’Algérie, les membres de la katiba d’Aqmi, Al-Ansar, dirigée par son cousin Abdelkrim le Targui lui apportent leur soutien. Très vite, la puissance militaire d’Ansar Dine dans les combats surpasse celle du Mnla. Des alliances de circonstance se forment.

Hors d’atteinte

Progressivement, l’Etat malien se délite sous la violence des combats au nord, la montée en puissance des groupes djihadistes et le coup d’Etat militaire de mars 2012 qui renverse l’ancien président ATT. Mais dans ce chaos, plusieurs informations indiquent qu’Iyad Ag Ghali, dont la percée est vite considérée comme un danger par les responsables français, était peut-être la cheville ouvrière d’un plan sophistiqué censé ramener le calme.

En janvier 2013, les renseignements américains indiquent que plusieurs colonnes de pick-ups se mettent en marche vers la ville de Konna sur la route de Bamako et vers l’aéroport de Mopti-Sévaré. Parmi les combattants, des hommes d’Ansar Dine avec Iyad à leur tête, allié d’Aqmi, du Mujao et du MNLA. Pour le ministère de la Défense français, le moment est venu d’intervenir. Il faut à tout prix empêcher la progression des « terroristes » vers la capitale. Mais sur place, un autre scénario, pensé à Bamako, cherche à mettre fin au conflit malien. Durant les dix mois qu’a duré l’occupation du nord Mali, Iyad Ag Ghali est resté en contact permanent avec les plus hautes autorités religieuses maliennes, lesquelles sont au mieux avec le bérets verts du capitaine Sanogo, l’homme qui a débarqué ATT. Ensemble, ils avaient imaginé une sorte de coup d’Etat en douceur qui a connu un début d’exécution. Le 9 janvier 2013, avant-veille de l’intervention française, les partisans du cheikh Hamaloua défilaient dans Bamako en faveur des militaires putschistes. Il ne restait plus au capitaine Sanogo et à ses alliés qu’à prendre le pouvoir, en profitant de la panique créée par le début de la marche des Touaregs sur Bamako et à négocier avec Iyad Ag Ghali, leur fidèle contact au Nord, qui avait pris soin de se prononcer contre la partition du pays. N’était-ce pas là, un gage de sa bonne volonté ?

Un diplomate français enfonce le clou : « rien n’indique qu’Ansar Dine et ses alliés allaient descendre vers Bamako. Ils n’étaient en formation pour aller si loin ». Pour preuve : lorsque les combattants d’Ansar Dine commencent à se diriger vers le sud, le 8 janvier 2013, les services français interceptent des communications entre Iyad et le DRS. Ces derniers conseillent au chef touareg de faire preuve de prudence et de ne pas se précipiter sur Bamako. Longtemps un pion aux mains d’Alger, Iyad était-il en train d’échapper à ses parrains de toujours ? Un ancien de ses proches raconte qu’à la même période, le chef touareg a diffusé un communiqué rédigé dans un français parfait – avec l’aide de qui ? — et signé de sa main, dans lequel il critique vivement la politique algérienne.

L’homme a cependant toujours ses entrées chez le grand voisin du nord où il s’approvisionne régulièrement. Sa femme, Anna Walet Bicha et plusieurs de ses lieutenants résideraient en permanence dans la ville de Tinzawaten, une base arrière importante d’où il se réorganise. Alors que les négociations avec le gouvernement malien sont dans l’impasse et que les tensions inter tribales ne cessent de s’accentuer sur le terrain, le réseau et l’aura d’Iyad Ag Ghali constituent de précieux atouts. D’autant qu’il n’épouse pas les revendications séparatistes touarègues que le gouvernement malien rejette en bloc. La liberté dont il dispose dans ses déplacements au nord Mali interrogent en tout cas la position de Paris dont les militaires sont toujours sur place. La France, qui lance sa nouvelle opération de lutte contre le terrorisme dans le Sahel, Barkhane, et dont l’alliance avec le Mnla au Mali n’a donné que peu de résultats souhaite-t-elle remettre Iyad Ag Ghali dans le jeu ? « C’est en tout cas un homme qu’il vaut mieux ne pas avoir contre soi » pointe Pierre Boilley.

