AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités

Rappel du premier message :

http://www.jeuneafrique.com/400016/politique/tchad-idriss-deby-reporte-tenue-elections-legislatives-manque-de-moyens/ a écrit:: Tchad : Idriss Déby Itno reporte la tenue des élections législatives « par manque de moyens »

Le président tchadien Idriss Déby Itno a annoncé ce jeudi lors d'une conférence de presse le report des élections législatives à une date inconnue. Le chef d'Etat a justifié cette décision par un manque de moyens pour les organiser.

« Quand je dis que nous ne pouvons pas faire des législatives, c’est par manque des moyens. En période de vache maigre, on ne peut rien faire. Quand nous aurons des ressources, on pourra organiser des élections législatives », a-t-il précisé jeudi 02 février devant la presse.

Les élections législatives devaient se dérouler courant 2016 rappelle la FIDH. Aucune nouvelle date n’a été fixée. C’est donc le statu quo pour l’instant à l’Assemblée nationale, où le Mouvement patriotique du Salut (MPS), le parti du président Déby, occupe 133 des 188 sièges depuis les dernières législatives en février 2011.

Appel au dialogue avec l’opposition

De retour du sommet d’Addis Abeba où il a fait élire son ministre des Affaires étrangères, Moussa Faki Mahamat, à la tête de la commission de l’Union africaine (UA), Idriss Déby Into a lancé un appel au dialogue en direction de l’opposition.

« Qu’elle n’ait pas peur de dialoguer avec moi, je suis Tchadien comme eux », a-t-il insisté, ajoutant que « l’opposition doit cesser de cultiver la haine qui a pour conséquence la déchirure du pays. Le Tchad n’a pas besoin de cela ».

L’opposition, emmené par l’ancien ministre Saleh Kebzabo, a contesté la réélection d’Idriss Déby pour un cinquième mandat en avril dernier avec près de 60%. L’opposition n’a recueilli que 12, 80 % des voix. Une réélection dès le premier tour donc qui marquait néanmoins un recul de presque 30 points par rapport à la présidentielle de 2011 (88%).

« Boko Haram est terminé »

Idriss Déby Itno a également profité de cette conférence de presse pour témoigner de son optimisme sur l’issue de la lutte contre les terroristes de Boko Haram, très dans la région du Lac Tchad. Le Tchad est un allié majeur de l’Occident en Afrique sub-saharienne contre les jihadistes dans la région. « Boko Haram est terminé, dans le cas contraire il est très affaibli. En plus des efforts faits par notre armée, la force mixte (composée du Tchad, du Niger, Nigeria et du Cameroun) a réduit la capacité de nuisance de Boko Haram », a-t-il assuré, avant d’ajouter « nous parviendrons à endiguer totalement Boko Haram ».

Pour rappel, Idriss Déby Itno avait déjà déclaré que Boko Haram était « décapité » en août 2015. L’organisation jihadiste continue de semer la terreur dans le nord Cameroun et du Nigéria où elle a pris d’assaut un convoi sous escorte militaire, faisant au passage 15 morts.

COBUS VAN STADEN - Project Syndicate a écrit:: The G20’s Africa Problem

Although the G20 has made a limited effort to broaden its engagement with Africa in recent years, it has yet to include Africans in discussions of global issues that bear directly on their own economic prospects. Yet by consistently treating the region as a ward instead of a coequal partner, the international community is undermining its own future interests.

CAPE TOWN – This has not been an easy year for the G20. The 2018 summit of the leaders of the world’s largest economies is being held in Buenos Aires, a city still reeling from a currency collapse. More broadly, the summit is taking place amid a fracturing of the multilateral order. Everything from NATO to the consensus on climate change appears to be coming apart at the seams.

Still, the G20 has long positioned itself as a global problem solver, having been conceived after the 1997 Asian financial crisis and then emerging as the primary global forum for addressing the crash of 2008. A decade later, a global crisis is on the agenda once again, only this time it has assumed the form of a mounting trade war between the United States and China.

Unlike in 2008, however, the world’s capacity for multilateral decision-making is deteriorating. The European Union remains preoccupied with its own internal disputes, and the United States, under President Donald Trump, has abandoned multilateralism and weakened the institutions needed to solve complex challenges such as the threat of technological unemployment from automation. And the effects of the Trump administration’s protectionism are already being felt. The World Trade Organization recently reported that in response to US tariffs, G20 countries have imposed around 40 new import restrictions, affecting $481 billion in global trade – a sixfold increase from the year before.

