War college -Studies & Research

Citation :

 The Graveyard of Command Posts:

What Chornobaivka Should Teach Us about Command and Control in Large-Scale Combat Operations

Lt. Gen. Milford “Beags” Beagle, U.S. Army

Brig. Gen. Jason C. Slider, U.S. Army

Lt. Col. Matthew R. Arrol, U.S. Army




In Ukraine, the village of Chornobaivka is legendary.1 Songs are written about it.2 Throughout 2022, the small town and its airfield on the outskirts of Kherson were a meatgrinder for Russian forces. From its original occupation in February to its liberation in November, Ukrainian strikes rained down with a precision and lethality rarely seen in war and allowed a scrappy defender to take down a regional leviathan.3 Patriotic enthusiasm aside, closer inspection of this hard-won victory reveals that lurking beneath the wreckage of Russian ambitions in the Kherson Oblast is a warning about the vulnerability of legacy command posts that the United States and its allies would do well to heed. The story of Chornobaivka is one of relentless assault on command and control characterized by a systematic attack on Russian command posts at scale and across all tactical echelons.4 Over the span of eight months, the Ukrainian fires strike complex successfully attacked the headquarters of Russia’s 8th Combined Arms Army, the 49th Combined Arms Army, the 22nd Army Corps, the 76th Guards Air Assault Division, the 247th Guards Air Assault Regiment, and their subordinate elements over twenty-two separate times.5 These attacks significantly degraded the Russians’ ability to plan and conduct coordinated operations on the western side of the Dnieper River. The loss of effective command and control sapped Russian momentum and prevented consolidation of gains, which ultimately led to their expulsion. In the process, Ukraine struck down high-level Russian leadership, killing Lt. Gen. Yakov Resantsev, commander of the 49th Combined Arms Army, and nearly killing Lt. Gen. Andrey Mordichev, commander of the 8th Combined Arms Army.6 Beyond Kherson, this pattern has been similar if less concentrated. Ukrainian attacks on command posts across the country have led to stunning attrition among senior Russian military leaders.7 This reflects a programmatic approach to striking at the capability and will of the Russian forces by removing their source of purpose, motivation, and direction. By any measure, the Ukrainians’ success is impressive. More than 1,500 officers have been killed in Russia’s war on Ukraine, including ten general officers and 152 colonels and lieutenant colonels.8
La suite;

https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2023/Graveyard-of-Command-Posts/

 

pdf : https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/English/MJ-23/Gen-Beagle/beagle-slider-arrol-command-posts-UA.pdf

https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/russias-use-of-drones-in-ukraine

Citation :

Russia's use of uncrewed systems in the Ukraine War
Executive Summary

Consistent with Russian military doctrine, the Russian military has used uncrewed aerial vehicles (UAVs) extensively in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations in Ukraine. This has enabled them to play prominent roles in artillery, counter-battery, and precision strikes missions.
While ISR drones play a central role in much of the Russian military’s targeting process, it appears that the rate of response is slow, making it challenging to engage targets that are mobile.
The lag in detection and targeting time highlights the lack of military-grade uncrewed combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in Russia’s arsenal. These systems would enable a faster detection to kill time. While the Russian military is clearly investing in these systems as evidenced by military announcements before the war, they are not likely to appear on the battlefield anytime soon.
Commercial drones have come to the fore in the Russia-Ukraine war to address pressing ISR needs and to serve as rudimentary loitering ammunitions. The Russian military and leadership were slow to accept the roles of the drones but are now encouraging their use by Russian forces.
Despite the acknowledged importance of these drones, the Russian military industrial complex has been slow to produce them in the significant numbers required by Russian forces. Some of the lack of production likely comes from a lack of domestic capabilities, inter-organizational competition and lack of communication, and a lack of central Russian government leadership on this issue.
One emergent solution to the commercial drone shortage is the rise of groups within Russia that are funding drones and drone parts for Russian units and acting as thought leaders in how to integrate and use commercial drones in military operations.
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for using drones have been developed through experience on the battlefield. Observations of Russian and Ukrainian use of drones by domestic groups in Russia have prompted initiatives to provide Russian soldiers with standardized training and TTPs for drone use.
Inexpensive commercial drones that are rigged with munitions are, in many ways, becoming more like munitions in their employment and loss rate; many are seen as expendable, single-use platforms for inflicting damage on military sites and platforms. This use has the added effect of making them expensive targets to counter for air-defense systems, producing potential Ukrainian air-defense employment compromises between protecting military units and critical infrastructure.
To address their military UAV challenges, the Russians are using Iranian-produced military drones extensively. With ranges in the hundreds of kilometers and antijamming systems, these drones have proved effective at targeting Ukrainian military platforms and critical infrastructure.

