Wikileaks,fuites et révélations

Rappel du premier message :

suite au post d´Aslan..y´aura des degats,l´Allemagne aussi alertée

Citation :: Le monde se prépare à de nouvelles révélations par WikiLeaks, Washington appréhende

(AFP) – Il y a 11 heures

WASHINGTON — Des gouvernements du monde entier se préparaient en ce début de week-end à de nouvelles révélations par WikiLeaks, sous la forme d'un tourbillon de câbles diplomatiques américains potentiellement embarrassants pour les Etats-Unis et leurs partenaires.

L'administration Obama avait annoncé dès mercredi que ses services diplomatiques avaient entrepris de préparer des gouvernements étrangers à la publication prochaine de documents secrets susceptibles de créer des "tensions" avec eux.

Dans un entretien sur CNN qui sera diffusé dimanche dont l'AFP a obtenu la retranscription vendredi, le chef d'état-major interarmées américain, l'amiral Michael Mullen, a estimé que les agissements de WikiLeaks étaient "extrêmement dangereux", notamment pour la sécurité des soldats américains, appelant les responsables du site à renoncer à ces révélations.

De son côté, le porte-parole du département d'Etat Philip Crowley a déclaré que les Etats-Unis se préparaient au "pire scénario". Le département d'Etat avait indiqué plus tôt s'attendre à la publication de documents diplomatiques concernant "un large éventail de dossiers et de pays".

Le porte-parole a spécifié que parmi les pays contactés par la secrétaire d'Etat Hillary Clinton figuraient l'Allemagne, l'Arabie saoudite, les Emirats arabes unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Afghanistan.

A Moscou, le quotidien Kommersant a affirmé que les fuites comportaient des appréciations "désagréables" qui pourraient blesser Moscou.

Ces révélations "peuvent provoquer une brouille entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie", tout comme avec la moitié des pays de la planète, écrit le quotidien.

A Rome, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Franco Frattini a été prévenu par Washington que des documents concernaient l'Italie.

Le Canada a indiqué que son ambassade à Washington "s'occupe actuellement de cette question avec le département d'Etat".

A Bagdad, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, James Jeffrey, avait affirmé plus tôt que sa mission était "inquiète" face à des révélations susceptibles de saper "des discussions de confiance".

Le site spécialisé dans la révélation de documents confidentiels a promis lundi de mettre en ligne sept fois plus de documents confidentiels que les 400.000 récemment publiés sur la guerre en Irak.

Les premières fuites de WikiLeaks, en juillet sur l'Afghanistan, contenaient peu d'importantes révélations, et celles émanant d'Irak se concentraient en majorité sur des exactions commises entre différentes factions irakiennes.

Washington pourrait être plus embarrassé par la divulgation de documents rédigés par ses diplomates, en particulier s'ils mettent en cause des partenaires étrangers des Etats-Unis.

Selon le ministère finlandais des Affaires étrangères, l'ambassade américaine dans ce pays pense que cette publication allait être "la plus grave".

Selon un haut responsable israélien, Israël, dont Washington est le plus important allié, a été informé que ces fuites de câbles diplomatiques pourraient porter sur des rapports confidentiels adressés par l'ambassade américaine à des responsables israéliens.

A Ankara, un diplomate turc de haut rang a indiqué que la Turquie avait également été mise au courant.

Selon des informations de presse, les nouvelles révélations porteraient notamment sur une aide de la Turquie aux militants d'Al-Qaïda en Irak et un soutien des Etats-Unis aux rebelles kurdes du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), réfugiés en Irak.

Le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères, Ahmet Davutoglu, a ensuite jugé qu'il serait "hors de question" de tolérer des actes terroristes "ayant la Turquie pour origine et visant un pays voisin". Il a aussi insisté sur "la coopération étroite" entre Washington et Ankara face au PKK.

Des responsables en Grande-Bretagne, Norvège et Danemark ont aussi indiqué que leurs pays avaient été informés par les Etats-Unis.

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 A10-na10

Boumedfa3 a écrit:: Le bel exemple démocratique

http://www.lematindz.net/index.php?news=2089&ric=39504 clown

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 23503508

Citation :: Julian Assange peut être libéré contre 282.000 euros

La Haute cour de Justice de Londres a repoussé mercredi l'appel formulé mardi par le gouvernement suédois à la libération sous caution du fondateur de WikiLeaks, Julian Assange .

Au terme d'une audience de 90 minutes, la Haute cour de Justice de Londres a accordé jeudi en appel la liberté conditionnelle à Julian Assange, le fondateur de WikiLeaks. Le juge Duncan Ouselay a rejeté l'appel interjeté mardi par les autorités suédoises contre la décision prise en première instance de remettre en liberté sous caution l'Australien de 39 ans. «La cour ne considère pas que dans ce cas elle a affaire à un fugitif essayant d'échapper à la justice, ou cherchant à se soustraire à un interrogatoire et à des poursuites», a assuré le magistrat.

Julian Assange a été placé en détention le 7 décembre en Grande-Bretagne dans le cadre d'une procédure d'extradition lancée par la Suède contre lui dans le cadre d'une affaire de viol et d'agression sexuelle présumés. Il a toujours démenti ces accusations, estimant qu'on cherche à le discréditer après la divulgation massive par WikiLeaks de télégrammes diplomatiques américains, qui a plongé Washington dans l'embarras.
Couvre-feu et bracelet électronique

Julian Assange va donc pouvoir sortir de prison, mais il devra pour cela s'acquitter d'une importante caution de 240.000 livres (282.000 euros), dont 200.000 en liquide. L'un des avocats londoniens d'Assange, Mark Stephens, s'est engagé à ce que le montant de la caution soit versé avant la fin de la journée. Plusieurs célébrités, comme le réalisateur américain Michael Moore et le cinéaste britannique Ken Loach, ont promis de mettre la main à la poche. Selon un de ses avocats, l'Australien devrait sortir dans la journée ou «au pire» vendredi.
Une fois libre, Julian Assange devra porter un bracelet électronique, devra respecter un couvre-feu, et se présenter régulièrement dans un commissariat. Il sera aussi assigné à résidence au nord-est de Londres, dans une propriété appartenant au patron du Frontline Club, ouvert aux journalistes couvrant des conflits et régulièrement utilisé par WikiLeaks. En première instance, le juge s'était dit «convaincu» que ces conditions strictes empêcheraient Julian Assange de s'enfuir.

Les ennuis judiciaires du fondateur de WikiLeaks sont loin d'être terminés. Selon le New York Times, la justice américaine tente actuellement d'établir si Julian Assange a conspiré avec un ancien analyste du renseignement militaire , soupçonné d'avoir transmis des documents classés extraits des serveurs du Pentagone et du département d'Etat. L'objectif du département américain de la Justice est de déterminer si Assange a incité ou aidé le soldat Bradley Manning à faire fuiter ces documents. S'ils y parviennent, les procureurs fédéraux pourraient inculper Assange de conspiration.

lefigaro

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Star3

Le Prophéte (saw) a dit: Les Hommes Les meilleurs sont ceux qui sont les plus utiles aux autres Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Star3

Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Captur10

Invité

apres avoir tiré les verre du nez d'un membre inexistant de la famille Rokfeller les investigations de la fameuse presse DZ Cool

nous eclaire un peut plus sur Julian Assange et Wikileaks

Citation :: Israël, l’un des rares pays épargnés
Par WikiLeaks, le monde tu tromperas ?Par : DJERRAD AMAR

En faisant le lien avec les déclarations d’Assange complimentant Netanyahu d’homme pas “naïf” mais un “politicien sophistiqué” ou encore “(...) Netanyahu a fait une déclaration intéressante disant que les dirigeants devraient dire en public ce qu’ils disent en privé, [ce qui] conduira à une sorte d’intensification du processus de paix au Moyen-Orient et en particulier en relation avec l’Iran”, il est certain qu’il y a connivence.

Selon de nouvelles révélations faites par “Al-Haqiqa”, un site de journalisme d’investigation, reprises par plusieurs sites, Assange aurait rencontré des responsables israéliens à Genève avec qui il aurait conclu un pacte secret consistant à ne pas divulguer ce qui peut nuire à Israël, surtout ceux provenant des ambassades américaines de Tel-Aviv et de Beyrouth sur les périodes correspondant aux attaques israéliennes au Liban et à Gaza.
L’assurance est que ces documents seraient “enlevés” avant les publications. “Veterans Today” aussi, qui titre dans son site : “Démoli, Wikileaks sert Israël”, accuse Assange, selon un rapport publié, “de recevoir de l'argent du Mossad lors d'une réunion de Genève… [d’avoir] accepté de laisser à Israël de choisir et de censurer toutes les fuites de WikiLeaks”. Si l’on ajoute qu’il a traité de menteurs, dans une vidéo, les partisans de la “vérité sur l’attentat du 11/9” que l’on qualifie d’adeptes des “thèses complotistes” alors même Fox News admet des vérités sur cet attentat, nous sommes en droit de questionner sur ses buts ! Ses attitudes ont provoqué le mécontentement de ces collaborateurs entraînant une scission. Les dissidents lui reprochent de passer des accords avec des médias choisis — sans les consulter et contre leur volonté — dont ils ignorent les contenus.
Devant ce manque de transparence, plusieurs d’entre eux, dont Daniel Domscheit-Berg, ont dû quitter WikiLeaks pour lancer leur propre site “OpenLeaks”, “pour réaliser l’objectif initial de Wikileaks”, selon une interview qu’il a accordée au journal allemand Die Tageszeitung. Il a été constaté, étrangement, que l’évènement aussi important que la guerre au Liban soit passé sous silence ; créant un “vide” documentaire bizarre.
On comprend dès lors la déclaration de B. Netanyahu annonçant avoir “pris les devants” et son empressement à réagir le 1er favorablement aux “fuites” en disant que “pour la 1re fois (…) il y ait consensus (…) que l'Iran est la menace (…) Quand les dirigeants ont la volonté de dire à leur peuple la vérité, cela sert la paix (…)”. En faisant le lien avec les déclarations d’Assange complimentant Netanyahu d’homme pas “naïf” mais un “politicien sophistiqué” ou encore “(...) Netanyahu a fait une déclaration intéressante disant que les dirigeants devraient dire en public ce qu’ils disent en privé… [ce qui] conduira à une sorte d’intensification du processus de paix au Moyen-Orient et en particulier en relation avec l’Iran”, il est certain qu’il y a connivence. Ses révélations sont d’une grande utilité dans la guerre de désinformation que mènent de concert dans la même stratégie l’Amérique et les sionistes.
Certains voient en WikiLeaks une “psy op made in Israël” (opérations psychologiques) destinées à donner l'illusion d'une “information libre et renégate”, afin d’influencer les raisonnements objectifs et les comportements pour mieux faire accepter leurs projets bellicistes. Il se trouve, hélas, dans le “monde arabe”, des “caisses de résonance” qui reproduisent ou acceptent sans recule et sans réflexions ce genre d’informations subversives et qui trouvent, de bonne foi peut-être, matière à s’en servir contre leur propre pays ou contre des pays amis tombant ainsi en plein dans le piège, alors que beaucoup de signes dévoilent un complot.
D’abord, il y a les cibles géopolitiques sélectionnées, ensuite les médias choisis connus pour être pro-sionistes et enfin la déclaration de H. Clinton affirmant que “ceux qui liront ces notes diplomatiques concluront que les craintes concernant l'Iran sont fondées (…) partagées et continueront d'être le leitmotiv de la politique que nous poursuivons, avec nos partenaires, afin d'empêcher l'Iran de se doter de l'arme nucléaire”.
Ces documents américains, d’apparence les desservant, s’avèrent converger vers les pays déjà ciblés dans cette stratégie américano-sioniste. Ils donnent des Arabes une image dégradante faite de lâcheté et de traîtrise afin de créer un climat de haine, d’adversité entre Arabes, musulmans et chrétiens. Ils visent à compromettre l’avenir de certaines personnalités en ternissant leur image car refusant de se rallier à leur projet d’agression contre l’Iran entre autres, mais aussi à déchoir certains de leurs serviteurs devenant inutiles.
Dans cette avalanche de “fuites”, aucun haut placé au sein de l’establishment US et israélien n’a été inquiété. Celles diffusées sur eux semblant les mettre dans “l’embarras” — notamment celles qui dévoilent “l’appréciation” que font les représentants américains des dirigeants “amis” — s’analysent comme “basiques” et souvent connues, sans impact comparées à l’information stratégique glissée relatives à l’Iran, les Arabes et les musulmans.
D’autres informations font état d’une tractation entre un journal libanais et Assange dans l’espoir de se procurer, contre de l’argent, en particulier un important PV d’une réunion tenue à l'ambassade américaine à Beyrouth, le 24 juillet 2006. Réunion déterminante dans la guerre contre le Hezbollah et ses alliés. Mais les documents reçus par Al-Akhbar s’avèrent sans importance. On comprend donc qu’Assange est un homme négociable, prêts à se censurer et à trahir. Dans ces conditions, il ne s’agit plus de probable manipulation, mais de collusion pour de l’argent.
Alors, Assange objet d’une manipulation, rusé négociant ou faisant partie du système sioniste qui domine la plupart des médias ? Comme rien ne peut plus désormais être caché, l’avenir proche nous dira si WikiLeaks est bien ce site qu’il prétend être ; un Hoax, ce canular informatique, ou bien un autre instrument de dominatio

http://www.liberte-algerie.com/edit.php?id=147530

cette presse est vraiment trop forte
sans envoyé spécial ni en israel, ni aux USA, ils arrivent à distance à percer le mystére de wiki leaks geek

Citation :: ID: 135031
Date: 2007-12-19 12:06:00
Origin: 07ALGIERS1806
Source: Embassy Algiers
Classification: SECRET
Dunno: 07ALGIERS1237 07ALGIERS1618 07ALGIERS1658 07ALGIERS1704
Destination: VZCZCXRO5580
PP RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #1806/01 3531206
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 191206Z DEC 07
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5022
INFO RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2467
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8733
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2078
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6935
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6149
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 1403
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0353
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3182
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ALGIERS 001806

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/17/2027
TAGS: PINS, PGOV, AG
SUBJECT: AN AILING AND FRAGILE ALGERIAN REGIME DRIFTS INTO
2008

REF: A. ALGIERS 1704
B. ALGIERS 1618
C. ALGIERS 1237
D. ALGIERS 1658

Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford; reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: Recent discussions with former government
officials, long-term opposition leaders and journalists paint
a picture of an Algerian regime that is fragile in ways it
has not been before, plagued by a lack of vision,
unprecedented levels of corruption and rumblings of division
within the military rank and file. Our Algerian contacts are
often a grumpy lot, but we now hear more than the ordinary
amount of concern about the GOA's inability or unwillingness
to address political, economic and security problems. The
December 11 suicide bombings in Algiers, carried out by two
men amnestied under the Charter for Peace and National
Reconciliation, have ignited heated debate about the ability
of President Bouteflika's reconciliation program to protect
the country. The debate pits proponents of an urgent and
aggressive approach to the terrorist threat against those
aligned with Bouteflika who still believe that amnesty has a
role to play. The picture of an isolated president, a
stagnant reform process and an uncertain approach towards
terror comes at a time when efforts within the government to
engineer a third term for Bouteflika are gathering steam. We
do not sense an explosion coming right away. Instead, we see
a government drifting and groping for a way forward. END
SUMMARY.

SHIP OF STATE ADRIFT
--------------------

2. (C) On December 3, opposition Rally for Culture and
Democracy (RCD) leader Said Sadi presented a somber overview
of the Algerian regime, saying it insisted on continued
control but lacked vision and capacity. Sadi warned that in
the context of current stagnation in economic and political
reform, Algeria's institutions were corroding from within,
losing many of their best cadres of workers and civil
servants. The former leader of the Islamist al-Islah party,
Abdallah Djaballah, who was ousted from the party's
leadership with active help from the Interior Ministry,
pointed out to us on December 17 that the harraga phenomenon
(ref A), in which youth flee on makeshift crafts to Europe,
was no longer limited only to poor, unemployed youth.
Djaballah viewed Algerian youth as having a choice "between
death at sea and a slow, gradual death at home" given the
profound lack of opportunities in the country's stagnant
economy. Sadi told us he was shocked to find so many
educated, middle-class Algerians in Quebec and parts of the
U.S. on a recent visit. "Those people are the future of
Algeria," Sadi said.

3. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX, told us
December 17 that when it came to national reconciliation, the
December 11 bombings had polarized the debate within the
Algerian security services, with an increasing number of
voices favoring a tougher approach. XXXXXXXXXXXX said that the
regime had no single, clear approach to fighting terror, a
fact proven by its indecisiveness on how to handle
high-profile amnesty cases such as that of Hassan Hattab (ref
B). According to Sadi and XXXXXXXXXXXX ordinary Algerians, who
have already lost confidence in the economic and political
reform agenda, are now losing faith in the ability of the
regime to protect them. Laila Aslaoui, a former minister,
women's rights activist and writer, told Ambassador at dinner
December 18 that much of Algerian society was demobilizing
against the terror threat. It was scandalous that the
Interior Ministry knew the Supreme Court was a target and did
nothing to improve the building's security or warn the
public, she claimed. She was caustic about the Interior
Minister's comment that it was impossible to provide complete
protection against bomb attacks, wondering why the GOA does
not more vigorously pursue terrorist suspects. The GOA had
asked Ms. Aslaoui on December 17 to help organize a march
condemning terrorism. In the 1990s, she said she would not
have hesitated. Now, she remarked bitterly, she would do
nothing that helps the Algerian government justify its
approach to security. XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX

XXXXXXXXXXXX, told Ambassador December 17
that there is a growing gap between what ordinary Algerians
see as their key needs and what they perceive the government
is offering in terms of wages and quality of life. As a
result, he said, fewer Algerians are willing to help the
government. The word on the street, he said, is that if you
have to do business in a government office, go but then leave
promptly and stay out of the way.

4. (C) On the other hand, Djaballah told us that widespread
disenchantment about the government's willingness to share
power with Islamists ultimately prompted Algerian Islamists
to heed calls by his and other Islamist parties to boycott
the November 29 local elections. They understand, he said,
that the new electoral law (ref C) was designed to
marginalize them and perpetuate the ruling coalition's grip
on power. Closing out political space will merely spur more
extremism, he warned. The Ambassador told Djaballah that the
U.S. favors political liberalization in Algeria but we also
understand that this may have to be done gradually. The U.S.
does not want to see a return to the violence of the 1990s
and is working with the GOA against those who actively seek
it. He welcomed Djaballah's effort to play in the legal
political system. The important point, the Ambassador
underlined, is that while political evolution might be slow
it needs to be in a steady direction of liberalization.
Djaballah accepted the point and appreciated our having
raised election process problems with the GOA.

A RULING "GANG FROM TIKRIT"
---------------------------

5. (C) Commenting on the stability of the country, XXXXXXXXXXXX
stressed that Algerians "have been through far worse than
this," and that internal divisions should not be mistaken for
instability. The regime, XXXXXXXXXXXX pointed out, values
stability above all else, and is consequently both fragile
and stable at the same time. XXXXXXXXXXXX agreed with an analogy
made by Sadi both to us and publicly in the press, comparing
the Bouteflika government to "a gang from Tikrit" in which a
disproportionate number of cabinet ministers and generals
came from the same region in the western province of Tlemcen
as President Bouteflika. (Indeed, many in the inner circle
come from the small town of Nedrumah.) The loyalty of this
"gang," according to XXXXXXXXXXXX and Sadi, is key to maintaining
stability, just as it did in Saddamn Hussein's Iraq.

SADI: "STAND UP FOR OUR YOUTH"
------------------------------

6. (C) Sadi warned of the long-term dangers of the U.S.
remaining silent on what he perceived as the deterioration of
Algerian democracy, as evidenced by the local elections. In
Sadi's view, outside support is critical to the survival of
democracy and the productive engagement of Algerian youth --
70 percent of the population -- in political and economic
life. If the U.S. is seen to be complicit in meaningless
elections and the process of amending the constitution to
allow Bouteflika to run for a third term, he warned, it risks
losing the youth demographic for the future.

7. (C) The Ambassador reminded Sadi of our fruitless efforts
to maintain a National Democratic Institute program in
Algeria that the Interior Ministry consciously shut down; few
political parties had pushed hard to save it. Ambassador
told Sadi we had raised on multiple occasions problems with
the election process and its credibility. He noted to Sadi
that we had heard other parties ask for more public U.S.
support, and urged the RCD and other Algerian parties to make
their voices heard. The U.S. would be credible in raising
obstacles to liberalization only if the Algerian political
parties themselves spoke out loudly. Given the absence of an
international election monitoring commissions in the 2008
legislative and local elections, the Ambassador advised Sadi
to consider sooner rather than later generating public
requests for international observers for the 2009
presidential elections.

STABILITY IN THE HANDS OF A DIVIDED MILITARY...
--------------------------------------------- --

8. (S) Sadi, who maintains contacts with elements of the

ALGIERS 00001806 003 OF 004

Algerian military and security services, told us that the
army was no longer as unified as it had been even a few years
ago. Two splits were emerging, he said. The first is among
younger officers who know Algeria is not well and blame the
old guard for neglect and mismanagement. These officers,
Sadi said, want change and feel an increasing sense of
urgency that the country is adrift. The second split
identified by Sadi lies within the senior ranks of the
military, between officers who favor a tougher approach to
security and counter-terrorism (the "eradicateurs") and those
still aligned with Bouteflika's national reconciliation
policy. XXXXXXXXXXXX, whose brother
is an army officer, said on December 17 that there are
colonels in the Algerian military who think the current drift
cannot continue. The question, XXXXXXXXXXXX whispered, is whether
they can organize themselves.

9. (S) Sadi told us of at least one conversation he has had
recently with General Toufik Mediene, the head of Algeria's
DRS (military intelligence apparatus) who is widely viewed as
the key figure in ensuring regime control and survival. He
said Mediene acknowledged that all was not well with the
health of Bouteflika and Algeria writ large. However,
according to Sadi, Mediene said that he needed some kind of
reassurance that any political alternative "would be viable"
and, by implication, would not destabilize the country. Sadi
said that many senior officers were beginning to wonder if
they could get the army out of politics altogether, without
fear of public retribution for past abuses during the civil
war.

...WHILE CORRUPTION AND OIL PRICES REACH NEW HEIGHTS
--------------------------------------------- -------

10. (S) Sadi, Djaballah, XXXXXXXXXXXX and numerous other
contacts have told us that corruption has reached
unprecedented levels in the current regime. As we reported
in ref D, the ruling FLN party, intent on laying the
groundwork for a Bouteflika third term, has sought to install
local officials through electoral wrangling based on loyalty
even at the expense of competence. With oil prices at record
highs, former Finance and Prime Minister Benbitour told
Ambassador in November, there was less incentive for the
regime to carry out much-needed reforms. High oil prices are
bringing incredible wealth into the country, Benbitour told
us, but ordinary people are not seeing any impact on their
daily lives. (Indeed, Benbitour publicly coined a term we
see often in the media now: Algeria is rich, but the people
are poor. Islamist leader Djaballah used it with us often on
December 17.) Corruption, XXXXXXXXXXXX, has reached epic
proportions, even within the military. He cited Lieutenant
General Ahmad Gaid Salah, commander of Algerian military
forces, as perhaps the most corrupt official in the military
apparatus, something other contacts have told us as well.
When Sadi mentioned the corruption problem to General
Mediene, Sadi said, Mediene acknowledged the problem.
Motioning silently to the portrait of Bouteflika that hung
over their heads, he indicated to Sadi that the extent of the
problem went all the way to the top. (Comment: many embassy
contacts think President Bouteflika himself is not
particularly corrupt, but they readily finger the President's
brothers, Said and Abdallah, as being particularly rapacious.
The Algerian military, meanwhile, has launched an
anti-corruption program that is ambitious by Algerian
standards but has left the senior leadership relatively
untouched. End Comment.)

COMMENT: AN AILING REGIME, AN AILING PRESIDENT
--------------------------------------------- -

11. (S) Our Algerian contacts are often a grumpy lot, but we
now hear more than the ordinary amount of concern about the
GOA's inability or unwillingness to address political,
economic and security problems. The bombings and the debate
about how to handle Islamist extremism also are starting to
remind of the ferocious arguments within Algerian society
during the worst of 1990s violence. These contacts agree
that while the 1990s showed most Algerians can withstand lots
of pain, the December 11 bombings laid bare the regime's lack
of vision and inability to manage the pressures. We are
starting to hear echoes of a debate within some circles of
the military establishment of an increasingly polarized

ALGIERS 00001806 004 OF 004

debate over national reconciliation has become a discussion
about the viability of Bouteflika's government itself.
According to our contacts, stability remains the top priority
even among officials on opposite sides of the debate,
although they see stability as flowing not from Bouteflika's
leadership but from a military apparatus that appears to
realize that the buck stops with them. The new element is
the push from Prime Minister Belkhadem and the FLN apparatus,
probably with impetus from Bouteflika's brothers if not
President Bouteflika himself, to arrange a constitutional
amendment and a third term. Sadi, a medical doctor, said
that both Bouteflika and Algeria itself were in critical
condition and fading. According to Sadi (who may or may not
know), Bouteflika suffers from terminal stomach cancer, and
the regime lies on the operating table, slipping towards a
point of no return as "untrained surgeons" stand by.
Meanwhile, the government's seeming inability to jump-start
the stagnant economy has Algerians, especially youth, feeling
gloomy and grim about the fate of their country as it drifts
into the new year.
FORD

Citation :: ID: 138656
Date: 2008-01-25 11:17:00
Origin: 08ALGIERS85
Source: Embassy Algiers
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXRO1124
RR RUEHTRO
DE RUEHAS #0085/01 0251117
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251117Z JAN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5162
INFO RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0391
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 8776
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 6192
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 2514
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 2125
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 6984
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3223
RUEPGBA/CDR USEUCOM INTEL VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ALGIERS 000085

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2028
TAGS: PREL, PGOV, KDEM, FR, AG
SUBJECT: FRENCH AMBASSADOR: BOUTEFLIKA MAY NOT NEED TO
MOVE BUT ALGERIA NEEDS TO

Classified By: Ambassador Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (d)

1. (C) French Ambassador Bajolet told the Ambassador on
January 23 that he and the French government are worried that
Algeria is gradually headed towards more instability, but
they do not see an alternative to Bouteflika's remaining in
power for a third term beginning in 2009. Bajolet, who
served here in the 1980s, said that the French strategic
interest in Algeria above all is stability and economic
growth. Increased pressure on Algerians to emigrate to
France because of a lack of opportunities in Algeria weighs
heavily on French political sensitivities and ultimately on
the social ties between the two countries. The French
government, he said, sees few positive developments in
Algeria now:

-- municipalities, who are closest to the population, have
no authority or resources to address needs locally;
-- there is an inability throughout the government to make
hard decisions; Bajolet called it a kind of immobilism;
-- the political parties have little space and seem ready
to make short-term deals at long-term political loss;
-- public interest in the formal political system has
diminished sharply, as seen in the two 2007 elections;
-- the business climate is difficult and not improving;
and investment and job creation are lacking (Bajolet noted
that a French business association had prepared a white paper
that detailed problems French companies face in Algeria and
how to recitify them. Bajolet observed that the Interior
Minister Zerhouni and the Algerian government were anxious
that it not be released publicly.);
-- corruption, all the way up to the Bouteflika brothers,
has reached a new level and is interfering with economic
development;

BOUTEFLIKA'S THIRD TERM AMBITIONS
---------------------------------

2. (C) Bajolet said he understood that the security service
leadership has given its approval for the constitution to be
changed so that Bouteflika can run for election again in
2009. Bajolet stated that Bouteflika's health is better and
that he might live several more years. His improved health
and activity has given him more leverage over the army, he
speculated. That said, Bajolet also opined that the
consensus within the top security leadership to support a
third term for Bouteflika resulted in part from the
widespread view that Bouteflika will not finish his third
term due to his his health problems. The relationship
between the security services and Bouteflika is still
ticklish. For example, the French have concluded that the
security services encouraged Minister of Veteran Affairs
Cherif Abbas to criticize Sarkozy on the eve of the French
president's visit in order to embarrass Bouteflika by
provoking the French to cancel the trip.

3. (C) Bajolet said the French are being extremely careful
about what they say to the Algerians about changing the
constituton and enabling Bouteflika to run for the third term
that everyone understands he will win. Bajolet sensed that
the Algerians clearly floated the idea publicly again right
before Sarkozy's visit in December to test whether the French
president would advise against it. He intentionally did not
do so. Bajolet observed that the French see no obvious
successor to Bouteflika. Former Prime Minister Hamrouche, he
noted, speaks of reform but the French are unsure whether he
could actually push through a reform program. Former Prime
Minister Ouyahia, they believe, is yet another apparatchik
and has little popularity in the country. Bajolet concluded
that without an obvious successor, pushing against Bouteflika
simply opens up new sources of instability. Instead, the
French have decided that the best message for them to deliver
is that they are neutral on the issue of Bouteflika's third
term but that the government needs to start addressing
Algeria's serious economic and political problems. (Bajolet
is particularly interested in decentralization, for example.)

SECURITY
--------

4. (C) Bajolet expressed great concern about the security
situation and asked numerous questions about our latest
warden message. Our recommendations that Americans avoid

ALGIERS 00000085 002 OF 002

Western schools had put him in a difficult spot, he noted,
since there are two official French schools in Algiers.
Bajolet asserted that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
appears to target the Algerian government mainly and targets
foreigners only as a means to embarrass the government. The
Ambassador disagreed, expressing his view that AQIM is
targeting both but with different goals. It targets the GoA
to embarrass it and as a means of retaliating for AQIM
losses. It targets foreigners to drive them out of Algeria
(and ultimately help destabilize the GoA). Bajolet noted
that there are multiple French vulnerabilities, including
French cultural centers around Algeria and scattered
diplomatic residences. So far, however, the Algerian
security services have handled threats to the French
appropriately and have, he claimed, kept the French
authorities informed.

5. (C) COMMENT: Bajolet opined that external pressure on the
government here to try to force it to drop the Bouteflika
third-term idea will not compel the GoA to drop it. Instead,
he thought, it would merely make working with the Algerians
more difficult, and the French now perceive that on both
security and economic/social issues they must work with
Algiers. He readily admitted that the medium- and long-term
outlook here is not good unless the government really begins
to fix the economy and the political system. He was not
confident that it would, but he had no clear idea of what to
do in that case.
FORD

Citation :: ID: 247810
Date: 2010-02-08 16:58:00
Origin: 10ALGIERS111
Source: Embassy Algiers
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHAS #0111/01 0391658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 081658Z FEB 10
FM AMEMBASSY ALGIERS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8404
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHHH/OPEC COLLECTIVE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RUCPDOC/DEPT OF COMMERCE WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000111

NOFORN
SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/MAG - NARDI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/08/2020
TAGS: PGOV, ENRG, ECON, ETRD, KCRM, PINS, AG
SUBJECT: ALGERIA: DIRECTORS OF NATIONAL OIL COMPANY
INVESTIGATED FOR CORRUPTION

Classified By: Ambassador David D. Pearce. Reasons: 1.4 (b), (d)

Summary
-------

1. (C/NF) Eight directors, including the CEO, of Algeria's
national oil company Sonatrach are under investigation for
corruption and have been fired and replaced. Industry
insiders fear company operations will soon be affected.
Algeria's intelligence services are leading the
investigation. This scandal is the latest in a dramatically
escalating series of investigations and prosecutions that we
have seen since last year involving Algerian government
ministries and public enterprises. Significantly, many of
the ministries affected are headed by ministers considered
close to Algerian President Bouteflika, including
Energy/Mines Minister Chekib Khelil. Speculation is rife
that political infighting between civilian and military
leadership lies behind the case, but we have no hard
evidence. Bouteflika's determined silence is only fueling
the uncertainty. End summary.