But while the world’s economic giants have been withdrawing from multilateralism, Africa has been quietly moving in the opposite direction. Earlier this year, the continent’s countries agreed on a new African Continental Free Trade Agreement, and committed to pursuing deeper cross-border economic and infrastructure integration within the framework of the African Union, as outlined in the AU’s Agenda 2063.

But, despite its embrace of multilateralism, Africa has struggled to get the G20’s attention. South Africa is the only African country in the G20, and it must constantly walk the fine line of speaking for the continent’s interests without imposing its voice on its neighbors. True, representatives from the AU and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development do attend G20 summits. But the countries occupying each institution’s rotating leadership do not always have the capacity to advocate forcefully on the continent’s behalf.

Moreover, this problem is compounded by the limited scope of the G20’s interactions with Africa. Rather than including Africa in wider discussions about global trade architecture, climate change, and the future of work, the G20 has largely limited its engagement with the continent to addressing narrower development issues.

To be sure, Africa’s large infrastructure gap, slow regional integration, and high levels of unemployment all stem from underdevelopment. No one is saying that development should be ignored; but nor should it be the only focus. When international engagement with Africa is confined to the silo of development, the continent is effectively reduced to a set of problems for external actors to solve. This tendency prevents Africa from participating as a legitimate and coequal member of the global community. If one lacks a seat at the table, then one is probably on the menu.

As matters stand, most of the G20’s engagement with Africa happens through its Development Working Group, which focuses on the basic building blocks of development, like poverty eradication. This means that Africa has no say in a host of other issues relating to development, including infrastructure, the shape of the digital economy, and the global banking system. As a result, key problems such as Africa’s structural exclusion from global markets – which is due in large part to G20 member states’ own domestic agricultural subsidies – go unexamined.

This isn’t just unfair to Africa; it also poses risks for the G20. Africa represents the world’s demographic future, and its development trajectory will increasingly affect the global economy. By 2050, Nigeria will have the world’s third-largest population, and by 2100, one-third of all people will be African. Clearly, any plan that the G20 makes for the future will have to put Africa at the forefront. Diminishing the region to a set of development challenges will no longer do.
To its credit, the G20 has started paying more attention to Africa in recent years. Under the Chinese presidency in 2016, the body made industrialization in Africa a high priority. And this was followed by the Compact with Africa under the German presidency in 2017. For its part, Argentina has not launched an Africa initiative of its own; but it has devoted attention to improving cooperation with the continent via people-to-people diplomacy.

The Compact with Africa is designed to facilitate economic reforms across the continent, and to attract investment from pools of private-sector funds in the global North. But though it has been well received among African leaders, the compact nonetheless perpetuates the trend of restricting African engagement to development issues.

Looking ahead, Africa must be afforded a greater role in setting the G20’s agenda. The continent will be disproportionally affected by climate change and transnational migration. Yet it will not be able to meet those challenges if its development is being hindered by an unequal global trade system.

These issues are on the agenda in Buenos Aires, but discussion of them will be largely deprived of an African perspective. This must change. It is time for creative solutions to make the G20 more representative and more effective in its engagement with the world. Our collective future depends on it.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Avec l'irruption de tous ces mastodontes sur l'échiquier africain, je doute fort de notre capacité à plus nous y développer!!!!!

Eurasia Future a écrit:: The UAE Will Help India “Multi-Align” Against China In Africa

The announcement that the UAE and India signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly invest in Africa will see Dubai greatly assisting New Delhi in its grand strategy of “multi-aligning” against China there, though Russia could play a stabilizing role by “balancing” many of the various actors engaged in this modern-day “Scramble for Africa”.

“Scramble For Africa”

The modern-day “Scramble for Africa” has been ongoing for quite a while, but it had hitherto mostly been between the US and China until the past year or so, with these two Great Powers encroaching in their own ways in the continental-wide “sphere of influence” that France has historically staked out as its own. Since then, America’s GCC allies – chief among them the UAE – have established themselves as the diplomatic kingpins in the strategic Horn of Africa region, coming on the heels of their Turkish competitor’s comprehensive strategic push all throughout the landmass. Concurrent with this, Russia surreptitiously returned to the continent via the unlikely route of its UN-approved military assistance mission in the Central African Republic, while the US’ Indian and Japanese allies have attempted to expand their reach in this part of the world through the “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor” (AAGC).

