document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine

Citation :: The Kingdom of Morocco has much to be proud of; for example, it has
been a long-time Middle East ally to the United States, being the first
country to recognize the United States as a nation in 1777. Moroccan
officers also are quick to tell us of King Mohammed Bin Youssaf's
Mohammed V's refusal to surrender Moroccan Jews to the Vichy (pro-Nazi)
French Government and certain death in Nazi concentration camps.
Today, Morocco has a moderate government in which the monarch, who
can trace his lineage to the Prophet Muhammad, challenges militant
ideology and encourages Islamic scholars to dispel the twisted theology
that produces mass murder. Morocco, as a guardian of maritime commerce
along the Gibraltar Strait and a nation that has recently contributed
peacekeepers to Kosovo and Bosnia, has great potential to become a
moderating force in the Middle East.

Al-Jaysh Al-Maghribi Abr Al-Tareekh (The Moroccan Army throughout
history) by Abdul-Haq Al-Merini offers Arab readers a glimpse of
Moroccan military history. (2) Al-Merini has written biographies and
collected speeches of the late Moroccan King Mohammed V and also King
Hassan II, who died in 1999. Al-Merini, who received his doctorate in
literature, is a prolific writer of history. The book won Morocco's
prize for literature in 1968 and has become a timeless military classic
among North African officers in Morocco, Algeria, Mauritania, and
Tunisia.

Al-Merini begins
his book, which is enthralling from beginning to end, by discussing the
frustrations Roman legions faced while pacifying Moroccan tribesmen. He
mentions the importance of Moroccan tribes in the Islamic expansion
beginning in A.D. 711 and concludes with Morocco's roles in World War
II, Operation Desert Storm, and peacekeeping operations in the Congo,
Somalia, and the Balkans. Understanding the Moroccan military will help
further the relationship between U.S. and Moroccan Armed Forces,
particularly as both nations are committed to battling Islamic
militancy and terrorism.

World War II

The first inkling of Morocco's pro-U.S. stance came with Mohammed V's
proclamation on 7 September 1938: "I wish to confirm with the highest
and clearest voice that Morocco's King and his subjects will offer
unified resistance and will side with France." (3) Despite the famous
Humphrey Bogart movie Casablanca, which featured a host of Nazi,
Allied, and Vichy French spies, the Moroccan position during the war
was quite clear; it picked the Allied cause against fascism. (4) On 3 September 1939, Moroccan mosques issued in poetic prose, a
royal proclamation that reminded its citizens of World War I's effect
on society, emphasizing the need to back France once again against the
Germans. What also motivated the Moroccans was a belief that nations
under French and British colonialism would be given their independence
once victory over Germany was achieved.

German Blitzkrieg 1940. On 3 September 1939, the Moroccans organized a
brigade of 2,300 fighters in Meknes. The brigade was part of the 1st
Moroccan Division, which included the 1st, 3d, and 7th Moroccan
Infantry Regiments. The regiments were sent to France and positioned
along the Belgian border under the command of French forces. After
marching 130 kilometers in 3 days, the Moroccans witnessed Adolf
Hitler's 10 May 1940 blitzkrieg and German forces' engagements on 14
and 15 May. There is no information about how the Moroccans were
defeated tactically, but Al-Merini mentions that of the 2,300 Moroccans
sent as part of the Belgian Campaign, only 50 returned to Meknes after
the liberation of Europe in 1945. A footnote to the chapter on World
War II contains the unit citation (A l'ordre de l'Armee) bestowed on
the 7th Moroccan Regiment by the French War Ministry. The citation
acknowledges Moroccan forces for bravery while engaged in hand-to-hand
combat against German units as well as their proficiency with bayonets.

In 1989, French and Belgian veterans gathered in Brussels to
memorialize those who died in the German blitzkrieg in Belgium. Part of
the ceremony involved reading verses from the Quran in memory of the
valiant Moroccans who died defending the Benelux countries.

Anfa Conference 1943. In January 1943, British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill, American President Franklin D. Roosevelt, French General
Charles DeGaulle, and King Mohammed V met for 4 days in the Casablanca
suburb of Anfa to map out a strategy for the war. The Anfa Conference
is significant because it is where the Allies first agreed on the
demand for an "unconditional surrender" of the Axis powers.

A highlight of the conference was a dinner party hosted by Roosevelt in
honor of Mohammed V and his son Moulay Hassan. Roosevelt's recognition
of the Moroccan Sovereign as host of the conference and as a ruler of
importance gave credibility to Moroccan aspirations for independence.
Roosevelt asserted that the King should not allow other countries to
exploit Morocco's natural resources. Roosevelt is also reported to have
said that he would do all in his power to support Morocco's wish to
gain its independence from France. At the conclusion of the conference,
the King proclaimed: "A new future for my country."

part2

Citation :: Casablanca and the Algerian port of Oran received the bulk of North
African Allied landings during Operation Torch. Al-Merini discusses
French infighting between Auguste Paul Nogues the pro-Vichy French
Governor-General to Morocco; DeGaulle; and French General Henri Honore
Giraud, who supported the Allied landings in North Africa.

The initial landings of Operation Torch involved U.S. and Free French
Army units engaging pro-Nazi Vichy French formations under Nogues.
Battles occurred off the Moroccan coastal towns of Ahsfee, Mahdia, and
Buzineeqah. Nogues encouraged King Mohammed V to move his capital from
Rabat to Fez to be closer to the Axis defenses, but the Moroccan
monarch refused, choosing instead to honor his commitment to the Anfa
Conference and to the Allied cause. The arrival of U.S. General George S. Patton's 5,000 troops and 250
tanks turned the tide of Vichy French resistance to the Allies. The
final fierce fighting for the Axis cause was an attempt to capture the
Moroccan capital of Rabat, but Marshal Henri Philippe Petain authorized
Nogues to negotiate a cease-fire with General Dwight D. Eisenhower in
Algiers. Once Morocco was secure, it served as a major base for U.S.
bombers and as a logistics center for the push toward Tunisia and
Sicily. On 18 November 1942, Nogues and Patton attended the annual
celebration of King Mohammed V's ascension. The monarch publicly
reaffirmed his commitment to the Allies by contributing 12,000 Moroccan
troops to the Allied forces.

Italy 1942-1944. The 12,000 Moroccan troops that joined the Allies
included infantry, artillery, anti-air units, and engineering companies
that were trained on U.S. and French military munitions. The first
destination of the Moroccan formation was to join trained Tunisians to
fight a combined German-Italian occupation force in Tunisia. Battles to
liberate Tunisia lasted 6 months. Elements of the Moroccan division were split up and joined with
other Algerian and Tunisian units attached to Allied forces liberating
the islands of Corsica and Elbe. By securing these islands along with
Tunisia, the Straits of Messina lay open to Sicily. From November 1943
to January 1944, the Moroccans became bogged down as they made their
way from an amphibious assault near Naples toward Mount Cassino. The
Moroccans used dynamite, grenades, and flamethrowers to take out each
defensive position.

In 1944,
Moroccan units joined the task force formed to assault the Gustav and
Sigfried lines. Moroccan units played an important role in breaking the
siege at Anzio, fighting alongside the Allies for 20 days. The
Moroccans also joined the Allies in the summer of 1944 to liberate Rome.

Final Invasion of Germany 1944-1945. It was necessary to regroup and
re-equip 6,000 Moroccan troops to augment the 12,000 exhausted Moroccan
troops who were fighting in North Africa and Italy. Fresh Moroccan
forces, along with battle-hardened troops, took part in the capture of
Florence (June 1944) and in the amphibious assault on Marseilles.
Making their way into France from the east, the Moroccans were once
again directly attacking along the Alps and the hills of Tuscany. By
October-November 1944, the Moroccans were fighting in winter conditions
along the Rhine.

part3

Citation :: A Moroccan honor guard marched with Allied forces along the Champs
Elysees in August 1944. Moroccan forces joined the First French Army to
liberate France and then helped guard the French sector in postwar
Germany.

According to Al Merini, 8,000 Moroccan soldiers lost their lives,
28,000 soldiers were wounded, and 7,000 became prisoners of war (POWs).
One-thousand Moroccans were awarded the Campaign de la Liberation, and
500 were posthumously awarded French, British, and American awards for
valor. The French government gave King Mohammed V and Crown Prince
Hassan II the Order of Liberation. Throughout 1945, Morocco
worked with the Allies to repatriate its POWs from Axis camps. The
French cited specific tribes like the Zayan and Zummur tribes for
excellence in commando tactics. Moroccan Army commanders were cited for
bravery and leadership; for example Idris Ben-Taher was credited with
helping capture the French town of Montpellier. The 2d and 7th Moroccan
Regiments received Belgium's Legion of Honor in 1947 for their actions
in 1940 against an unstoppable German blitzkrieg.

National Liberation Army 1947-1956Only military students of French academies and those with a passion for
the Vietnam war know that Moroccan troops participated in the French
War in Indochina. Moroccan forces witnessed Ho Chi Minh and his
guerrillas drain French forces and the foreign legionnaires, which
culminated in their defeat in Diem Bien Phu. Moroccans and Algerians
wondered if the same tactics would apply to their own countries, which
led to the formation of the National Liberation Front (FLN) in Algeria
and the National Liberation Army (ALN) in Morocco. The FLN and ALN were
dedicated to ridding Algeria and Morocco respectively of French rule.

The early organization of the ALN consisted of cells of 25 operatives
(14 civilian and 11 military) representing one vanguard and a vanguard
squad leader. Cells were put under different levels of command and
employed in guerrilla operations against lone French outposts. In
hindsight, and in recognition of the contributions Moroccans made to
World War II, the French might have worked toward a more peaceful
transition to Moroccan self-rule. Instead, Paris dragged its feet. It
took a political solution and a guerrilla vanguard to gain independence
for Morocco (July 1956) almost 11 years after the end of World War II.
Many of the armed ALN cells based themselves in the middle Atlas
Mountains and the Rift Valley. ALN leader Abdulkareem Al-Khateeb
developed and implemented the idea of recruiting Moroccan officers and
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) in the French Army within ALN ranks.

King Mohammed V and Crown Prince Hassan strove to collect all the
elements of Moroccan formations into one Moroccan Armed Force. When
Morocco gained its independence in 1956, Moroccans were fighting under
French and Spanish flags as well as with the ALN. Hassan went to Paris
to negotiate the transition for self-rule and to establish a Moroccan
Armed Force of 15,000 troops.

part 4

Citation :: Mohammed
V went directly to ALN leaders to acknowledge their contributions to
the Nation's independence. He offered each fighter the opportunity to
join the Moroccan Armed Forces and employed many of them as border
guards. He instituted a 9-month training program to ease the Moroccan's
transition to the regular army, and he brought ALN leaders and
formations to the palace in Rabat to go through a military inspection
and a presentation of colors before the King. The book offers a
valuable lesson about assimilating a liberation army into society,
retaining its dignity, and recognizing its military value to a newly
independent nation. In the 1960s, many Moroccans were sent to Spanish,
French, and U.S. military schools, a trend that continues today.
Al-Merini also lists 22 schools within Morocco that are affiliated with
the military. The Moroccan military is proud of its officer and NCO
academic achievements. Lieutenant Colonel Abdelkader Al-Marboo and
Major Mohammed Raffei attended the French Higher Military College, and
during the 1989-1990 academic year, organized a symposium on European
Defense in the 21st Century. In the spring of 1991, Moroccans published
the Air Force magazine L' Espace Morocaine, which emphasizes military
thought and formulates new theories on security.

