Electronic Warfare / Guerre electronique

quand le Cyberwar se melange au EW

Citation :

Countermeasures Capabilities Become Clearer

Jan 19, 2010



By David A. Fulghum
Nashua, N.H.

For U.S. helicopter pilots in particular, Afghanistan is a new battlefield with new threats. And as troops and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance resources pour into the theater, rotary-wing use will quickly escalate.

Already, a CH-47—newly modified with an advanced laser-based defense system for operations in Iraq/Afghanistan—was able to fight its way out of a “complex [combat] situation where the Chinook was engaged by multiple infrared man-portable air defense missiles,” says U.S. Army Lt. Col. Ray Pickering, product manager for infrared countermeasures (IRCM). The crowning success for any enemy offensive effort would be to shoot down a helicopter, he says. “A Chinook with 30 people on board would be a global news event. If we lost a CH-47 a week for six weeks, the war would be over.”

In Afghanistan, the Chinook is especially important because of its ability to operate at high altitudes. The demand for the heavy-lift platform ensures it will be targeted often.

“We have a missile-warning system that can identify missiles by type, we have flares to deflect IR missiles, and we have a laser-equipped Atircm [Advanced Threat Infrared Countermeasures] that can defeat any missile in current use,” Pickering says. He adds, however, “we know there are bigger and better missiles that could show up.”

Other Army officials tell Aviation Week that Atircm can defeat the Russian-built SA-16 missile, and that “we have not seen any SA-18s in theater,” although they are known to be available on the black market.

“One of the trends that I’m seeing that keeps me awake, especially in a complex asymmetric threat environment like Afghanistan, is the use of a lot of low-tech weapons,” says Michael Maas, BAE Systems’ chief technical officer for survivability and protection solutions. “Anyone can buy a high-tech, laser range-finder and night-vision or low-light thermal-vision hardware on the Internet for $10,000—and some of these insurgents have deep pockets. When they couple high-tech sensors with low-tech weapons, they can phenomenally increase their effectiveness. It’s a real challenge for us, as an industry, to deal with those threats.”

Part of the first wave of quick-reaction capabilities ordered in July 2008 by the U.S. Army was fielding of the Atircm-AN/ALQ-212(V) which includes IR sensors to detect enemy anti-aircraft missiles and laser-based jam heads to confuse and deflect their IR guidance.

More precisely, Atircm steers a beam of jamming energy that is modulated—using the systems library of threat signatures—specifically to disable or misdirect a particular type of enemy missile’s seeker.

“We’ve already fielded a company of [13 upgraded] Chinooks in theater,” Pickering says. “We will upgrade the rest of the Chinooks in Iraq and Afghanistan during the next year [as they move through phased-cycle maintenance].”

“We fielded the first aircraft in mid-October, several weeks ahead of the Army’s expectations,” says Tom Kirkpatrick, BAE Systems’ program manager for the Atircm effort. “The initial request was for all deployed CH-47s to be equipped with Atircm, and we’re delivering.”

BAE Systems already had personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan to support the Common Missile Warning System (CMWS), which early last year surpassed more than 1 million combat flight hours. BAE’s manufacturing facility in New Hampshire serves as the depot, but the company also deployed additional service representatives into the theater of operations for the Atircm program. So far, BAE Systems has delivered more than 70 laser jam heads and 70 multi-band lasers.

The company says the fielded version of the Atircm followed a series of rigorous qualifications through field and flight tests, and that the Atircm and CMWS (which uses chaff and flares) cooperate against evolving threats. Atircm’s multi-band laser has an infrared countermeasures capability that provides laser jamming in several threat bands, which further enhances the missile-warning suite.

“The addition of Atircm provides an added layer of protection, but it does it in a less conspicuous way than flares. Response of the CMWS is a little easier to confirm in the field,” Kirkpatrick says. “You get a warning and you see a dispense of chaff and/or flares. Atircm works a bit differently. Its laser reaches out a [longer] distance to add protection.”