Consolidating The American “Camp”

While this many independently moving parts might make it seem like the “scramble” for Africa’s resources, markets, and strategic location is utterly chaotic and at risk of causing a kinetic conflict between the various player s involved, the fact of the matter is that a stabilizing convergence of sorts is presently ongoing whereby a vague system of “bipolarity” is poised to set in across the continent, albeit one where Russia could play a crucial role in “balancing” between both “camps”. This “consolidation process” was indirectly set into motion once the GCC and the Indo-Japanese members of the anti-China “Quad” began to actively probe opportunities in Africa, which aligned with the tacit strategic desire of the US to involve as many of its allies as possible there as it seeks to eventually assemble an economic coalition to challenge China’s dominant presence.

The announcement that the UAE and India just signed a memorandum of understanding to jointly invest in Africa is the first tangible step to formally linking together the US’ disparate allies, with the possibility now emerging of the UAE – and by extension, the entire GCC – becoming part of the AAGC. It would be natural for the US to endorse this union at a convenient time in the future and ‘bless’ it with support through the so-called “BUILD Act”, as well as encourage France to jump on board this emerging multilateral “containment” platform by providing investment and security services given its historic hegemony in the continent. The reasons why the UAE is siding with India’s AAGC and not China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) in Africa are manifold, but they basically boil down to three main ones.

Building The Two “Blocs”

The first is that the UAE is a solid American ally that’s positioning itself to replace its “big brother” Saudi Arabia as the GCC hegemon, so it has an interest in cooperating with the US’ grand strategic schemes anywhere in the world. Secondly, there are concerns – whether legitimate or not – that CPEC’s Gwadar terminal port might one day overshadow Dubai and make it economically redundant, hence the most immediate self-interested motivation that the Emirates has to “multi-align” against BRI in Africa. And thirdly, as an added incentive (not that it actually needed one), the UAE will never forget how Pakistan refused to become militarily involved in the War on Yemen, which deprived the coalition of the country’s world-class anti-insurgency experience that could have been a game-changer and averted the current quagmire that’s draining the GCC’s blood, treasure, and international reputation.

Bearing all of these considerations in mind, it’s a no-brainer why the UAE wanted to partner with India instead of China in Africa and therefore catalyze the US’ envisaged “consolidation process” there, which could have far-reaching long-term ramifications as the New Cold War heats up and this continental theater becomes all the more important. The natural response would be for China to facilitate its Pakistani partner’s entrance into this competition by helping it transform its Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC) between Gwadar and several BRI-built (or -linked) East African ports into multilateral economic partnerships, with Islamabad then reaching out to its Ankara ally to include Turkey into this developing win-win framework. Only through such a means can China stand any chance at sustainably competing with its American-aligned rivals given the intensifying infowar being waged against its investments in Africa.

Russia’s “Balancing” Role In Midwifing A “Renaissance 2.0”

Accepting that the American-backed “bloc” is much further along to fruition than the Chinese one, but that these two “camps” are nevertheless in the midst of forming in Africa, it’s relevant to discuss the role that Russia could play in all of this. As it stands, Russia is endeavoring to become the 21st-century’s supreme “balancing” force in Afro-Eurasia, to which end it’s clinching a variety of strategic partnerships with competing pairs of countries, which pertinently includes the GCC & Turkey, India & Pakistan, and Japan & China. Russia’s uniquely neutral position enables it to conceivably serve as a bridge for bringing together these rival states, seeing as how it’s the common denominator between them. In principle, Russia could join both the AAGC and BRI”s African initiatives as an equal strategic partner, though provided that certain criteria are first met in order to allow this to happen.

For example, Russia needs to sign a peace treaty with Japan before formally joining the AAGC in the future, though this could greatly be facilitated by courting Japanese investments in the Far East and then advancing the proposal for a so-called “Northern Islands Socio-Economic Condominium” over the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin, and Hokkaido. Concerning the Chinese angle, Russia is proving its worth as a no-nonsense security provider in Africa capable of exporting its “mercenary”-driven “Democratic Security” model all throughout the continent and especially in BRI partner states, thereby fulfilling the demand that Beijing has for ensuring that Washington’s Hybrid War schemes don’t offset its investment projects there. If Russia can succeed in simultaneously joining the AAGC and BRI through these means, then it could encourage the “China-India-Plus-One” model to be applied all across Africa in linking these two global initiatives, sidelining the US and France, and midwifing a “Renaissance 2.0”.