Full report: https://www.cna.org/reports/2023/05/Russias-Use-of-Uncrewed-Systems-in-Ukraine.pdf

https://www.rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/special-resources/meatgrinder-russian-tactics-second-year-its-invasion-ukraine

Citation :

Meatgrinder: Russian Tactics in the Second Year of Its Invasion of Ukraine
6 - 8 minutes

The scale of Russian losses in 2022, combined with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation confronting NATO systems they had not previously contended with, has caused a significant deviation in Russian operations from the country’s doctrine. This report seeks to outline how Russian forces have adapted their tactics in the Ukrainian conflict and the challenges this has created for the Ukrainian military that must be overcome. The report examines Russian military adaptation by combat function.

Russian infantry tactics have shifted from trying to deploy uniform Battalion Tactical Groups as combined arms units of action to a stratified division by function into line, assault, specialised and disposable troops. These are formed into task-organised groupings. Line infantry are largely used for ground holding and defensive operations. Disposable infantry are used for continuous skirmishing to either identify Ukrainian firing positions, which are then targeted by specialised infantry, or to find weak points in Ukrainian defences to be prioritised for assault. Casualties are very unevenly distributed across these functions. The foremost weakness across Russian infantry units is low morale, which leads to poor unit cohesion and inter-unit cooperation.

Russian engineering has proven to be one of the stronger branches of the Russian military. Russian engineers have been constructing complex obstacles and field fortifications across the front. This includes concrete reinforced trenches and command bunkers, wire-entanglements, hedgehogs, anti-tank ditches, and complex minefields. Russian mine laying is extensive and mixes anti-tank and victim-initiated anti-personnel mines, the latter frequently being laid with multiple initiation mechanisms to complicate breaching. These defences pose a major tactical challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations.

Russian armour is rarely used for attempts at breakthrough. Instead, armour is largely employed in a fire support function to deliver accurate fire against Ukrainian positions. Russia has started to employ thermal camouflage on its vehicles and, using a range of other modifications and tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), has significantly reduced the detectability of tanks at stand-off ranges. Furthermore, these measures have reduced the probability of kill of a variety of anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) at ranges beyond 1,400 m.

Russian artillery has begun to significantly refine the Reconnaissance Strike Complex following the destruction of its ammunition stockpiles and command and control infrastructure by guided multiple-launch rocket systems (GMLRS) in July 2022. This has resulted in much closer integration of multiple UAVs directly supporting commanders authorised to apply fires. Russian artillery has also improved its ability to fire from multiple positions and to fire and move, reducing susceptibility to counterbattery fire. The key system enabling this coordination appears to be the Strelets system. There has been a shift in reliance upon 152-mm howitzers to a much greater emphasis on 120-mm mortars in Russian fires; this reflects munitions and barrel availability. Responsive Russian fires represent the greatest challenge to Ukrainian offensive operations. Russian artillery is also increasingly relying on loitering munitions for counterbattery fires.

Russian electronic warfare (EW) remains potent, with an approximate distribution of at least one major system covering each 10 km of front. These systems are heavily weighted towards the defeat of UAVs and tend not to try and deconflict their effects. Ukrainian UAV losses remain at approximately 10,000 per month. Russian EW is also apparently achieving real time interception and decryption of Ukrainian Motorola 256-bit encrypted tactical communications systems, which are widely employed by the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Russian air defences have also seen a significant increase in their effectiveness now that they are set up around known, and fairly static, locations and are properly connected. Although Russia has persistently struggled to respond to emerging threats, over time it has adapted. Russian air defences are now assessed by the Ukrainian military to be intercepting a proportion of GMLRS strikes as Russian point defences are directly connected to superior radar.

Russian aviation remains constrained to delivering stand-off effects, ranging from responsive lofted S-8 salvos against Ukrainian forming-up points, to FAB-500 glide bombs delivered from medium altitude to ranges up to 70 km. The Ukrainian military notes that Russia has a large stockpile of FAB-500s and is systematically upgrading them with glide kits. Although they only have limited accuracy, the size of these munitions poses a serious threat. The Russian Aerospace Forces remain a ‘force in being’ and a major threat to advancing Ukrainian forces, although they currently lack the capabilities to penetrate Ukrainian air defences.

Following the destruction of Russian command and control infrastructure in July 2022, the Russian military withdrew major headquarters out of range of GMLRS and placed them in hardened structures. They also wired them into the Ukrainian civil telecommunications network and used field cables to branch from this to brigade headquarters further forward. Assigned assets tend to connect to these headquarters via microlink, significantly reducing their signature. At the same time, from the battalion down, Russian forces largely rely on unencrypted analogue military radios, reflecting a shortage of trained signallers at the tactical level.

