Electronic Warfare / Guerre electronique

thanks on va bouquiner un peu pour cette nuit là

EJ Pod

je crois qu'on a peine acquis le " AN/PLM-4 " aussi :



plus d'infos :

http://www.ailtso.com/radar_signal_simulator_plm4.htm#Specifications

source :

Citation :

EDO Corp., Lancaster, Calif., was awarded a $8,520,662 contract which will provide for standard high-power radar signal simulators (AN/PLM-4), 85 production units (AN/PLM-4) with millimeter wave option, and 6 production units. Two percent of this effort will support Foreign Military Sales efforts to Morocco. 542 CBSG/PKT, Robins Air Force Base, Ga., is the contracting activity (FA8540-07-C-0004).

http://military-online.blogspot.com/2010/04/military-contracts-april-6-2010.html

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2010/04/dod-contracts_4253.htm

deja posté hier l´info

Citation :

U.S. Air Force Awards Raytheon $49 Million for Stand-In Jammer

TUCSON, Ariz., May 6, 2010 /PRNewswire/ -- The U.S. Air Force awarded Raytheon Company (NYSE: RTN) a $48.9 million contract to begin engineering, manufacturing and design (EMD) of its Miniature Air Launched Decoy stand-in jammer variant.

MALD is a state-of-the-art, low-cost, decoy flight vehicle that is modular, air-launched and programmable. It weighs less than 300 pounds and has a range of approximately 500 nautical miles (about 575 statute miles). The MALD-J adds radar-jamming capability to the basic MALD platform without altering the decoy's outer mold line.

"During EMD, Raytheon will put MALD-J through an aggressive series of free-flight and captive-carry tests," said Scott Muse, Raytheon's MALD program director. "This is a critical capability for the warfighter, and we intend to meet the required asset available date of 2012."

Prior to entering EMD, the MALD-J successfully completed all 27 test events, culminating in a free-flight test in December 2009. Raytheon recently completed a second free-flight test of the MALD-J April 27.

"In executing the MALD-J program, Raytheon has been ahead of schedule and under budget for 39 months in a row, and we have every reason to expect the same performance during EMD," said Ken Watson, the U.S. Air Force's MALD program manager. "The success of this program is crucial because it will reduce or eliminate the need for manned stand-in jamming aircraft."

Raytheon Company



data sheet http://www.raytheon.com/capabilities/rtnwcm/groups/rms/documents/content/rtn_rms_ps_mald_datasheet.pdf

Citation :

DATE:12/05/10
SOURCE:Flight International
Elta Systems completes G550 'JSTARS' design
By Arie Egozi

Israel Aerospace Industries' Elta Systems subsidiary has completed the initial design of an airborne joint surveillance and attack radar system, based on the Gulfstream G550 business jet.

Elta has for "some years" been working on a synthetic aperture radar/ground moving target indication system that will provide good quality imagery, says director of marketing Igo Licht.

The demand from potential customers is to also add communications, electronic and signals intelligence capabilities, he says. "Such a system will also include an electro-optical payload and a sensor fusion system that will supply the commanders with a full ground picture," he adds.

The manned platform could also in "the not so far future" be accompanied by unmanned air vehicles carrying SAR/GMTI payloads to cover a larger area, Licht believes. Elta manufactures smaller versions of its radars and other sensors suitable for all sizes of UAV.

Elta is already offering versions of the G550 configured for the airborne early warning and signals intelligence missions (below), with examples already operational with the air forces of Israel and Singapore.

Its work to also offer a ground surveillance variant stems from a military demand to maintain an up-to-date ground picture from stand-off range.