On 8 November 1956, Moroccan Armed Forces developed a national security
structure. A High Council for National Defense, chaired by the king,
was created. The council included a prime minister, a minister of
labor, an interior minister, and a minister of national economy. The
council oversees the affairs of the Defense Ministry and aids in civil
control over the military. The council also combines all elements of
national powereconomics, human resources, and internal policing
to address matters of national security--a lesson Egypt learned only
after the debacle of the 1967 Six-Day War.

Morocco's unique military organization Al-Deerk Al-Malaki (Royal
Guards) not only protects the monarch but provides security in courts,
military policing, port security, and airport security. The essence of
Morocco's uniformed services is summed up in a speech King Hassan II
made declaring that his army is a democratic army that is a school for
the Nation. Military service is compulsory for all citizens.

The book also chronicles the effect the Moroccan Armed Forces have had
in the internal development of Morocco. They have built bridges,
repaired roads, provided technical help to farmers, repaired dams, and
distributed meal rations to the needy during the holy month of Ramadan.

Activity Since 1960

part 5

Citation :: Congo 1960-1961. The Moroccans became highly active in
peacekeeping, sending two battalions to the Congo under the command of
General Hammu Al-Kitani. The force included Royal Guard and Regular
Army units that integrated well under Al-Kitani's command. They
interacted with Katangan Separatist Rebels, reorganized the Congolese
police force, restored order in villages, surveyed a dam, and reopened
the port of Boma along the Congo River.

Arab-Israeli wars 1967 and 1973. Moroccan forces arrived too late to
participate in the Six-Day War, but sent forces to the Egyptian and
Syrian fronts in the 1973 Yom-Kippur War. Golan (Syrian) Front units
and Moroccan units were under the command of General Abdelsalam
Al-Safrewi. Faced with Israeli armor, the Moroccans armed their
infantry with bazookas. On the Egyptian front they made a more
effective contribution under the command of Colonel-Major (brigadier
general) Hassan Al-Hatmee. Moroccan Desert units, which were positioned
around the town of Suez, built defensive perimeters along Bir Azeib, a
strategic location that controlled access to the two roads leading to
Cairo (the Suez to Cairo road and the Ras-al-Abadiyah to Hilwan road).
Moroccan troops returned from Egypt and Syria in April 1974.

Congo 1977. In 1977, the Moroccans increased their presence in the
Congo, responding to a call from the Organization of African Unity to
bring peace and stability to the Congo (then called Zaire). Under the
command of Colonel Abdelkader Lubarees, and with the aid of French
transports, the Moroccans landed 1,300 troops. Their mission was to put
down a communist insurgency in Katanga Province. While battling Cuban
and Angolan forces, the Moroccans captured Soviet hardware, including
SAM-7 missiles. Western Sahara Since 1975. The former Spanish
Sahara borders Morocco, and before Spanish colonialism of the area in
1885, the region was an autonomous area administered by the Moroccan
monarchy. Al-Merini describes how members of the ALN were directed to
combat Spanish units as early as 1958. Members of the ALN even waged
attacks on French forces in Tindouf (southwestern Algeria) to relieve
pressure from the FLN, which from 1954 to 1962 fought for its
independence from France.

After Spain withdrew from the Spanish Sahara in 1975, Morocco and
Mauritania mobilized forces, with Morocco occupying two-thirds of the
territory. The Moroccans staged a "Green March," in which 300,000 of
its citizens and troops marched with Qurans to reclaim Moroccan
territory. This issue has become the single most defining aspect in
Moroccan nationalism today. A prolonged guerrilla war ensued, in which
the Algerian-supported Polisario fought for its independence from
Western Sahara. The conflict remains unresolved.

Mauritania 1977 to 1979. Twelve thousand Moroccan troops were
dispatched to Mauritania to help combat Polisario separatists. Algeria
supported the Polisario as part of its strategy of adopting an
anti-West rejectionist front. Morocco, as a pro-U.S. monarchy, was ripe
for attack by Egypt's strongman Gamal Abdel-Nasser and the
pan-Arabists. The Western Sahara War continued until the UN brokered a
cease-fire in 1991. Before the cease-fire, the Moroccans built a series
of sand barriers along the border of Algeria and the Western Sahara
designed to limit desert raiding. The barriers were highly effective,
leaving the Polisario few avenues of escape.

part 6

Citation :: Central African Republic 1979. After the September coup that had
freed the Nation of a military dictatorship, the Moroccans dispatched a
security contingent in equatorial Africa to restore order to the
Central African Republic. No information in the book reveals the size
of this Moroccan force.

Persian Gulf War 1990-1991. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert
Storm, King Hassan II sent a Moroccan force of 1,300 troops to Saudi
Arabia and 1,000 troops to the United Arab Emirates. The troops came
with tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided missiles and Milan
antitank missiles, jeeps, trucks, communications cars, water tanks, and
repair trucks. The force's task organization was based on how it fought
in Western Sahara. Somalia 1992. The Moroccan forces that were
sent to Somalia were task-organized to provide humanitarian relief. The
force included 1,250 combat troops and 50 military medical personnel
serving under the command of Colonel (Doctor) Alaal Farraj. Among the
Moroccans who arrived with their forces in Somalia was Helima Merri, a
female Moroccan physician from the Ministry of Health, who with 36
civilian doctors and their support staff opened a second Moroccan field
hospital. Publicizing Merri's role could encourage other Arab armies to
see the leadership potential of professional Arab women. A social
service contingency led by Captain Fidwi Binani provided Somalis with
counseling and psychological services.

In mid-June 1993, a combined Moroccan-French force swept an area of
Mogadishu that was controlled by militia loyal to Mohammed Farrah
Aidid. An ensuing exchange of fire led to the death of Colonel Abdullah
Binmamous and 4 Moroccan soldiers and injury to 40 Moroccan citizens.
Al-Merini discusses the importance of the Islamic contingent that
attacked Aidid, who was holding Muslims hostage and using innocent
civilians in his war against other factions. After Binmamous's death,
the Moroccans doubled their efforts and with the French took over the
Balee Doo-Ghlee section of the city, capturing over 100 of Aidid's
militia and impounding numerous weapons.

On 21 June 1993, King Hassan II sent Crown Prince Mohammed to oversee
the return of the Moroccan soldiers who had died in the battle to
secure Balee Doo-Ghlee and to ensure that proper honors were rendered
to them. The Moroccans, who arrived in Somalia in December 1992 and
left in April 1994, policed major districts of Mogadishu, guarding
relief convoys centers and the airport. They also relieved Pakistani
peacekeepers in the UN security operation called Mansoor II.

Bosnia 1996. In March 1996, 1,200 Moroccan troops left the port of
Agadir as part of a UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia. The troops
positioned themselves around Mount Igman to provide security to
Sarajevo and to reinforce French forces. They provided protection to UN
and NATO convoys and security to the city of Mostar; guarded a valuable
airstrip; and sent forces to Gorazde.

Morocco--An Arab Ally According to Al-Merini, the United States needs
moderate Arab friends who have played a constructive role in ensuring
stability around the world and who have thwarted the forces of
intolerance and hate. Morocco's military history demonstrates the kind
of Arab ally who can play a major role in various operations from the
current stabilization of Iraq to assisting in Liberia. Europe and the
United States need to continue to cultivate Morocco and the fruitful
role it plays in the world.

part 7

Citation :: Al-Merini's book describes Morocco's importance as a moderate
Islamic representative in Bosnia and Somalia. By joining the United
States and Europe, Morocco is a bright example of how the Arab League
should act in future conflicts. Al-Merini encourages U.S. military
planners to recognize the positive contribution of Arab forces and
understand how vital it is to combat religious militancy and acts of
terror around the world.

Al-Jaysh Al-Maghribi abr Al-Tareekh is an important book. Translating
and assessing would further understanding between Moroccan and American
uniformed services and capitalize on our Arab and Muslim ally's
military potential.

source lien

Invité

Excellente trouvaille Ultras, merci Like a Star @ heaven

Invité

Lors de la guerre du golf de 1991, l'opération tempête du désert, la participation des FAR à l'attaque pour libérer le Koweït:

Citation :: Le long de la côte, le Joint Forces Command East, divisé grosso modo en 3 groupes de forces comprenant pour l'Arabie Saoudite la 2e brigade d'infanterie motorisée de la Garde, la 8e brigade d'infanterie mécanisée et la 10e brigade d'infanterie, pour le Koweït la brigade Al-Fatah, ainsi qu'un régiment mécanisé marocain et 5 bataillons d'infanterie des Emirats Arabes Unis, d'Oman, du Qatar, du Sénégal et du Bengladesh. Au total, 152 véhicules de combat blindés et 112 systèmes d'artillerie. Mission : attaquer les forces irakiennes sur le territoire koweïtien et s'emparer de secteurs clés sur la côte, et ainsi protéger le flanc de la I MEF, avant de libérer Koweït City.

C'est un article très long, j'ai juste pris la partie où les FAR ont été cités, j'ai cherché un topic concernant la participation de nos FAR à la guerre du golf 1991 mais j'ai pas trouvé c'est pourquoi je l'ai posté ici.

les soldats marocains avaient refusé de participer au combat contre les irakiens. d'ailleurs cela avait crée des problèmes avec les américains

le Maroc était aller dans le Golf pour une mission purement défensif.

_________________
L'homme sage est celui qui vient toujours chercher des conseils dabord, des armes on en trouve partout.

feu Hassan II.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbjNQ_5QvgQ

Invité

En 1890, selon un français de l'époque...

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine YXsjI

Tarikh es-Soudan de Abderrahmane Es Saâdi

Le lien suivant renvoi directement à la partie marocaine de l'histoire du bilad es-sudan avec l(expedition du pacha djouder (p 215)

http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/bpt6k261452/f242.tableDesMatieres

_________________

""Qu'importe que je sois de mauvaise foi puisque je lutte pour une cause juste.
Qu'importe que je lutte pour une cause injuste puisque je suis de bonne foi""

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine VUO9YX1

“L'histoire n'est que la géographie dans le temps, comme la géographie n'est que l'histoire dans l'espace.”

un article sur l'équipement de l'armée marocaine en 62
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/1962/03/04/page/34/article/morocco-will-get-arms-from-russia

Texte en Arabe de l'organisation militaire au 19 ème siècle

http://www.habous.gov.ma/daouat-alhaq/item/3275

Citation :: الجيش المغربي في عهد الدولة العلوية

عناصر الجيــش
:
1- القبائل المخزنية : كان الجيش يتألف من عناصر تدين بالطاعة للمخزن وهي القبائل الكبيرة كالشراكة والوداية والشراردة الخ ... ومن « الباخرة» العبيد الذين كانوا يتكون منهم الجيش الإسماعيلي. وكان على كل قبيلة من القبائل المذكورة أن تجعل رهن إشارة « المخزن» « رحى» من « المخازنية » أي الجنود الذين يتمركزون أينما استقر « المخزن». فكان أغلب هؤلاء « المخازنية» يتمركزون في ضواحي مدينة فاس عاصمة المغرب ومقر السلطة المركزية وعلى أطراف « المدن السلطانية» عاملة على إخضاع القبائل المحيطة بها.
2- العسكــر : كان تحت إمرة « حكومة المخزن» « طابور» يضم 500 « عسكري». ويحمل اسم « العسكر» وهو مجموعة من الجنود الذين يتجندون طول حياتهم لحماية المخزن سواء في حالة الحرب أم المسلم. ويدعون أيضا « المسترزقة». وكانت أسماؤهم تحفظ في « كناش» المخزن ويفرض لهم العطاء من بيت المال.
وقد كانوا متمركزين في المناطق الرئيسية كمناطق فاس ومكناس ووزان وتافيلالت وتيزنيت ووجدة .. وكانوا يستعينون في حالة حرب « بالنوايب» (نابية: هلة عسكرية يقوم بها الخيالة).
3- المتطوعـون : وهم الجنود الذين خرجوا من « التنفيذ» كان عددهم في الجيش «المخزني» يبلغ عشرين ألفا في صفوف المشاة وعشرة آلاف في صفوف الخيالة وأربعة آلاف في صفوف المدفعية. وكان يعبر عن التطوع في الجيش بالعبار الآتية : « كتب روحو في الطابور».