Concluding Thoughts

The UAE’s decision to team up with India and develop third-party African states is a major move that’s bound to have an enormous impact on the course of the New Cold War in the continent, especially in regards to catalyzing the consolidation of a larger American-aligned anti-Chinese “containment” “camp” there. This might actually be more of a stabilizing development than a destabilizing one, however, so long as China seizes the moment to assemble its own economic coalition with Pakistan and Turkey, therefore creating a bipolar system of sorts for managing African affairs. Russia’s role in all of this is to “balance” between the two “blocs” in order to broker the ultimate convergence between them, one that would take advantage of its strategic partnerships with each party apart from the US and France in order to create a sustainable win-win platform for incorporating Africa into the emerging Multipolar World Order.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Ils ont pas beaucoup de chances dans les pays froncophones ou encore dans les pays de culte islamique sunnite sofi

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AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités - Page 8 Marche12

Alors que le Maroc lui est plus proche de la Chine sur le continent, notamment en permettant aux banques chinoises de commercer avec le Yuan via nos banques en Afrique. C'est un atout pour eux de profiter de notre réseau bancaire tentaculaire , et avec leur monnaie ! Les Européens et US n'aiment pas ça j'en suis persuadé.

Entre la Chine, l'Inde, et le Japon aussi ces dernières années, l'Afrique va devenir un champ de bataille économique pour ces puissances asiatiques qui feront le monde de demain. Sans parler des Anglais qui eux aussi commence a lorgner le continent, les Sud Coréens ... L'avenir du monde est passer de l'Ouest a l'Est et ça se répercute sur l Afrique.

A nous de placer nos pions et collaborer intelligemment avec ces puissances.

The Intercept a écrit:: U.S. MILITARY SAYS IT HAS A “LIGHT FOOTPRINT” IN AFRICA. THESE DOCUMENTS SHOW A VAST NETWORK OF BASES.

THE U.S. MILITARY has long insisted that it maintains a “light footprint” in Africa, and there have been reports of proposed drawdowns in special operations forces and closures of outposts on the continent, due to a 2017 ambush in Niger and an increasing focus on rivals like China and Russia. But through it all, U.S. Africa Command has fallen short of providing concrete information about its bases on the continent, leaving in question the true scope of the American presence there.

Documents obtained from AFRICOM by The Intercept, via the Freedom of Information Act, however, offer a unique window onto the sprawling network of U.S. military outposts in Africa, including previously undisclosed or unconfirmed sites in hotspots like Libya, Niger, and Somalia. The Pentagon has also told The Intercept that troop reductions in Africa will be modest and phased-in over several years and that no outposts are expected to close as a result of the personnel cuts.

According to a 2018 briefing by AFRICOM science adviser Peter E. Teil, the military’s constellation of bases includes 34 sites scattered across the continent, with high concentrations in the north and west as well as the Horn of Africa. These regions, not surprisingly, have also seen numerous U.S. drone attacks and low-profile commando raids in recent years. For example, Libya — the site of drone and commando missions, but for which President Donald Trump said he saw no U.S. military role just last year — is nonetheless home to three previously undisclosed outposts.

“U.S. Africa Command’s posture plan is designed to secure strategic access to key locations on a continent characterized by vast distances and limited infrastructure,” Gen. Thomas Waldhauser, the AFRICOM commander, told the House Armed Services Committee earlier this year, though he didn’t provide specifics on the number of bases. “Our posture network allows forward staging of forces to provide operational flexibility and timely response to crises involving U. S. personnel or interests without creating the optic that U. S. Africa Command is militarizing Africa.”

According to Adam Moore, an assistant professor of geography at the University of California, Los Angeles and an expert on the U.S. military’s presence in Africa, “It is getting harder for the U.S. military to plausibly claim that it has a ‘light footprint’ in Africa. In just the past five years, it has established what is perhaps the largest drone complex in the world in Djibouti — Chabelley — which is involved in wars on two continents, Yemen, and Somalia.” Moore also noted that the U.S. is building an even larger drone base in Agadez, Niger. “Certainly, for people living in Somalia, Niger, and Djibouti, the notion that the U.S. is not militarizing their countries rings false,” he added.