#Source

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Le Al Qaïdaiste touareg Iyad Ag Ghali est selon le #New York Times, l'homme des services secrets algériens. et le daechiste Abou Walid al-Sahraoui est un membre du polisario..... et nous Sleep

JA a écrit:: Sahel : Iyad Ag Ghali tente-t-il un rapprochement avec Abou Walid al-Sahraoui ?

Le chef du Groupe de soutien à l'islam et aux musulmans, déjà à la tête d'un regroupement de plusieurs groupes jihadistes, tenterait d'étendre son influence dans la région, notamment via un rapprochement avec l'émir de l'État islamique au grand Sahara.

Au Mali, Iyad Ag Ghali, leader du Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans (GSIM), et Abou Walid al-Sahraoui, émir de l’État islamique au grand Sahara (EIGS), ont-ils entamé un rapprochement ?

Selon nos sources, les deux chefs jihadistes se seraient rencontrés début décembre dans la région de Kidal. Quelques jours plus tard, Sahraoui se serait entretenu avec des lieutenants d’Ag Ghali à Tin Abao, au sud de Ménaka.

Leurs hommes ont été vus ensemble à plusieurs reprises ces derniers mois près des villages de Talataye et d’Indelimane, situés entre Ansongo et Ménaka. Parmi les proches d’Iyad Ag Ghali qui auraient participé à ces discussions figure Malick Ag Wanasnat, tué dans la nuit du 13 au 14 février dans une frappe de l’armée française dans le nord du Mali. Leur alliance serait surtout effective dans la zone dite des trois frontières (Mali-Burkina-Niger), où sévit Sahraoui et où la force conjointe du G5 Sahel compte se déployer.

Leur alliance serait surtout effective dans la zone dite des trois frontières (Mali-Burkina-Niger), où sévit Sahraoui et où la force conjointe du G5 Sahel compte se déployer.

Le GSIM dirigé par Iyad Ag Ghali, dont la création remonte à mars 2017, est placé sous la bannière d’Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi), le groupe jihadiste regroupe Ansar Eddine, Al-Mourabitoune ainsi que la katiba Macina. « Ag Ghali était déjà le patron du jihad malien. Avec ce rapprochement, il veut élargir son influence au niveau régional », s’inquiète une source sécuritaire occidentale.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb - Page 30 987443

MAP a écrit:: L’absence de collaboration des services algériens rend le climat propice au développement du terrorisme dans la région (Khiame)

dimanche, 18 mars, 2018 à 12:27

Paris – L’absence de collaboration des services algériens avec leurs homologues marocains rend le climat propice au développement du terrorisme dans la région, a affirmé le directeur du Bureau central d’investigations judiciaires (BCIJ), Abdelhak Khiame.

Ce manque de collaboration est préjudiciable pour les deux pays, a déploré M. Khiame, dans un entretien publié par l’hebdomadaire international Jeune Afrique dans sa dernière livraison, expliquant qu'”il nous impose par exemple de redoubler d’efforts pour contrôler nos frontières”.

Une collaboration avec les services algériens reste bien entendu souhaitée et envisageable, a-t-il poursuivi, soutenant qu'”il suffit que nos voisins acceptent de dissocier les questions politiques des enjeux sécuritaires”.

Evoquant la situation au Sahel, le directeur du BCIJ a affirmé qu’outre Daesh dont les cadres ont opté pour le Maghreb après que l’étau s’est resserré en Irak et en Syrie, le polisario peut être également considéré comme une organisation terroriste dans cette région.

“Nous avons recensé plus d’une centaine de ses membres opérant au sein d’Aqmi, avec laquelle
ils ont été impliqués dans des attaques menées dans le nord de la Mauritanie”, a-t-il dit.

Sur un autre registre, M. Khiame a indiqué que le nombre des cellules terroristes démantelées au Maroc est passé de 21 en 2015 à 19 en 2016 et à seulement 9 en 2017, faisant observer que les années 2015 et 2016 ont été marquées par la recrudescence du phénomène terroriste partout dans le monde.

“Notre stratégie a toujours reposé sur l’anticipation et la prévention, et elle a porté ses fruits”, a-t-il dit, notant que le risque terroriste est toujours omniprésent au Maroc.