وحدات الجيش المخزني :

1- عسكر المشاة : يتألف جيش المشاة من « العسكر» ومن « المتطوعين» وينقسم إلى عدة «طابورت». وكان لكل طابور (500 جندي) قائد يدعى « قائد الرحى» (كولونيل) وله خليفة. وتنقسم الرحى إلى 5 « مئات» يقود كل واحدة منها « قائد المائة» (عريف) والمائة إلى 8 فرق وكل فرقة (12 عسكري) يقودها « مقدم» (ضابط صف).
وكان كل طابور من هذه الطابورات يقيم بمدينة رئيسية كمراكش وطنجة ويحم اسم المدينة التي يقيم بها. ما عدا طابور مدينة مكناس الذي كان يحمل اسم « عسكر العبيد» لكونه كان يضم رجال « الباخرة».
وكان سلاحهم هو « المكحلة» و « الكوبيطة» و « تفالة» و « بوشويكة» وكانوا يدعونه «ليقامة الحرب».
وكان زي جندي المشاة يتألف من كبوط أحمر أو أخضر وسراويل أزرق و « بدعية» حمراء وشكارة من الجلد و « بلغة» صفراء و «شاشية» حمراء. أما ضابط جيش المشاة فكان يلبس بذلة مكونة من القميص والقفطان و « الفراجية» و « البرنس» و « التماك» وحزامة لحمل الرصاص. وكانت البذلة توزع بواسطة « قائد المسخرين» بمناسبة الأعياد.
وكان لجيش المشاة علم يسمى حامله « بالطراد».
2- الخيــالة :
كان جيش الخيالة ينقسم إلى « رحى» يبلغ عدد فرسان كل واحدة منها 300 وتنقسم هي الأخرى إلى «محلات» في كل « محلة» 100 فارس يقودها « قائد المائة». وكان الخيالة يعززون جيش المشاة في حالة حرب لمهارتهم في فن الرمي. أما في حالة سلم كانوا يوزعون على المدن المخزنية للقيام بدور « رجال الدرك». وكان 800 فارس من جيش الخيالة يصحبون « المواكب السلطاني» في حلة وترحاله.
وكان قائدهم الأعلى هو قائد المشور الذي كان ملحقا بالصقر السلطاني. أما قائدهم في المدن فهو باشا المدينة وقائدهم خارجها قائد القبيلة. وكانوا يرتدون نفس بذلة المشاة. وكان سلاحهم هو « المزرقة» و «الكابوس».
3- الطبجيــة :
كان جيش الطبجية (جند المدفعية) يتكون من المتطوعين ومن « الباخر» ومن بعض رجال القبائل. بلغ عددهم ما يقرب من 4000 « طبجي». وكانوا موزعين على المدن الساحلية كطنجة والعرائش والبيضاء ورباط الفتح (معسكر النصر) والجديدة والصويرة. وكانوا يحمون السواحل المغربية من كل دخيل عن طريق البحر تحت إمرة قائدهم « قائد الطبجية». وكانت فرق أخرى من جند المدفعية موزعة على أبراج المدن الداخلية كفاس ومكناس ومراكش ووجدة.
وكانوا يستعملون في دفاعهم عن الشواطئ والمدن المذكورة مدافع تقيلة من نوع 75 ورشات من نوع « مكسيم» وبطاريات. وكان يعمل في صفوفهم مهندسون تخرج بعضهم من أوربا لمساعدتهم في كيفية الرمي بالمدافع والبطاريات.
4- القوات الاحتياطية :
كانت في كل مدينة فرقة عسكرية مسلحة تدعى « عسة» وهي مكونة من خمسين جنديا تسهر على أنت السكان تحت إمرة باشا المدينة. ففي النهار كانت هذه الفرق تحمي البنايات الرسمية وفي الليل كانت تقوم مقامها « دوريات» أخرى تسمى « بدوارة» تطوف غي أزقة المدن لتحميها من المجرمين تحت إمرة «قائد الدور».
وكان فيلق آخر يدعى « المشورة» مؤلفا من 800 إلى 1000 جندي يكون الحرس للمشور وللقصر الملكي بجانب فيلق « المسخرين».
5- القوة البحرية:
كان الأسطول المخزني يحتوي على عدة بواخر حربية منها :
- الحسني : اشتراها المولى الحسن الأول من انجلترا سنة 1885 عدد بحارتها 40.
- سيدي التركي : اشتراها المخزن من ألمانيا سنة 1810 عدد بحارتها 20 وكانت راصفة لميناء العرائش لتموين مراكز الريف الحربية.
- البشير : صنعت في ايطاليا واشتراها المخزن المغربي سنة 1988 م وزودها ب، 22 من المدافع وبمائة من البحارة الرباطيين والسلاويين والطنجيين ليقاوم بها قراصنة الريف. وكانت راسية بميناء طنجة.
وكان ربانها ألمانيا يدعى « مثنى» وأمين صائرها « عبد الكريم زيوزيو» التطواني.
وتحدثت بعض المصدر التاريخية عن وجود قطع بحرية أخرى في آخر العهد العزيزي مثل « طراد طوربيدي» بها 10 مدافع من عيار 12 سم. وبلغت حمولتها 2200 طن. ومثل « إحسان» الخ ..
6- الحرس السلطاني:
هم « خدمة السلطان من الجند العسكري» ويسمون « بطابور العبيد». ولهذا الطابور قائد يدعى قائد «الرحى» و « قواد المائة» وخليفة لكل واحد منهم يدعى « الشاوش» ومقدمون (لكل مائة أربعة) وخلائف «للمقدمين» يسمونهم « الأنياشي» (وهي كلمة تركية) و « علافان» و «علام» يحمل العلم الخاص السلطاني وهو من ملف أحمر. وكانت بلغ عدد عسكرية موسيقية تابعة للحرس السلطاني بلغ عدد عازفها الثلاثين تقدم ألوانا من ألحانها بالمشور عقب كل صلاة عشاء.
7- قيادة الجيـش :
كان يعتبر وما يزال السلطان هو القائد الأعلى للجيش فيشرف بنفسه على الحركات الهامة للجيش. وكان «العلاف» (مقتصد عام) بمثابة وزير للحربية والدفاع الحربي وينفذ الأوامر السلطانية فيما يخص التعيينات داخل صفوف الجيش. وكان « العلاف» يمسك سجلا للعسكر يشتمل على أسماء الضباط والجنود والمؤن المخصصة لهم.
وكان قائد الجيش بصفة عامة هو قائد « المشور» ويليه « قائد المحلة» الذي يشرف على قواد الرحى وقواد المائة والمقدمين ورجال الأمن. ويعمل تحت إمرة «قائد المحلة» كل من « قائد العسكر» وهو ضابط التموين « والزابط» الذي يكون مسؤولا عن الأمن داخل صفوف الجيش وفرقه.
وكان ديوان السلطان العسكري ينقسم إلى أربعة أقسام : « أحدها فيما يخص من اثبات وعطاء والثاني ما يختص بالأعمال من رسوم وحقوق والثالث يختص بالعمال من تغيير وعزل والرابع ما يختص ببيت المال».
8- تداريب الجيش واستعراضه :
كان الجيش المخزني يقوم بتمرينات عسكرية واستعراض أمام « قائد الأعلى» في كل يوم أربعاء لمعرفة الحاضر من الجنود والمتغيب منهم وللوقوف على مدى تقدمه.
وكان السلطان يمتطي صهوة فرسه « ويتبعه وزراؤه وأعيان دولته وجنوده حاملين للمدافع والمهاريس في موكب مهيب إلى أن يصل إلى الحل المعد للرمي والسباق» ويتلقون الجنود «الاستخبارات العسكرية الخاصة بكلمة السر» والأوامر الجديدة في شأن حمل السلاح واستعماله والتجول به أو بدونه وما جد في عملية الهجوم الخ ..
وقد استدعى المخزن ضباطا فتبين أجانب ليساعدوا ضباط الجيش المخزني على تدريب جنود وحداتهم تدريبا عسكريا عصريا، فكانت بعثة اسبانية تعمل على تنظيم الجيش في مدينة طنجة وثانية انجلترية تدرب جيش الخيالة تحت إمرة القائد «ماك لين» وثالثة ايطالية تسهر على صناعة الأسلحة بفاس تحت رئاسة كوبونيل ايطالي ورابعة فرنسية تتعاون مع القيادة العليا لجيش المخزن لإعادة تنظيم وحداته تحت قيادة ضابط من رتبة كمندار.
وكانت مهمة « الجيش المخزني» كمهام الجيوش الأخرى تتلخص في حماية وحدة التراب المغربي واستعادة الثغور المغتصبة والمحافظة على النظام في مجموع المملكة المغربية.

Vous trouverez plusieurs articles en arabe sur l’histoire militaire marocaine sur le site de Habous

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Texte en Arabe de l'organisation militaire au 19 ème siècle

http://www.habous.gov.ma/daouat-alhaq/item/3275

Citation :: الجيش المغربي في عهد الدولة العلوية

عناصر الجيــش

:
1- القبائل المخزنية : كان الجيش يتألف من عناصر تدين بالطاعة للمخزن وهي القبائل الكبيرة كالشراكة والوداية والشراردة الخ ... ومن « الباخرة» العبيد الذين كانوا يتكون منهم الجيش الإسماعيلي. وكان على كل قبيلة من القبائل المذكورة أن تجعل رهن إشارة « المخزن» « رحى» من « المخازنية » أي الجنود الذين يتمركزون أينما استقر « المخزن». فكان أغلب هؤلاء « المخازنية» يتمركزون في ضواحي مدينة فاس عاصمة المغرب ومقر السلطة المركزية وعلى أطراف « المدن السلطانية» عاملة على إخضاع القبائل المحيطة بها.
2- العسكــر : كان تحت إمرة « حكومة المخزن» « طابور» يضم 500 « عسكري». ويحمل اسم « العسكر» وهو مجموعة من الجنود الذين يتجندون طول حياتهم لحماية المخزن سواء في حالة الحرب أم المسلم. ويدعون أيضا « المسترزقة». وكانت أسماؤهم تحفظ في « كناش» المخزن ويفرض لهم العطاء من بيت المال.
وقد كانوا متمركزين في المناطق الرئيسية كمناطق فاس ومكناس ووزان وتافيلالت وتيزنيت ووجدة .. وكانوا يستعينون في حالة حرب « بالنوايب» (نابية: هلة عسكرية يقوم بها الخيالة).
3- المتطوعـون : وهم الجنود الذين خرجوا من « التنفيذ» كان عددهم في الجيش «المخزني» يبلغ عشرين ألفا في صفوف المشاة وعشرة آلاف في صفوف الخيالة وأربعة آلاف في صفوف المدفعية. وكان يعبر عن التطوع في الجيش بالعبار الآتية : « كتب روحو في الطابور».