Eight Senior Officials Implicated
---------------------------------

2. (U) A corruption scandal has broken involving Algeria's
largest company, the state oil and gas monopoly Sonatrach.
The press first reported on January 14 that an examining
magistrate ordered Sonatrach's CEO Mohamed Meziane, VP for
pipelines Benamar Zenasni, VP for upstream activity
Boumediene Belkacem, and five other company executives to
answer questions concerning allegations of irregularities in
the awarding of contracts to two consulting firms owned by
Meziane's sons and a supplier of security equipment. They
were questioned for twenty hours.

3. (U) All eight Sonatrach officials were then placed under
formal investigation ("judicial control") which requires a
person to report periodically to police and not leave the
country). Some were detained. Meziane himself was placed
under judicial control; the two Sonatrach VPs were detained
in Serkadji prison. An additional Sonatrach senior official,
VP for commercialization Chawki Rahal, was placed under
judicial control. Four Sonatrach directors (for social
affairs, exploration, pipelines and transport, and
commercialization) were placed under judicial control.
Meziane's two sons were detained -- some stories say, for
being major shareholders in companies to which the Sonatrach
contracts were awarded. All efforts by defense lawyers to
lift the detentions and judicial control have been rejected.
Outside Sonatrach, former CEO of the bank Credit Populaire
d'Algerie Hachemi Meghaoui and his son were ordered detained.

4. (U) Abdelhafid Feghouli, VP for downstream operations, was
immediately appointed acting Sonatrach CEO. The three other
VPs under suspicion have been replaced. Energy/Mines
Minister Dr. Chakib Khelil, whose ministry has responsibility
for Sonatrach, claimed in a January 17 press conference that
the investigation had caught him unawares and that all he
knew was what had been reported in the press. He has since
refused to discuss the allegations or take responsibility for
the affair, saying February 2 that he had no details of the
charges and that he would not resign. Khelil pleaded that he
was responsible for the entire energy sector but not for
managing Sonatrach or any of the some 50 other state energy
companies under his ministry's purview. He assured the press
soon after the affair broke that Sonatrach's production would
not be affected and that the company would continue to carry
out all projects underway. The week of January 24, the press
reported that Sonatrach lawyers would not defend the
suspects, since Sonatrach was a victim of the fraud they are
suspected of committing.

Foreign Producers Worried
-------------------------

5. (C/NF) Ambassador on January 27 met XXXXXXXXXXXX

Meziane. XXXXXXXXXXXX sources tell him the issue under
investigation is Sonatrach's granting of sole-source
contracts. Sonatrach's regulations specify strict conditions
for this type of contract ("procedure R-115"). Only CEO
Meziane would have had authority to authorize and approve
them.

6. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX had heard that 1,600 such contracts were
under investigation. Some of these contracts reportedly went
through Meziane's sons. A few years earlier, Sonatrach had
pressed Anadarko to enter into one such contract jointly with
the U.S.-Algerian joint venture BRC (Brown and Root-Condor)
to develop the el-Merk oilfield. XXXXXXXXXXXX, the contract was never
carried out, BRC was liquidated, and Sonatrach in 2008
awarded the el-Merk contract to Anadarko. XXXXXXXXXXXX stated that
this contract was not/not one of those under investigation.
(Comment: BRC, nonetheless, figures in the list of ongoing
investigations cited in the press. End comment)

7. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that Abdelhafid Ferghouli, former VP
for downstream operations now appointed interim CEO, is the
one (now former) Sonatrach VP with whom Anadarko was not
acquainted. XXXXXXXXXXXX doubted he would last long or be
effective in the top position. No one expects the Sonatrach
executives under investigation to return to their previous
positions.

Continuity of Sonatrach Operations
----------------------------------

8. (C/NF) Energy/Mines Minister Khelil's Jan. 17 assurances
that company operations would be unaffected have not gone
unchallenged. Several press reports sourced to industry
insiders and experts say that fear has paralyzed Sonatrach
upper ranks, who are all afraid to make a decision. XXXXXXXXXXXX
view paralleled this assessment, and we have heard similar
views from French -- quite concerned about Sonatrach because
of the French oil company Total's exposure here -- and other
diplomats. He said that all senior executives, at least in
the upstream end of operations he is familiar with, are
looking over their shoulders and afraid to make decisions or
sign anything. The company would not sign amendments to
XXXXXXXXXXXX insurance contracts on oil production necessitated
by the 2009 budget amendments (Complementary Finance Law) --
contracts for which former VP for Upstream Operations
Belkacem was responsible. Sonatrach had contracted foreign
insurance companies to provide this insurance. Now these
companies were not getting paid. Before long, they would
cease insuring XXXXXXXXXXXX production operations. If that
happened, work would stop. XXXXXXXXXXXX said XXXXXXXXXXXX fields are
the largest upstream project with foreign participation in
Algeria.

Leading Role of Algeria's Intelligence Services
--------------------------------------------- --

9. (C) All papers report that Algeria's equivalent to the
DNI, the Departement du Renseignement et de la Securite
(DRS), which is no longer under the Ministry of National
Defense, carried out the investigation. Although DRS' move
out of the shadows and into the limelight has been
unprecedented, its special investigative service for internal
corruption has been active for years (i.e., even as far back
as the Boumedienne era). The magazine "Jeune Afrique"
recently claimed, for example, that DRS had investigated 1650
elected Algerian local officials (or about one out of ten)
since 2002 for corruption. XXXXXXXXXXXX was well aware of DRS'
involvement in the Sonatrach case and related that former VP
Belkacem, in many meetings with XXXXXXXXXXXX, had been extremely
careful in what he said when others, even company waiters,
were present. He was very guarded over the telephone.
XXXXXXXXXXXX imputed this behavior to concern over DRS
surveillance. XXXXXXXXXXXX confided that DRS has interviewed many
of XXXXXXXXXXXX company's local staff.

Political Ramifications
-----------------------

10. (C/NF) XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that no one believed Energy/Mines
Minister Khelil's claims to know nothing of the
investigation. Most believe Khelil exercised a guiding hand
over Sonatrach operations. XXXXXXXXXXXX noted that his
conversations with industry insiders had pointed to a cousin

of the minister known only as Hemche who was a close adviser
to former CEO Meziane. His sources believed Hemche was a key
decision-maker, although Meziane did the signing. Early last
December, Hemche reportedly abruptly retired and took up
residence in Lugano, Switzerland.

11. (C) Ambassador noted that Algiers is swirling with
speculation about the political background of this and other
scandals affecting several government ministries and public
enterprises. Some believed it was a logical outcome of
President Bouteflika's oft-stated commitment to attack
corruption. Most, however, interpret the DRS move against
high-level Sonatrach officials -- who all owed their jobs to
Bouteflika-confidant Khelil -- as the military's retaliation
via the DRS against the civilian control over it that
Bouteflika had imposed since his reelection to a second term
in 2004.

Comment
-------

12. (C) The investigation against the leadership of the
company that finances over half the country's budget and
produces 98 percent of its export revenue has shocked the
country and generated rampant speculation about the political
motivations behind it. In a country where power
relationships and processes are opaque, speculation is as
rife as hard evidence is scarce. A visiting analyst of a
leading U.S. risk analysis firm told Poloff the week of
January 31, for example, that all his contacts believe the
DRS shaped the investigation to send a message to Bouteflika,
either that he should allow relatives of leading generals a
greater slice of the economic pie, or that Bouteflika's
western Algerian "clan" should cede power back to the
military (which many regard as dominated by eastern
Algerians), or simply that the civilian-dominated authority
should restore more behind-the-scenes influence to the
military. Despite this theory and others we have heard, we
see no hard evidence for any particular political
interpretation. What is certain is that the alleged
infraction and sums involved in this corruption case may only
represent the tip of an iceberg -- which was precisely the
point of an open letter to the DRS published by a former
Sonatrach VP January 30 in the French language daily "El
Watan." That article urged the DRS to look into a long list
of much larger Sonatrach operations, including spot market
sales to a handful of select customers connected to senior
members of the power structure. The U.S. risk analyst's
sources were certain the DRS planted this article as a
further warning to civilian authority.

13. (C) This case is the latest in a series of corruption
investigations that started to surface with increasing
frequency since last spring and which are now competing with
indignation over TSA measures and Algeria's failed bid to win
the African Cup of Nations football tournament for the main
headlines in the daily press. Two of the larger cases
already underway are alleged wrongdoing in the construction
of the East-West Highway and in the awarding of fishing
licenses to Turkish companies. Others involve
state-controlled telephone operator Algerie Telecom, BRC
(mentioned previously), and the National Bank of Algeria.
Few cases have yet produced a trial or conviction, helping
harden the widespread view that leading public officials
continue to enrich themselves with impunity at public
expense. With DRS "commissars" believed present in virtually
every public company or ministry front office, senior
officials are said to be worried that every visitor,
especially non-Algerians, is duly noted and reported. DRS
files, already swollen with decades of political and personal
financial dirt on practically all notable Algerians, are said
to be growing fatter with information on suspicious business
dealings or allegations of special favors. The big question
no one can answer definitively is whether Bouteflika is
orchestrating this anti-corruption blitz, as PM Ouyahia has
publicly claimed and as would be consistent with Bouteflika's
longstanding intention, or is its ultimate target. His
silence, noted by the press, has only fueled the speculation.
PEARCE

Invité

Fremo a écrit:: * commençant par la question de poursuite judiciare et machin ... cite moi le nom d'un seule Etat qui a fait ce genre de poursuite, à cause des cables de Wikitruc, à l'occident ... et pourquelle raison ?! un document qui cite des conneries sans fondement ... si il y a quelqu'un qui se plaint d'une situation se diriger vers la justice, non pas vers un Mr X ou Y ... et la justice marocaine a montré son indépendance plusieurs fois, juste il y a quelques mois, Une amende contre le Premier Ministre et 2 membres de son gvt suite à l'épisode la femme qui n'a pas pu eu son traitement ailleurs, et qu'il a perdu sa vie ... si je me rappelle bien l'ammende s'éleve à plusieurs M Mad si ma mémoire est bonne!

il a eu des poursuit judiciaires, pirs par des citoyens contre l'etat (ou ses represantants en ce cas):

Citation :: La familia de José Couso afirma, en la denuncia que presentó ayer ante la Fiscalía de Madrid, que los hechos y relatos que aparecen en los telegramas enviados al Departamento de Estado desde la Embajada de Madrid y filtrados por Wikileaks podrían ser indicativos de la existencia de una "conspiración o concierto delictivo" entre fiscales y miembros del Gobierno español y funcionarios de EE UU para tapar el procedimiento penal abierto en la Audiencia Nacional tras la muerte del cámara de Tele 5 fallecido en Bagdad el 8 de abril de 2003 por el disparo efectuado desde un tanque estadounidense. "Los funcionarios y altos cargos españoles", señala el texto, podrían haber actuado conforme a las "instrucciones" de diplomáticos de la Embajada de Madrid, "causando perjuicio a ciudadanos españoles y a poderes constitucionales del Estado".

Los Couso, que no atribuyen delitos concretos a nadie en particular, quieren que la fiscalía investigue unos hechos en los que aparece implicado el propio fiscal general del Estado junto a ex altos cargos del Gobierno como Juan Fernando López Aguilar, Miguel Ángel Moratinos o María Teresa Fernández de la Vega. Cándido Conde-Pumpido aparece en los telegramas como uno de los interlocutores habituales de la embajada, donde habría asegurado, según la versión de la embajada, que hacía "lo posible para que el caso [Couso] se archivara".

Citation :: La famille de José Couso a dit dans la plainte déposée hier avec le procureur de Madrid, que les faits et les histoires qui apparaissent dans les télégrammes envoyés au Département d'État de l'ambassade de Madrid et de fuite par Wikileaks pourrait être le signe de l'existence de une «association de malfaiteurs ou de concert" entre les procureurs et le gouvernement espagnol et les responsables américains pour bloquer la procédure pénale ouverte à la Haute Cour après la mort de la chambre de Tele 5 tué à Bagdad le 8 avril 2003 par le coup de feu tiré à partir d'un char américain. "Les officiers espagnols et des fonctionnaires," le texte, pourrait avoir agi en conformité avec les «instructions» des diplomates de l'ambassade à Madrid ", causant un préjudice à des citoyens espagnols et des pouvoirs constitutionnels de l'Etat."

Le Couso, n'ont pas attribué à quelqu'un des crimes spécifiques, en particulier, les procureurs veulent enquêter sur des faits qui apparaissent impliquant le procureur général d'Etat lui-même avec d'anciens hauts fonctionnaires comme Juan Fernando Lopez Aguilar, Miguel Angel Moratinos et María Teresa Fernandez de la Vega. Candido Conde-Pumpido apparaît dans le télégramme comme l'un des partenaires habituels de l'ambassade, où il a obtenu, selon la version de l'ambassade, qui a été "possible pour le cas [Couso] être déposée."

http://www.elpais.com/articulo/espana/familia/Couso/presenta/denuncia/fiscales/altos/cargos/elpepunac/20101214elpepinac_6/Tes

merci Leo pour les cables d´alger,c´est grave ce qu´ils disent la cyclops

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 A10-na10

Invité

Citation :: Kadhafi roule au Botox

Le colonel Mouammar Kadhafi a toujours alimenté les phantasmes des journalistes et des observateurs. Ses lubies sans fin et ses frasques ont souvent défrayé la chronique.
D’après un des câbles confidentiels révélés par WikiLeaks, le guide de la révolution libyenne ferait très attention à son apparence. Ainsi, il se soumettrait très souvent à des traitements au Botox afin de paraitre plus jeune et sans rides. Ces traitements dont il raffole à l’excès lui occasionneraient de temps à autres des dysfonctionnements au niveau des muscles faciaux. Les diagnostics qui disaient que le colonel Kadhafi pourrait souffrir de troubles cérébraux ne sont pas corrects. D’un autre côté, le même câble mentionne que le chef d’Etat libyen ne souffrirait pas d’un cancer, mais plutôt d’hypertension et serait également diabétique. D’après les diplomates américains, Mouammar Kadhafi est un hypodermique. Il a peur de toutes les maladies visibles sur le corps et, à chaque fois qu’il subit des examens médicaux, il insiste pour que ceux-ci soient filmés dans leur globalité.

Source : Magreb-Intelligence

Bon, au moins quelque chose de marrant Very Happy

Yakuza a écrit:: merci Leo pour les cables d´alger,c´est grave ce qu´ils disent la

Connaissant "El Pais" je suis sure qu'il y a pire. Il doit y avoir des conversations entre eux et "Le Monde" pour le meilleur timing. N'oublit pas que Tauquoi et Cembrero sont en charge des cables maghrebins.C'est la raison pour la quelle je suis soupicious de Assange, il parle de transparence mas a la meme fois il donne le monopole des cables a une certaine presse qui font un usage des memes selon leurs lignes editrices et le monde et el pais ne portent pas le maroc dans leurs coeurs.

Wait and see.

Citation :: Wikileaks : La corruption touche jusqu’aux frères de Bouteflika et menace l'économie algérienne

Vendredi, 17 Décembre 2010, 13:33 | Samy Ousy-Ali

Après les Américains, les Français. Dans un câble diplomatique américain classé confidentiel obtenu par Wikileaks et publié par le quotidien espagnol El Pais, l’ex-ambassadeur de France en Algérie, Bernard Bajolet, dresse un tableau noir sur l’Etat de l’Algérie au début de l’année 2008. Ancien ambassadeur à Amman, Sarajevo, Bagdad, Bajolet a servi en Algérie entre août 2006 et juillet 2008 avant d’être nommé coordinateur des services de renseignements à l’Elysée. Nous publions intégralement le câble dans lequel il s’exprime sur l’Algérie au cours d’une rencontre avec l'ambassadeur US à Alger.