An overview of Russian adaptation reveals a force that is able to improve and evolve its employment of key systems. There is evidence of a centralised process for identifying shortcomings in employment and the development of mitigations. Nevertheless, much of this adaptation is reactive and is aimed at making up for serious deficiencies in Russian units. The result is a structure that becomes better over time at managing the problems it immediately faces, but also one that struggles to anticipate new threats. The conclusion therefore is that the Russian Armed Forces pose a significant challenge for the Ukrainian military on the defence. Nevertheless, if Ukraine can disrupt Russian defences and impose a dynamic situation on them, Russian units are likely to rapidly lose their coordination. Changes in the air combat environment, for example, have led rapidly to incidents of Russian fratricide.

Full report : https://static.rusi.org/403-SR-Russian-Tactics-web-final.pdf

https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/jamming-jdam-threat-us-munitions-russian-electronic-warfare

Citation :

rusi.org
Jamming JDAM: The Threat to US Munitions from Russian Electronic Warfare
10 - 12 minutes

Main Image Credit Accuracy at risk: concerns have emerged that Russian jamming is causing some US-made Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) to miss their targets in Ukraine. Image: US Air Force / Wikimedia Commons

Leaked US documents show that Russian electronic warfare may be having a negative effect on US-supplied Joint Direct Attack Munitions.

The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) began life in the wake of the US-led Operation Desert Storm which evicted Iraq from Kuwait in 1991. Lessons learned from the campaign by the US armed forces included the need for an all-weather precision munition. The concept would harness the US Global Positioning System (GPS) Position, Navigation and Timing (PNT) satellite constellation. GPS had been a star performer in Desert Storm. Catapulted into the public consciousness, GPS systems used by the Coalition helped weapons find their targets and troops reach their objectives. Since then, GPS has become a standard feature of military and civilian life.
What is JDAM?

The JDAM’s name is – to an extent – a misnomer, as it is not a weapon per se. Instead, the term covers a panoply of kits outfitting an array of ‘dumb’ bombs. These kits equip the mid- and tail-section of an unguided bomb and contain the GPS and an Inertial Guidance System (INS). The INS, which does not depend on GPS PNT signals, also helps the weapon’s precision. Today, 15 different JDAM kits are in service, equipping a range of bombs weighing from 500 lb (225 kg) to 2,000 lb (900 kg).

The basic concept of operations for JDAM is for the guidance kit to be loaded with the target’s coordinates, most probably latitude and longitude. These coordinates are either transferred from the aircraft or loaded before the sortie. Target coordinates can also be updated during the mission. The weapon is released, and the tail unit continually receives signals from the GPS constellation on the bomb’s position relative to the target. The bomb’s trajectory is continually adjusted by the fins on the tail unit as it heads towards the target, based on the PNT information it is receiving and the data provided by its INS. Publicly available figures indicate that JDAM guidance kits can hit within 5 m (16 ft) of a target or less. Should the GPS signal be unavailable, the INS can steer the bomb to within 30 m (98 ft) of the target.
Into Ukraine

JDAM deliveries commenced in 1997, with the weapon making its combat debut two years later during NATO’s Operation Allied Force in 1999. NATO’s air campaign was directed against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to end the suppression of Kosovar ethnic Albanians. Since then, JDAM has been used in successive conflicts involving the US, with JDAM kits exported to over 30 countries, including Ukraine. The latter received the JDAM Extended Range (JDAM-ER) system, which gives a 500 lb bomb similar accuracy, but an extended range of 43 nautical miles (80 km). This helps Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) jets deploying the weapon to stay outside the engagement envelope of Russian short-range air defence systems like the Pantsir-S1 (NATO reporting name SA-22 Greyhound).

It is no secret that Russian land forces have deployed scores of electronic warfare systems into the Ukrainian theatre of operations

Exact information on the effectiveness of JDAM-ER in Ukrainian hands has not reached the public domain for understandable reasons. Nevertheless, in March, a UAF spokesperson praised the bombs’ accuracy and urged the US to supply more. JDAM was in the news again one month later, but this time for less auspicious reasons. A trove of classified US Department of Defense documents revealed concerns over the efficacy of Russian electronic warfare (EW) jamming of JDAM and other US-supplied weapons using GPS.
Russian Counter-GPS Tactics

The documents articulated US concerns that Russian jamming was causing some JDAM-ER munitions to miss their targets. It is no secret that Russian land forces have deployed scores of EW systems into the Ukrainian theatre of operations. Some of these are specifically designed to jam GPS transmissions, the Russian Army’s R-330Zh Zhitel system deployed at the tactical level being a notable example. The R-330Zh detects and attacks radio signals across wavebands from 100 MHz to 2 GHz. Open sources say the system can transmit jamming signals with 10 kW of power. Signals from the US GPS satellites which JDAM kits use are transmitted on wavebands from 1.164GHz to 1.575GHz. These fall squarely within the R-330Zh’s catchment area. Official documents seen by the author state that the system has a jamming range of up to 30 km (18.6 miles).