وحدات الجيش المخزني :

1- عسكر المشاة : يتألف جيش المشاة من « العسكر» ومن « المتطوعين» وينقسم إلى عدة «طابورت». وكان لكل طابور (500 جندي) قائد يدعى « قائد الرحى» (كولونيل) وله خليفة. وتنقسم الرحى إلى 5 « مئات» يقود كل واحدة منها « قائد المائة» (عريف) والمائة إلى 8 فرق وكل فرقة (12 عسكري) يقودها « مقدم» (ضابط صف).
وكان كل طابور من هذه الطابورات يقيم بمدينة رئيسية كمراكش وطنجة ويحم اسم المدينة التي يقيم بها. ما عدا طابور مدينة مكناس الذي كان يحمل اسم « عسكر العبيد» لكونه كان يضم رجال « الباخرة».
وكان سلاحهم هو « المكحلة» و « الكوبيطة» و « تفالة» و « بوشويكة» وكانوا يدعونه «ليقامة الحرب».
وكان زي جندي المشاة يتألف من كبوط أحمر أو أخضر وسراويل أزرق و « بدعية» حمراء وشكارة من الجلد و « بلغة» صفراء و «شاشية» حمراء. أما ضابط جيش المشاة فكان يلبس بذلة مكونة من القميص والقفطان و « الفراجية» و « البرنس» و « التماك» وحزامة لحمل الرصاص. وكانت البذلة توزع بواسطة « قائد المسخرين» بمناسبة الأعياد.
وكان لجيش المشاة علم يسمى حامله « بالطراد».
2- الخيــالة :
كان جيش الخيالة ينقسم إلى « رحى» يبلغ عدد فرسان كل واحدة منها 300 وتنقسم هي الأخرى إلى «محلات» في كل « محلة» 100 فارس يقودها « قائد المائة». وكان الخيالة يعززون جيش المشاة في حالة حرب لمهارتهم في فن الرمي. أما في حالة سلم كانوا يوزعون على المدن المخزنية للقيام بدور « رجال الدرك». وكان 800 فارس من جيش الخيالة يصحبون « المواكب السلطاني» في حلة وترحاله.
وكان قائدهم الأعلى هو قائد المشور الذي كان ملحقا بالصقر السلطاني. أما قائدهم في المدن فهو باشا المدينة وقائدهم خارجها قائد القبيلة. وكانوا يرتدون نفس بذلة المشاة. وكان سلاحهم هو « المزرقة» و «الكابوس».
3- الطبجيــة :
كان جيش الطبجية (جند المدفعية) يتكون من المتطوعين ومن « الباخر» ومن بعض رجال القبائل. بلغ عددهم ما يقرب من 4000 « طبجي». وكانوا موزعين على المدن الساحلية كطنجة والعرائش والبيضاء ورباط الفتح (معسكر النصر) والجديدة والصويرة. وكانوا يحمون السواحل المغربية من كل دخيل عن طريق البحر تحت إمرة قائدهم « قائد الطبجية». وكانت فرق أخرى من جند المدفعية موزعة على أبراج المدن الداخلية كفاس ومكناس ومراكش ووجدة.
وكانوا يستعملون في دفاعهم عن الشواطئ والمدن المذكورة مدافع تقيلة من نوع 75 ورشات من نوع « مكسيم» وبطاريات. وكان يعمل في صفوفهم مهندسون تخرج بعضهم من أوربا لمساعدتهم في كيفية الرمي بالمدافع والبطاريات.
4- القوات الاحتياطية :
كانت في كل مدينة فرقة عسكرية مسلحة تدعى « عسة» وهي مكونة من خمسين جنديا تسهر على أنت السكان تحت إمرة باشا المدينة. ففي النهار كانت هذه الفرق تحمي البنايات الرسمية وفي الليل كانت تقوم مقامها « دوريات» أخرى تسمى « بدوارة» تطوف غي أزقة المدن لتحميها من المجرمين تحت إمرة «قائد الدور».
وكان فيلق آخر يدعى « المشورة» مؤلفا من 800 إلى 1000 جندي يكون الحرس للمشور وللقصر الملكي بجانب فيلق « المسخرين».
5- القوة البحرية:
كان الأسطول المخزني يحتوي على عدة بواخر حربية منها :
- الحسني : اشتراها المولى الحسن الأول من انجلترا سنة 1885 عدد بحارتها 40.
- سيدي التركي : اشتراها المخزن من ألمانيا سنة 1810 عدد بحارتها 20 وكانت راصفة لميناء العرائش لتموين مراكز الريف الحربية.
- البشير : صنعت في ايطاليا واشتراها المخزن المغربي سنة 1988 م وزودها ب، 22 من المدافع وبمائة من البحارة الرباطيين والسلاويين والطنجيين ليقاوم بها قراصنة الريف. وكانت راسية بميناء طنجة.
وكان ربانها ألمانيا يدعى « مثنى» وأمين صائرها « عبد الكريم زيوزيو» التطواني.
وتحدثت بعض المصدر التاريخية عن وجود قطع بحرية أخرى في آخر العهد العزيزي مثل « طراد طوربيدي» بها 10 مدافع من عيار 12 سم. وبلغت حمولتها 2200 طن. ومثل « إحسان» الخ ..
6- الحرس السلطاني:
هم « خدمة السلطان من الجند العسكري» ويسمون « بطابور العبيد». ولهذا الطابور قائد يدعى قائد «الرحى» و « قواد المائة» وخليفة لكل واحد منهم يدعى « الشاوش» ومقدمون (لكل مائة أربعة) وخلائف «للمقدمين» يسمونهم « الأنياشي» (وهي كلمة تركية) و « علافان» و «علام» يحمل العلم الخاص السلطاني وهو من ملف أحمر. وكانت بلغ عدد عسكرية موسيقية تابعة للحرس السلطاني بلغ عدد عازفها الثلاثين تقدم ألوانا من ألحانها بالمشور عقب كل صلاة عشاء.
7- قيادة الجيـش :
كان يعتبر وما يزال السلطان هو القائد الأعلى للجيش فيشرف بنفسه على الحركات الهامة للجيش. وكان «العلاف» (مقتصد عام) بمثابة وزير للحربية والدفاع الحربي وينفذ الأوامر السلطانية فيما يخص التعيينات داخل صفوف الجيش. وكان « العلاف» يمسك سجلا للعسكر يشتمل على أسماء الضباط والجنود والمؤن المخصصة لهم.
وكان قائد الجيش بصفة عامة هو قائد « المشور» ويليه « قائد المحلة» الذي يشرف على قواد الرحى وقواد المائة والمقدمين ورجال الأمن. ويعمل تحت إمرة «قائد المحلة» كل من « قائد العسكر» وهو ضابط التموين « والزابط» الذي يكون مسؤولا عن الأمن داخل صفوف الجيش وفرقه.
وكان ديوان السلطان العسكري ينقسم إلى أربعة أقسام : « أحدها فيما يخص من اثبات وعطاء والثاني ما يختص بالأعمال من رسوم وحقوق والثالث يختص بالعمال من تغيير وعزل والرابع ما يختص ببيت المال».
8- تداريب الجيش واستعراضه :
كان الجيش المخزني يقوم بتمرينات عسكرية واستعراض أمام « قائد الأعلى» في كل يوم أربعاء لمعرفة الحاضر من الجنود والمتغيب منهم وللوقوف على مدى تقدمه.
وكان السلطان يمتطي صهوة فرسه « ويتبعه وزراؤه وأعيان دولته وجنوده حاملين للمدافع والمهاريس في موكب مهيب إلى أن يصل إلى الحل المعد للرمي والسباق» ويتلقون الجنود «الاستخبارات العسكرية الخاصة بكلمة السر» والأوامر الجديدة في شأن حمل السلاح واستعماله والتجول به أو بدونه وما جد في عملية الهجوم الخ ..
وقد استدعى المخزن ضباطا فتبين أجانب ليساعدوا ضباط الجيش المخزني على تدريب جنود وحداتهم تدريبا عسكريا عصريا، فكانت بعثة اسبانية تعمل على تنظيم الجيش في مدينة طنجة وثانية انجلترية تدرب جيش الخيالة تحت إمرة القائد «ماك لين» وثالثة ايطالية تسهر على صناعة الأسلحة بفاس تحت رئاسة كوبونيل ايطالي ورابعة فرنسية تتعاون مع القيادة العليا لجيش المخزن لإعادة تنظيم وحداته تحت قيادة ضابط من رتبة كمندار.
وكانت مهمة « الجيش المخزني» كمهام الجيوش الأخرى تتلخص في حماية وحدة التراب المغربي واستعادة الثغور المغتصبة والمحافظة على النظام في مجموع المملكة المغربية.

Il y a plein d erreur surtout les dates d achat des navires mais en général c est acceptable

Sid Et Turki cargo militaire de fabrication allemande armé de deux canons Krupp construit en 1892
Al Bachir croiseur de fabrication italienne construit en 1899

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document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_16

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_13

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_17

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_18

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_19

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_20

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_22

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Orbat_21

و كان حقا علينا نصر المؤمنين - حب الأوطان من الإيمان

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je ne sais pas si c'est le bon topic, mais une trouvaille trés interressante video qui explique comment les sovietes ont pu voler les secrets du mirage dans les années 1969 a l'aide de l'Egypte de Nasser.

mais ce qui nous interesse c'est de la minute 17.36 a 18.29 seconde, Vacili kouloutcha le directeur du bureau des affaires etrangeres de l'ex URSS au proche orient dit que dans les années 1990 le géneral abdelhaq el kadiri s'est rendu a l'URSS pour négocier l'achat d'un seul tank et il ne sait pas comment personne n'a eu de soupcons et qu'ils ont approuvé le contrat pour se rendre compte aprés que le tank a été livré aux américains (par les marocains) ( il dit que s'etait un coup de l'interne..).

ca me fait penser aux accords signés avec les russes récemment sur la non divulgation du secret du matériel militaire (est ce que c'est relié..) vidéo récente 1 er juillet 2016.

j'ai déja entendu que le maroc avait livré MIG 17 dans les annés 60 pour avoir en contre partie des f_5 mais c'est la premiere fois que j'entend l'affaire du char soviete.

bradli23 a écrit:: je ne sais pas si c'est le bon topic, mais une trouvaille trés interressante video qui explique comment les sovietes ont pu voler les secrets du mirage dans les années 1969 a l'aide de l'Egypte de Nasser.

mais ce qui nous interesse c'est de la minute 17.36 a 18.29 seconde, Vacili kouloutcha le directeur du bureau des affaires etrangeres de l'ex URSS au proche orient dit que dans les années 1990 le géneral abdelhaq el kadiri s'est rendu a l'URSS pour négocier l'achat d'un seul tank et il ne sait pas comment personne n'a eu de soupcons et qu'ils ont approuvé le contrat pour se rendre compte aprés que le tank a été livré aux américains (par les marocains) ( il dit que s'etait un coup de l'interne..).

ca me fait penser aux accords signés avec les russes récemment sur la non divulgation du secret du matériel militaire (est ce que c'est relié..) vidéo récente 1 er juillet 2016.

j'ai déja entendu que le maroc avait livré MIG 17 dans les annés 60 pour avoir en contre partie des f_5 mais c'est la premiere fois que j'entend l'affaire du char soviete.

J avais lu cet information dans un livre américain sur les T-80 , mais si je me rappel bien le nombre était de 7 ou 8 , la date donné par l auteur 1988.je vais essayer de le retrouver .