BAE Systems is also applying technology for the U.S. Army’s Common Infrared Countermeasures (Circm) and the U.S. Navy’s Joint Allied Threat Awareness System (Jatas) programs. The Circm program is derived from the Atircm/CMWS effort, but is designed to provide the Army with a smaller, lighter-weight solution for other rotary-wing aircraft. Along with detection of guided surface-to-air missiles, the Jatas system will detect and locate the source of fire from small arms and unguided missiles such as the rocket-propelled grenade.

Part of the long-term problem for contractors is being able to predict what enemy weaponry is going to be in 2-4 years when the current weapons under development are finally fielded.

There are some fascinating possibilities for the longer term. A strong IR or laser surveillance source—operated as a radar in the terahertz frequency range—can scan across a battlefield to create minute light reflections that can be detected by a sensitive IR receiver. These reflections contain information that can reveal and identify the passive sensor, creating the reflection, including night-vision goggles worn by an individual or infrared sensors associated with a particular weapon.

The concept is to find “passive receivers looking at you,” says Mark Hutchins, a program manager for Circm in BAE Systems’ survivability and protection solutions business unit. “The idea is to see a glint of reflected laser light. To do so will require more energy content, but every optical system will provide a return that can be exploited.”

“Electronic warfare used to be focused on passive countermeasures,” Maas says. “But now the lines between [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance and EW] technologies are getting more blurred every day. Active detection is [possible by] sensors looking at sensors. Better sensor fusion could let you see the source of small-arms fire and other threats that are out of band and that use different parts of the spectrum. You could perhaps detect [communications] networks. Then you could geo-locate and attack emitters, jam links and disrupt communications.”

Convergence of technologies is driving the integration of many types of sensor data. At the same time it is creating the need for advanced algorithms and massive processing power to make it all work together.

“If you provide the pilot and co-pilot with missile, laser, small-arms and radar warning—all as separate alerts—it could be too distracting,” Maas says. “Say there is a laser range-finder and a radar that is associated with single weapon—a missile or an anti-aircraft gun. You want a single display that says, ‘It’s a ZSU [anti-aircraft gun] and actively shooting at us using a laser range-finder.’ If you have door gunners, you can give them clues and they can make the decision to fire, or you can provide the information to an attack helicopter.”

That also brings into focus another long-term development effort.

“We’ve done a lot with hostile unguided weapons fire,” Hutchins says. “You have to rapidly locate people shooting at you. Then, do I maneuver rapidly or pass the information to someone else who can engage them more effectively? I think that’s a lot of our future focus—more integrated, more network-centric electronic warfare. We’re now a sensor in the network and we need to get information from that network in a timely fashion about what we are facing.”

Finally, in parallel to the convergence in technologies, specialists face a convergence in combat and non-combat threats. They believe that technologies used to detect enemy fire also can be used to lessen other dangers.

“Threats to the platform also include flying into trees, wires, each other and the ground,” says Maas. “Navigation, terrain-following and EW systems are overlapping and merging. There is a fusion of sensor and processing technology that would allow us to deal with all those threats. A major problem we would like to solve is brownout, and it happens in the last 50 ft. and last few seconds of a flight. It doesn’t take much to get disoriented and there is a tremendous lack of depth perception.”

Information from IR and millimeter-wave-band transmitters could be fused in a single picture, so that aircrews could see the landscape and nearby objects through dust, for example.

AWST

prises ajdhui
LockMart Airborne Multi-Intelligence Laboratory(Gulfstream III)

thanks on va bouquiner un peu pour cette nuit là

EJ Pod

je crois qu'on a peine acquis le " AN/PLM-4 " aussi :



plus d'infos :

http://www.ailtso.com/radar_signal_simulator_plm4.htm#Specifications

source :

Citation :

EDO Corp., Lancaster, Calif., was awarded a $8,520,662 contract which will provide for standard high-power radar signal simulators (AN/PLM-4), 85 production units (AN/PLM-4) with millimeter wave option, and 6 production units. Two percent of this effort will support Foreign Military Sales efforts to Morocco. 542 CBSG/PKT, Robins Air Force Base, Ga., is the contracting activity (FA8540-07-C-0004).

http://military-online.blogspot.com/2010/04/military-contracts-april-6-2010.html

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/04/dod-contracts_4253.htm

deja posté hier l´info

Citation :

U.S. Air Force Awards Raytheon $49 Million for Stand-In Jammer

TUCSON, Ariz., May 6, 2010 /PRNewswire/ -- The U.S. Air Force awarded Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) a $48.9 million contract to begin engineering, manufacturing and design (EMD) of its Miniature Air Launched Decoy stand-in jammer variant.