GPS signals are very weak by the time they have travelled the 10,900 nautical miles (20,200 km) from the satellite to Earth. Radio signal strength is typically measured in decibels-per-milliwatt (dBm). GPS signals can have a strength of circa −127 dBm by the time they reach Earth. Such weak signals can be easy to jam with comparatively little power. To put matters into perspective, a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests that the R-330Zh can generate a jamming signal strength of −70 dBm. Like a long-distance runner, radio signals lose strength the further they travel. Thus, the R-330Zh’s signal may reduce by between −123 dBm and −126 dBm, depending on the jamming frequency, by the time it travels its full 30 km range. Nonetheless, even at between −53 dBm and −56 dBm, it is still notably stronger than the strength of the GPS signal arriving from space. Moreover, the closer the GPS receiver is to the R-330Zh’s jamming antenna, the stronger the jamming signal becomes.

The US has made strenuous efforts to mitigate the jamming risk to JDAM. In the early 2000s, the Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SASSM) upgrade was rolled out across the JDAM fleet. This included the addition of guidance kits using M-Code GPS transmissions. M-Code is the encrypted military GPS signal. The JDAM’s GPS receiver will only accept signals with this encryption, excluding all others. Technically, if jamming signals are being transmitted from an R-330Zh, the JDAM munition should ignore these as they lack the appropriate encryption.
Why is This Happening?

Despite the steps the US has taken to safeguard JDAM’s resilience to global navigation satellite system (GNSS) jamming, it may still be vulnerable. One senior EW expert told the author that, even with SASSM, the sheer brute force of a powerful jamming signal can prevent the JDAM’s GNSS receiver from obtaining the encrypted signal. Steps can be taken to try to nullify any jamming. The exact capabilities of the JDAM’s GNSS systems are understandably classified. Counter-EW provisions may include the system recognising a jamming signal and its direction. The receiver may then be able to ‘block out’ signals coming from that direction, while continuing to receive GNSS signals from unaffected areas. A GNSS receiver will typically need to ‘see’ – that is, have an uninterrupted Line-of-Sight (LOS) with – at least four satellites. Often, a GNSS receiver has more satellites than this within range. Thus, blocking off the direction of the jamming signals will not necessarily deprive the receiver of being able to ‘see’ other satellites.

Jamming is not causing JDAMs to stop working, but it is risking their accuracy – arguably a key selling point of the weapon

However, it is possible that Russian forces may choose to protect potential JDAM targets with multiple jammers, enabling signals to hit the GNSS receiver from two or more directions. This could deprive the receiver of the LOS range to unjammed GNSS signals. Above all, the problem may well be the sheer power of the jamming signal that can be brought to bear, as shown by the R-330Zh.

One problem for the Russians is that a powerful jamming signal may be comparatively easy for Ukrainian EW experts to detect. Once the jamming signal is detected and identified as such, the jammer’s latitude and longitude could then be determined. These coordinates could be passed to artillery and engaged with kinetic fires. This tactic may help to explain some of Russia’s EW equipment losses.

Another problem is that transmitting a huge amount of jamming power across the frequencies used by PNT signals has the potential to jam any other radio traffic weaker than the jamming signal. This could include friendly receivers like satellite communications terminals and GNSS systems. For example, Russia’s GLONASS GNSS constellation transmits some signals which are similar to GPS. These risk being jammed by friendly signals. Evidence from Ukraine suggests that the Russian Army regularly suffers electromagnetic fratricide to this end. The force often exhibits scant concern for jamming friendly signals when attacking its enemies.

The EW expert also told the author that it is possible to spoof GNSS signals. For example, an EW system receives the incoming M-Code transmitted from space. It takes the signal and retransmits it, but with a stronger amplification. The JDAM system may recognise this signal as legitimate, but the fake signal may be subtly modified to feed false information into the GNSS system. Hypothetically, the M-Code could be modified and retransmitted in such a way as to deceive the JDAM vis-à-vis its position in time and space. This could then affect the munition’s accuracy.
What Now?

Although Russia’s GNSS jamming activities may not be cost-free from an electromagnetic fratricide and hard kill vulnerability perspective, the leaked US documents show that it is having an impact. Jamming is not causing the JDAMs to stop working, but it is risking their accuracy – arguably a key selling point of the weapon. This is a potential problem when comparatively small targets are being engaged. US GNSS engineers may have to rethink how they safeguard JDAMs for the wars of tomorrow, based on the conflicts of today.

The views expressed in this Commentary are the author’s, and do not represent those of RUSI or any other institution.

Report: https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023-07-08

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