Le titre du livre est T-80 Standard Tank: The Soviet Army's Last Armored Champion (New Vanguard) by by Steven J. Zaloga

Voici l'extrait qui nous intéressent (deuxième paragraphe)

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine RhgwFGe

document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine RhgwFGe

En plus sur le lien wiki du T80 on retrouve ce paragraphe

"In 1992, the United Kingdom bought a number of T-80U MBTs for defence research and development. They were not bought officially but through a specially created trading company which was supposed to deliver them to Morocco. The price of five million USD offered for each tank ensured a lack of suspicion on the part of the Russians. Britain evaluated the tanks on their proving grounds and transferred one to the US where the Americans evaluated it on the Aberdeen Proving Ground. While evaluating the vehicle, the US and UK are alleged to have noted any weak spots and flaws of the T-80U. In January 1994, British Minister of State for Defence Procurement Jonathan Aitken (answering a Question to the Secretary of State for Defence) confirmed in parliamentary debates that a Russian T-80U tank was imported for "defence research and development purposes".""

Tout les deux n'ont pas de source de leur récit.

effectivement un autre article qui confirme cela mais parle plutôt de 5 chars T-80 livrés au Maroc qui les a livré a son tour a la France Allemagne GB et USA. cependant les british n'ont acheté qu'1 seul tank de leur coté :

Countries.
Cyprus (41 T-80U), Pakistan(320),People’s Republic of China (200 T-80U),
Republic of Korea(80 T-80U), Russian Federation (12,479 – some were lost in the Chechnya fighting or otherwise destroyed), and Ukraine (234 T-80/T-80B/T-80BK/T-80BVK, 28 T-80U, and 11 T-80UD). In 1992, the Spetstekhnika organization sold five T-80U tanks to Morocco, which then resold the tanks to France, Germany, the UnitedKingdom, and the United States. In 1992, the Voyentekh export firm in the Russian Federation sold another T-80U to the United Kingdom. Finally,Sweden has acquired a T-80U for evaluations.

source : https://www.forecastinternational.com/archive/disp_pdf.cfm?DACH_RECNO=422
page 9

autre source plus crédile qui parle aussi de 5 chars achetés par les marocains a la fin des années 80 et livrés au occidentaux selon Steven J. Zaloga
comme disait Shugan188 :

https://m.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/39s6la/is_it_true_that_soviet_military_exports_were/

moral de l'histoire, malgré tout ce qu'on risqué et ce qu'on fait pour nous présumés alliés a risque d'attirer la colère d'une grande puissance a l'époque (URSS) et ce qui peut engendrer sur le fait qu'on ne concède pas du matériel sensible dans l'avenir (s-400 par exemple) de l'autre coté on a rien eu au retour si ce n'est le chantage et les coups bas (peut être nous forcer a accepter l'installation de l'AFRICOM sur notre sol sans contre partie). j’espère que ça va faire réfléchir nos responsables pour être des partenaires crédibles aux yeux des autres puissances e.

c'est vrai que tout le monde joue ce jeu la comme Israël avec la Russie , la chine etc... mais il faut avoir une vision et peut être faire ce jeu dans les 2 sens pour profiter des 2 camps ( laisser les russes étudier les armes sensibles des américains.....). ne jamais mettre ses œufs dans un seul panier.

Pour moi il n y 'as pas de source crédible sur ce sujet et ça reste que des spéculations et meme si c'est vrai les occidentaux savent qu'ils n’apprendront rien d'utile d'un T-80 destiné à un pays arabe :

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monkey_model

Sujet déjà traité à mainte reprises. . Merci de faire vos recherches sur les bons topics avant d'ouvrir un débat si inutile

_________________
document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine Marche12

http://deremilitari.org/2014/02/warfare-and-firearms-in-fifteenth-century-morocco-1400-1492/

Citation :: Warfare and Firearms in Fifteenth Century Morocco, 1400-1492

Warfare in history is back in vogue again with special interest in the period 1350-1750. Much of this renewal arises from debate over the ‘Early Modern Military Revolution’ paradigm formulated by Geoffrey Parker and other self-described ‘New’ Military Historians.1 While the origins of this revolution are fixedly sixteenth century, tracing its roots has given new respectability to ‘a perennial stalking dinosaur of a theory’ – the Gunpowder Revolution of the Fifteenth Century.2Revolutionary or not, firepower warfare definitely played a compelling role in the political, social and commercial changes in the decades from 1430 to 1492.3 The ‘New Monarchs’ of fifteenth-century Europe and the ‘Gunpowder Empires’ of Afro-Asia and Iberia, whether land-based or seaborne, owed their expansion in no small measure to superior gunpowder firepower. Cannon coercion intensified the struggle for commodities, customers and trade routes begun once ‘Age of Exploration’ adventurism melded into the mercantile ‘Commercial Revolution’, itself both prelude and component to Parker’s gestating military revolution.4 Violent military intrusion could and often did unleash tumultuous social, religious and cultural ferment and accelerated change, if not outright prolonged upheaval, among victims and perpetrators alike.5 Several ‘new military historians’ are now shaping these paradigms to serve as templates for the study of political and social change on a global scale. The ambitions of this article are more modest, however. Its focus is just one country, Morocco, and its conclusions are tentative rather than declarative.

[smartads]

Still, it is truly ironic that the independence of modern Morocco stands upon its own distinctive ‘sixteenth century military revolution’ because, in the fifteenth century, Morocco came within a hair’s breadth of joining Byzantium, Burgundy, Granada, Novgorod and other fifteenth century states in the cartological museum of political extinction.6 In that century Morocco’s primary foreign antagonist, Portugal, developed a potent blend of amphibious assault power, naval suppressive fire techniques, and a deft divide-and-conquer strategy of occupying vulnerable coastal cities – all based on artillery warfare and, increasingly, arquebuse firearm.7 Lisbon ruled its penetration points through a carrot-and-stick approach mixing commercial enticements for compliant Moroccan notables and merchants with frequent and violent military excursions into the countryside, all anchored on fortified land enclaves supported by a self-sufficient seaborne logistical network.8 These Portuguese and later Castilian incursions helped to set off revolts that sped up fragmentation of the ancient Banu Marin sultanate (1262-1465) and brought forward a new ruling house, the Banu Wattas (1465-1554).

The new Sultanate, however, had to contend with more challenges than Iberian aggression and technological superiority. Long dormant traditions of local self-reliance had revived among restive Moroccans and would not be surrendered casually to some distant, tax-gouging pretender. Leo Africanus (Muhammad al-Wazani), reflecting on the wars and repression bedeviling Morocco in the late 1400s, classed the Wattasids of Fez alongside the infidel King of Portugal as co-equal despoilers of a hapless people battling against intruding despots, domestic or foreign, Muslim or Christian.9 But patriotic or parasitic, the Wattasid Sultanate which finally gained its footing in 1472 after 15 years of fitna [civil, turmoil] was a more disjointed state than the Marinid, and not only because of foreign hammerings. The new makhzan [the official state appa–ratus of army and civil service] had already lost control of a populist gunpowder revolution aborning within society itself.

Analysis of the ‘Gunpowder Revolution’ era in Morocco is complicated by two sources problems. First, the indigenous record for fifteenth-century Morocco is astoundingly sparse and poorly reconstructed; and, until recently, both Moroccan and western scholars not aligned with colonialist-minded French history writers have shown distaste for the entire era.10 The major secondary work on this period, a revised dissertation by the French scholar Auguste Cour, is now over 70 years old, supplemented by thoughtful but cursive essays by Nehemia Levtzion and Abdullah Laraoui. Several excellent recent articles have sharpened our focus on the period, but even these have concentrated on the late 1400s.11 Thus, until virtually the onset of the Granadan war (1481-1492), when Moroccan witnesses like Africanus and Muhammad al-Kurasi are heard, we must lean on rather the triumphalist writings of Portuguese, a few Castilians, and one Lowlands cavalier, Jurge Von Ehingin.12 Thus, in addition to a lack of available sources, those we have must be treated with some diffidence. Al-Kurasi, Ruy de Pina, and Mateus de Pisano wrote as loyal courtiers with an eye to enhancing the reputation of their royal patrons. The familiar cautions about the medieval tendency to exaggerate enemy force size still apply throughout the Moroccan-Iberian struggle. On the other hand, writers as diverse as Gomes Eanes Zurara and Leo Africanus prided themselves on visiting battle sites, interviewing participants, describing accurately events and personalities, and recording even defeats and’ embarrassments in some detail. Our sources may therefore display predictable biases but they are far from useless.

From their side, all sources testify readily and repeatedly to artillery and firearms as being vital to Portuguese hegemony. In 1510 a Lisbon courtier summed up the past century of expansionism with militaristic panache, his vision covering the globe-but Morocco formed his real frame of reference:

Pliny says that Europe, being more excellent than all the other parts of the world, produces more conquering races … due to its excellence, some writers consider it not a third but a half of the world; nor need we doubt that in cities, towns, walled fortresses, and other stately and beautiful buildings, Europe excels Asia and Africa, as do her larger and better fleets, much better armed than those of any other region. Nor dare Asia or Africa deny that Europe possesses great abundances of arms and superiority in artillery.13

Portugal’s assault on Morocco began in 1415 at the Mediterranean port town of Sabta (Ceuta). Confirmed use of gunpowder weapons in the taking of Ceuta may be problematic, but Portuguese installation of bombardas, medium-calibre colebratas, and anti-personnel falconetes proved essential to defending the new conquest from repeated Moroccan counter-sieges.14 Although hand-held guns [tiros de fogo] and espingarieros [‘riflemen’] appear for the first time in Morocco with King Duarte’s expedition against Tangiers in 1437, they did not save the Portuguese from a humiliating defeat by the Marinid Sultan and his allies.15 Despite this reverse, Lisbon’s forces continued to raid coastal villages while seducing harbour towns like Tangiers, Sla, Safi, Azammur, Anfa and Massa from their unenthusiastic allegiance to the Banu Marin dynasty of Fez.16 After two decades of mixing peaceful trade with annual royal plundering expeditions (frequently led by no less than Henry the Navigator) and piracy by garrisons and privateers, King Affonso himself pounced on a second harbour town on the Straits of Gibraltar, Qsar-s-Saghir.17Lisbon’s ship-to-shore fire effectively repelled Muslim defenders trying to rally the beach against the landing and, in three days, Qsar-s-Saghir fell to this huge force of 25,000 soldiers. Chroniclers of the 1458 campaign made it abundantly clear that artillery was decisive.18 Cannons made it possible to take Qsar-s-Saghir. (‘Great was the terror of the King of Fez’ at the guns), and cannons insured that the city would hold (the Governor of Alcazara ‘taught the Moors to fear the artillery we’d set on our walls’).19 The allocation of 32 expensive and scarce guns to defend their new acquisition indicated that the Portuguese intended their presence on Moroccan soil to be permanent – and had full confidence in their artillery to guarantee that permanence.