Un article/etude (prospective) tres interessant (petit pdf) sur les DIRCM IRCM LAIRCM ATIRCM

Il yest fait mention de l'achat du LAIRCM.

http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/images/articleimages/pdf/22%20-%20Eye%20on%20Electronics_MAY2009.pdf

feu F-4G Wild Weasel

article vieux d´AFM,desolé pour la qualité,mais instructif sur les missions Wild Weasel/SEAD/DEAD en ex-Yougoslavie.

le coté EW de l´operation Odyssey Dawn/Harmattan et le "SEAD" du Rafale

grand merci pour les docs postés yak

c'est le DEAD qu'a fait le rafale à l'aide du AASM non pas du SEAD les français jouent sur l'amalgame

ca reste SEAD puisque ca supprime,ca devient alors lethal SEAD(ou DEAD),surtout quand la cible est mobile,et qu´il faut la localiser pour la detruire.
on peut les determiner comme ci :

en SEAD on n´a pas l´intention de detruire,on veut supprimer la menace,mais si ca s´oblige on le detruit(lethal)
en DEAD,on ne va que pour detruire,avec intention deja.

en general ca se confond et le terme SEAD reste global pour bcp de monde encore

oui mais généralement SEAD on va avec l'intention de s'attaquer à la composante radar, d'où un missile anti-radiation qui peut se mettre sur la même fréquence que le radar du SAM en vue de le détruire ou pousser ses opérateurs à l'éteindre l'objectif ultime c'est d’empêcher les radars ennemi d'illuminer
on voit que le rafale est parti visé des lanceurs d'un SA3 en vue les détruire, le DEAD c'est la destruction des lanceurs SAM principalement

pas tout a fait mon ami,look,quand tu vas avec HARM,tu veux ouvrir un couloir de Strike disons de 10min,les HARM(ou meme LGB/roquettes) sont la,les senseurs sensent ce qu´il y´a et tout,vous avez interet a ne pas vous faire remarquez et si tout va bien ils n´eclaireront pas et ne tireront pas,voila un SEAD,fait softly et non lethal(avec jamming aussi et surtout)...mais s´ils osent tirer,pour defendre tu reponds a la menace pour en finir avec elle,et ca reste SEAD.n´empeche que l´intention est soft.

un DAED a une intention hard kill,tu porte disons des CBU,2 LGB,AASM L/JDAM et tu vas a la chasse des SAM(radars ou launchers kif kif) seulement pour detruire babhoum et rien d´autre,toi ou eux.souvent c´est avec les Pod que ca se fait pour localiser(les F16CG d´aviano ont donné naissance a ce concept en 99 avec le blinking des serbes)

c´est comme un bandit qui va couvrir un hold-up,l´un prefere faire dans le discret et faire vite,l´autre veut seulement tirer dans le tas

http://users.frii.com/dawog/vaq132/s20011016valley_of_death%20%28EW%29.htm

merci pour le lien un janes en plus

ce que je trouve un peu étonnant dans le premier Doc, c'est la classification des menaces ,je croyais que l'on se soucierait plus des SA6 vu leur long range / mobilité plus tôt que les S200 , goa...

on ne peut que constater avec fierté qu'un F16bloc52 est mieux placé pour la fonction omnirole à laquelle aspire le rafale
le F16 a accès à un arsenal armement plus vaste
j'imagine que les Emiris exigeront que l'ALARM de MBDA soit cablé sur rafale

Donc si on résonne un peu, il n y a pas vraiment de mission exclusivement Sead ( aucune intention offensive ), elles doivent forcement faire partie d'un ensemble complet avec plusieurs objectif dont le Sead fait partie, autrement qu'elle est l’intérêt d'équiper des avions en LGB et roquettes et passer au dessus d'un objectif ennemi sans tirer ? de la reconnaissance ? les mission de reco ne sont pourtant pas fait avec des chasseurs configuration bombardier ( sauf peut etre chasseur multirole ) ?