For the last 10 years, AFRICOM has not only sought to define its presence as limited in scope, but its military outposts as small, temporary, and little more than local bases where Americans are tenants. For instance, this is how Waldhauser described a low-profile drone outpost in Tunisia last year: “And it’s not our base, it’s the Tunisians’ base.” On a visit to a U.S. facility in Senegal this summer, the AFRICOM chief took pains to emphasize that the U.S. had no intension of establishing a permanent base there. Still, there’s no denying the scope of AFRICOM’s network of outposts, nor the growth in infrastructure. Air Forces Africa alone, the command’s air component, has recently completed or is currently working on nearly 30 construction projects across four countries in Africa. “The U.S. footprint on the African continent has grown markedly over the last decade to promote U.S. security interests on the continent,” Navy Cmdr. Candice Tresch, a Pentagon spokesperson, told The Intercept.

While China, France, Russia, and the United Arab Emirates have increased their own military engagement in Africa in recent years and a number of countries now possess outposts on the continent, none approach the wide-ranging U.S. footprint. China, for example, has just one base in Africa – a facility in Djibouti.

According to the documents obtained by The Intercept through the Freedom of Information Act, AFRICOM’s network of bases includes larger “enduring” outposts, consisting of forward operating sites, or FOSes, and cooperative security locations, or CSLs, as well as more numerous austere sites known as contingency locations, or CLs. All of these are located on the African continent except for an FOS on Britain’s Ascension Island in the south Atlantic. Teil’s map of AFRICOM’s “Strategic Posture” names the specific locations of all 14 FOSes and CSLs and provides country-specific locales for the 20 contingency locations. The Pentagon would not say whether the tally was exhaustive, however, citing concerns about publicly providing the number of forces deployed to specific facilities or individual countries. “For reasons of operational security, complete and specific force lay-downs are not releasable,” said Tresch.

While troops and outposts periodically come and go from the continent, and some locations used by commandos conducting sensitive missions are likely kept under wraps, Teil’s map represents the most current and complete accounting available and indicates the areas of the continent of greatest concern to Africa Command. “The distribution of bases suggests that the U.S. military is organized around three counter-terrorism theaters in Africa: the Horn of Africa — Somalia, Djibouti, Kenya; Libya; and the Sahel — Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso,” says Moore, noting that the U.S. has only one base in the south of the continent and has scaled back engagement in Central Africa in recent years.

Niger, Somalia, and Kenya

Teil’s briefing confirms, for the first time, that the U.S. military currently has more sites in Niger — five, including two cooperative security locations — than any other country on the western side of the continent. Niamey, the country’s capital, is the location of Air Base 101, a longtime U.S. drone outpost attached to Diori Hamani International Airport; the site of a Special Operations Advanced Operations Base; and the West Africa node for AFRICOM’s contractor-provided personnel recovery and casualty evacuation services. The other CSL, in the remote smuggling hub of Agadez, is set to become the premier U.S. military outpost in West Africa. That drone base, located at Nigerien Air Base 201, not only boasts a $100 million construction price tag but, with operating expenses, is estimated to cost U.S. taxpayers more than a quarter-billion dollars by 2024 when the 10-year agreement for its use ends.

Officially, a CSL is neither “a U.S. facility or base.” It is, according to the military, “simply a location that, when needed and with the permission of the partner country, can be used by U.S. personnel to support a wide range of contingencies.” The sheer dimensions, cost, and importance of Agadez seems to suggest otherwise. “Judging by its size and the infrastructure investments to date, Agadez more resembles massive bases that the military created in Iraq and Afghanistan than a small, unobtrusive, ‘lily pad,’” says Moore.

The U.S. military presence in Niger gained widespread exposure last year when an October 4 ambush by ISIS in the Greater Sahara near the Mali border killed four U.S. soldiers, including Green Berets, and wounded two others. A Pentagon investigation into the attack shed additional light on other key U.S. military sites in Niger including Ouallam and Arlit, where Special Operations forces (SOF) deployed in 2017, and Maradi, where SOF were sent in 2016. Arlit also appeared as a proposed contingency location in a formerly secret 2015 AFRICOM posture plan obtained by The Intercept. Ouallam, which was listed in contracting documents brought to light by The Intercept last year, was the site of an SOF effort to train and equip a Nigerien counterterrorism company as well as another effort to conduct operations with other local units. Contracting documents from 2017 also noted the need for 4,400 gallons per month of gasoline, 1,100 gallons per month of diesel fuel, and 6,000 gallons of aviation turbine fuel to be delivered, every 90 days, to a “military installation” in Dirkou.