The impression of Moroccan vulnerability seems self-evident. The only cannon identified at Ceuta – which, by the way, is also the first confirmation of a gunpowder artillery weapon in Moroccan hands – came not from accounts of the combat, but in a victor’s inventory of loot:

found in the city and dockyards – four galleys and a royal galley, plenty of darts, arrows, arbalests and bucklers, one bombard, much gunpowder, tallow, wax, anchors, cordage, masts, tillers, all in abundance.20

Following Ceuta, Portugal would annex Qsar-s-Saghir (1458), Arzila and Tangier (1471), and compel most other harbour towns into quasi–vasselage, piling defeat upon defeat on the Moroccan ruling elites. Just as the loss of Ceuta contributed to the murder of Sultan Abu Sa’id in 1420,21 a man once credited as a saviour of the dynasty, loss of Qsar helped trigger a dynastic war between the Banu Marin and their ‘Orleanist’ cousins, the Banu Wattas, which lasted from 1458 until 1472. Indeed, evaluating Moroccan military performance in the 1400s, some scholars concluded – very wrongly – that firearms could not possibly have come into Moroccan possession before the very late fifteenth or early sixteenth century.22

But the Moroccans did have artillery and soon used it. In 1419, four years after Ceuta, Sultan Abu Sa’id led an international Muslim expedition against the occupiers. His army included Moroccans from as far south as the Sus Valley, forces from the city-states of Algeria, soldiers sent by the Hafsid Caliph of Tunis, and warships from the Amir of Granada, ruler of Islamic Spain.23 Also included were two bombards, dragged on sleds, crewed by Granadan advisors. The assault was intimidating but, according to Zurara, short-lived:

[Attacking the walls from all sides, the Moors tried] to wear them down with that violent invention – the bombard-like the ones we brought to conquer this place. The Moors had two, a lot for them, the mainstays of this diabolical offensive. They shot at the walls but with no success because we brought up our own which inflicted real damage. Then, as the enemy was repairing, a wily engineer shot off his piece so well that he bested the enemy’s main gun, slew the gunner, and then so adroitly suppressed the fire of the other weapon that the Moors lost all their guns.24

Although the Sultans own standing army was small, 10,000 at most, he and his subordinates clearly commanded every component of the entire force once assembled, likely 40-50,000 professionals with numerous tribesmen and villagers turning out like militia.25 Second, the siege was a ‘national’ effort with tribal units and volunteers from all over the realm as well as militia from cities far to the south of Marrakech and even pro–Lisbon port towns. The Granadans present underscored the fact of Moroccan access to European military technology, for Iberian Muslims had already shown their dexterity with artillery during the 1404-1410 Antequerra War between Granada and Castile.26 But questions are raised, too. Moroccan cannoneers proved they could emplace, load, aim and fire, but what exactly was the organisation, support basis and manning for a medieval gun battery? Where did the cannons come from? How were they made? The Sultan or his local officers would march on Ceuta nearly every two years, but these never matched the 1419 and 1425 attacks in intensity (or artillery).27

The 1437 contest for Tangiers also begs as many questions as its records answer.28 European chroniclers relate that Portuguese infantry deployed in formations that mixed ‘handgunners and crossbowmen’ [espingardeiros e beesteiros], but give few details about their tactics or effectiveness. (Personal firearms had yet to appear in Moroccan ranks.) The octogenarian defender of Tangiers, Salah ibn Salah, turned to both the Sultan in Fez and the Amir of Granada for guns and men, but little is said of how these weapons were used outside the city walls .29 Tangiers defended itself with a mixture of bombards, small calibre guns, and (primarily) older ‘throwing’ machines such as trebuchets, still in common use on both sides of the Straits. Ironically, a key factor in Lisbon’s defeat was its own artillery logistics. Unable to take the city within two weeks, Princes Henry and Fernando ordered the guns of Ceuta dragged overland to reinforce the trenches around Tangiers. This ponderous hauling operation allowed Wazir’Abu Zakariya’ al-Wattas, chief of the royal military, enough time to pull in his allies from the provinces, encircle the besiegers, and capture several of the weapons with Prince Dom Fernando into the bargain.30 Guns taken at Tangiers later reappeared in makhzan service, but the truce Portugal signed to get its entrapped forces released did not stop King Duarte from regular raiding on Moroccan trade and territory.

The relatively low-level violence after Lisbon’s catastrophe at Tangiers ended explosively in 1456-57 in a series of punch and counter-punch assaults, beginning with a massive Moroccan assault on Ceuta. During this siege, the Sultan’s forces demonstrated to an unnerved Portuguese garrison that they knew how to coordinate artillery fire with ground attacks and also how to employ harassing fire to prevent a sortie from the town while they drew their forces together.

at sunrise, watchers on the tower gave warning and cried aloud that the infidels were drawing near in great numbers. At this, every man seized his weapon. Then we saw the infidels crossing a mountain which lay in front of the town and, indeed, the whole mountain seemed to be covered with men. We shot at them with our bombards, which were the best we could employ at the moment. But they drew near to the ditches, being armed with hand-bows and curious long–bows and other weapons. They assailed us with these and with bom–bards, and shot at us all that day whenever anyone exposed himself and, while engaging us, they set their main army in array.31

When Affonso then siezed Qasr-s-Saghir the next year, the Sultanate reacted quickly. The Moroccan Wazir, head of the Banu Wattas faction and deputy to the Banu Marin Sultan, responding to the appeals of his commanders to ‘come with the army and break the walls with your bombards and siege engines’, fielded at least 32 guns for the counter-siege.32 Moroccan soldiers armed with hand-guns also came to Portuguese attention for the first time during this makhzan-led campaign against occupied Qsar-s-Saghir.33

Although unsuccessful, the siege at Qsar lasted over eight weeks, nearly a full royal campaign season and, together with the 1456 siege of Ceuta, provides some of our best current data on gunpowder warfare in fifteenth century Morocco. Even though they now had over 30 guns, the Moroccans continued to deploy them as pairs, two to a battery. This procedure allowed the battery the option to fire its bombards in alternating sequence or volley together and permitted keeping shot and stores nearby, reducing the danger of exposing crewmen to fire while moving supplies. Crossbowmen served with the crews to fire on the walls, for–cing the Portuguese to shelter their own gun emplacements so that they could not target Moroccan positions as well. To frustrate the garrison further, the Wazir’s engineers and sappers [zapadores] set up dummy guns and dug multiple positions so they could keep the cannons moving from place to place. This time, the Portuguese identified the origins of the crew as not only Granadans, but also Moroccans and ‘elchees’, meaning European mercenaries, prisoners, and converts to Islam. (Since many of Affonso’s gunners were Germans and Flandersmen, one might fairly suggest that the Portuguese, too, had ‘elchees’ of their own.)34 While there is not enough detail for full reconstruction of a Moroccan order-of-battle, the presence of these highly-specialised and readily recognised military professionals confirms that the Banu Marin makhzan now possessed a distinct, fulltime artillery corps.

How proficient were Moroccan artillerists? Zurara, hardly an impartial judge, said Banu Marin batteries got off over 30 rounds a day – a very respectable volume of fire.35 However, he also reassured his fellow impe–rialists that ‘the Moors inflicted few casualties and did little damage’ even though they ‘fired 1,595 cannonballs from siege engines, colabretas (a type of medium cannon), and other artillery’.36 Against such a barrage, how did these two counter-sieges fail? First, besides the natural advantages which accrue to defenders, Lisbon’s men could look to their own hefty array of cannons, as many if not more than the Moroccans, plus a highly mobile ship-to-shore fire support and a continuous cycle of resupply vessels. Remembering the biases of our sources, Portuguese gunners seem to have scored better shots, suggesting expertise also played a factor. Third, in the middle of these major operations, the festering conflict between a young Banu Marin Sultan and the tribal clients of his Wattasid Wazir inflamed and finally exploded. An army organised in a confederal command structure could hardly keep to the field with the state system imploding.37

For the next decade, Portuguese raids and cannonades against the coast became almost annual events.38 Leo Africanus’s lament for the 1463 destruction of Anfa, now the modern city of Casablanca, pays bitter homage to the punitive skills of Lisbon’s attackers, and lays the blame for this carnage upon ‘the weakness and sloth of the Wattasid sultan’.

Anfa always traded vigorously with Portugal and England … The town was destroyed for two reasons: first, because it was too protective of it liberties and, second, it engaged too frequently in piracy against Cadiz and Portugal … fifty sail, armed with big guns, were sent against the town.39

Conversely, Moroccan artillery almost vanishes from the records. The lack of documentation for the 1460s, which covers the Marinid-Wattasid wars, is particularly disheartening, given comparative developments in other Islamic lands. The Hafsid Caliphate of Tunis, for example, had a corps of arquebusier infantry and a gun forge by the end of the decade.40

In 1471, after years of minor forays, Portugal’s King Affonso launched an unprecedented armada against port Arzila.41 Facing 400 ships, over 30,000 troops, and a landing force armed with arquebuses, crossbows and cannons of all calibres, the defenders just crumpled.42 (France invaded Italy in 1494 with a scarcely larger army.) Affonso then led his army upland to Tangiers with the fleet following along the shore to give covering fire. Cowed by the 12 massive bombards in Affonso’s train and its militia afield with the Banu Wattas army, the city surrendered with barely a fight.43 Muhammad ash-Shaykh al-Wattas, who had defeated the Banu Marin dynasty, a host of secessionist free-towns, rebelling tribes, and an oligarchy of pietist nobles who still held Fez, rushed an army to Arzila, only to discover himself outnumbered and (with but a single cannon) outgunned. Trapped between the uncertainties of besieging the well-provisioned Portuguese or wresting his own capital from the most dangerous revolutionary force he had faced in seven years of civil war, the Sultan signed a humiliating ten-year truce that gave Arzila, Tangiers, Ceuta and Qasr-s-Saghir over to Affonso. Even then, no longer distracted by Portuguese invasions, he had to negotiate the capitulation of the in–surgent Muhammad al-Juti and his ‘reign of saints’ holding the city of Fez – perhaps for lack of artillery to retake the city by force.

In the 15 years since the Marinid-Wattasid struggle erupted, the balance of firepower between Lisbon and the Moroccans had lurched from near parity (as shown in the grand sieges of 1456-1459) to quantum Portuguese superiority in operational versatility, tactical expertise and in the types, numbers and technical currency of guns. From the Portuguese side, Affonso himself can claim some credit, deciding to ‘modernise’ his arsenal early in the 1450s and replace the guns lost at Tangiers.44 He brought in a cadre of German and Flemish artisans to cast bronze cannons, pieces with far greater durability, range and firepower than old–fashioned wrought iron guns, forgers to make matchlock arquebuse guns, and assorted mercenaries to fire the guns, repair them and train crews. Second, despite the 1472 truce, he and son Joao II persisted in subverting the quasi-autonomous port towns like Azammur to serve as logistical waystations for royal caravals heading to Guinea and India.45 Lisbon also wrung treaties from these towns to fortify a local trading post in each harbour, then violated that concession by slipping cannons and garrisons into the stockade. Once installed, the merchant-commanders of these posts [feitorias] gradually insinuated or bullied themselves into a communal policing role, overseeing and regulating local markets for a wide range of mercantile purposes. One of those measures was a total arms embargo, embodied in rigorous search and seizure of any vessels suspected of trying to sell cannons, firearms or gunpowder stocks to Muslim town authorities or folk at large. While probably not a complete success, the vigilance of Portuguese inspections, now enforced on Moroccan docks as well as at sea, accelerated depletion of Moroccan gunpowder arsenals and prevented replenishment. Indeed, as the six–teenth century approached, Europeans often remarked not only on the absence of firearms among ‘los Moros’ but even – as Spaniards noted when they seized the Mediterranean towns of Millila, Ghasasa and Badis in 1496-97 – the apparent Moroccan ignorance of gunnery and their terror at its results, results now depressingly familiar to Europeans.46

From the Moroccan side, chroniclers testified to their own lack of firepower in two different, not especially helpful, modes. First, on occasions when reports of cannons might be expected, none appear. Al–Kurasi, the poet-celebrator of the dynasty, frequently refers to Wattasid gunpowder weaponry in later verses. However, in his detailed recount–ing of Muhammad ash-Shaykh’s epic reduction of the 1489 Portuguese expedition to build ‘Fort Graciosa’ inland from Larache, he lauds the genius, patience and energy of the Sultan, but says nothing about any Moroccan guns.47 Al-Kurasi also failed to mention the inconvenient fact that Graciosa did not fall to Muhammad’s strenuous campaigning. Rather, the Portuguese garrison and ships; ‘by firing their cannons day and night’, forced the makhzan to concede them an honourable with–drawal. Sources also intimate their comparative inferiority in gunpowder technology by their comments on the ‘irresistibility’ of cannons, a theme noted in Africanus, in al-Maggari, and the anonymous author of a post–1492 work on the Granada war.48 No author, however, offered to explain whygunpowder weaponry and expertise almost vanished from Moroccan military resources between 1460 and 1490. Then, in the 1490s, despite the belittling comments of European observers, we again get glimpses of Moroccan gunpowder weapons in action, starting with a mention by Africanus that the Wattasid Sultan installed 100makhzan arquebusiers at Larache after the Graciosa campaign.49 In 1496 Sultan Muhammad ash-Shaykh al-Wattas led an expedition against Dubdu on the eastern frontier, a centre of Banu Marin diehards that also controlled the main overland link between Fez and Algeria. Both Leo and al-Kurasi described the campaign, and Africanus credits the success of makhzan tactics to skillful deployments of arquebuse soldiers against Dubdu’s cavalry militias.50 Also, in Morocco’s deep south, beyond the reach. of both Portuguese imperial order and Wattasid makhzan, Leo found a new development-the proliferation of firearms among tribes and polities who would submit to neither Lisbon nor Fez nor any other aspiring outside dominator.