Appétit vorace du président Bouteflika pour un troisième mandat, corruption qui a atteint de nouveaux sommets touchant jusqu’aux frères du chef de l’Etat, incapacité du gouvernement à prendre en charge les problèmes des Algériens, partis politiques privés d’espace, menaces terroristes qui planent autant sur les Algériens que sur les étrangers, le diagnostic que l’ambassadeur français a livré à son homologue américaine met en évidence une Algérie instable, des dirigeants qui manquent de vision et une population privée d’assistance.
Ce constat rejoint à peu de choses prés celui que l’ambassadeur américain Robert Ford a fait à la même année, au même mois (janvier 2008), constat dans lequel il note que « l’Algérie est un pays à la dérive, que le peuple algérien est malheureux et que le DRS est méfiant et paranoïaque ». Que dit Bernard Bajolet au cours de cette rencontre qui s’est déroulée le 23 janvier 2008 à l’ambassade US à Alger ?
La France redoute que l’Algérie s’installe progressivement dans l’instabilité. Les Français sont convaincus que le président Bouteflika, 73 ans, révisera la constitution de 1996 pour s’octroyer un troisième mandat. Chose faite en novembre 2008 et Bouteflika a été réélu avec un score digne des années de glaciation soviétique. Que l’armée a donné son accord pour l’amendement de la loi fondamentale mais que cet accord est sous-tendu par l’idée que Bouteflika ne finirait pas son troisième mandat pour des raisons de santé.
Or, les Français sont persuadés que Bouteflika, qui a été opéré en France en décembre 2005 d’un ulcère hémorragique, « jouit d’une bonne santé et qu'il pourrait vivre encore plusieurs années ». Pour autant, l’absence d’une personnalité capable d’assurer la succession du chef de l’Etat constitue une source d’instabilité. Ni Mouloud Hamrouche, ni Ahmed Ouyahi qualifié d’ « apparatchik peu populaire » ne sont en mesure de former une véritable relève, incontestable.
La corruption a atteint de nouveaux sommets, touche jusqu’aux frères de Bouteflika ( Said et Abdelghani) et menace le développement économique du pays. Quant au climat d’affaires, il est tout simplement morose Mais les autorités algériennes, notamment l’ex-ministre de l’Intérieur, Yazid Zerhouni, s’angoissent à l’idée que l’on puisse critiquer publiquement cette morosité. Bref, un pays est frappé d’immobilisme.
Il est tout de même dramatique de voir comment deux ambassades, américaine et française, deux des plus importants partenaires de l’Algérie, dressent deux portraits peu élogieux de l’Algérie, de ses dirigeants, neuf ans après l’arrivée au pouvoir d’Abdelaziz Bouteflika. Alors que ce dernier avait toutes les cartes en main (adhésion d’une large partie de la population, appui de l’armée, stabilité politique, décrue du terrorisme, soutien de la communauté internationale et surtout une santé financière insolente) pour assurer le progrès, la richesse et le bonheur de son peuple, ces deux mandats sont perçus par ses partenaires étrangers comme de vértibles gâchis. Lisons le mémo.

Le câble classé confidentiel émis le 25 janvier 2008

L'ambassadeur français Bajolet a déclaré à l'ambassadeur le 23 janvier que lui et le gouvernement français redoutent que L'Algérie se dirige progressivement vers plus d'instabilité, mais ils ne voient pas d’autre alternative qu’un troisième mandat pour Bouteflika en 2009. Bajolet, qui a été diplomate à Alger dans les années 1980, a déclaré que l’intérêt stratégique de la France en Algérie est avant tout sa stabilité et son développement économique. Le flux migratoire des Algériens qui fuient leur pays vers la France pèse lourdement sur les sensibilités politiques françaises et, ultimement, sur les liens sociaux entre les deux pays. Le gouvernement français, dit-il, constate qu’aujourd’hui il a peu de progrès positifs en Algérie :
Les municipalités, qui sont plus proches de la population, n’ont ni le pouvoir ni les ressources pour répondre aux besoins locaux;
- Le gouvernement est incapable de prendre et d’assumer les décisions difficiles ; Bajolet a qualifié cela de sorte d'immobilisme;
- Les partis politiques bénéficient de peu d'espace et semblent plutôt disposés à faire des coups à court terme et manquent d’une vision politique à long terme;
- L'intérêt que porte le public au système politique a fortement décliné, comme on le voit dans les deux élections de 2007;
- Le climat des affaires est difficile et ne s'améliore pas; l'investissement et la création d'emplois font défaut (Bajolet a noté qu'une association d'affaires française avait préparé un livre blanc qui détaille les problèmes auxquels se heurtent les entreprises françaises en Algérie et la manière avec laquelle on peut y apporter des solutions. Bajolet a fait observer que le ministre de l’Intérieur Yazid Zerhouni et le gouvernement algérien étaient inquiets à l’idée qu’il soit rendu public.) ;
- La corruption, qui remonte jusqu'aux les frères de Bouteflika, a atteint un nouveau sommet et interfère dans le développement économique.
Bouteflika et ses ambitions pour un troisième mandat
Bajolet a dit qu'il a compris que l’armée a donné son accord la révision de la constitution pour permettre à Bouteflika de se présenter à nouveau aux élections de 2009. Bajolet a déclaré que Bouteflika jouit d’une bonne santé et qu'il pourrait vivre encore plusieurs années. Il a supposé que l’amélioration de l’état de sa santé et son activisme lui ont conféré davantage d'influence sur l'armée. Cela dit, Bajolet était aussi d'avis que le consensus au sein de l’armée pour soutenir un troisième mandat pour Bouteflika découle en partie d’une opinion largement répandue que Bouteflika ne terminera pas son troisième mandat en raison de ses problèmes de santé.
La relation entre l’armée et Bouteflika reste encore difficile. Par exemple, les Français ont conclu que les services de renseignement ont encouragé le ministre des Anciens combattants, Cherif Abbas, à critiquer Sarkozy à la veille de sa visite en Algérie pour provoquer l’annulation du voyage et mettre ainsi Bouteflika dans l’embarras.
Bajolet dit que les Français sont extrêmement prudents sur ce qu'ils disent aux Algériens à propos de la révision de la constitution qui permettrait à Bouteflika de se présenter à un troisième mandat, élection dont tout le monde comprend qu'il sortira gagnant. Bajolet a senti que les Algériens ont clairement lancé l'idée publiquement à nouveau juste avant la visite de Sarkozy en décembre pour vérifier si le président français allait déconseiller Bouteflika de modifier la constitution. Sarkozy s’est intentionnellement abstenu de le faire.
Bajolet a fait observer que les Français n’ont pas une idée sur le successeur éventuel de Bouteflika. Il a noté que l’ancien Premier ministre, Hamrouche, parle de réformes, mais les Français ne savent pas s’il est effectivement en mesure d’aller vers un programme de réformes. Les Français croient que l’ancien Premier ministre, Ouyahia, est encore un autre apparatchik et jouit de peu de popularité dans le pays. Bajolet a conclu que l’absence d’un successeur évident, qui pourrait contrecarrer Bouteflika, est source d'instabilité. Par contre, les Français ont décidé que pour eux le meilleur message à livrer est d’être neutres sur la question du troisième mandat de Bouteflika, mais que le gouvernement doit commencer à s’occuper des graves problèmes économiques et politiques de l’Algérie. (Bajolet est particulièrement intéressé par la question de la décentralisation, par exemple.)
Sécurit
Bajolet a exprimé sa vive préoccupation sur la situation sécuritaire et posé de nombreuses questions à propos de notre dernier message d’alerte. Nos recommandations pour les Américains d'éviter les écoles étrangères l'avaient mis dans une situation difficile, a-t-il noté, car il ya deux écoles de langue française officielle à Alger.
Bajolet a affirmé qu’Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) semble cibler principalement le gouvernement algérien ainsi que les objectifs étrangers pour mettre les autorités algériennes dans l’embarras. L’Ambassadeur a exprimé son désaccord, faisant valoir que de son point de vue AQMI cible les deux à la fois, mais avec des objectifs différents. Il cible le gouvernement algérien pour le placer dans une situation difficile mais aussi pour se venger des pertes subies par AQMI. Il s’attaque aux étrangers pour les chasser d’Algérie (Et, finalement déstabiliser le gouvernement algérien).
Bajolet a noté que les cibles françaises sont nombreuses, y compris les centres culturels français et les résidences diplomatiques en Algérie. Toutefois, jusqu’à présent, les services de sécurité ont géré effacement les menaces qui pèsent sur les Français et ont, selon lui, tenu les autorités françaises au courant de ces menaces
Commentaire
Bajolet a estimé que les autorités algériennes n’apprécieraient pas qu’on fasse pression de l’extérieur pour obliger le président Bouteflika à renoncer à l’idée de briguer un troisième mandat. Ce faisant, pensait-il, une pression ne ferait que compliquer le travail avec les Algériens et les Français estiment qu’aujourd’hui ils doivent coopérer avec Alger aussi bien sur le volet sécuritaire qu’économique. Il a admis volontiers qu’en Algérie les perspectives à moyen et à long terme ne sont pas bonnes à moins que les autorités commencent vraiment à stabiliser le système économique et politique. Il n’est pas confiant que cela se fasse, mais il n’a pas une idée précise de ce qu’il faudrait entreprendre pour y remédier.

dna-algerie

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Star3

Le Prophéte (saw) a dit: Les Hommes Les meilleurs sont ceux qui sont les plus utiles aux autres Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Star3

Marocains et Algériens se font concurrence en tout, même en matière de corruption. C'est à qui sera le plus corrompu Rolling Eyes

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Signat10

merci de m 'avoir deridé Samy j 'en avais bien besoin Laughing

Invité

Meme avant, j'avais un gros doute sur wiileaks :

Citation :: Et si wikileaks n’était qu’un prétexte à la troisième guerre mondiale …

Wiki : site web modifiable par ses visiteurs
Leaks : fuites

Wikileaks, c’est quoi, c’est qui ?

Depuis sa création, le site wikileaks publie des documents sensibles, voire classés « secret défense ».
Si l’identité des contributeurs et leur rémunération éventuelle restent un secret, l’équipe dirigeante n’hésite pas à s’afficher et à donner des conférences. A l’origine du projet, on trouve The Sunshine Press, un organisme à but non lucratif financé exclusivement par les dons «de défenseurs des droits de l'homme, de journalistes d'investigation, de technophiles et du grand public ». Porte-parole du site, Julian Assange, un Australien qui se présente comme un hacker militant, rêve de faire d’internet un moyen pour les citoyens d’apprendre ce que leurs dirigeants leur cachent. Ce personnage énigmatique assure ne pas gagner d’argent avec ce site et affirme travailler avec une centaine de personnes environ.

Les premières fuites

Début avril 2010, wikileaks diffuse la vidéo d’une bavure de l’armée américaine en Irak. On y voit les soldats tuer douze civils dont deux journalistes de Reuters. Suite à ce buzz, pour la première fois de l’histoire, le pentagone déclare un site « menace pour l’armée américaine ».
D’autres diffusions dénonçant la censure en Australie, l’extrème droite britannique, ou les agissements douteux d’une importante banque Islandaise, dérangent les dirigeants un peu partout dans le monde … capitaliste.
Les grandes nations de la planète tremblent.

La tentative de déstabilisation

En août, Julian Assange est accusé de viol et agression sur deux femmes en Suède. Le fondateurn de wikileaks annoncera que le pentagone pourrait être derrière ces accusations visant, selon lui, à « détruire » le site internet qui embarasse l’armée américaine.
« Je ne sais pas ce qui se cache derrière (ces accusations), mais on nous avait averti que , par exemple, le pentagone, nous jouerait de vilains tours pour nous détruire » affirmait Julian Assange dans un entretien publié par le tabloïd suédois Aftonbladet. « En plus, on m’avait mis en garde contre des pièges sexuels », ajoutait-il.
Quelques semaines plus tard, les chefs d’inculpation s’avèreront non fondés.

Le largage massif

Fin novembre, wikileaks publie plus de 250000 documents émanant du département d’état américain. Cinq grands journeaux de la presse internationale ont accés en exclusivité à ces télégrammes diplomatiques échangés entre le département d’état américain et ses ambassades. Ces cinq journeaux sont : Le Monde (Paris) , The New York Times (The New York) , The Guardian (Londres) , Der Spiegel (Hambourg) et El Pais (Madrid).
… premiers doutes du Chienchien … Pourquoi donner la primeur à des journeaux occidentaux ? …

Première utilisation des fuites : les écrans de fumée

Outre les « journeaux de guerre » relatant les comportements de l’armée US en Irak et en Afghanistan, l’essentiel de cette deuxième salve de scoops se résume à des rumeurs entre gens hauts placés. Ainsi, on apprendra très vite que selon Jean-David Lévitte, conseiller diplomatique de Nicolas Sarkozy, Hugo Chavez est « fou » et il est en train de transformer son pays en un « autre Zimbabwé ». On découvrira également, de source ambassade des états unis à Rome, que Silvio Berlusconi est « incapable » et « vaniteux » , « inefficace » et « physiquement fragile ».
Et une dernière pour la route : selon le prince Andrew, représentant spécial du Royaume-Uni pour le commerce extérieur, « les français sont corrompus, les journalistes bruyants, et les enquêteurs de l’état idiots ».
Voilà donc les fameuses et fumeuses révélations de wikileaks ? Oui ! Enfin, celles que l’on met en avant, qu’on affiche, qu’on divulgue et diffuse. Mais en grattant un peu, on peut aussi lire bien plus interessant ….

Deuxième utilisation des fuites : l’amorce du détonateur

Source : Al-Quds Al-Arabi (quotidien panarabe de Londres)

Dans les premières révélations, on peut lire que le roi d’Arabie Saoudite a demandé aux Etats Unis de « bombarder l’Iran » …

« Tous les rapports sur le nucléaire iranien ont établi que l’Iran, à ce jour, ne produisait que de l’uranium faiblement enrichi. Alors pourquoi un état arabe comme l’Arabie Saoudite, qui jouit dans le monde musulman d’une position éminente, s’est-il empêtré dans une telle démarche ? » s’étonne Al-Quds Al-Arabi à propos des révélations de wikileaks faisant état d’une demande officielle par le roi Abdallah d’Arabie Saoudite aux Etats-Unis d’attaquer militairement les sites nucléaires iraniens. « A supposer que le nucléaire iranien représente réellement une menace, pourquoi ne pas y répondre avec un projet nucléaire similaire ? Le roi saoudien n’a-t-il pas pensé aux conséquences dramatiques d’une frappe militaire ? Ces révélations ne plairont certainement pas à l’Iran. Reste à savoir quelle sera la réaction de Téhéran . Une forte tension est à prévoir dans les relations entre l’Iran et ses voisins, l’Arabie Saoudite au premier chef.

Source : Yediot Aharonot (quotidien Tel Aviv – 400000 exemplaires)

Si WikiLeaks n’existait pas, Israël devrait l’inventer. Une vérité qui ne laisse place à aucune ambiguïté a éclaté au grand jour. Le monde entier, et pas seulement Israël, est terrifié par la menace nucléaire iranienne. La nucléarisation de l’Iran ne relève pas de la paranoïa israélienne, comme certains le prétendent. De Riyad à Moscou, les dirigeants du monde en perdent le sommeil. La question iranienne est le fil conducteur des centaines de milliers de documents rendus publics par WikiLeaks. Il en ressort que le monde attend d’Israël et des Etats-Unis, dans cet ordre, qu’ils fassent quelque chose pour barrer la route au “Hitler de Téhéran”.

Les fuites ne portent pas atteinte à la politique étrangère de Washington ; elles viennent étayer la principale thèse avancée par deux gouvernements américains, qui s’avère incroyablement similaire au message central du discours officiel israélien : l’Iran représente la plus grande menace, claire et immédiate, pour la stabilité du monde, lequel doit agir pour supprimer cette tumeur maligne. Tout le reste est secondaire.

Certains médias ont tenté d’exagérer l’importance d’un ordre qu’aurait donné la secrétaire d’Etat Hillary Clinton au personnel diplomatique américain, consistant à espionner des hauts fonctionnaires des Nations unies. Mais, si l’on étudie d’un peu plus près les documents, on s’apercevra que l’étroite coopération entre certains fonctionnaires de l’ONU et le Hamas ou le Hezbollah, était effectivement une source de préoccupation. Là encore, c’est une question qu’Israël avait fréquemment soulevée.