FAMAS a écrit:

merci pour le lien un janes en plus

ce que je trouve un peu étonnant dans le premier Doc, c'est la classification des menaces ,je croyais que l'on se soucierait plus des SA6 vu leur long range / mobilité plus tôt que les S200 , goa...

on ne peut que constater avec fierté qu'un F16bloc52 est mieux placé pour la fonction omnirole à laquelle aspire le rafale
le F16 a accès à un arsenal armement plus vaste
j'imagine que les Emiris exigeront que l'ALARM de MBDA soit cablé sur rafale

le SA6 n´est pas vraiment long range,plutot limité(24/27km max),avec du LGB ou GPS tu le degomme
le SA5/S200 avait -comme S300 mtn- la publicité de tres long range etc,et effectivement il l´est,mais il a vite ete depassé,victime de sa renommée,mtn ils se font vite massacré de loin,vulnerables au jamming qu´ils sont,et ne peuvent echaper a ce qui les ciblent.

Nano a écrit:

Donc si on résonne un peu, il n y a pas vraiment de mission exclusivement Sead ( aucune intention offensive ), elles doivent forcement faire partie d'un ensemble complet avec plusieurs objectif dont le Sead fait partie, autrement qu'elle est l’intérêt d'équiper des avions en LGB et roquettes et passer au dessus d'un objectif ennemi sans tirer ? de la reconnaissance ? les mission de reco ne sont pourtant pas fait avec des chasseurs configuration bombardier ( sauf peut etre chasseur multirole ) ?

exact,SEAD n´est qu´un element,une partie de la chaine(d´alimentation allais je dire lol) de frappe,quand on lacne une pair F16 pour aller chasser,on peut appeler ca DAED,mais quand ils accompagnent un package,la ou c´est mieux de ne pas provoquer dabord,c´est SEAD.

pour les equipés roquettes/bombes,ca peut soit etre DEAD,souvent en TBA pour s´approcher des SAM,soit des "lievres" utilisés pour "stimuler" les radars a les illuminer et donc laisser les autres derriere les capter,ca vient de la nature ou la mangouste force le cobra a mordre pour mieux lui saisir la nuque et le tuer

mtn tu peux voir des config dernierement genre 1 HARM+1LGB ou 1 HARM+2 LJDAM chez l´USAF,ca melange les 2 genres.

Merci yakuza et Famas pour le cours.

ca explique ce qu´on disait

Citation :

U.S. pilots plant SEAD with Turkish counterparts

Posted 3/9/2012 Email story Print story
by Staff Sgt. Daryl Knee
Anatolian Falcon 2012 Public Affairs

3/9/2012 - KONYA, Turkey (AFNS) -- The Turkish and U.S. air forces continue to combine their air assets and share tactics in large-force employments during Exercise Anatolian Falcon 2012 here March 5-16.

During LFE exercises, units oftentimes take advantage of the high number of aircraft participating to test mass communication efforts, but the 480th Fighter Squadron pilots from Spangdahlem Air Base, Germany, are sharing suppression-of-enemy-air-defenses tactics with their Turkish counterparts.

SEAD, the 480th FS's specialty, is any action taken to deter enemy surface-to-air missiles or anti-aircraft artillery. The objective is not the destruction of the ground-based threats but to subdue those threats until an air mission is complete.

"Our enemies know some of the capabilities of SEAD teams," said Capt. David Dubel, a 480th FS pilot. "The presence of a SEAD team is sometimes enough in itself to make our enemies flee and allow us to complete whatever mission we're on."

For Anatolian Falcon 2012, each air mission has an objective such as the destruction of a plotted target or the defeat of enemy aircraft. Mission planners assign groups of aircraft-specific tasks, either offensive counter air, SEAD or ground attack.

Both nations employ the F-16 Fighting Falcon, a multi-faceted fighter aircraft that can combat threats in the air or on the ground. Turkish and U.S. military units train differently, and the various functions of the F-16 can lead pilots to specialize in or understand unique perspectives of the aircraft.

Large-scale exercises allow the NATO allies to share and build upon proven tactics and techniques. For the 480th FS, sharing their SEAD tactics with the Turkish air force helps both prepare for real combat.