Among the people of the Dra’a valley are many chiefs who are now always at war … these folk here use firearms, the arquebuse and the espingard [an older Spanish handgun], and I have never seen such finely decorated guns. With these weapons, they kill each other all day longs.51

Unnoticed at the time by the agents of the contending states, gunpowder weaponry would soon revolutionize communal modes of defiance and resistance in Moroccono less than state modes of warfare. That story, however, marks the beginning of the ‘military revolution’ of Morocco’s sixteenth century and the end of the era we are considering here.

The incipient revival of firearms capabilities among Moroccans in the 1490s suggests a partial explanation for the pattern of expansion, evapo–ration and reappearance of gunnery in Morocco. A vital, if not determining, factor must be the complex but rapidly changing nature of Moroccan connections to and interactions with the state and peoples of Granada, the last vestige of Islamic Spain. Until the late 1450s, military cooperation between Morocco, Granada and even other North African societies was close, standing foremost on relations between newly restabilised dynastic regimes. But Granadans took the lead on both sides of the Straits in obtaining weapons, providing expertise, and recruiting crews, whether Granadan Muslims, Christian captives or conscripts. No evidence exists that the Marinids or Muhammad ash-Shaykh al-Wattas ever attempted to found a domestic production capability for Morocco and, in fact, Morocco’s first foundry did not appear until the 1530s. Thus, except for occasions when the makhzan could capture modern artillery from an enemy – and the only significant fifteenth century incident of such capture occurred at Tangiers in 1437 – Moroccan ties to Granada served as the primary (if not only) source for gunpowder equipment. These tiesunravelled after 1458 when both states fell into internal political strife, turmoil exacerbated by invasions from stronger states with forces proficient in the use of artillery. Equipment captures simply ceased while natural deterioration and internal war reduced Moroccan stocks of the old iron guns.

Thereafter military isolation intensified, first, because of the effective–ness of Portugal’s surveillance in the 1460s and 1470s, but then because Granada soon faced the threat of outright destruction. Indeed, during the Granadan War, Muhammad ash-Shaykh al-Wattas kept embarrassed neutrality, selling grain to the Christians and observing the Castilian blockade of the Andalusian coast throughout the 1480s. When Granada fell in 1492, Moroccan-Granadan relations changed a third time. Beginning as a trickle after the first major towns fell in 1485, the movement of Spanish Muslims and Jews increased steadily during the war, gradually taking on the dimensions of a demographic shift in the mid-1490s. Distracted by other military concerns, both Ferdinand and Muhammad lacked the will and resources to control either these migrations or the migrants themselves completely. A significant number of Granadans, whether individuals or groups, Muslims or Jews, were war veterans, many experienced in gunpowder weapons combat or crafts. Many found their way into the service of the makhzan and its agents but, as Leo Africanus and many Castilian historians tell us, many also became privateers, enrolled as bodyguards or mercenaries, and sold their services to the domestic challengers of the Wattasids as well.

In many respects, Morocco’s entire sixteenth century was a prolonged military revolution, one with enormous multi-faceted consequences for that era and for Morocco today. The early roots of that revolution remain but a dim and debatable outline. What is clear, however, even from this summary treatment of one restricted topic is that military history cannot study technology alone in pursuit of military change nor restrict itself to one country. It must become simultaneously social history and interna–tional comparative history, or regress again to the analytical level of ideology, mystique and saga. Second, on this eve of the voyage of Columbus – which is also the eve of Granada’s demise and the great ‘demobilisation’ diaspora of Spain’s Jews and Muslims just mentioned – Third World scholars must now begin the daunting task of bringing their own past into wider public consciousness and placing that history into a global context. The fifteenth century seems a fine place to start.

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End Notes

The author wishes to thank Paul Chevedden, Donald J. Kagay, David Finkelstein, Albert D. McJoynt, Judy Groff and Nikki Keddie for their advice, assitance and encouragement during the development of this article.

1. Grossly oversimplified, the Early Modern Military Revolution consists of four sequential (but chronologically overlapping) military developments which, Professor Parker argues, had highly diffuse and complex revolu–tionary consequences for early modern states and societies: [l1 armies and navies are forced to reorganise in order to make the most efficient use of the destructive power of gunpowder weapons; [21 part of this restructuring leads to enormous growth in the size of permanent armed forces which en–tail voracious demands on patrons for fiscal, material and human resources; [31 development of agencies and procedures by states and societies to wring these resources from other groups and activities, such as taxes, conscriptions, investments, schools, mercantile endeavours and war; and [41 the infectious pervasiveness of war and its demands on the state and society caused by this expansion. Three key theoretical statements are: Geoffrey Parker, TheMilitary Revolution (Cambridge 1988); William McNeill, The Pursuit of Power (Chicago 1982); and Charles Tilly’s wonderful essay ‘War-Making and State-Making as Organized Crime’, in P. Evans, D. Reuschmeyer and T. Skocpol (eds), Bringing the State Back (Cambridge 1984),169-99.

2. See John R. Hale’s witty and not entirely dismissive plea for restraint in historical theorisation in ‘Gunpowder and the Renaissance’, in C.H. Carter (ed.), From the Renaissance to the Counter-Reformation (London 1966).

3. In addition to McNeill’s Pursuit of Power, which says a lot about the revolutionary role of gunpowder in the fifteenth century, see these other works: R. Bean, ‘War and the Birth of the Nation-State’, Journal of Economic History, 33 (March 1973): 203-31; John Bridgman, ‘Gunpowder and Governmental Power’, in L.L. Farrar (ed.), War: A Historical, Political, and Social Study (Santa Barbara, CA 1978), 105-11; Malcolm G.A. Vale, War and Chivalry (Athens, GA 1981), esp. 136-44; John R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe (New York 1985), esp. 46-8. Scholars interested in the Islamic world must read David Ayalon, Gunpowder and Firearms in the Mamluke Kingdom (London 1956); Andrew C. Hess, ‘Firearms and the Decline of Ibn Khaldun’s Military Elite’, Archivum Ottomanicum, 5 (1972): 173-201 and The Forgotten Frontier (Chicago 1978); Ahmad al-Hassan and Donald Hill, Islamic Technology (Cambridge 1986), 98-115.

4. The great Portuguese chronicler, Gomes Eannes Zurara, concludes his history of the exploration of Guinea with the wonderfully self-deceptive comment that ‘affairs [between Portugal and the Africans] now are conducted more by commerce and mutual agreement than force and feats of arms’. The trade he means, however, is the slave trade where humanity is harvested by war, kidnapping and brigandage. The trade is only peaceful now because someone other than the Portuguese does the risky work. War, slave commerce and the explorations of the Portuguese were simultaneous from the very first (Zurara, Crdnica dos feitos notavies que passaram na Conquesta de Guine, ed. T. de Sousa Soares (Lisbon 1878), 354). Good analytical introductions are Bailey W. Diffie and George Winius,Foundations of the Portuguese Empire, vol. 1 (Minneapolis, MN 1977); Frederick C. Lane’s essays in Profits from Power: Readings in Protection Rent and Violence Controlling Enterprises (Albany, NY 1979); Malwyn Newitt, ‘Plunder and the Rewards of Office in the Portuguese Empire’, in M. Duffy (ed.), The Military Revolution and the State, vol. 1 (Exeter 1980), 10-20.

5. There are many examples, but of special interest for the fifteenth century are Malcolm G.A. Vale’s ‘New Techniques and Old Ideals: The Impact of Artillery on War and Chivalry at the End of the Hundred Year’s War’, in C.T. Almond (ed.), War, Literature, and Politics in the Late Middle Ages (Liverpool 1976), 57-72; J. Petrovic, ‘Firearms in the Balkans’, in V.J. Parry and Malcom Yapp (eds), War, Technology, and Society in the Middle East (London 1976), 165-72; Philip Contamine,War in the Middle Ages, trans. by M. Jones (London/New York 1984).

6. This is my dissertation thesis, argued at length in Weston F. Cook, Jr, ‘The Hundred Years War for Morocco, 1465-1580: Warfare and State-Building in the Early Modern Maghrib’, 2 vols (unpublished Dissertation, Georgetown University 1989).

7. Summarised succinctly but brilliantly in John Vogt’s ‘Saint Barbara’s Legions: Portuguese Artillery in the Struggle for Morocco’, Military Affairs, 41 (December 1977): 176-82.

8. Robert Ricard, ‘A propos de rebato: Note sur la tactique militaire dans les places portugaises du Maroc’, Bulletin Hispanique, 35 (1933): 448-51; John S. Galbraith, ‘The Turbulent Frontier as a factor in British Expansion’, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 2 (January 1960): 150-68.

9. Muhammad al-Wazani/Leo Africanus, Description de 1’Afrique, 2 vols, trans. P. Epaulard (Paris 1956),1: 27-30 and 40-41.

10. Auguste Cour, La dynastie marocaine de Beni Wattas (Constantine 1920) and the sound summary chapter by Nehemia Levtzion in ‘Sharifs and Ottomans in the Maghrib’, in Roland Oliver (ed.), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 3 (Cambridge 1977). Nineteenth and twentieth century French historians often justified their creeping subjugation of Morocco by distorting Wattasid history to prove that Moroccans could not govern their own society unless enthralled to despotism of superstitious fanatics (the Wattasids are often – somehow – caricatured as a ‘secularist’ dynasty) or under the tutelage of enlightened foreigners. Abdullah Laroui ponders the neglect of this era and the challenges facing researchers in The History of the Maghrib (Princeton 1977), 209-42.

11. Mercedes Garcia-Arenal, ‘The Revolution of Fas in 869-1465 and the Death of Sultan Abd al-Hagq al-Marini, Bulletin of the School of African and Oriental Studies, 41 (1972): 43-66; M. Benchekroun, La vie intellectuelle marocaine sous les merinides et les wattasides (Rabat 1974); Muhammad al-Hajji, L’Activite intellectuelle au Maroc a 1’epoque sa’adide, 2 vols (Rabat 1976-77); Abd al-Krim Krim, al-Maghrib fi’ahd ad-Dawla as-Sa’adiya (Casablanca 1978); Ahmad Boucharb, Dukkala wa-l-isti’mar al-Burtuagli (Casablanca 1984); Vincent Cornell, ‘The Logic of, Analogy and the Role of the Sufi Shaykh in Post–Marinid Morocco’, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 15 (1983): 67-93.