While the five bases in Niger anchor the west of the continent, the five U.S. outposts in Somalia are tops in the east. Somalia is the East Africa hub for contractor-provided personnel recovery and casualty evacuation services as well as the main node for the military’s own personnel recovery and casualty evacuation operations. These sites, revealed in AFRICOM maps for the first time, do not include a CIA base revealed in 2014 by The Nation.

All U.S. military facilities in Somalia, by virtue of being contingency locations, are unnamed on AFRICOM’s 2018 map. Previously, Kismayo has been identified as a key outpost, while the declassified 2015 AFRICOM posture plan names proposed CLs in Baidoa, Bosaaso, and the capital, Mogadishu, as well as Berbera in the self-declared state of Somaliland. If locations on Teil’s map are accurate, one of the Somali sites is located in this latter region. Reporting by Vice News earlier this year indicated there were actually six new U.S facilities being constructed in Somalia as well as the expansion of Baledogle, a base for which a contract for “emergency runway repairs” was recently issued.

According to top secret documents obtained by The Intercept in 2015, elite troops from a unit known as Task Force 48-4 were involved in drone attacks in Somalia earlier this decade. This air war has continued in the years since. The U.S. has already conducted 36 air strikes in Somalia this year, compared to 34 for all of 2017 and 15 in 2016, according to the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

Somalia’s neighbor, Kenya, boasts four U.S. bases. These include cooperative security locations at Mombasa as well as Manda Bay, where a 2013 Pentagon study of secret drone operations in Somalia and Yemen noted that two manned fixed-wing aircraft were then based. AFRICOM’s 2015 posture plan also mentions contingency locations at Lakipia, the site of a Kenyan Air Force base, and another Kenyan airfield at Wajir that was upgraded and expanded by the U.S. Navy earlier in this decade.

Libya, Tunisia, and Djibouti

Teil’s map shows a cluster of three unnamed and previously unreported contingency locations near the Libyan coastline. Since 2011, the U.S. has carried out approximately 550 drone strikes targeting al Qaeda and Islamic State militants in the restive North African nation. During a four-month span in 2016, for example, there were around 300 such attacks, according to U.S. officials. That’s seven times more than the 42 confirmed U.S. drone strikes carried out in Somalia, Yemen, and Pakistan combined for all of 2016, according to data compiled by the Bureau of Investigative Journalism, a London-based nonprofit news organization. The Libya attacks have continued under the Trump administration, with the latest acknowledged U.S. drone strike occurring near Al Uwaynat on November 29. AFRICOM’s 2015 posture plan listed only an outpost at Al-Wigh, a Saharan airfield near that country’s borders with Niger, Chad, and Algeria, located far to the south of the three current CLs.

Africa Command’s map also shows a contingency location in neighboring Tunisia, possibly Sidi Ahmed Air Base, a key regional U.S. drone outpost that has played an important role in air strikes in Libya in recent years. “You know, flying intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance drones out of Tunisia has been taking place for quite some time,” said Waldhauser, the AFRICOM commander, last year. “[W]e fly there, it’s not a secret, but we are very respectful to the Tunisians’ desires in terms of, you know, how we support them and the fact that we have [a] low profile…”

Djibouti is home to the crown jewel of U.S. bases on the continent, Camp Lemonnier, a former French Foreign Legion outpost and AFRICOM’s lone forward operating site on the continent. A longtime hub for counterterrorism operations in Yemen and Somalia and the home of Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa (CJTF–HOA), Camp Lemonnier hosts around 4,000 U.S. and allied personnel, and, according to Teil, is the “main platform” for U.S. crisis response forces in Africa. Since 2002, the base has expanded from 88 acres to nearly 600 acres and spun off a satellite outpost — a cooperative security location 10 kilometers to the southwest, where drone operations in the country were relocated in 2013. Chabelley Airfield has gone on to serve as an integral base for missions in Somalia and Yemen as well as the drone war against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. “United States military personnel remain deployed to Djibouti, including for purposes of posturing for counterterrorism and counter-piracy operations in the vicinity of the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula, and to provide contingency support for embassy security augmentation in East Africa,” President Donald Trump noted in June.