"We're expecting to be targeted -- that's our job," Dubel said. "We have a lot of tactics to defend against those threats. There are different tactics as to whether the enemy is just looking at us, have a lock on us or have actually fired a missile.

"The (ground attack) mission is to get 100 percent bombs on target," he continued, "and SEAD's mission is to get 100 percent of the (ground attackers) home."

An exercise-evaluation team is on site to test the SEAD teams' capabilities to safeguard the ground-attack aircraft. The team members of the Multinational Aircrew Electronic Warfare Tactics Facility, also known as Polygone, use a mobile surface-to-air missile radar system to target and "destroy" the exercise aircraft.

The system forces the pilots to change their plans en-route, said Jack Graham, a radar technician. Once the technicians switch the system to the radar or active mode, it emits a signal. The signal alerts the pilots to the radar's presence. The pilots then must identify the threat, assess the risks, attack the new threat or avoid the area all together.

Graham said he can mask the radar's location by switching off the detection system. Since the radar is mobile, the team can move to different locations as directed by the mission planners. As Anatolian Falcon 2012 continues, the location or frequency of attacks change to strain the SEAD capabilities of the Turkish and American pilots.

"We keep the pilots on their toes so they're always prepared for the real event," he said. "As long as we keep them on their toes, we're doing a good job."

Dubel said some of the exercise scenarios are relatively calm until an unlocated surface-to-air missile system begins broadcasting a frequency.

"Our job is to sniff out the SAM systems and change the game plan," Dubel said. "We don't want to lose any of our players, which in the real world would be our lives."

http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123293372

Citation :

Carl Gessman, a Polygone radar operator, removes the cover from a tactical radar threat generator during Anatolian Falcon 2012 in Konya, Turkey, March 8, 2012. Polygone is a multinational aircrew electronic warfare tactics facility located in Europe and was used to simulate pop-up ground threats throughout the exercise

Citation :

Carl Gessman, a Polygone radar operator, attaches grounding rods for a generator used to power a tactical radar threat generator during Anatolian Falcon 2012 in Konya, Turkey, March 8, 2012. The radar provided a simulated enemy ground threat capability to the pilots participating in the exercise.

Citation :

ASTAC Elint pod
This combat-proven system is in service with France, Japan and the air forces of several other countries. Recording capabilities and datalinks for real-time interfaces with ground stations are available as options.

Un excellent article sur la guerre électronique
ewh2008
merci à Mr.jad pour l'aide :balkom:

Pour continuer sur le thread Turquie Armee etc...

inanc a écrit:

Une bombe EMP , l'effet d'une bombe nucléaire sans les morts.

La rechrche porte probablement sur les EMP non nuc. Les EMP nuc sont connue depuis les annees 60, par ex Starfish Prime aux US

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=128170775

http://www.ece.unm.edu/summa/notes/trestle_movie.html

Selon les frequence ciblee certaines de ces bombes peuvent faire bouillir les personnes sur place. le pricnipe du fonctionnement du four a micro onde human edition...a ma conaissance officiellement ce genr d'engin est interdit (convention de geneve) mais face a une telle energie il n'y a pas moyen de filter efficacement ces frequences...

GlaivedeSion a écrit:

Baybars a écrit:

Une machine électromagnétique de très courte portée a été développé par l'université Suleymen Demirel, cette machine est en cours de développement. Et intéresse l'industrie militaire. Une arme redoutable pouvant touchée une cible grâce aux ondes électromagnétiques qui détruit les composants électroniques de l'appareil.

Le but est de développer un système pouvant détruite tout système électronique. La SSM a un projet dans ce sens, un missile EMPS/HPMW pouvant être tirer à partir d'un drone ou par missile de croisière pour détruire les installations électroniques de l'ennemi.

C'est la Bombe E "electromagnetique" Les grandes puissance militaires mondiales la possede,sauf que les infrastructures et les forces militaires critiques des ces puissances sont proteger contre ce genre d'arme.