12. Africanus was born in Morocco, probably in the 1470s. Muhammad al–Kuraswrote in the 1550s, fairly contemporary with the events or witnesses thereof (Arusat al- Masa’il fima li-Banu Wattas min Fada’il, ed. A. Ben Mansur (Rabat 1963). Most Moroccan writers on these events were chroniclers born in the seventeenth century or later. For Jurge Von Ehingen, see The Diary of Jurge von Ehingen, trans. Malcolm Letts (London 1929).

13. Duarte Pachco Pereira, Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis, ed. Damiao Peres (Lisbon 1954), 27-8.

14. Portuguese accounts are Gomes E. Zurara, Cronica de tomada de septa por el Rei Dom Jodo I, ed. F. Periera (Lisbon 1915), 169-264 (note 204); Gomes E. Zurara, Cronica da Conde Dom Pedro de Meneses, in Colleccod de libros inMites de hist6ria portuguesza, [hereafter CLIHP], ed. Jose Correa de Serra, vol. 2 ‘(Lisbon 1792), 240-539; Mateus de Pisano, Livro da Guerra de Ceuta, ed. R.C. Pinto (Lisbon 1915), 38-50; Jer6nomio de Mascarenhas, Historia de la ciudad de Ceuta, ed. A. de Dornales (Lisbon 1918), 80-113. A decent Arabic account from lost sources is Muhammad al-Qadiri’s Nashr al-Mathani, ed. and trans. E. Micheaux-Bellaire in Archives Marocaines, 24 (1917): 233-6. Good summaries include John Vogt, ‘Crusading and Commercial Elements in the Portuguese Capture of Ceuta’, Muslim World, 59 (1969): 287-99; Derek Latham, ‘The Strategic Position of and Defense of Ceuta in the Later Muslim Period’, Islamic Quarterly, 15 (1972): 189-204; Henry Livermore, A New History of Portugal (Cambridge 1977), 106-10.

15. The earliest and most unambiguous reference to ‘hand-guns’ in Morocco is in Ruy de Pina’s account of Tangiers (see his Cronica d’el Rei Dom Duarte, in CLIHP-1: 71-194, noting 103-6, 111-16, 132, 151-3 of 142-58). See also Documentos sobre a expansiao portuguesza, ed. Vitorino Magalhaes Godinho, 3 vols, (Lisbon 1943-1956), 2: 55-78, 93-102, 128-31; Richard Ricard, ‘Le Maroc septentrional au XV siecle d’apres les chroniques portugaises’, Hesperis, 23 (1936): 89-143.

16. Godinho, Documentos, 3: 16-18; Pedro de Azevedo, Documentos das chance–larias reais relativos a Marrocos, 2 vols (Coimbra 1915-1934), 2: 106-7, 250-1, 297-8, 304; Ca Da Mosto, Voyages, 58-9; R. Ricard, ‘Les portugais et le sahara atlantique au XV siecle’, Hesperis, 11 (1930): 97-110; Boucharb, Dukkala, 18–84.

17. Gomes E. Zurara, Cronica do Conde Dom Duarte de Meneses, ed. Larry King (Lisbon 1978), 104-20; Roy de Pina, Cronica d’el Rey Dom Affonso V, CLIHP-1 (Lisbon 1797), 458-83 of 199-626; Damiao de Gois, Cronica do Principe Dom Jodo II, ed. A.J. Goncalvez-Guimarais (Coimbra 1905), 33-47; Mascarenhas, Ceuta,232-4; Africanus, Afrique, 1: 265. On Portuguese pre-1458 privateer–ing, see Zurara, Dom Pedro, 310-12, 345, 347-52, 359-62, 366369, 377, 379, 410, 414, 417, 486, 494, 498, 515-19, 536-7, and note also Azevedo, Documentos, 2: 26 and Von Ehingen, Diary, 31-7; Zurara, Conquesta de Guine, 203.

18. Cristovao Rodrigues Acenheiro, Cronicas dos Senhores Reis de Portugal, ed. Jose Correa de Serra, CLIHP-V (Coimbra 1824): 260-2.

19. Zurara, Dom Duarte,131 and (on the number of various cannon types) 164.

20. Zurara, Ceuta, 264. I have found no unambiguous evidence that Moroccans possessed any kind of cannon predating this reference from Zurara. All others I have seen, including the famous reference of Ibn Khaldun to the 1277 siege of Sijilmassa, are either anachronistic or too vague to exclude the possibility that the weapon in question was not one of the many common throwing machines which could hurl gunpowder-based incendiaries. Nonetheless, given that true artillery – cannons and guns that used a controlled gunpowder explosion to propel a missile at a target – existed in Iberia in the fourteenth century, Moroccans clearly must have obtained and used artillery before 1415. But my readings do not supply an earlier date. I am eager to be corrected.

21. Africanus, Afrique, 1: 267.

22. G.S. Colin, ‘Barud’, Encyclopedia of Islam, vol. 1, 2nd edn, (Leiden 1960), 1: 1057-8; repeated by Andrew C. Hess, Forgotten Frontier, 23-4.

23. Zurara, Dom Pedro, 253-5, 261, 268-9, 276, 324-5, 335, 368-9; 376-505, 522-4, 539.

24. Zurara, Dom Pedro, 459-61.

25. In a much shorter account of the 1419 siege, Zurara said over 100,000 but this figure rings of typical medievalist exaggeration (Guine, 32). Africanus gives no figures but, at least from the Portuguese records, his snide depiction of Abu Said being murdered at a ‘Belshazzar’s Feast’ for failing to prosecute jihad only a year after this exhausting assault against the Portuguese invaders is inaccurate and unfair (Afrique. 1: 267).

26. This short-lived war, more a prolonged series of border skirmishes, revealed considerable changes in the technological and logistical capability of Iberian armies on the eve of modernity. Ian A. McDonald, Don Fernando de Antequera (Oxford 1948).

27. Zurara, Dom Pedro, 520-39, 566, 578, 589-91, 600.

28. Ruy de Pina, Dom Duarte, 71-194; Zurara, Dom Pedro, 391-7; Godihno, Documentos, 2: 55-78, 93-102, 128-31.

29. Ruy de Pina, Dom Duarte, 135-6 and 146-57.

30. Zurara, Dom Pedro, 391-7; Ricard, ‘Le Maroc septentrional’,114.

31. Von Ehingen, Diary, 33-4.

32. Zurara, Dom Duarte, 174-234,281-9; Ruys de Pina, Affonso V, 465-83.

33. Ruy de Pina, Affonso V, 465 and 469.

34. Note the quotation from Heironymous Munzer’s 1495 Itinerium given in R. Ricard, ‘Notes sur les possessions portugaises du Maroc a la fin du XV siecele’,Hesperis, 8 (1928): 410.

35. Zurara, Dom Duarte, 359. 36. Ibid., 201.

37. Zurara, Dom Pedro, 341-55.

38. Mascarenhas, Ceuta, 237-40; Ruy de Pina, Affonso V, 490-1.

39. Africanus, Afrique, I: 160-1. See also Ruys de Pina, Affonso V, 520.

40. Anselm Adorne saw this apparently ceremonial unit and its foundry shop when he visited Tunis on his ‘travels’. His notes were edited and translated into French by R. Brunsehvig in Deux recits de voyages inedits en Afrique du nord au XV siecle (Paris 1936), 212-20.

41. Ruy de Pina, Affonso V, 511-32; Africanus, Afrique, I: 260-2; De Gois, fodo II, 70-84.

42. Shortly afterwards, the king commemorated his conquest with a series of magnificent tapestries depicting the landing, encirclement and assault on Arzila. These tapestries richly detailed the cannons, firearms and siege tactics employed by Lisbon against Arzila, much as the more famous bas relief carvings in the Toledo choristy display the progressive conquest of Granada by Castile and the weapons employed. Oddly, colour reproductions of the tapestries are few, but black-and-white copies with extensive artistic and historical comments are in Reynaldo do Santos, As Tapecarias da Tomada de Arzila (Lisbon 1925). Most cannons presented are the large-mouthed, sled–dragged type which resemble culvert pipes, a type already made obsolete by developments in Italy, France and Burgundy. Individual firearms include the old colubrina de mao [handgun], espingarda, and newer models of the matchlock arquebuse.

43. Ruy de Pina, Affonso V, 490-6; Africanus, Afrique, 1: 263-4; De Gois, Jodo II, 84-91.

44. Ruy de Pina, Affonso V, 452-3, 465-6.

45. For details from the later 1470s and 1480s, examples are Ruy de Pina, Joao It, 70; Garcia de Resende; Crdnica de Dom Joao II e Miscelanea, ed. J.V. Serrao (Lisbon 1973), 94, 99-100; Africanus, Afrique, 1: 117-18.

46. Fernando de Zafra, in Coleccion de documentos inedites para la historia de Espana, [hereafter CODOINI vols 11 and 51 of 112 (Madrid 1847 and 1899) 11: 88-92, 484-6, 528-33; 51: 67-83; Pierre de Cenival, ‘Introduction’, Sources inedites de l‘histoire du Maroc: Archives et bibliotheques d’Espagne, premiere serie, vol. 1 of 3 vols, (Paris 1921), iii-vi; Andreas Bernaldez, Memorias del reinado de los Reyes Catolicos, ed. M. Gomez Moreno and J. de la Mata–Carriazo, 2 vols (Madrid 1943), 2: 380-1; Pedro de Medina, Cronica de los Duques de Medina Sidonia (Madrid 1861), 516-23; Lorenzo de Padilla, Cronica de Felipe [CODOIN vol. 8] (Madrid 1846), 48-51.

47. al-Kurasi, Arusat al-Masa’il, 15-17. For other sources on the abortive Graciosa campaign, see Ruys de Pina, Joao 77, 97-103; Resende, Joao H, 120-7; Damiao de Gois, Dom Manuel (Ricard), 2-7; Anselmo Braacamp Freire, Expedicoes e armadas nos annos de 1488 e 1489 (Lisbon 1915), 17-35 and 51-2; David Lopes,Historia de Arzila durante o domindo portugaisa (1471-1550 e 1577-1589) (Coimbra 1925), 82-93.

48. Africanus, Afrique, I: 27-40, 160-1, 250-2, 260-7; anonymous, Nubdhat at–Asr fi akhbar muluk Bani Nasr, ed. and trans. A. al-Bustani and Carlos Quiros (Larache 1940), entire work; Abu’l-Abbas al-Maggari, Nafh at-tib min Ghusni– I- Andalus-r-Ratib, ed. Ihsan Abbas, 8 vols (Beirut 1968), 4: 510-35. Spanish artillery superiority is credited by early Muslim authors (and most Castilians as well) with being the decisive factor in the conquest of Granada – along with the Will of Providence.

49. Africanus, Afrique, I: 250-2.

50. Ibid., 299-302; al-Kurasi, Arusat al-Masa il,19-21.

51. Africanus, Afrique, 2: 423-4. Sources for Morocco in the early 1500s, which are much more numerous and detailed, indicate that the slow but irreversible proliferation of firearms among the Moroccan people gradually be–came one of the major obstacles to both Portuguese imperialism and Wattasid domination of the civil society. The eventual, often forcible consolidation of these local resistances into the Sa’adian dynastic movement would become one of the key components in Morocco’s own gunpowder revolution in later decades.

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document sur l'histoire de l'armee marocaine

""Qu'importe que je sois de mauvaise foi puisque je lutte pour une cause juste. Qu'importe que je lutte pour une cause injuste puisque je suis de bonne foi""

“L'histoire n'est que la géographie dans le temps, comme la géographie n'est que l'histoire dans l'espace.”

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Warfare and Firearms in Fifteenth Century Morocco, 1400-1492

""Qu'importe que je sois de mauvaise foi puisque je lutte pour une cause juste.
Qu'importe que je lutte pour une cause injuste puisque je suis de bonne foi""