Le fait est que, jusqu’ici, rien dans la masse des révélations n’a jeté une lumière défavorable sur Israël. Le Premier ministre Benyamin Nétanyahou s’en sort (relativement) indemne, tout comme son prédécesseur Ehoud Olmert. Même la déclaration du chef sortant du Mossad, Meir Dagan [Tamir Pardo lui succédera au 1er janvier 2011], sur la nécessité pour les Etats-Unis d’encourager la révolte des intellectuels et des étudiants en Iran s’inscrit dans une vision du monde démocratique – et dans une longue expérience en matière de renversement des dictatures. Les politiques étrangère et de défense d’Israël n’ont sans doute jamais été autant confortées ces dernières années que le dimanche 28 novembre dernier. Au moins sur le front iranien, et apparemment pour bien d’autres questions également, les dirigeants du monde, y compris du monde arabe, pensent comme nous, même s’ils ont honte de le reconnaître. Une honte que WikiLeaks a montrée au grand jour.

Source : Kayhan (Téhéran)

Les documents diffusés par WikiLeaks n’ont rien d’exceptionnel. Il ne faut surtout pas croire que ce sont des “révélations” qui ont été faites contre le bon vouloir de Washington. Il est évident que les dirigeants de Washington et de la CIA ont programmé cette diffusion. Ce que l’on nous présente comme des “documents” n’est qu’une nouvelle manière de proférer des accusations infondées contre les opposants à la politique de Washington, comme Téhéran. Le but est de présenter l’Iran comme une menace aux yeux des opinions publiques occidentales. Franchement, si les Etats-Unis avaient une preuve quelconque que l’Iran ait acheté des missiles à la Corée du Nord, ils auraient communiqué ces informations au Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU pour convaincre les quinze pays de voter unanimement les sanctions contre le programme nucléaire iranien. Mais ils n’avaient pas de preuves et ils ont mis plusieurs mois pour réunir une majorité [le 9 juin 2010], et ce avec beaucoup de difficultés. Les manœuvres du site WikiLeaks peuvent être considérées comme de la “propagande douce”. Ce site a commencé en envoyant une petite flèche dans le dos de Washington afin de s’attirer la sympathie mondiale, puis s’est attaqué avec l’artillerie lourde aux opposants des Etats-Unis. Il est important de noter que, sans la complicité des médias occidentaux, jamais WikiLeaks n’aurait pu attirer l’attention des opinions publiques du monde entier et encore moins être pris au sérieux. Pourquoi ces informations ont-elles aussi été imprimées dans The New York Times, Le Monde, The Guardian, El País et Der Spiegel si le but n’était pas de convaincre les opinions publiques du “danger” iranien ?

La manipulation de l’opinion planétaire a t-elle bien fonctionnée ?

Alors, on commence par « lacher » des fuites de la CIA . et bing, l’impérialisme américain semble attaqué…
Bien sur, Washington se rebelle : alors, tentative de déstabilisation envers Julian Assange, en vue de le décrédibiliser…
Echec du pentagone : les affaires de viol et violence n’étaient en fait qu’une histoire de préservatif troué envers des consententes … (je ne sais pas vous, mais perso, ça sent déjà le ridicule…)
On continue ; plus de 250000 scoops largués massivement en pature à la presse internationale ; bravo wikileaks …
Récupération médiatique des médias occidentaux dominants (et pour cause, ils avaient la primeur !) : des rumeurs, des cancans, des ragots, des querelles de clochers entre dirigeants médisants. La montagne aurait accouché d’une souris ? …
Et bien, les USA semblent bien vouloir que non : on continue à harceler Assange et wikileaks, sans toutefois (et c’est là que mes doutes se confirment) pouvoir l’empêcher de diffuser, d’agir, sans pouvoir « flinguer » son site … la CIA serait-elle si nulle que ça ? Même pas les capacités du hacker moyen ? …

En fait, c’est ma conclusion, mais je pense que vous serez nombreux à la cautionner : le paragraphe précédent « l’amorce du détonateur », qui ne sera jamais médiatisé au grand public, est assez révélateur : les fuites de wikileaks diabolisent l’Iran, annoncent ouvertement que l’Arabie Saoudite veut détruire ce pays (ha bon ? et pourquoi ?) ; étrangement, il n’y a aucune « fuite » sur l’état d’Israël (rien de rien, pas l’ombre d’une rumeur …nation irréprochable ? ou … ?)
« L’Iran a l’arme nucléaire, l’Iran est l’ennemi public numéro un de la planète, son voisin saoudien veut sa peau, l’état d’Israël est irréprochable,… » Et toutes ces révélations qui vont foutre un bordel planétaire monstre ne sont pas la cause des USA, vu qu’ils ont été eux-mêmes les premiers attaqués ! C’est wikileaks qui est responsable !

Je finirais cet article en confirmant ceci : bien sur que c’est wikileaks qui est et sera responsable de la future destruction de la planète ; mais wikileaks n’est pas le canard enchainé ou le médiapart de la mondialisation, ce n’est qu’une création de la CIA !

http://forget.e-monsite.com/rubrique,et-si-wikileaks-n-etait-qu-un-pretexte-a-la-troisieme-guerre-mondiale,1131422.html

Snack, s'il est possible pour toi de poser une question à un agent d'un service de renseignement, quel qu'il soit, demande lui si une fuite d'une telle importance est possible. Si cette fuite de documents publiés par Wikileaks n'était pas voulu et organisée, il y a longtemps que le sieur Julian Assange serait mort d'une crise cardiaque ou, au minimum changé de profession, de crainte de voir ses proches perdre leurs jobs et sa propre vie transformée en enfer Twisted Evil

_________________
Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 Signat10

La question est de savoir par qui dans les services de renseignement, quel clan, pourquoi, au service de quel objectifs, ces fuites ont pu être organisées? Rien de tel que de livrer de vrais infos pour en faire passer de fausses, le problème étant de reconnaître les unes des autres...

Invité

Samyadams a écrit:: Snack, s'il est possible pour toi de poser une question à un agent d'un service de renseignement, quel qu'il soit, demande lui si une fuite d'une telle importance est possible. Si cette fuite de documents publiés par Wikileaks n'était pas voulu et organisée, il y a longtemps que le sieur Julian Assange serait mort d'une crise cardiaque ou, au minimum changé de profession, de crainte de voir ses proches perdre leurs jobs et sa propre vie transformée en enfer

Exactement! D'autant plus que vu les connaissances des services américains, si ces ''fuites'' étaient vraiment déstabilisante, je pense que le site, le serveur, les ordinateurs utilisés par Wikileaks auraient explosés!

La justice au Maroc 1.

Citation :: ID: 222045
Date: 2009-08-24 18:11:00
Origin: 09RABAT719
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 09RABAT443 09RABAT607
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0007
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0719/01 2361811
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241811Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0593
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000719

SIPDIS

STATE FOR L/LEI, DRL/NESCA, NEA/PI AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/24/2019
TAGS: PHUM, CJAN, EAID, PGOV, KJUS, KCRM, MO
SUBJECT: PHONE CALL JUSTICE: MEDDLING IN MOROCCO'S JUDICIARY

REF: A. RABAT 0607
B. RABAT 0443

Classified By: CDA Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: The Moroccan judicial system suffers from
both a lack of independence and a lack of public confidence,
and it remains an impediment to the country's development and
reform efforts. Recognizing these problems, King Mohammed VI
has called for a comprehensive reform of the judicial system
to include greater independence and efficiency, but it is as
yet unclear how committed the Government is to making
meaningful reforms. Judges are not even minimally
independent of the Ministry of Justice, and officials use
direct intervention, career consequences, and political
pressure to influence outcomes. This is further exacerbated
by many judges' inability to apply the law correctly, even
without outside meddling. Judicial incompetence and lack of
independence are stumbling blocks that the GOM and the King
must overcome to achieve their stated social and political
reform goals. The Mission will continue to assist as the
Government demonstrates its willingness to act. End Summary.

-------------------------
The King Announces a Plan
-------------------------

2. (SBU) On August 21, the King, looking healthier and
thinner than he has in years, unveiled the framework of his
much-anticipated judicial reform plan, which focused on six
priorities:

-- a more independent judiciary;
-- modernizing the legal system to include a new penal
policy, the establishment of a national crime observatory,
and the promotion of alternative sentencing mechanisms;
-- upgrading administrative mechanisms in the court system
and delegating authority to judicial officers;
-- upgrading training and performance of judges and judicial
staff;
-- increasing efficiency, and
-- preventing corruption.

He appointed the Ministry of Justice to develop and implement
these priorities, explaining that judicial reform would
support the other major modernization and development
projects initiated by the Palace. The plan comes at a time
of general public disaffection with the judiciary and amid
calls for greater judicial independence from Moroccan
non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

-----------------------------------------
Phone Call Justice and Political Meddling
-----------------------------------------

3. (C) When PolOff asked prominent judicial reform activist
Abdelaziz Nouyidi to comment on the degree of judicial
independence in Morocco, he laughed. "When it deals with
anything political, there is zero independence. When it has
to do with the press, there is zero independence. With all
other cases, there is more room for independence, but not
very much," he told PolOff. Nouyidi described an encounter
with a judge who received a phone call from the Ministry of
the Interior during their conversation. The judge,
responding to the caller's questions, stated, "The verdict
was what you wanted." Nouyidi said the judge immediately
became embarrassed by having this conversation in front of an
activist for judicial reform, but had been so accustomed to
reporting on his cases to ministry officials that he had
forgotten to be discreet.

4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX said
the lack of independence allows the court system to be
manipulated into an instrument of political repression.
"Other countries use the army or the police to control
politics," he mused, "but in Morocco, we use the justice
system."

5. (C) In one recent case, Said Yabou, an attorney and
member of the Istiqlal Party (PI), was elected Council
President of Youssoufia (a township outside of Rabat), in an
alliance with the Islamist-inspired Party of Justice and
Development (PJD). The hotly contested council election
required the intervention of security forces to prevent
serious clashes between the PI-PJD coalition and the rival
coalition made up of the Popular Movement Party (MP) and the
Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM). Immediately after
winning the council presidency, and in violation of the code
for lawyers and proper procedure, Yabou was arrested on
charges of fraud. He was speedily convicted, sentenced to
two years in prison and lost his council seat. Several
contacts speculated that this was an entirely political move,
and illustrated the way in which the judiciary may be used to
achieve political ends.

---------------------
No Legal Independence
---------------------

6. (C) Despite language in the Moroccan constitution
asserting the judiciary's independence from the legislative
and executive branches, this is not implemented. According
to Francois Ramsey, the Director of the American Bar
Association (ABA) in Morocco, there is no judicial
independence. The Ministry of Justice (MOJ) is one of five
Ministries under the direct control of the King, and it hires
and fires judges, controls promotions, and decides who can be
appointed, and where. Judges can become civil servants in
the MOJ, and can also serve concurrently as prosecutors. It
is not unusual for a judge to serve in his capacity as a
magistrate one day, and the next day to serve as a lawyer and
defend the interests of the state. Legal reform advocates
argue that this situation creates conflicts of interest and
limits the degree to which judges can make impartial and
independent decisions.

7. (C) The High Judiciary Council, which is headed by the
King, oversees the disciplining of judges. The Minister of
Justice also serves as a full-time member of the Council.
Asked whether any judges had been prosecuted for corruption
or other offenses, Rachid Filali Meknassi, Director of
Transparency Maroc, noted that the High Judiciary Council had
sanctioned 70 judges at its last meeting. However, he added
that "because of the lack of independence, we can't tell if
these 'professional faults' were for not following orders
from above, or were for actual misdeeds."

8. (C)XXXXXXXXXXXXX, described the High Judiciary Council as willing to
hold judges accountable for corruption-related offenses,
provided there is sufficient evidence. He argued, however,
that the Ministry of Justice was unlikely to use Judiciary
Council sanctions to punish judges for failing to deliver the
desired verdict. "If the Ministry wants to punish a judge
for being too independent," he explained, "they don't bother
with the Council. They just appoint him to an unwanted post
in the desert somewhere and don't let him get promoted."

---------
Influence
---------

9. (C) The MOJ's ability to promote or reassign judges makes
it difficult for justices to contradict ministry
instructions, even if the judge's independent verdict would
be in line with the law. Nouyidi, the judicial reform
activist, opined, "When judges have not received explicit
instructions on a case, they usually act in line with their
expectation of ministry preferences," because of their
interest in avoiding the disfavor of ministry authorities,
which would risk damaging their careers. According to
Nouyidi, instructions to judges can come from both inside and
outside the Ministry of Justice. Power to influence judicial
decisions also resides in the hands of Palace insiders or
friends, including the Head of the Supreme Court.

10. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX. Ironically, he declined to provide the
names of any independent judges, noting that is the duty of
the MOJ. "Any meeting would have to be set through them," he
explained, "they control who can talk." He also added that
any judge would "be afraid" to take action without first
consulting the Ministry.

11. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXXX blamed the political system, rather than
the individual judges, for the lack of principled decisions
by magistrates. There are plenty of brave judges who are
constrained by politics, he asserted, observing, "When it
comes to politics, there is very little room for
independence." Citing the irregularities that took place in
the June communal elections, including the use of
extra-political pressure tactics to influence mayoral
elections, XXXXXXXXXXXXX wondered how 3,000 judges could change
the system when even independent political parties succumb to
pressure from the State (Ref A).

---------------------------
Corruption and Incompetence
---------------------------

12. (C) Filali Meknassi of Transparency Maroc underlined a
growing culture of corruption that has made judges amenable
to receiving directions from above without complaint. Top
level judges can earn as much as USD 4000/month, but even the
highest salary is not commensurate with the lavish lifestyle
enjoyed by many magistrates, he said.

13. (C) Particularly in cases that could have important
implications, judges are so accustomed to receiving
directions on how to rule that they find it difficult to
assert their independence, Filali Menknassi explained. In
addition, the lack of transparency in judicial decisions
makes it impossible to determine how many decisions are made
under direct government influence. A middleman with an
agenda could sway judges' decisions by claiming to represent
officials in the Ministry, he observed, and even without
specific instructions, the judges may act on their own
personal biases rather than the law.

14. (C) According to XXXXXXXXXXXXX, the incompetence of judges
serves as another major hindrance to independence. "A
surprising number of judges do not know the law well enough
to apply it correctly and therefore have no idea how to make
an appropriate decision," he said. Judges therefore often
rely on guidance or instructions from the Ministry as a
crutch to compensate for their inability to apply the
relevant legal principles. In addition to a lack of
knowledge about the law, judges receive very little ethics
training, compounding the problem, XXXXXXXXXXXXX added.

------------------------------------
Everyone Agrees It's Time for Reform
------------------------------------

15. (SBU) The lack of independence, efficiency, and
impartiality in the judiciary remain areas of concern for the
Moroccan public, according to a series of focus group
discussions on the judicial system conducted by the People's
Mirror, the first public opinion research center in the Arab
World. Focus group participants expressed their belief that
case outcomes "have been decided by the Minister of Justice
in consultation with other actors in the government -- not by
the judges," a sentiment echoed by many embassy contacts.
Participants emphasized that strengthening and improving the
role of the judiciary, particularly judicial independence,
are necessary but as yet missing steps in Morocco's overall
development.

16. (SBU) In April, a group of Moroccan NGOs submitted
recommendations on justice sector reform to the Ministry of
Justice. Without an independent judiciary, they argued, the
success of other reforms, including the advancement of
women's rights and implementation of the new family code,
will be limited. They called for constitutional and
legislative reform to remove the judiciary from executive
control, and for greater transparency in legal decisions. It
is too soon to determine whether and how these
recommendations will be incorporated into the new legal
reform plan.

-------
Comment
-------

17. (C) The judicial system's lack of independence and the
corresponding lack of public confidence are impediments to
the country's development and reform efforts. Fortunately,
the highest levels of the GOM appear to be aware of the need
for reform and have shared some of the major principles of
their reform plan (Ref B). The King first described his
judicial reform plans on July 30, 2008; after more than a
year, details have emerged. The GOM has also expressed a
desire for U.S. support in strengthening judicial competence
and independence. The Mission will continue to work with the
Ministry of Justice as it defines its plans, in order to find
areas of possible cooperation. Professional training of
judges in both law and ethics would be one potential area for
assistance. However, assistance will only be "window
dressing" without meaningful steps by the GOM to eliminate
the opportunity for meddling by government officials. The
continued use of the judiciary for political purposes
undermines the GOM's otherwise laudable efforts to promote
judicial reform and transparency. Ultimately, to reach the
societal and political results that the King and GOM leaders
have identified as goals, they will have to give up this
retrograde lever for political control. In meeting with the
Moroccan authorities, the Mission will continue to press for
greater judicial independence. End Comment.