D’autre part, le directeur du BCIJ a indiqué que 1.668 Marocains ont rejoint Daesh, ajoutant que “certains ont dû être tués au combat contre les forces de la coalition, mais nous n’avons pas, pour l’instant, les moyens de connaître leur nombre”.

“En revanche, tous ces individus sont connus de nos services et seront arrêtés s’ils tentent de rentrer au pays,” a-t-il assuré, citant le cas d’une centaine d’entre eux, interceptés et présentés devant la justice.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Et une fois dzvant la justice !! Il y a pas le risque ils contaminent les autes détenus de droit commun.
Les anglais et francais envoient leurs FS pour faire la lessive sur place.

Jacques Roussellier / American Military University a écrit:: Breaking North Africa’s Border Security Conundrum

Although Maghreb states have tended to pursue border security unilaterally, increased transnational coordination at the local level offers a more sustainable approach.

The regular spats between Rabat and Algiers on inadequate border security, including ineffective counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics efforts, are again indicating how the two countries’ competition for dominance is obstructing the possibility of regional cooperation. Officially, the bitter feud over sovereignty of the Western Sahara prevents the two countries from agreeing on other regional issues such as border security. Morocco urges Algeria to set aside the dispute in order to work more effectively on other pressing North African concerns, while Algeria has no incentive to decouple border security from a final settlement on the status of Western Sahara so long as it can leverage the former to pressure Morocco on the latter.

Yet Morocco and Algeria, as well as Tunisia, all face the same conundrum at their borders. The increase in cross-border trafficking over the last decade has coincided with a proliferation of new actors who are displacing old smuggling patterns. This presents a challenge to governments and security services alike—to the extent they can actually function in these regions—in a way that has stripped the protection provided by borders and turned them into potential national security threats. The patchy and under-resourced nature of the Maghreb states’ security cooperation, marred by the Morocco–Algeria political rivalry and failed or weak governments in Libya and Tunisia, is particularly evident in the border regions’ glaring vulnerabilities to transnational crime, terrorist networks, and illegal migration.

While the 2,400 kilometers (1,500 miles) of borders between Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, and Libya are clearly demarcated, they serve less to mark the start or end of state sovereignty than as buffer zones, lands in their own right linking geographically connected regions. These borders have little social, economic, or even political significance in and of themselves. Instead, they serve as channels for negotiating transnational identities, building mutual economic reliance—including through migration and smuggling goods—and facilitating the movement of armed groups, which see these border regions as a natural breeding ground for ideological extremism. Unlike in the majority of the African continent, the borders between the Maghreb states’ more heavily populated northern regions are old and well-established: they were not imposed by colonialist Europe, nor do they reflect strong geographical or ethno-cultural divisions. In contrast, the Maghreb’s external borders to the south are largely inherited from the French colonial administration, most notably in Algeria. While Morocco’s border with the Sahara is essentially defined by the former Spanish colony of Western Sahara, Algeria owes its chunk of the Sahara Desert to France’s colonial design and interests in the region. These imposed borders make less sense in many respects, thereby increasing the Maghreb’s security vulnerabilities.

The porous nature of the Maghreb’s external borders and the countries’ historical connection with Saharan and Sahel commercial routes have compounded the security issues along the region’s precarious margins. In Algeria, decades of ineffective border control with Libya and Tunisia (where there have been noticeable operational improvements in recent years) have exacerbated established smuggling networks and led to a flourishing informal economy that helps stabilize these otherwise restless regions. The relative vacuum of authority along the Maghreb’s borders, particularly with Mali and Libya, also saw the emergence of illegal migration and trade in weapons and narcotics, which feeds into terrorist networks—a situation that rapidly deteriorated further following the Tunisian revolution and collapse of the Libyan state in 2011.

And despite Morocco and Algeria each independently improving their capacities for border control and increasing funding for it, the increase in the volume and frequency of smuggling and displacement along the Morocco–Algeria border also increases the risk of transnational terrorism. Algeria’s increased counter-terrorism efforts have kept border infiltration into Morocco to a minimum, and Morocco does face a much larger threat from the return of experienced fighters from Syria and Libya. However, Rabat’s and Algiers’ unwillingness to cooperate on border security is untenable in the long run. At the very least, the low risk that the border presents ensures that the perennial “border issue” will remain a political card that Algeria can freely link to a broader settlement on the status of Western Sahara.