Cameroon, Mali, and Chad

AFRICOM’s strategic posture also includes two contingency locations in Cameroon. One is an outpost in the north of the country, known as CL Garoua, which is used to fly drone missions and also as a base for the Army’s Task Force Darby, which supports Cameroonian forces fighting the terrorist group Boko Haram. Cameroon is also home to a longtime outpost in Douala as well as U.S. facilities in Maroua and a nearby base called Salak, which is also used by U.S. personnel and private contractors for training missions and drone surveillance. In 2017, Amnesty International, the London-based research firm Forensic Architecture, and The Intercept exposed illegal imprisonment, torture, and killings by Cameroonian troops at Salak.

In neighboring Mali, there are two contingency locations. AFRICOM’s 2015 posture plan lists proposed CLs in Gao and Mali’s capital, Bamako. The 2018 map also notes the existence of a CSL in Chad’s capital N’Djamena, a site where the U.S. began flying drones earlier this decade; it’s also the headquarters of a Special Operations Command and Control Element, an elite battalion-level command. Another unidentified contingency location in Chad could be a CL in Faya Largeau, which was mentioned in AFRICOM’s 2015 posture plan.

In Gabon, a cooperative security location exists in Libreville. Last year, U.S. troops carried out an exercise there to test their ability to turn the Libreville CSL into a forward command post to facilitate an influx of a large number of forces. A CSL can also be found in Accra, Ghana, and another CSL is located on a small compound at Captain Andalla Cissé Air Base in Dakar, Senegal. “This location is very important to us because it helps mitigate the time and space on the continent the size of Africa,” said AFRICOM commander Waldhauser while visiting the Senegalese capital earlier this year.

Only one base lies in the far south of the continent, a CSL in Botswana’s capital, Gaborone, that is run by the Army. To its north, CSL Entebbe in Uganda has long been an important air base for American forces in Africa, serving as a hub for surveillance aircraft. It also proved integral to Operation Oaken Steel, the July 2016 rapid deployment of troops to rescue U.S. personnel after fighting broke out near the American Embassy in Juba, South Sudan.

“We Have Increased the Firepower”

In May, responding to questions about measures taken after the October 2017 ambush in Niger, Waldhauser spoke of fortifying the U.S. presence on the continent. “We have increased, which I won’t go into details here, but we have increased the firepower, we’ve increased the ISR [intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance] capacity, we’ve increased various response times,” he said. “So we have beefed up a lot of things posture-wise with regard to these forces.” This firepower includes drones. “We have been arming out of Niger, and we’ll use that as appropriate,” Waldhauser noted this summer, alluding to the presence of armed remotely piloted aircraft, or RPAs, now based there.

AFRICOM did not respond to multiple requests to interview Waldhauser.

After months of reports that the Defense Department was considering a major drawdown of Special Operations forces in Africa as well as the closure of military outposts in Tunisia, Cameroon, Libya and Kenya, the Pentagon now says that less than 10 percent of 7,200 forces assigned to AFRICOM will be withdrawn over several years and no bases will close as a result. In fact, U.S. base construction in Africa is booming. Air Forces Africa spokesperson Auburn Davis told The Intercept that the Air Force recently completed 21 construction projects in Kenya, Tunisia, Niger and Djibouti and currently has seven others underway in Niger and Djibouti.

“The proliferation of bases in the Sahel, Libya, and Horn of Africa suggests that AFRICOM’s counterterrorism missions in those regions of the continent will continue indefinitely,” Moore told The Intercept. Hours after Moore made those comments, the Pentagon announced that six firms had been named under a potential five-year, $240 million contract for design and construction services for naval facilities in Africa, beginning with the expansion of the tarmac at Camp Lemonnier in Djibouti.

#Source

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

On constate des opérations aériennes dans le Nord-Est de l'Algérie (probablement depuis la base de drônes américains en Tunisie).

L'Algérie aboie sur le Maroc pendant que son derrière se fait piloner.
Ils se focalisent sur nous alors que le danger vient d'aileurs!