*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

La justice, les prisons et les detens salafistes au Maroc et 2.

Citation :: ID: 207250
Date: 2009-05-15 12:35:00
Origin: 09RABAT408
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Dunno: 08RABAT569 09STATE6210
Destination: VZCZCXRO5443
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #0408/01 1351235
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151235Z MAY 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0113
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHBS/AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS PRIORITY 3198
RUEHCP/AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN PRIORITY 0316
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR PRIORITY 0494
RUEHPG/AMEMBASSY PRAGUE PRIORITY 0246
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1634
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0902
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 4595

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RABAT 000408

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR INR - MCCORMACK AND INL/AAE - ALTON/STOLWORTHY
STATE ALSO FOR NEA/MAG AND CA/OCS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/15/2029
TAGS: PINR, PHUM, SOCI, EAID, SNAR, PTER, KCRM, MO
SUBJECT: OPENING UP AGAIN? MOROCCAN PRISON ADMINISTRATION
AND REFORM (C-NE9-00043)

REF: A. STATE 006210 (C-NE9-00043) (NOTAL)
B. 08 RABAT 0569 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary: This cable responds to Ref A request for
information and provides a broader general update on
Morocco's prison situation and the now year-old Prison
Administration. Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's
prisons are in a difficult, but changing situation. They
have won increasing international interest, due in part to a
large number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk of
radicalization. The Government of Morocco (GOM) reported
that among the roughly 60,000 prisoners, more than 100
inmates died in 2008, which NGOs blamed on poor conditions.
Morocco's chief warden is Prison Administration
Delegate-General Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former top cop for
the late King Hassan II. Benhachem has been in office a year
following a shakeup after a major breakout by radical
Islamist prisoners. He told us security was his first
priority and rehabilitation next. With King Mohammed VI's
support and a larger budget, Benhachem has improved security,
increased rations, and is embarking on an ambitious building
program, but problems persist. He is beginning to open to
international cooperation. The Justice Ministry is
redrafting the penal code to allow for parole and probation,
the most effective way to ease overcrowding, and has asked us
for help. The USG so far has provided only modest support to
a prison rights NGO. We have sought new funding, including
under a Defense Appropriations Act Section 1207, to aid the
Ministry of Justice, Prison Administration and organizations
involved in post-release re-entry, to reduce the risk that
former prisoners could become suicide bombers. End Summary.

----------
Background
----------

2. (C) Overcrowded and underfunded, Morocco's prisons are in
a difficult but changing situation. They have been the locus
of increasing international interest, due in part to a large
number of Islamist prisoners, and the risk that the difficult
environment could foster violent tendencies post-release.
With a population of some 60,000, estimates in early 2008
suggested that prison budgets were barely one dollar per
prisoner per day. Prisoners must receive food from family
and friends if they are to eat at a reasonable standard.
Overcrowding can be severe, as shown in some photographs of
prisoners sleeping across the floor of a large cell, packed
like sardines, a condition uncommon, but which may still
exist in some facilities.

3. (C) During the &years of lead,8 the repressive era of
Hassan II, Moroccan prisons were often forbidding places,
isolated in the desert with unspeakable conditions and abuse
common. Later in Hassan II,s reign and under King Mohammed
VI, many of these symbols of repression have been closed;
some turned in to places of remembrance but cutting prison
capacity. Despite growth in the number of prisoners in
recent years, no new prisons have been built for years,
although that is now changing. Outside interest has
increased since a young Moroccan, released on pardon after
being imprisoned for several years for alleged association
with those involved in the 2003 Casablanca bombings, blew
himself up in a Casablanca cybercafe in 2007, part of a ring
of seven such suicide bombers. In the years leading up to
2008, the Ministry of Justice (MOJ) then responsible for
prisons, instituted some human rights-linked changes funded
by outside donors, including permitting NGOs to work in the
prisons. In response to agitation by Islamist/Salafist
prisoner support groups and families, it also granted
increasing privileges to some Islamist prisoners. The death
penalty has not been carried out in about a decade, although
abolition of capital punishment will not likely soon occur.

RABAT 00000408 002 OF 007

This has contributed to growing numbers of capital prisoners.
The diminution of repression in Moroccan society has
probably also contributed to the rising number of inmates,
with severe physical abuse a lesser form of crime deterrence.
We understand that as many as half the inmate population may
be awaiting trial.

4. (C) In late April 2008, after the escape of nine
Salafists (Islamic radicals) from Kenitra prison, many
convicted of involvement in the 2003 Casablanca bombings,
King Mohammed VI moved responsibility for prison
administration from the MOJ and gave it to the newly created
Directorate under the Prime Minister's Office. The MOJ had
accommodated the growing organized presence of Salafists in
the prisons by granting increasing privileges, and there was
a sense that it had simply lost control. The escape turned
the prison situation into an embarrassment for the GOM and
the King.

------------------------------------------
Benhachem and the King: The New Old Guard
------------------------------------------

5. (C) The King named Moulay Hafid Benhachem, a former
Director General of National Security (DGSN or national
police) under Hassan II, to head the new Prison
Administration, with the quasi-ministerial-rank of Delegate
General, and reporting formally to the Prime Minister but
undoubtedly also directly to the Palace. Retired since 2003,
Benhachem had a reputation for toughness. He did not engage,
as far as we have been able to determine, in any official or
unofficial work or consulting for the GOM during his
retirement, nor did he work in the private sector. Benhachem
brought with him to the Prison Administration several
veterans of the former king's security apparatus, triggering
concerns within the diplomatic and domestic human rights
communities.

6. (C) On the day of Benhachem's appointment, King Mohammed
VI released a statement directing Benhachem and his new
Directorate to improve the reinsertion and reintegration of
former prisoners into society; guarantee security and
discipline within the prison system; ensure respect for law
within the system; bring conditions in prisons into
accordance with international norms; ensure respect for human
rights and dignity within facilities; and improve working
conditions for staff members and guards. The same statement
indicated that such improvements were crucial to combating
radical Islam. This was notable as the GOM had previously
been reluctant to publicly link militant Islam with prison
conditions. The same day, Minister of Justice Radi said that
Benhachem's appointment was part and parcel of a broader
justice sector reform process.

-------------------------
The Prison Administration
-------------------------

7. (C) The Directorate General for Prison Administration and
Reinsertion is an independent entity with its own budget and
central administrative apparatus. It absorbed all
responsibility for correctional administration from the MOJ
and is not affiliated with any other ministry or agency.
Since the removal of the Prison Administration from the
Ministry, there has been little discussion between the two
organizations except through formal channels. While the MOJ
still directs strategic penal policy, such as the possibility
of expanding alternative sentencing or judicial supervision,
it now has no input into security and daily operations of
prison facilities. Nor is there any indication of a
continuing link between Benhachem and the DGSN, or of any
influence from the DGSN/Interior Ministry (MOI). The MOI has
adamantly refused to even discuss with us prisons or related
assistance.

RABAT 00000408 003 OF 007

8. (C) Benhachem's approach to his new job seems well
thought-out and strategic. On assuming his position in April
2008, Benhachem halted discussions with foreign embassies
about cooperation programs, undertook an intensive internal
organizational audit, and formulated a plan and budget. He
fired officials he felt were incompetent or corrupt.
Benhachem proceeded to issue a series of directives ordering
prison guards to begin wearing their uniforms on duty once
again and instructing all staff to apply all rules and
regulations consistently at all facilities. He warned of
dire consequences if his instructions were not followed. He
ended the policy of appeasement of Salafist inmates, who had
gained unprecedented privileges and control under the MOJ
(Ref B). However, with palace support, he also got a larger
budget, and once he reestablished security, funds were then
appropriately next allocated for improved food. In addition,
he expedited existing construction and pushed forward plans
for additional new prisons. The recapture (or death) of all
the Salafist escapees, and others as well, allowed scope for
renewed reform and cooperation with the international
community.

--------------------------------------
Personality, Priorities and Assistance
--------------------------------------

9. (C) EmbOffs met with Benhachem on June 19, 2008 (Ref B),
and again on March 31, 2009, at the Directorate General for
Prison Administration and Reinsertion (DGAP) headquarters.
In both meetings, they found him direct, charming and
practical, but wary of USG intentions. Benhachem underscored
the ministerial status of the Prison Administration.
Benhachem told EmbOffs that he is in charge of prisoners
while incarcerated and responsible for their reintegration
into society when released, although he had earlier confirmed
that his responsibility ended at the prison gate. The DGAP's
2009 budget includes USD 128 million for general operations
and USD 86 million for capital expenses such as new
construction and renovation. Benhachem told EmbOffs that
this represented a 40 percent increase in funding. In
statements reported in the press, Benhachem said that the new
budget allowed him to increase spending per prisoner USD 50
cents to two dollars per day.

10. (C) In a separate meeting with Morocco USAID Mission
Director, he expressed a greater degree of comfort in working
with USAID than the Embassy, and recommended that all
requests for programming and cooperation with the DGAP be
sent through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) via
diplomatic note. He also floated the idea of forming an
inter-ministerial coordination group, helmed by the MFA, to
work on security sector assistance issues with the USG.
(Comment: This suggests his mandate may include increased
controls on and transparency in relations with U.S. entities.
End Comment.)

11. (C) In the March 31 meeting, Benhachem told EmbOffs that
security and rehabilitation were his twin and intertwined
priorities. However, he emphasized that he would not
sacrifice security in the name of reform, saying, "I cannot
make progress if I do not control my buildings." On the
security side, Benhachem had very specific thoughts and
highlighted renovation, new construction, and improved
technological ability to scan inmates and packages for
contraband as immediate areas of focus. He said that
establishing closed-circuit-television networks and
electronic monitoring of facilities and inmates was an
important medium-term goal that would leverage his limited
staff and financial resources to greater effect. Benhachem
also expressed a need for better equipment for his staff and
improved training.

12. (C) On the subject of rehabilitation and post-release
reintegration of inmates, Benhachem appeared open-minded but
less in command of the subject. He expressed a need for

RABAT 00000408 004 OF 007

greater life skills programming but offered no specific
ideas. He reinforced a desire for medical assistance within
prisons and encouraged EmbOffs to coordinate with Deputy
Administrator for Social and Cultural Programs Hilmi.
Benhachem also said that there needed to be greater
coordination with the private sector and local governments to
provide jobs and soft landings for released prisoners.
Benhachem maintained there was no serious overcrowding in the
women's section and was less interested in specific women's
programming. (Note: Women are a small minority of prisoners
-- perhaps only three percent. End Note.)

13. (C) Despite public statements of support from Minister
of Justice Radi, who told then-Ambassador Riley in November
2007 that he sought the creation of an independent prison
authority, relations between Justice and the DGAP remain
tense. M'Hammed Abdenabaoui, the number three at the MOJ,
still holds the pre-sentencing and post-release portfolio for
his Ministry. He told PolOff in a February meeting that the
MOJ was interested in collaborating with the USG in designing
reentry programs. Abdenabaoui said that communication with
the DGAP was still tense but improving. He thought Benhachem
seemed to have little respect for the MOJ's former prison
managers.

----------------
The Two Deputies
----------------

14. (C) Two deputies assist Benhachem. Mustapha Hilmi, a
former prosecutor who also served at the upper echelons of
the MOJ's Central Prison Authority, was given the title of
Director of Social, Cultural and Reintegration Activities.
Soufiane Ouamrou, formerly of the police (DGSN) became the
Director of Inmate and Physical Security. Hilmi is known to
EmbOffs and is respected within the legal community. He
assisted the American Bar Association in Rabat in efforts to
reform the Moroccan Bar Association. Under the MOJ, he was
known as a moderate voice on prison issues. At the March 31
meeting, Benhachem appeared to have a collaborative,
respectful and easy relationship with Hilmi, who also
attended. Benhachem appeared to trust his insights and
delegated tasks to him easily. Mission staff have not met
with Ouamrou and little is known about him.

------------------
Current Conditions
------------------

15. (C) Overcrowding remains the largest single challenge to
the Moroccan prison system. Its 59 prisons, many of which
are outdated and poorly maintained, hold 60,000 inmates, 40
percent more than they were designed to house. Almost half
of those detained are in pre-trial or preventive detention.
Since Moroccan law allows for up to a year of pre-trial
detention, and Morocco has no jails in which individuals
awaiting trial can be held separately from convicts, this
class of inmate contributes significantly to the overcrowding
problem.

16. (C) According to the Moroccan Prison Observatory (OMP),
an independent, non-profit watchdog group, inmate complaints
of abuse or substandard conditions increased by 22.48 percent
in 2008 compared to 19 percent in 2007. OMP received 520
letters from prisoners or their relatives related to
mistreatment, poor conditions, malnutrition, lack of medical
treatment, sexual assault and violence. The OMP's report
linked 18 deaths directly to substandard conditions and
inmate violence as a result of overcrowding, and reported
greater than 100 inmate deaths overall. The OMP also
strongly criticized poor working conditions for the system's
5,228 guards, most of whom only make USD 240 per month. In
press statements, Abderrahim Jamai, a member of the OMP
board, said that the organization's attempts to raise issues
of concern with Benhachem were rebuffed and their letters to

RABAT 00000408 005 OF 007

the DGAP remain unanswered.

17. (C) The DGAP's Hilmi, in a public statement, countered
that cases of violence were down 12 percent in 2008 compared
to the period between 2003 and 2007. In a separate
statement, Benhachem said that 2008's inmate mortality rate,
while high, was less than the previous year's rate of 125
deaths, and well within norms for a system of this size. He
added that 32 percent of mortality cases were due to chronic
diseases, and that 66 percent of deaths among the prisoners
were registered in hospitals. Benhachem said that there was
one suicide every two months in 2008.

----------------------------
Status of Islamist Prisoners
----------------------------

18. (C) The majority of Salafist or terror-related inmates
are held in prisons in Tetouan, Sale and Ain Sebaa outside
Casablanca. Although they no longer enjoy the broad
privileges they once did they, like most inmates in the
system, they have easy access to mobile phones and contraband
smuggled in when family members bring food. On January 29,
Embassy received a letter from Reda Ben Othman, an "Islamic
detainee at the local prison of Ain Sebaa." He alleged that
he and his fellow religious prisoners still suffer "assault
and torture" at the hands of authorities for their beliefs.
There is a formally recognized NGO, "Anassir" (victory),
which advocates for the prisoners as individuals or as a
group. In 2007, a photograph of a police officer beating the
wife of a Salafist prisoner at an Anassir demonstration was
carried by al Qaeda websites, accompanied by threats against
perfidious Moroccan authorities. Benhachem has apparently
dispersed some Salafist prisioners, but most remain
concentrated in a few higher-security prisons.

--------------
Plan of Action
--------------

19. (C) In a speech at a national workshop on implementing
the International Convention against Torture (ICAT) in
Morocco, Benhachem said that harmonizing Moroccan legislation
with the ICAT was in the interests of society and that
protection of human rights was a central aspect of his
mandate. He said that he had issued directives on respect
for rights to all staff members and would not hesitate to
punish violators. He also encouraged all security sector
staff to meet both the spirit and the letter of laws and
agreements. Since his appointment, Benhachem has suspended
or fired five prison directors and more than 20 guards and
officials for dereliction of duty or malfeasance.

20. (C) At the ICAT workshop, Benhachem said that a special
240 million dirham (USD 30 million) allocation is being used
to complete six new prisons in the first half of 2009. He
added that renovations at the "priority prisons" of Oukacha
in Casablanca and Kenitra are well underway. The end result
of this investment, he explained, would be to increase inmate
living space from the current level of 1.6 meters per person
to three meters. (Note: International norms call for nine
meters. End Note.) The new facilities will include areas
for enhanced inmate training and counseling. Benhachem
indicated that the DGAP will begin to recruit an additional
6,000 guards in 2012.