In addition to the lack of coordination to address these transnational threats, the Maghreb countries lack a policy to confront shared issues of impoverished, politically neglected, and easily radicalized communities along their shared border regions—particularly in southeastern Morocco, southeastern Algeria, and western Tunisia. The root causes of these regions’ multifarious grievances would be best addressed by a cross-border and multi-pronged local approach. Border security efforts alone instead exacerbate political unrest, or even increase the appeal of extremist ideologies, because clamping down on smuggling disrupts local livelihood options. For example, the southern Algerian city of Tamanrasset—a strategic trade node between Libya, Algeria, Mali, and Niger—tripled in population in the last ten years, largely due to illicit trafficking, which would be hard to replace with equally lucrative legal economic activities. The illicit trade of cheap Algerian gasoline across the Tunisian border can bring one group of smugglers an average profit of $120-160 a day, compared to a profit of $6 to $9 a day for legal Tunisian street vendors.

The emergence of such borderlands economics is a reminder that, unlike in Europe—where centralized states grew to extract riches and power from their peripheries—North Africa’s state building began with the foundation of cities along trans-Saharan trading routes, which local power bases then used as springboards for central dynastic rule. Borders in the Maghreb are thus cohesive economic spaces with shared identities thrust into a perpetually contested environment, rather than unruly and distant margins of national territory. Despite challenges of human development, Algeria’s and Morocco’s southern regions are just as strategic as the “center.” For example, Algeria’s south, which forms 80 percent of the nation’s territory and 9 percent of its population, is home to the most of the country’s lucrative oil and gas industry, which accounts for 35 percent of GDP and about 75 percent of state revenue.

Maintaining the status quo in the Maghreb’s complex borderlands could easily get out of control. However, embedding cross-border security efforts at the regional and local levels with a practical economic development strategy that offers alternative economic resources to smuggling and human trafficking could help stabilize these regions. Provinces along the Moroccan–Algerian or the Algerian–Tunisian frontier, for instance, could implement joint borderlands development and security strategy at the local level. This local-driven model, if quietly supported by central governments, could allow for increased cooperation and security without the states having to change their stances on whether border issues should be linked to political issues such as the status of Western Sahara.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Le régime algérien bouge ses pions.. AQMI appelle au boycott des entreprises françaises

RFI a écrit:: Sahel: Aqmi menace les entreprises occidentales
Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique menace de s'en prendre aux entreprises installées dans la région du Sahel. Dans un communiqué publié mardi 8 mai au soir, le groupe terroriste accuse les sociétés occidentales de piller les ressources de ces pays et annonce qu'elles sont devenues des cibles d'attaque. Et ce pour une zone allant «de la Libye à la Mauritanie» dit le communiqué. C'est une première.

C'est la première fois qu'AQMI menace des entreprises, nous explique Wassim Nasr, journaliste à France 24 et spécialiste des groupes jihadistes. «Aqmi, al-Qaïda en l'occurrence, a décidé de s'en prendre à toutes les entreprises et institutions occidentales, en particulier françaises, en appelant aussi dans le même communiqué les musulmans à rester loin de ces entreprises... (ce message) s'adresse à ceux qui travaillent dans ces entreprises directement... mais aussi et surtout aux civils en leur disant : restez loin de ces endroits pour éviter d'être touchés à votre tour... »

Il s'agit d'une nouvelle phase par rapport aux appels « classiques » émis par Ayman al-Zawahiri, le patron d'al-Qaïda. « On passe à un autre niveau qui devrait être pris au sérieux » conclut le journaliste. #Source

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

décidément, l'Algérie à une dent de sagesse contre la France

Carnegie - Chatham House - Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis a écrit:: Morocco’s Failure to Reintegrate Former Jihadis

Morocco’s security-oriented approach to countering violent extremism leaves little room for rehabilitation efforts.

At first glance, the Moroccan state’s security-focused approach to countering extremism appears to be highly effective in preventing terrorist attacks. Even the most recent incident, a December 15 murder of two Scandinavian tourists in Imlil, seemed an isolated case. Moroccan authorities swiftly apprehended the perpetrators, and over the course of the following two weeks, authorities arrested an additional eighteen jihadis suspected of aiding them. However, a deeper look at Rabat’s broader countering violent extremism (CVE) strategy reveals its failure to rehabilitate and reintegrate former Salafi-jihadi detainees.