Je me suis interesse a cette arme voila dix ans,d'apres mes souvenirs cette arme sert a "punir" la population ennemie en mettant HS tous ce qui comporte un composant electronique,non proteger.

Voir aussi la police et les services d'urgences visé par cette arme,les armée modernes sont immuniser contre ce type d'arme.

Tout a fait d'accord Glaive. Mais a quel point un ppays peut-il se proteger contre ce genre d'armement?



Gauging The Threat Of An Electro-Magnetic Pulse Attack In The US

Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/gauging-the-threat-of-an-electro-magnetic-pulse-attack-in-the-us-2010-9#ixzz1ubIs1hJz

Citation :

Over the past decade there has been an ongoing debate over the threat posed by electromagnetic pulse (EMP) to modern civilization. This debate has been the most heated perhaps in the United States, where the commission appointed by Congress to assess the threat to the United States warned of the dangers posed by EMP in reports released in 2004 and 2008. The commission also called for a national commitment to address the EMP threat by hardening the national infrastructure.

There is little doubt that efforts by the United States to harden infrastructure against EMP — and its ability to manage critical infrastructure manually in the event of an EMP attack — have been eroded in recent decades as the Cold War ended and the threat of nuclear conflict with Russia lessened. This is also true of the U.S. military, which has spent little time contemplating such scenarios in the years since the fall of the Soviet Union. The cost of remedying the situation, especially retrofitting older systems rather than simply regulating that new systems be better hardened, is immense. And as with any issue involving massive amounts of money, the debate over guarding against EMP has become quite politicized in recent years.

We have long avoided writing on this topic for precisely that reason. However, as the debate over the EMP threat has continued, a great deal of discussion about the threat has appeared in the media. Many STRATFOR readers have asked for our take on the threat, and we thought it might be helpful to dispassionately discuss the tactical elements involved in such an attack and the various actors that could conduct one. The following is our assessment of the likelihood of an EMP attack against the United States.

Defining Electromagnetic Pulse

EMP can be generated from natural sources such as lightning or solar storms interacting with the earth’s atmosphere, ionosphere and magnetic field. It can also be artificially created using a nuclear weapon or a variety of non-nuclear devices. It has long been proven that EMP can disable electronics. Its ability to do so has been demonstrated by solar storms, lightning strikes and atmospheric nuclear explosions before the ban on such tests. The effect has also been recreated by EMP simulators designed to reproduce the electromagnetic pulse of a nuclear device and study how the phenomenon impacts various kinds of electrical and electronic devices such as power grids, telecommunications and computer systems, both civilian and military.

The effects of an EMP — both tactical and strategic — have the potential to be quite significant, but they are also quite uncertain. Such widespread effects can be created during a high-altitude nuclear detonation (generally above 30 kilometers, or about 18 miles). This widespread EMP effect is referred to as high-altitude EMP or HEMP. Test data from actual high-altitude nuclear explosions is extremely limited. Only the United States and the Soviet Union conducted atmospheric nuclear tests above 20 kilometers and, combined, they carried out fewer than 20 actual tests.

As late as 1962 — a year before the Partial Test Ban Treaty went into effect, prohibiting its signatories from conducting aboveground test detonations and ending atmospheric tests — scientists were surprised by the HEMP effect. During a July 1962 atmospheric nuclear test called “Starfish Prime,” which took place 400 kilometers above Johnston Island in the Pacific, electrical and electronic systems were damaged in Hawaii, some 1,400 kilometers away. The Starfish Prime test was not designed to study HEMP, and the effect on Hawaii, which was so far from ground zero, startled U.S. scientists.

High-altitude nuclear testing effectively ended before the parameters and effects of HEMP were well understood. The limited body of knowledge that was gained from these tests remains a highly classified matter in both the United States and Russia. Consequently, it is difficult to speak intelligently about EMP or publicly debate the precise nature of its effects in the open-source arena.