21. (C) In terms of health services, Benhachem said that the
DGAP directly employs 107 general practitioners and has a
large number of medical specialists under contract to provide
inmates with additional care as needed. According to
Benhachem, the DGAP has also increased per person medical
expenditures from less than USD .01 to USD .50 per day.

--------------------------------------------- ------
Pretrial Diversion, Parole and the Justice Ministry

RABAT 00000408 006 OF 007

--------------------------------------------- ------

22. (C) As part of a longer-term strategy to decrease
overcrowding and provide incentive-based rehabilitation
programs, the GOM with the MOJ in the lead is revising the
penal code to allow for parole and probationary release of
convicts. There is no such provision under current law; so
inmates must either serve their entire sentence or hope to
benefit from a royal pardon. Some prisoners convicted of
terrorism won early release in pardons, in some cases due to
an admittedly wide dragnet after the 2003 Casablanca
bombings. Both Benhachem and the MOJ's Abdenabaoui
separately told EmbOffs that the creation of a parole and
probation system is a crucial aspect of correctional reform
in Morocco. Abdenabaoui, who would have MOJ authority over
any conditional release structure, informally requested USG
help in setting up such a system in 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Abdelaziz Nouyaidi, President of NGO Adala (Justice), told
EmbOffs in April that the GOM had not yet invited civil
society comment on the draft penal code and was playing its
cards close to the chest.

-------------------------
Partners and Other Actors
-------------------------

23. (C) The largest actor working on rehabilitation and
correctional issues outside of the DGAP is the Mohammed VI
Foundation for Reinsertion. Founded in 2002 with strong
royal patronage, the GOM-funded private foundation aims to
lead the effort to improve vocational and educational reform
in prisons. Overseen by a board made up of human rights
activists and private sector leaders, the Foundation has laid
out a plan to provide vocational training to 26,570 inmates
(11 percent female) between 2008 and 2012. The Foundation
has established Post-Release Coaching Centers designed to
ease the transition to freedom.

24. (C) Other potential partners include:

-- The Observatory of Moroccan Prisons (mentioned earlier).
OMP was the recipient of the first USG funded prison
assistance in Morocco, initially in 2006 through a grant from
the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor for technical
assistance to this human rights civil society organization
and, in 2008 in a modest USD 80,000 grant of Counterterrorism
(S/CT) funds administered by Middle East Partnership
Initiative (MEPI);

-- Relais Prison, a social work organization run by Fatna
Elbouih, a prominent former political prisoner, who works
with inmates on vocational, health and counseling issues;

-- Association Annasir (or Al Nasir), an Islamist prisoner
support and advocacy organization;

-- Other small NGOs, including one in Western Sahara, support
prisoner welfare and education;

-- The Belgian Embassy, which works with released prisoners;

-- The British Embassy, which is funding a mediation training
program in prisons through U.S.-based NGO Search for Common
Ground and has funded curriculum development programs in the
past at the DGAP's training Academy in Ifrane;

-- The Danish Embassy, which is funding an agricultural
vocational skills program at a minimum-security prison in
central Morocco; and

-- The European Union, which has expressed an interest in
working on penal issues in Morocco.

-------
Comment

RABAT 00000408 007 OF 007

-------

25. (C) Comment: Although still steering a firm,
security-focused course, Benhachem appears to have somewhat
assuaged those who feared he would focus only on walls and
guards and not rehabilitation or reform. Once he established
control, he seems ready to begin engaging with donors. Given
his apparent lack of trust over USG motives in wanting to
fund prison programs, it would be advisable to proceed slowly
and closely engage only if identifiable funds are already
available for a program that could be implemented with input
from the DGAP. Conversely, assistance to the MOJ, with which
our relations are good and growing, in revising the penal
code and setting up conditional release programs might be
easier and less controversial first steps towards building
broader trust and programming. The Mission has also
requested Washington funding for a longer-term, more
comprehensive approach, including under Section 1207 and/or
MEPI, that would also focus on pre-intake, prison conditions
and vital support for the re-entry into society of those
whose term is finished. End Comment.

*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

Invité

Une excellente analyse sur Wikileaks et le phénomène de fuite d'informations dans les organismes.

Citation :: Et si Wikileaks était une chance ?
Partager
1243
Ecrit le 13 décembre 2010
par Fabrice Epelboin
Wikileaks est là pour durer
Tout comme il était difficile d’expliquer, hier, à des néophytes, qu’essayer d’arrêter le piratage de mp3 était techniquement une illusion, et que le plus efficace consistait à s’adapter à la situation, il est tout aussi complexe d’expliquer pourquoi Wikileaks ne s’arrêtera pas, et qu’il faudra faire avec.
C’est comme ça.
A partir du moment où une information est numérique, c’est comme ça.
Vous ne pouvez en contrôler parfaitement la circulation, il y a des fuites. C’est vrai avec un CD rippé en mp3 (une fuite de son circuit de distribution fermé initial), tout comme avec des documents militaires, copiés sur une clé USB ou un CD vierge.
Pire, plus vous cherchez à contrôler la circulation d’une information numérique, plus vous perturbez cette circulation et rendez le système inefficace et coûteux.
Ce que Wikileaks va faire subir aux militaires, aux Etats, demain aux banques et sans doute sous peu aux grandes multinationales, est de la même ampleur que ce que le P2P a fait subir à l’industrie de la musique.
Un bouleversement systémique, essentiellement dû à une force mystérieuse, dont les adeptes se comptent depuis longtemps par millions, qui semble vouloir que comme l’Homme, l’octet, lui aussi, aspire à être Libre.
Les petits ennuis financiers des maisons de disques, par rapport à ce qu’il se passe aujourd’hui, désormais, qui va s’en soucier ? Personne.
Mais ne vous y trompez pas, cette liberté revendiquée par ceux qui se sont battus contre Hadopi, résonne parfaitement avec celle que nous fait entrevoir Wikileaks, la liberté des octets.
Wikileaks n’est qu’un concept disruptif
Mais avant tout, on n’arrêtera pas Wikileaks parce que Wikileaks n’est pas simplement un site, c’est un concept. Il n’est pas le seul, d’ailleurs, d’autres, comme Cryptome, qui a participé à la fondation de Wikileaks, font moins parler d’eux mais sont potentiellement tout aussi disruptifs, voir bien plus.
En passant par l’intermédiaire de la presse, Wikileaks a fait une concession importante par rapport à sa vision originelle, toujours défendue par d’autres qui depuis ont fait sécession et préparent leur propre projet, plus radical.
Plutôt que de passer par la presse et de distiller les informations au compte goutte, cette nouvelle génération de Wikileaks procéderait à des ‘dump’ massifs. Tout, d’un coup, en vrac, et sans passer par un intermédiaire.
Passer par la presse, et publier au compte goutte, pose la question du choix éditorial de Wikileaks. Pourquoi telle information a-t-elle été publiée, plutôt qu’une autre, qui le sera peut être dans six mois ? Quelle est l’intention de Wikileaks ?
On peut se perdre en conjectures sur le sujet, c’est au mieux une perte de temps et bien souvent une tentative maladroite pour noyer le poisson et éviter d’avoir à regarder les choses en face. Le plus simple est encore de lire les écrits d’Assange.
Son intention n’est pas de faire tomber tel chef d’Etat ou de porter atteinte à tel intérêt, il veut tout simplement détruire les formes actuelles de gouvernance, que lui et le courant de pensée qu’il représente, considèrent comme des conspirations.
Qu’il réussisse à les détruire n’est pas (encore ?) évident, mais qu’il les oblige à changer de façon radicale et accélérée ne fait désormais aucun doute.
La conspiration selon Assange
N’allez pas croire qu’Assange croit à une grande conspiration qui nous cacherait l’existence d’aliens vivant parmi nous (update: quoi que). Il a une définition bien différente de la conspiration :
Les régimes autoritaires donnent naissance à des forces d’opposition en faisant pression sur les individus et la volonté collective qui aspirent à la liberté, la vérité et l’accomplissement individuel. Les plans qui font marcher le régime, une fois découverts, provoquent une résistance. Dès lors, ils sont gardés secrets pour permettre au régime de connaître le succès. Ceci est suffisant pour qualifier leur conduite de conspiratoire.
Une conspiration, c’est, pour Assange, un réseau d’individu qui se partagent de façon exclusive des informations pour leur bénéfice, et au détriment de ceux qui n’y ont pas accès.
Effectivement, force est de constater que l’armée américaine et le gouvernement des USA tombent dans cette catégorie, ce qui explique le choix des cibles de Wikileaks. Tout comme le choix d’une banque qui abriterait des systèmes de corruption à large échelle, que Wikileaks promet de mettre à nu prochainement, ainsi que les nombreuses organisations dont le site a déjà fait fuiter des informations. Un très grand nombre d’entreprises sont aussi de bonnes candidates, ainsi que de nombreuses autres organisations, comme la presse, qu’Assange classe au rayon des conspirateurs (un point de vue semble-t-il partagé par l’ambassade des Etats-Unis à Paris).
La conspiration comme réseau

En bon geek, Assange aborde les conspirations qu’il veut abattre comme un réseau. Un réseau qui a besoin de communiquer, mais dans le secret, car si révéler ses plans aux yeux de tous susciterait une résistance qui l’empêcherait de fonctionner, ne pas faire circuler l’information nécessaire à la réalisation de ces même plans serait tout aussi désastreux. Un réseau qui n’est pas inscrit sur un organigramme, mais un réseau tout de même, dont aucun nœud, si puissant soit-il, n’a nécessairement une vision claire de l’ensemble. Rien de bien compliqué pour quelqu’un comme Julien Assange.
Familier avec la culture hacker, Assange détourne le système, et y introduit le virus de la ‘fuite’, inévitable conséquence du passage à l’ère du numérique, où les notions de copie, de circulation, de partage et de consommation de l’information sont, techniquement, parfaitement similaires (un leçon que l’industrie du disque n’a toujours pas comprise).

Pour Assange (et j’avoue partager son point de vue), les conséquences de la possibilité d’une fuite dans une organisation qui poursuit un but caché du plus grand nombre sont désastreuses :
Plus une organisation est secrète ou injuste, plus la possibilité d’une fuite y amène peur et paranoïa au sein des ses dirigeants et de ses cadres. Cela doit aboutir à une diminution de l’efficacité de ses mécanismes de communication internes (et une augmentation de la ‘taxe au secret’) et à un déclin de la capacité à traiter de l’information de l’ensemble du système, qui aboutirait à une incapacité à conserver le pouvoir dans un environnement qui demanderait de s’adapter.
Par conséquent, dans un monde ou les fuites sont faciles, les organisations secrètes ou injustes seraient plus touchées que les organisations ouvertes et justes. Puisque les organisations injustes donnent naissance à une opposition, et n’arriveront à conserver le pouvoir qu’à peu d’endroits. Des fuites publiées en masse les laisseront vulnérables et à la merci de ceux qui cherchent à les remplacer par des formes plus ouvertes de gouvernance.
En introduisant le concept de Wikileaks, Assange fait exploser le coût de cette ‘taxe au secret’, que l’organisation doit débourser pour confiner à elle seule la circulation de l’information indispensable à sa survie.
L’industrie du disque, là encore, donne un (tout) petit aperçu du problème. Pour tenter de confiner la circulation de fichiers musicaux à un ensemble (relativement) contrôlé d’utilisateurs (ceux qui l’on payé), les sommes qu’elle devrait débourser seraient colossales (en même temps, c’est l’Etat qui paie). Avec le virus de la fuite, le problème se généralise à toute organisation qui fait circuler de l’information confidentielle en circuit fermé.
En perturbant la circulation de l’information qui y circule en interne, Assange veut ralentir ces organisations ‘complotistes’ pour les rendre moins efficaces, plus lourdes et plus coûteuses. Et devinez quoi : ça marche.
Dans ses écrits, Assange s’attend à ce qu’ainsi poussées dans leurs retranchements, ces organisations révèlent leur vrai visage et leur caractère autoritaire, et se mettent, par exemple, à censurer la presse. Et devinez quoi : ça marche.
Aujourd’hui le gouvernement américain, hier son armée, demain, une grande institution financière. Qu’il s’agisse de Wikileaks ou d’un projet alternatif, toutes les organisations qui fonctionnent sur la base d’informations gardées secrètes par une élite est, qu’elle le réalise ou pas, dans une situation de crise absolue.
C’est le système de gouvernance avec lequel l’humanité a fait son chemin jusqu’à aujourd’hui qui est remis en question. La distinction entre démocratie et dictature n’est pas énorme de ce point de vue là.
Pour Assange, les démocraties contemporaines ne sont que des régimes autoritaires qui gardent secret leurs intentions et manipulent les masses en contrôlant le flot de l’information afin de les leurrer. Une façon de voir qui trouvera echo chez beaucoup, tant dans certains pays, la mise en scène est grossière et cousue de fil blanc.

Demain (matin)
La première réaction de tout système est de chercher à se préserver, et c’est ce à quoi nous assistons en ce moment. Une chasse à l’homme qui a de bonnes chances de faire d’Assange au mieux un héro et au pire un martyr, des attaques informatiques contre Wikileaks qui l’a poussé à se déployer et à disséminer son contenu aux quatre coins du monde, et une multitudes de lois en projet ou sur le point d’être votés, permettant à l’Etat français de censurer des informations sur internet sans recourir à la justice, d’y interdire les appels au boycott, d’y publier des informations sensibles sur une entreprises française, et même d’y appeler à manifester.
Démocratie ? Plus vraiment.
La stratégie d’Assange est redoutable, en faisant exploser la ‘taxe au secret’ de ces organisations, il rend leur coûts de fonctionnement exorbitant, et grippe leur fonctionnement.
Une ritournelle que les lecteurs habituels de ReadWriteWeb ont déjà entendu, quand il s’agissait d’expliquer pourquoi les coûts technologiques d’Hadopi allaient nécessairement crever le plafond au vu de l’inexorable force d’innovation à laquelle ils s’opposent.
Ici, c’est la même chose, mais pour les gouvernements, les entreprises, les banques, les églises, les partis politiques, les syndicats…
Inutile de vous dire qu’il n’y a pas suffisamment d’argent sur terre pour payer une telle taxe sur le secret. La seule alternative au verrouillage et au passage à une nouvelle forme de régime autoritaire – la société de la surveillance – c’est ce que beaucoup appellent déjà la dictature de la transparence.
Après demain
La nature geek et binaire du virus qu’Assange a ainsi lancé sur les modèles de gouvernance contemporains fait que les positions intermédiaires risquent d’être délicates à tenir. Faire comme si de rien n’était et continuer comme avant n’est, quoi qu’il en soit, en aucun cas une option. Le numérique est désormais au centre de l’échiquier politique, diplomatique, militaire, et plus que jamais, économique.
Au final, nous risquons d’avoir à choisir entre deux nouvelles formes de dictatures (si tant est que la transparence en soit une). Celle de la société de la surveillance a été abondamment décrite, entre autre par Orwell, et nous sommes à sa porte aujourd’hui, l’alternative reste à écrire, à moins que 1984 vous tente.
Comme l’industrie du disque et son modèle économique hier, le monde se retrouve confronté,brutalement, à l’obsolescence de son modèle de gouvernance face à la civilisation du numérique dans lequel il est entré. Des choix radicaux devront être faits dans les mois et les années à venir.
La France se réveille, avec son éternel retard sur le numérique, dans un monde nouveau. Des élites au pouvoir parfaitement inaptes à comprendre ce qu’il se passe, et vraisemblablement balayées d’ici peu par des fuites fatidiques, venues confirmer ce que tout le monde soupçonne ou apporter une pierre de plus à l’édifice des scandales.
Etant donné l’ineptie de la gouvernance en place pour tout ce qui touche au numérique, on ne peut vraisemblablement pas à ce stade éviter une dérive accélérée vers la société de la surveillance, déjà bien entamée. Mais prétexter Hadopi, les pédophiles ou Dieu sait quoi ne leurrera plus personne désormais.
Hadopi (et sous peu Loppsi, elle aussi dynamité par Wikileaks il y a plus d’un an) ont montré qu’il n’y a pas grand chose à attendre des contres-pouvoir habituels d’une démocratie. Parlement godillot et justice sur le banc de touche, circulez, il n’y a rien a voir.
Peu de chances pourtant que les élections soient annulées. Pour l’instant, les manifestations de soutien sont plutot bon enfant (même s’il est évident que nous aurons des émeutes, et qui sait, des révolutions Wikileaks quelque part un jour). Nous devrions en arriver, dans 15 mois désormais, à choisir entre deux ou trois projets de sociétés (continuer comme avant n’étant, je me répète, plus vraiment une option).
Ces projets porteront des choix essentiels en matière de libertés numériques, car celles-ci viennent de sauter à la figure de tous, là où l’essentiel des citoyens français, parce qu’ils avaient un usage modéré ou inexistant d’internet, ne se pensaient pas un instant concernés par ces enjeux.
Ces libertés numériques orienteront notre avenir de façon radicale. Dictature de la transparence, société de la surveillance, une seule chose est sûre pour l’instant, c’est maintenant qu’il faut choisir.

http://fr.readwriteweb.com/2010/12/13/a-la-une/si-wikileaks-tait-une-chance/

Invité

WikiLeaks : Assange promet des documents "sensibles" sur Israël

Citation :: 3.700 documents sur la guerre israélienne au Liban en 2006 et sur l'assassinat du cadre du Hamas, Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, attribué au Mossad, devraient être dévoilés par le site.