MALD is a state-of-the-art, low-cost, decoy flight vehicle that is modular, air-launched and programmable. It weighs less than 300 pounds and has a range of approximately 500 nautical miles (about 575 statute miles). The MALD-J adds radar-jamming capability to the basic MALD platform without altering the decoy's outer mold line.

"During EMD, Raytheon will put MALD-J through an aggressive series of free-flight and captive-carry tests," said Scott Muse, Raytheon's MALD program director. "This is a critical capability for the warfighter, and we intend to meet the required asset available date of 2012."

Prior to entering EMD, the MALD-J successfully completed all 27 test events, culminating in a free-flight test in December 2009. Raytheon recently completed a second free-flight test of the MALD-J April 27.

"In executing the MALD-J program, Raytheon has been ahead of schedule and under budget for 39 months in a row, and we have every reason to expect the same performance during EMD," said Ken Watson, the U.S. Air Force's MALD program manager. "The success of this program is crucial because it will reduce or eliminate the need for manned stand-in jamming aircraft."

Raytheon Company



data sheet http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/rms/documents/content/rtn_rms_ps_mald_datasheet.pdf

Citation :

DATE:12/05/10
SOURCE:Flight International
Elta Systems completes G550 'JSTARS' design
By Arie Egozi

Israel Aerospace Industries' Elta Systems subsidiary has completed the initial design of an airborne joint surveillance and attack radar system, based on the Gulfstream G550 business jet.

Elta has for "some years" been working on a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indication system that will provide good quality imagery, says director of marketing Igo Licht.

The demand from potential customers is to also add communications, electronic and signals intelligence capabilities, he says. "Such a system will also include an electro-optical payload and a sensor fusion system that will supply the commanders with a full ground picture," he adds.

The manned platform could also in "the not so far future" be accompanied by unmanned air vehicles carrying SAR/GMTI payloads to cover a larger area, Licht believes. Elta manufactures smaller versions of its radars and other sensors suitable for all sizes of UAV.

Elta is already offering versions of the G550 configured for the airborne early warning and signals intelligence missions (below), with examples already operational with the air forces of Israel and Singapore.

Its work to also offer a ground surveillance variant stems from a military demand to maintain an up-to-date ground picture from stand-off range.

Un article/etude (prospective) tres interessant (petit pdf) sur les DIRCM IRCM LAIRCM ATIRCM

Il yest fait mention de l'achat du LAIRCM.

http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/22%20-%20Eye%20on%20Electronics_MAY2009.pdf

feu F-4G Wild Weasel

article vieux d´AFM,desolé pour la qualité,mais instructif sur les missions Wild Weasel/SEAD/DEAD en ex-Yougoslavie.

le coté EW de l´operation Odyssey Dawn/Harmattan et le "SEAD" du Rafale

grand merci pour les docs postés yak

c'est le DEAD qu'a fait le rafale à l'aide du AASM non pas du SEAD les français jouent sur l'amalgame

ca reste SEAD puisque ca supprime,ca devient alors lethal SEAD(ou DEAD),surtout quand la cible est mobile,et qu´il faut la localiser pour la detruire.
on peut les determiner comme ci :

en SEAD on n´a pas l´intention de detruire,on veut supprimer la menace,mais si ca s´oblige on le detruit(lethal)
en DEAD,on ne va que pour detruire,avec intention deja.

en general ca se confond et le terme SEAD reste global pour bcp de monde encore

oui mais généralement SEAD on va avec l'intention de s'attaquer à la composante radar, d'où un missile anti-radiation qui peut se mettre sur la même fréquence que le radar du SAM en vue de le détruire ou pousser ses opérateurs à l'éteindre l'objectif ultime c'est d’empêcher les radars ennemi d'illuminer
on voit que le rafale est parti visé des lanceurs d'un SA3 en vue les détruire, le DEAD c'est la destruction des lanceurs SAM principalement

pas tout a fait mon ami,look,quand tu vas avec HARM,tu veux ouvrir un couloir de Strike disons de 10min,les HARM(ou meme LGB/roquettes) sont la,les senseurs sensent ce qu´il y´a et tout,vous avez interet a ne pas vous faire remarquez et si tout va bien ils n´eclaireront pas et ne tireront pas,voila un SEAD,fait softly et non lethal(avec jamming aussi et surtout)...mais s´ils osent tirer,pour defendre tu reponds a la menace pour en finir avec elle,et ca reste SEAD.n´empeche que l´intention est soft.