The importance of the EMP threat should not be understated. There is no doubt that the impact of a HEMP attack would be significant. But any actor plotting such an attack would be dealing with immense uncertainties — not only about the ideal altitude at which to detonate the device based on its design and yield in order to maximize its effect but also about the nature of those effects and just how devastating they could be.

Non-nuclear devices that create an EMP-like effect, such as high-power microwave (HPM) devices, have been developed by several countries, including the United States. The most capable of these devices are thought to have significant tactical utility and more powerful variants may be able to achieve effects more than a kilometer away. But at the present time, such weapons do not appear to be able to create an EMP effect large enough to affect a city, much less an entire country. Because of this, we will confine our discussion of the EMP threat to HEMP caused by a nuclear detonation, which also happens to be the most prevalent scenario appearing in the media.

Attack Scenarios

In order to have the best chance of causing the type of immediate and certain EMP damage to the United States on a continent-wide scale, as discussed in many media reports, a nuclear weapon (probably in the megaton range) would need to be detonated well above 30 kilometers somewhere over the American Midwest. Modern commercial aircraft cruise at a third of this altitude. Only the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia and China possess both the mature warhead design and intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capability to conduct such an attack from their own territory, and these same countries have possessed that capability for decades. (Shorter range missiles can achieve this altitude, but the center of the United States is still 1,000 kilometers from the Eastern Seaboard and more than 3,000 kilometers from the Western Seaboard — so just any old Scud missile won’t do.)

The HEMP threat is nothing new. It has existed since the early 1960s, when nuclear weapons were first mated with ballistic missiles, and grew to be an important component of nuclear strategy. Despite the necessarily limited understanding of its effects, both the United States and Soviet Union almost certainly included the use of weapons to create HEMPs in both defensive and especially offensive scenarios, and both post-Soviet Russia and China are still thought to include HEMP in some attack scenarios against the United States.

However, there are significant deterrents to the use of nuclear weapons in a HEMP attack against the United States, and nuclear weapons have not been used in an attack anywhere since 1945. Despite some theorizing that a HEMP attack might be somehow less destructive and therefore less likely to provoke a devastating retaliatory response, such an attack against the United States would inherently and necessarily represent a nuclear attack on the U.S. homeland and the idea that the United States would not respond in kind is absurd. The United States continues to maintain the most credible and survivable nuclear deterrent in the world, and any actor contemplating a HEMP attack would have to assume not that they might experience some limited reprisal but that the U.S. reprisal would be full, swift and devastating.

Countries that build nuclear weapons do so at great expense. This is not a minor point. Even today, a successful nuclear weapons program is the product of years — if not a decade or more — and the focused investment of a broad spectrum of national resources. Nuclear weapons also are developed as a deterrent to attack, not with the intention of immediately using them offensively. Once a design has achieved an initial capability, the focus shifts to establishing a survivable deterrent that can withstand first a conventional and then a nuclear first strike so that the nuclear arsenal can serve its primary purpose as a deterrent to attack. The coherency, skill and focus this requires are difficult to overstate and come at immense cost — including opportunity cost — to the developing country. The idea that Washington will interpret the use of a nuclear weapon to create a HEMP as somehow less hostile than the use of a nuclear weapon to physically destroy an American city is not something a country is likely to gamble on.

In other words, for the countries capable of carrying out a HEMP attack, the principles of nuclear deterrence and the threat of a full-scale retaliatory strike continue to hold and govern, just as they did during the most tension-filled days of the Cold War.

Rogue Actors

One scenario that has been widely put forth is that the EMP threat emanates not from a global or regional power like Russia or China but from a rogue state or a transnational terrorist group that does not possess ICBMs but will use subterfuge to accomplish its mission without leaving any fingerprints. In this scenario, the rogue state or terrorist group loads a nuclear warhead and missile launcher aboard a cargo ship or tanker and then launches the missile from just off the coast in order to get the warhead into position over the target for a HEMP strike. This scenario would involve either a short-range ballistic missile to achieve a localized metropolitan strike or a longer-range (but not intercontinental) ballistic missile to reach the necessary position over the Eastern or Western seaboard or the Midwest to achieve a key coastline or continental strike.