Rabat has long worked to counter radical groups, particularly since the Casablanca bombings in 2003. Accordingly, between 2002 and 2018, more than 3000 alleged jihadis were arrested, and 186 terrorist cells dismantled, including 65 cells linked to the Islamic State. However, there is a high rate of recidivism among jihadi prisoners. Of the jihadis imprisoned in these years, 220 had previously been arrested on terrorism charges, not counting the estimated 1300 Moroccans who have left to fight in Syria. Former jihadi detainees headed several of the terrorist cells that were dismantled since 2015. Similarly, three members of the Imlil cell were former detainees—including the leader, Abdessamad Ejjoud, who was sentenced to four years in prison in 2014 for attempting to join the Islamic State in Syria. He was released after ten months because authorities lacked proof of his intentions, after which he brought together other like-minded marginalized youth with the aid of a local imam.

Rabat’s CVE policy aims to be comprehensive in not only preventing terrorist attacks but also tackling the root causes of radicalization, such as socioeconomic inequality and extremist religious narratives. Most of the cells that have been discovered in the past few years are small—consisting of five to fifteen people—suggesting that state policies are effectively preventing jihadis from organizing into larger groups. Yet despite Rabat’s sporadic efforts to deradicalize jihadis while they are in prison, this policy remains unable to reintegrate them after they have been released. Authorities point to the “successful” reintegration of some former Salafi-jihadis whom King Mohamed VI pardoned since 2012—such as Abdelkerim Chadli and Mohammed Rafiki “Abu Hafs,” who eventually joined formal politics or founded NGOs. Yet the regime used these figures, who largely deradicalized on their own, primarily as a way to promote the idea that it was able to contain the former radical Islamists.

Only in 2016 did the state begin a more systematic approach to reintegration. The General Delegation for Prison Administration and Reintegration (DGAPR) launched the Moussalaha (“reconciliation”) deradicalization program in prisons jointly with the Mohammedia League for Scholars (Rabita) and the National Council for Human Rights (CNDH). The program aims to rehabilitate Salafi-jihadis within Moroccan prisons through a threefold approach: “reconciliation with the Self, with religious texts, and with society.” According to some participants in this program, this means “renouncing violence, accepting pluralistic interpretations of religious texts, and recognizing the legitimacy of the regime (the monarchy).”1 The apparent success of the first cohort in July 2017—several participants had their prison sentences shortened or even received a royal pardon—encouraged scores of former jihadis to join this initiative in the hope of leaving prison. For the second class, which took place in 2018, more than 300 prisoners applied for 25 spots.

While it is still early to draw conclusions from the preliminary stages of this deradicalization program, so far it has had very limited impact on jihadism more broadly. First, its objective of reconciliation is very broad: one former jihadi cynically asked, “Reconciliation between whom and whom?”2 Significantly, it only targets a fraction of jihadi prisoners, with the DGAPR accepting only about 50 volunteers for the first two cohorts of almost 1000 jihadis currently imprisoned. The first cohort in particular consisted mainly those who already expressed their “disenchantment” with jihadism in letters to the Rabita, in which they sought dialogue with religious scholars and expressed their willingness to “repent.” This indicates authorities are failing to reach enough people, especially those who have not yet renounced jihadism.

More importantly, the program does not oversee any socioeconomic reintegration for jihadis once they are released from prison. One former Moussalaha participant argued that he felt deceived by the program leaders’ unmet “promises” of reintegration: “We were told that we will be taken care of after prison, but nothing has been achieved.”3 The Mohamed VI Foundation for the Reintegration of Detainees does provide some limited care programs for all former detainees, such as issuing small grants to help them start a business. However, it has not tailored a specific program for former jihadis, who complain that reducing stigmas in their communities and providing psychological counseling are their more pressing needs. Instead, authorities rely mainly on routine security monitoring. A more comprehensive deradicalization program would include services such as family support, psychological counseling, vocational training, and forums to continue religious dialogue with credible scholars.