un DAED a une intention hard kill,tu porte disons des CBU,2 LGB,AASM L/JDAM et tu vas a la chasse des SAM(radars ou launchers kif kif) seulement pour detruire babhoum et rien d´autre,toi ou eux.souvent c´est avec les Pod que ca se fait pour localiser(les F16CG d´aviano ont donné naissance a ce concept en 99 avec le blinking des serbes)

c´est comme un bandit qui va couvrir un hold-up,l´un prefere faire dans le discret et faire vite,l´autre veut seulement tirer dans le tas

http://users.frii.com/dawog/vaq132/s20011016valley_of_death%20%28EW%29.htm

merci pour le lien un janes en plus

ce que je trouve un peu étonnant dans le premier Doc, c'est la classification des menaces ,je croyais que l'on se soucierait plus des SA6 vu leur long range / mobilité plus tôt que les S200 , goa...

on ne peut que constater avec fierté qu'un F16bloc52 est mieux placé pour la fonction omnirole à laquelle aspire le rafale
le F16 a accès à un arsenal armement plus vaste
j'imagine que les Emiris exigeront que l'ALARM de MBDA soit cablé sur rafale

Donc si on résonne un peu, il n y a pas vraiment de mission exclusivement Sead ( aucune intention offensive ), elles doivent forcement faire partie d'un ensemble complet avec plusieurs objectif dont le Sead fait partie, autrement qu'elle est l’intérêt d'équiper des avions en LGB et roquettes et passer au dessus d'un objectif ennemi sans tirer ? de la reconnaissance ? les mission de reco ne sont pourtant pas fait avec des chasseurs configuration bombardier ( sauf peut etre chasseur multirole ) ?

FAMAS a écrit:

merci pour le lien un janes en plus

ce que je trouve un peu étonnant dans le premier Doc, c'est la classification des menaces ,je croyais que l'on se soucierait plus des SA6 vu leur long range / mobilité plus tôt que les S200 , goa...

on ne peut que constater avec fierté qu'un F16bloc52 est mieux placé pour la fonction omnirole à laquelle aspire le rafale
le F16 a accès à un arsenal armement plus vaste
j'imagine que les Emiris exigeront que l'ALARM de MBDA soit cablé sur rafale

le SA6 n´est pas vraiment long range,plutot limité(24/27km max),avec du LGB ou GPS tu le degomme
le SA5/S200 avait -comme S300 mtn- la publicité de tres long range etc,et effectivement il l´est,mais il a vite ete depassé,victime de sa renommée,mtn ils se font vite massacré de loin,vulnerables au jamming qu´ils sont,et ne peuvent echaper a ce qui les ciblent.

Nano a écrit:

Donc si on résonne un peu, il n y a pas vraiment de mission exclusivement Sead ( aucune intention offensive ), elles doivent forcement faire partie d'un ensemble complet avec plusieurs objectif dont le Sead fait partie, autrement qu'elle est l’intérêt d'équiper des avions en LGB et roquettes et passer au dessus d'un objectif ennemi sans tirer ? de la reconnaissance ? les mission de reco ne sont pourtant pas fait avec des chasseurs configuration bombardier ( sauf peut etre chasseur multirole ) ?

exact,SEAD n´est qu´un element,une partie de la chaine(d´alimentation allais je dire lol) de frappe,quand on lacne une pair F16 pour aller chasser,on peut appeler ca DAED,mais quand ils accompagnent un package,la ou c´est mieux de ne pas provoquer dabord,c´est SEAD.

pour les equipés roquettes/bombes,ca peut soit etre DEAD,souvent en TBA pour s´approcher des SAM,soit des "lievres" utilisés pour "stimuler" les radars a les illuminer et donc laisser les autres derriere les capter,ca vient de la nature ou la mangouste force le cobra a mordre pour mieux lui saisir la nuque et le tuer

mtn tu peux voir des config dernierement genre 1 HARM+1LGB ou 1 HARM+2 LJDAM chez l´USAF,ca melange les 2 genres.