When we consider this scenario, we must first acknowledge that it faces the same obstacles as any other nuclear weapon employed in a terrorist attack. It is unlikely that a terrorist group like al Qaeda or Hezbollah can develop its own nuclear weapons program. It is also highly unlikely that a nation that has devoted significant effort and treasure to develop a nuclear weapon would entrust such a weapon to an outside organization.

Any use of a nuclear weapon would be vigorously investigated and the nation that produced the weapon would be identified and would pay a heavy price for such an attack (there has been a large investment in the last decade in nuclear forensics). Lastly, as noted above, a nuclear weapon is seen as a deterrent by countries such as North Korea or Iran, which seek such weapons to protect themselves from invasion, not to use them offensively. While a group like al Qaeda would likely use a nuclear device if it could obtain one, we doubt that other groups such as Hezbollah would. Hezbollah has a known base of operations in Lebanon that could be hit in a counterstrike and would therefore be less willing to risk an attack that could be traced back to it.


Also, such a scenario would require not a crude nuclear device but a sophisticated nuclear warhead capable of being mated with a ballistic missile. There are considerable technical barriers that separate a crude nuclear device from a sophisticated nuclear warhead. The engineering expertise required to construct such a warhead is far greater than that required to construct a crude device. A warhead must be far more compact than a primitive device. It must also have a trigger mechanism and electronics and physics packages capable of withstanding the force of an ICBM launch, the journey into the cold vacuum of space and the heat and force of re-entering the atmosphere — and still function as designed. Designing a functional warhead takes considerable advances in several fields of science, including physics, electronics, engineering, metallurgy and explosives technology, and overseeing it all must be a high-end quality assurance capability. Because of this, it is our estimation that it would be far simpler for a terrorist group looking to conduct a nuclear attack to do so using a crude device than it would be using a sophisticated warhead — although we assess the risk of any non-state actor obtaining a nuclear capability of any kind, crude or sophisticated, as extraordinarily unlikely.


But even if a terrorist organization were somehow able to obtain a functional warhead and compatible fissile core, the challenges of mating the warhead to a missile it was not designed for and then getting it to launch and detonate properly would be far more daunting than it would appear at first glance. Additionally, the process of fueling a liquid-fueled ballistic missile at sea and then launching it from a ship using an improvised launcher would also be very challenging. (North Korea, Iran and Pakistan all rely heavily on Scud technology, which uses volatile, corrosive and toxic fuels.)

Such a scenario is challenging enough, even before the uncertainty of achieving the desired HEMP effect is taken into account. This is just the kind of complexity and uncertainty that well-trained terrorist operatives seek to avoid in an operation. Besides, a ground-level nuclear detonation in a city such as New York or Washington would be more likely to cause the type of terror, death and physical destruction that is sought in a terrorist attack than could be achieved by generally non-lethal EMP.

Make no mistake: EMP is real. Modern civilization depends heavily on electronics and the electrical grid for a wide range of vital functions, and this is truer in the United States than in most other countries. Because of this, a HEMP attack or a substantial geomagnetic storm could have a dramatic impact on modern life in the affected area. However, as we’ve discussed, the EMP threat has been around for more than half a century and there are a number of technical and practical variables that make a HEMP attack using a nuclear warhead highly unlikely.

When considering the EMP threat, it is important to recognize that it exists amid a myriad other threats, including related threats such as nuclear warfare and targeted, small-scale HPM attacks. They also include threats posed by conventional warfare and conventional weapons such as man-portable air-defense systems, terrorism, cyberwarfare attacks against critical infrastructure, chemical and biological attacks — even natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and tsunamis.