Post-prison reintegration of jihadis is partly falling short because civil society is absent from efforts to prevent and counter extremism. The state’s security-oriented approach does not allow non-state actors to work in this sphere, only tolerating them when they work in collaboration with authorities. Even Morocco’s socioeconomic development programs incorporate this over-securitized approach to extremism. For instance, since 2005 the Ministry of Interior has overseen the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), which aims, among other things, to fight the “breeding grounds” of radicalization in Morocco’s impoverished areas.

In this regard, civil society organizations (CSOs) fear that working on issues related to preventing radicalization makes them subject to increased monitoring or censorship by authorities. For instance, in a July 2014 speech to parliament, then Minister of Interior Mohamed Hassad attacked the Moroccan Association for Human Rights (AMDH), a secular human rights NGO, for discrediting the government’s efforts in counterterrorism and being apologists for radicalism—likely in reality a response to the AMDH’s frequent criticism of the state. This incident has made other independent organizations wary of working on issues related to extremism lest they give the government fodder to launch similar rhetorical attacks or even restrict their activities. As part of a program to understand roots of violent extremism and build the capacity of civil society organizations (CSOs), the Moroccan chapter of Search for Common Ground found that most organizations it interviewed were highly reluctant to identify their activities as related to countering extremism or to reveal their sources of funding.4 CSOs operate in a highly sensitive context that prevents engagement in CVE activities.

When some former detainees return to their jihadi activities, CSOs face even tougher scrutiny. For instance, Anas El Haloui, an Islamist activist who spent three years in prison on charges of joining an extremist group, became the spokesperson of the Joint Committee for the Defense of Islamic Detainees after his release. He worked to defend the rights of former Salafi detainees and solicited the support of many national and international human rights NGOs. When he left Morocco in late 2013 to fight in Syria, many other human rights NGOs backed away from defending Salafi-jihadi prisoners. For instance, Al-Karama Forum for Human Rights—a human rights NGO close to the PJD—became silent on this issue and refused to allow the Joint Committee for the Defense of Islamist Detainees to hold meetings on Al Karama premises.

Morocco’s security measures seem to have been relatively effective in preventing major terrorist attacks in the last few years. However, in the absence of a comprehensive deradicalization program that includes civil society efforts to rehabilitate former prisoners, the country will remain vulnerable to growing radicalization among marginalized populations.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

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» (Algérie) Terrorisme.
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» Vidéros et Documentaires sur le Maroc
» Alger au mille bar, entre terrorisme et bikini..

Guerre contre le Terrorisme dans le Maghreb

Un titre choc du magazine américain ‘Foreign Policy’ sur le Maroc

""Qu'importe que je sois de mauvaise foi puisque je lutte pour une cause juste. Qu'importe que je lutte pour une cause injuste puisque je suis de bonne foi""

“L'histoire n'est que la géographie dans le temps, comme la géographie n'est que l'histoire dans l'espace.”

Tanger: le terroriste venait de Ndjaména

Morocco's Jihadist Paradox, Unraveled

Intelligence agencies are running al-Qaeda camps in North Africa — UN consultant (EXCLUSIVE) – INSURGE intelligence

ISIS EXPANDS INTO THE SAHEL, AFRICA’S MIGRATION HUB

Trois principes clés de Daesh battus en brèche par les oulémas du Maroc

1/ Le jihad ne signifie pas la guerre

2/ Daesh est un État extrémiste et non islamique

3/ L’impôt imposé aux non musulmans est obsolète

The Age of Hyper-Terrorism and ‘Low Cost’ Terrorism

Le malien Iyad Ag Ghali, djihadiste et intouchable

Sahel : Iyad Ag Ghali tente-t-il un rapprochement avec Abou Walid al-Sahraoui ?

L’absence de collaboration des services algériens rend le climat propice au développement du terrorisme dans la région (Khiame)

Breaking North Africa’s Border Security Conundrum

Although Maghreb states have tended to pursue border security unilaterally, increased transnational coordination at the local level offers a more sustainable approach.

Sahel: Aqmi menace les entreprises occidentales

Morocco’s Failure to Reintegrate Former Jihadis

Morocco’s security-oriented approach to countering violent extremism leaves little room for rehabilitation efforts.

""Qu'importe que je sois de mauvaise foi puisque je lutte pour une cause juste.
Qu'importe que je lutte pour une cause injuste puisque je suis de bonne foi""