Le fondateur de WikiLeaks Julian Assange a promis sur la télévision Al-Jazira du Qatar la publication de centaines de documents "sensibles" sur Israël, affirmant n'avoir conclu aucune entente pour épargner ce pays. (c) Afp
Le fondateur de WikiLeaks Julian Assange a promis sur la télévision Al-Jazira du Qatar la publication de centaines de documents "sensibles" sur Israël, affirmant n'avoir conclu aucune entente pour épargner ce pays.

Sur le même sujetJulian Assange "homme de l'année" pour Le Monde
WikiLeaks confirme un différend France-USA sur le nucléaire
Tous nos articles sur WikiLeaks
Cité jeudi 23 décembre par le site internet d'Al-Jazira, Julian Assange a affirmé que WikiLeaks disposait de documents "sensibles et classés" sur la guerre israélienne au Liban en 2006 et l'assassinat en janvier à Dubaï du cadre du Hamas Mahmoud al-Mabhouh, attribué au Mossad.

Il a nié toute entente avec Israël pour ne pas publier de documents concernant l'Etat hébreu, et a dit en avoir 3.700. "Nous n'avons aucun accord secret avec aucun pays", a-t-il affirmé, selon une traduction en arabe de ses propos.

"Nous n'avons aucun contact direct ou indirect avec les Israéliens", a-t-il insisté, précisant que ce qui a déjà été publié sur Israël ne constitue que 2% des documents en possession de WikiLeaks sur ce pays.

Selon l'un des câbles diplomatiques américains publiés récemment par WikiLeaks, des membres du Fatah, le parti du président palestinien Mahmoud Abbas, ont demandé à Israël d'attaquer le mouvement rival Hamas en 2007.

Nouvelobs Source

Video

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=U6mcSXge4Qo

Citation :: Wikileaks: Embraer favoured Super Hornet for Brazilian fighter contract

A newly-leaked diplomatic cable describes Embraer chief executive Frederico Fleury Curado candidly revealing the company's preferred bidder for the F-X2 contract.

The nearly two-year-old message drafted by the US consulate in Sao Paolo, Brazil, summarizes a closed-door meeting on 29 January 2009 between Curado and Clifford Sobel, who was then the US ambassador.

Four months after Brazil's air force short-listed three fighters - the Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, Dassault Rafale and Saab Gripen - for the still-ongoing F-X2 competition, Curado told Sobel that a US purchase of Embraer Super Tucanos would "add value" to Boeing's bid.

"Curado then stated that Embraer privately hopes Boeing wins the contract, though publicly they remain neutral," says the cable, dated 19 February 2009 and stamped "confidential".

Curado also downplayed one of the Brazilian government's key goals in the F-X2 acquisition strategy, according to the cable. By making technology transfer a key part of the bidding requirements, Brazil wants to leverage F-X2 to acquire the skills for developing a fifth-generation fighter after 2025.

But Curado told Sobel that "building a jet fighter is a difficult process and that the only way to truly learn how to build a plane is to develop the aircraft from the very beginning", the cable says, quoting Curado directly saying that "it is through trial and error that a company learns how to actually build an aircraft".

Asked to comment on the cable's description of Curado's remarks, Embraer issued a statement that "our position has always been and remains neutral in this tender".

As it expects to participate in the research, development and production of the fighters, Embraer also has signed agreements with all three finalists for the long-delayed F-X2 order, the company adds.

Brazil originally planned to award the F-X2 contract in mid-2009, but the acquisition process has been mired in political disputes.

On 7 September 2009, Brazilian President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva announced that the Rafale had been selected for the F-X2 order even though the air force had not yet submitted its recommendation. After defence minister Nelson Jobim threatened to resign, da Silva agreed to back down although he reportedly still favours the Rafale.

After da Silva's successor - Dilma Rousseff - was elected on 1 November, the F-X2 contract was expected to be awarded by end-year.

Flight International

_________________

Wikileaks,fuites et révélations - Page 10 المسيرة-الخضراء2

un petit dessin vaut mieux qu'un long discours scratch

Sur la Jordanie 1. Tres interessant le role de Rania, elle a vraiment un role cle' a cote' du roi Abdellah.

Citation :: ID: 146560
Date: 2008-03-19 17:34:00
Origin: 08AMMAN869
Source: Embassy Amman
Classification: SECRET//NOFORN
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXRO9530
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #0869/01 0791734
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 191734Z MAR 08 ZDK
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2100
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 000869

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/18/2018
TAGS: PGOV, KWBG, IR, JO
SUBJECT: KING AND QUEEN OUTLINE IRANIAN "NEMESIS" FOR
VISITING STAFFDEL

AMMAN 00000869 001.2 OF 002

Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
-------

1. (C) Speaking to members of an Jordanian MFA-organized
delegation of staffers from the U.S. Senate, King Abdullah
and Queen Rania stressed the threat Iran poses to security
and stability in the region, and linked the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict to the rise of Iranian influence
in the region. The King asserted that a collapse of the
peace process would strengthen Iran's hand. The Queen added
that economically strong, politically moderate alternatives
in the region are the only thing that will ultimately defeat
Iran's influence. Asked about the utility of direct
engagement with Iran, the King believed that it would likely
prove unfruitful, and any such initiative would have to be
accomplished with delicacy and full consultation with
America's allies in the region. Both the King and the Queen
spoke about their efforts to build a solid economic future
for the young people of Jordan. In closing, the King spoke
highly about his recent visit to the United States. End
Summary.

The Iranian Threat
------------------

2. (C) Opening up the meeting, the King said that he
believes that in the post-Annapolis peace talks, the parties
will at some stage need U.S. intervention to close gaps on
core issues, as the parties will be unable to do so on their
own. He urged that the U.S. look at the Israeli/Palestinian
issue in its regional context. "Failure (of the peace talks)
will give Iran and its proxies exactly what they're looking
for," the King asserted. He stated his belief that the
Iranian regime is playing for time, working to block a
solution to the Palestinian problem before the end of the
Bush presidency, in order to strengthen the hands of
militants throughout the Middle East. Iran was also advising
the Syrian leadership to wait for a new administration before
embarking on any Golan initiative. The King referred to the
"Iranian nemesis" and noted its "signature" in the conflicts
of the region, and its presence by proxy on the
Mediterranean, as evidence of its growing influence and
confidence. The King stressed that we should "connect the
dots" between regional stability and Iranian influence, and
avoid compartmentalizing Iran, Iraq and the peace process.
The King said failure on the peace process would make Iran
even more aggressive, compel a Sunni Arab response, and thus
deepen conflict in Lebanon and Iraq. A lot was at stake in
the peace process this year to preserve U.S. interests in the
region, he said.

3. (C) Queen Rania chimed in on the issue as well, saying
that success for moderate Arab states was critically
important in order to defeat Iran's agenda. She said that
Jordan was trying to become a model, a place where people
say, "this is the kind of country we want to live in." The
Queen said this is the only strategy that will ultimately
work in countering Iranian influence - "this is what they're
afraid of." Jordan's economic reforms and support for
education are part of that overall effort, but the going is
tough - the Queen said that "sometimes it feels like we're
swimming against the current."

4. (S/NF) Asked about direct U.S. engagement with Iran, the
King replied, "it depends on what you're trying to achieve."
He sees Iran as a revolutionary power first and foremost. As
such, it will either continue to expand (both in terms of
territory and in terms of influence), or it will implode. In
this context, the King wondered, "are they willing to deal
sensibly with you?" If a mutually beneficial dialogue is
started, the King said it should be behind the scenes, and at
a low level. Any expansion to a more formal relationship
would have to be accomplished with constant consultations
between the U.S. and its allies - it is not something that
Arab leaders should learn about from the press. In the end,
however, the King betrayed his underlying skepticism that
direct contact with Iran would be fruitful.

Youth and Opportunity
---------------------

5. (C) The King and Queen both touched briefly on outreach
to youth in Jordan. Citing a recent poll, the King indicated
that the younger generation is concerned less with politics
and more with jobs. He believes that building a solid middle
class in Jordan is the key to keeping radicalism under wraps.
"If the youth have hope, they'll be a stabilizing factor,"
added the Queen. In the end, they both cited supply and
demand in the job market as the critical factor in Jordan's

AMMAN 00000869 002 OF 002

future. The King noted his recent visit to the poor rural
town of Shobak, in which he encountered a seamstress in a
garment factory who was college-educated. Investing in
education is a worthy goal, he noted, but jobs must be
waiting for those trained workers if the economy is to
advance as a whole.

Visit Feedback
--------------

6. (C) The King told the staffdel how pleased he was with
his recent trip to the United States. "It's the best visit
I've had in seven and a half years. I left extremely
optimistic," he said.

HALE

Des problemes d'identite'e nationale et communauteres en Jordanie.

Citation :: ID: 218464
Date: 2009-07-28 14:27:00
Origin: 09AMMAN1689
Source: Embassy Amman
Classification: SECRET
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXRO8322
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1689/01 2091427
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 281427Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 5609
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001689

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/23/2019
TAGS: PGOV, KDEM, SOCI, JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN SOCCER GAME HALTED AMIDST ANTI-REGIME
CHANTS, HOOLIGANISM TOWARD PALESTINIANS

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Lawrence Mandel
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S) Summary: Anti-Palestinian hooliganism and slogans
denigrating the Palestinian origins of both the Queen and the
Crown Prince led to the cancellation of a July 17 soccer game
between the rival Faisali and Wahdat clubs, who traditionally
represent the East Banker and Palestinian communities,
respectively. Matches between the two teams have a long
history of violence, but the specific digs at the royal
family marked a new low. The clubs have been fined and their
fans publicly chastised, yet official media reporting and
commentary has been noticeably thin. The game exposed the
growing rift between East Bankers and Palestinians in Jordan.
The King's silence on the event is noteworthy, as is a
reluctance among our contacts to discuss the issue. End
Summary.

Faisali 0, Wahdat 0, PPD (Riot)
-------------------------------

2. (C) Jordanian police intervened to stop fan violence and
the chanting of anti-regime slogans during a July 17 match
between Amman soccer clubs Faisali and Wahdat in the
industrial town of Zarqa. The unrest began when Faisali fans
started to chant slogans against Palestinian-origin
Jordanians, including Queen Rania. Some Faisali fans threw
bottles at Wahdat players and their fans. The coaches of
both teams ordered their players off of the field in the
middle of the game for their own safety, and the remainder of
the match was canceled. (Note: It ended in a scoreless
draw. End Note.)

A Storied Rivalry
-----------------

3. (U) Faisali and Wahdat serve as the proxy champions of
the East Banker and Palestinian communities, respectively.
Faisali, whose name refers to the Hashemite King Faisal, is
controlled by a prominent tribe (the 'Udwan) which hails from
the East Banker stronghold of Salt. It is known as the
favored team of tribal East Bankers, even though many of its
players are of Palestinian origin. Since the formation of
the Jordanian Football Union (JFU) in 1944, Faisali has won
thirty national championships.

4. (C) Wahdat, which takes its name from the large
Palestinian refugee camp on the southern side of Amman, is
seen as the favored team of Palestinian-origin Jordanians.
Wahdat has won eleven national soccer championships since
1944, including the last three. The club's current president
is Tareq Khoury, a successful businessman who allegedly
bought his seat on the Wahdat board. He has since leveraged
that position into a political career, and was elected to the
Lower House of Parliament in 2007.

Game Over
---------

5. (S) Faisali-Wahdat games have a long history of
hooliganism and politically motivated violence. Past matches
have been shut down by the police following riots spurred by
offensive slogans shouted by both sides. Those slogans have
over time become a popular barometer of tensions between East
Bankers and Palestinians. The slogans and cheers on the
Faisali side during the July 17 match were particularly
divisive and controversial, as they were directed at members
of the royal family for the first time. Faisali supporters
chanted about the Palestinian origins of Queen Rania with the
cheer, "divorce her you father of Hussein, and we'll marry
you to two of ours." The newly appointed Crown Prince did
not escape comment either, as he is half Palestinian (and one
quarter British) himself.

Official Fallout
----------------

6. (SBU) Official reaction to the match was surprisingly
pro-forma. Prince Ali, half-brother to the King and chairman
of the Jordanian Football Union (JFU), issued a statement
calling the behavior of Faisali fans "unacceptable" and "a
red line." In addition to a relatively meager 5000 JD (USD
7000) fine on Faisali, the JFU indicated that larger security
restrictions would be placed on future games. Members of
parliament also sent a missive to the press denouncing the
chants of Faisali supporters as "contrary to Jordanian
values." The statement was read by MP and Wahdat president
Tareq Khoury on the floor of parliament. The Faisali club
issued a press release of its own, promising to identify the
"outcasts" among its fans and deal with them accordingly.

Media Silence, Internet Cacophony

AMMAN 00001689 002 OF 002

---------------------------------

7. (C) Despite all of the official condemnations of Faisali
and its supporters, none of Jordan's self-censoring media
featured descriptive news stories about the game and why it
was called off. Columnists and commentators, even those who
are usually used to advance pro-government views, were
noticeably silent. The heads of the Faisali and Wahdat fan
clubs were allegedly invited to appear on Al-Jazeera, but
refused in recognition of the sensitivities surrounding
criticism of the royal family.

8. (SBU) Internet news sites, however, were full of
commentary on the game and its implications. Many defended
the Faisali supporters as "real" Jordanians fighting against
undue Palestinian influence. Some commentators believe that
Prince Ali failed to remain neutral in the conflict by only
chastising Faisali supporters, and called for Wahdat to
receive similar opprobrium.

Comment
-------

9. (S) There is broad recognition throughout Jordan that the
Faisali-Wahdat incident exposed the uncomfortable gap between
East Bankers and Palestinian-origin Jordanians -- one that
most would rather keep well-hidden for the sake of political
stability. The connection between this rift and the
Hashemite monarchy, including the newly-appointed Crown
Prince, makes the incident even more unsettling. Even our
most forthcoming contacts are reluctant to talk with us about
the issue, recognizing that it strikes at the core of
Jordanian identity politics. One contact reluctantly
admitted that the game brought out the "ugly side of
Jordanian ultranationalism" and said that it would be
difficult to contain now that it was publicly expressed.
Another pointed to the "increasingly explicit and
provocative" Faisali slogans as proof that status
quo-oriented East Bankers are uncomfortable with the
increasing pressures for reform that will inevitably lessen
their near-monopoly on political and social power.

10. (S) The King's silence on the game and its political
implications is deafening. High level government contacts
and members of the diplomatic community are puzzled by the
King's failure to respond to a verbal attack on his family
that also dips in to Jordanian identity politics. While he
is on "internal vacation" in the southern part of Jordan, the
King's public exposure has been limited to meetings with
scattered foreign officials. While perhaps unintentional,
the King's silence has effectively empowered the pro-status
quo establishment.
Mandel

» Toutes vos questions sur les FAR

Wikileaks,fuites et révélations

Julian Assange peut être libéré contre 282.000 euros