The world is a dangerous place, full of potential threats. Some things are more likely to occur than others, and there is only a limited amount of funding to monitor, harden against, and try to prevent, prepare for and manage them all. When one attempts to defend against everything, the practical result is that one defends against nothing. Clear-sighted, well-grounded and rational prioritization of threats is essential to the effective defense of the homeland.

Hardening national infrastructure against EMP and HPM is undoubtedly important, and there are very real weaknesses and critical vulnerabilities in America’s critical infrastructure — not to mention civil society. But each dollar spent on these efforts must be balanced against a dollar not spent on, for example, port security, which we believe is a far more likely and far more consequential vector for nuclear attack by a rogue state or non-state actor.


Read more: http://www.businessinsider.com/gauging-the-threat-of-an-electro-magnetic-pulse-attack-in-the-us-2010-9#ixzz1ubJ9CWzR

http://www.empcommission.org/

http://economicsnewspaper.com/economics/are-nuclear-power-plants-would-survive-a-nuclear-electromagnetic-pulse-or-a-solar-storm-5181.html

Aucun pays au monde n'est proteger contre ce genre d'arme on peut raisonablement penser qu'un pays X qui attaque un pays Y disposant d'arme nucleaire,recevera le feu nucleaire en retour.

Ce qui me fait dire que cette a a une efficassite limite au pays non nucleariser.

Citation :

Cassidian electro-optics protects against laser-guided weapons





Munich, 19 December 2012

• Laser beams disable enemy optical targeting systems with outstanding precision
  
• Sensor with extremely high resolution guarantees exact detection of threats
  

Cassidian has developed an electronic defence system which, for the first time, will provide vehicles, ships and helicopters with reliable protection against laser-guided weapons. (c) Cassidian
Cassidian, the defence and security division of EADS, has developed an electronic defence system which, for the first time, will provide vehicles, ships and helicopters with reliable protection against laser-guided weapons.

Cassidian, the defence and security division of EADS, has developed an electronic defence system which, for the first time, will provide vehicles, ships and helicopters with reliable protection against laser-guided weapons.

“The threat from lasers to armed forces on a mission is continuing to increase, because weapons such as laser-guided missiles or sniper rifles with laser targeting optics are widespread,” explains Elmar Compans, head of the Sensors & Electronic Warfare unit at Cassidian. “Through the combination of our many years of experience with laser warning sensors and the most varied defence lasers, as well as the use of commercially available components, we have succeeded in developing a uniquely effective, targeted countermeasure.”

The defence concept, which Cassidian has developed for the German procurement authority, is based on the so-called “dazzling” process, which means dazzling the targeting optics of the enemy missile with an eye-safe laser beam. Laser-guided missiles are guided to their targets by the marksman keeping the weapon station’s sight aimed at the target. The weapon station either sends control signals to the missile via laser, or it aims a laser beam itself at the target, whose reflections then guide the missile to its target. In both cases, the marksman can no longer track the target due to the dazzling beam so that the missile no longer receives any targeting information and shoots past the target. The most common countermeasure currently is to spray artificial fog.

Cassidian’s defence system uses special multispectral technology which is also effective against protective goggles. The use of an eye-safe laser is important to be able to use the system even in a civil environment, e.g. on board ships or helicopters in harbours or airports. This means that the dazzling is not associated with eye damage. Working together with the Luftwaffe Institute of Aviation Medicine, Cassidian has carried out a medicinal study and shown that the dazzle effect falls below the radiant flux density which is permissible for eyes. For protection to be effective, a threat must be quickly and precisely detected by a sensor with a very high directional resolution, which enables the precise targeting of the laser beam. Cassidian’s defence system has demonstrated its effectiveness during successful field tests at the Bundeswehr Technical Centre 81 in Greding. Further tests are to follow next year.

Cassidian is one of the world leaders in missile warning systems. The MILDS warning sensor (MILDS = Missile Launch Detection System, http://www.cassidian.com/en_US/web/guest/milds-an/aar-601), for example, with over 8,000 units sold, is the standard system for helicopters and mission aircraft.