Merci yakuza et Famas pour le cours.

ca explique ce qu´on disait

Citation :

U.S. pilots plant SEAD with Turkish counterparts

Posted 3/9/2012 Email story Print story
by Staff Sgt. Daryl Knee
Anatolian Falcon 2012 Public Affairs

3/9/2012 - KONYA, Turkey (AFNS) -- The Turkish and U.S. air forces continue to combine their air assets and share tactics in large-force employments during Exercise Anatolian Falcon 2012 here March 5-16.

During LFE exercises, units oftentimes take advantage of the high number of aircraft participating to test mass communication efforts, but the 480th Fighter Squadron pilots from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, are sharing suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses tactics with their Turkish counterparts.

SEAD, the 480th FS's specialty, is any action taken to deter enemy surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery. The objective is not the destruction of the ground-based threats but to subdue those threats until an air mission is complete.

"Our enemies know some of the capabilities of SEAD teams," said Capt. David Dubel, a 480th FS pilot. "The presence of a SEAD team is sometimes enough in itself to make our enemies flee and allow us to complete whatever mission we're on."

For Anatolian Falcon 2012, each air mission has an objective such as the destruction of a plotted target or the defeat of enemy aircraft. Mission planners assign groups of aircraft-specific tasks, either offensive counter air, SEAD or ground attack.

Both nations employ the F-16 Fighting Falcon, a multi-faceted fighter aircraft that can combat threats in the air or on the ground. Turkish and U.S. military units train differently, and the various functions of the F-16 can lead pilots to specialize in or understand unique perspectives of the aircraft.

Large-scale exercises allow the NATO allies to share and build upon proven tactics and techniques. For the 480th FS, sharing their SEAD tactics with the Turkish air force helps both prepare for real combat.

"We're expecting to be targeted -- that's our job," Dubel said. "We have a lot of tactics to defend against those threats. There are different tactics as to whether the enemy is just looking at us, have a lock on us or have actually fired a missile.

"The (ground attack) mission is to get 100 percent bombs on target," he continued, "and SEAD's mission is to get 100 percent of the (ground attackers) home."

An exercise-evaluation team is on site to test the SEAD teams' capabilities to safeguard the ground-attack aircraft. The team members of the Multinational Aircrew Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility, also known as Polygone, use a mobile surface-to-air missile radar system to target and "destroy" the exercise aircraft.

The system forces the pilots to change their plans en-route, said Jack Graham, a radar technician. Once the technicians switch the system to the radar or active mode, it emits a signal. The signal alerts the pilots to the radar's presence. The pilots then must identify the threat, assess the risks, attack the new threat or avoid the area all together.

Graham said he can mask the radar's location by switching off the detection system. Since the radar is mobile, the team can move to different locations as directed by the mission planners. As Anatolian Falcon 2012 continues, the location or frequency of attacks change to strain the SEAD capabilities of the Turkish and American pilots.

"We keep the pilots on their toes so they're always prepared for the real event," he said. "As long as we keep them on their toes, we're doing a good job."

Dubel said some of the exercise scenarios are relatively calm until an unlocated surface-to-air missile system begins broadcasting a frequency.

"Our job is to sniff out the SAM systems and change the game plan," Dubel said. "We don't want to lose any of our players, which in the real world would be our lives."

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123293372

Citation :

Carl Gessman, a Polygone radar operator, removes the cover from a tactical radar threat generator during Anatolian Falcon 2012 in Konya, Turkey, March 8, 2012. Polygone is a multinational aircrew electronic warfare tactics facility located in Europe and was used to simulate pop-up ground threats throughout the exercise

Citation :

Carl Gessman, a Polygone radar operator, attaches grounding rods for a generator used to power a tactical radar threat generator during Anatolian Falcon 2012 in Konya, Turkey, March 8, 2012. The radar provided a simulated enemy ground threat capability to the pilots participating in the exercise.