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L'homme sage est celui qui vient toujours chercher des conseils dabord, des armes on en trouve partout.

feu Hassan II.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbjNQ_5QvgQ

Haha l'Algérie que du bla bla . Depuis plusieurs années ils ont carrément donner leurs fesses aux US, ces *** avait même utiliser cette carte pour avoir la décision US d'intégrer les DH dans ma mission de la Minurso (annulation de AL..) . Le pétrole algérien est devenu la chasse gardée des majors US du pétrole, et par dessus le marché ils les laissent faire des opérations chez eux. Et après ça parle de souveraineté, de discours socialistes Laughing

pays des martyrs Mecque des révolutionnaires lb3abe3 oui

Vraiment ces algériens, ils sont schizophrènes, après ils critiquent les Tunisiens car ils se rapprochent des US, du cinéma, c'est juste pour mieux cacher leurs copinage secret avec les américains (pétrole, sécuritaire toz l'ANP garante de la souveraineté) une diversion

Eurasia Future a écrit:: Trump’s “Prosper Africa” Strategy Is An Admission Of Defeat But Also A Wily Trap - Eurasia Future

National Security Advisor John Bolton recently announced the Trump Administration’s new “Prosper Africa” strategy, which is basically a tacit admission of defeat acknowledging that the US’ objectives there haven’t been achieved since the end of the Old Cold War, but it’s also a wily trap for encouraging China and Russia to overextend themselves in this resource-rich but high-risk continent as the Great Power competition between the unipolar and multipolar blocs heats up all across the “Global South”.

Acknowledging Defeat

The Trump Administration officially promulgated its “Prosper Africa” strategy on Thursday after National Security Advisor John Bolton presented it to an exclusive audience at the neoconservative Heritage Foundation think tank, and it basically boils down to a continental application of the “Trump Doctrine’s” America First policy in Africa’s contemporary geopolitical and economic conditions. Bolton emphasized that the US’ new approach will focus on trade and commercial relations, anti-terrorist cooperation, and the effective and efficient disbursement of aid (including to various peacekeeping missions), all of which will openly promote America’s agenda in Africa. As much as he probably hated to admit it, Bolton was forced to acknowledge that the US has failed to achieve its objectives in this part of the world since the end of the Old Cold War and that this has therefore created opportunities for his country’s Chinese and Russian Great Power competitors to become powerful forces in Africa.

The Sore Loser

Bolton spends a lot of time lamenting how China’s economic influence has extended all across the continent, attacking the Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) with the typical infowar accusations that it’s ensnared partner countries into so-called “debt traps” and confirming the author’s April 2018 forecast that the US will obsessively focus on how this has supposedly affected the geostrategic landlocked state of Zambia. In addition, the National Security Advisor draws a line in the sand by starkly saying that “the balance of power in the Horn of Africa—astride major arteries of maritime trade between Europe, the Middle East, and South Asia—would shift in favor of China” if Djibouti transfers control of a port terminal to the People’s Republic. As for Russia, Bolton accuses it of “corrupt economic dealings”, “selling arms and energy in exchange for votes at the United Nations”, and “continuing to extract natural resources from the region for its own benefit.”

Fake News Frenzy

In other words, the US’ repeated failures in the two and a half decades since the end of the Old Cold War enabled China to emerge as Africa’s leading economic partner while Russia is making inroads in becoming a reliable provider of security in exchange for extraction contracts, with both Great Powers complementing one another’s multipolar activities to collectively break the unipolar monopoly that had previously controlled the continent. Bolton believes that Chinese and Russian activities “stunt economic growth in Africa; threaten the financial independence of African nations; inhibit opportunities for U.S. investment; interfere with U.S. military operations; and pose a significant threat to U.S. national security interests”, but only the last-mentioned is true. African economic growth is exploding; countries have diversified their financial partnerships; US monopolies finally face competition; and the US is voluntarily scaling back its military activities in Africa in order to focus on more directly “containing” China and Russia in their home regions.

The Sino-Russo Threat To American Hegemony

The only reason why any of this could be interpreted as “a significant threat” is because the US can no longer interfere in African affairs as much as it would currently like to do in order to offset the Chinese-African Strategic Partnership that lies at the core of China’s future success. The 21st-century geopolitics of the emerging Multipolar World Order are such that China needs African markets, labor, and resources in order to secure its continued growth, stability, and ultimate rise as a global superpower, hence the win-win relationship between the two whereby China helps develop Africa in exchange for obtaining reliable access to its natural and human resources. Regarding Russia, its Afro-Eurasian “balancing” act has a considerable chance of succeeding if Moscow combines its recent security gains with its plans to connect the continent via its involvement in the West-East and North-South Trans-African Railways and then diplomatically balances the two emerging “blocs” in the modern-day “Scramble for Africa”.

“Prosper Africa”

In response to its self-evident failures over the decades, the US is now putting forth the so-called “Prosper Africa” strategy as its intended solution, though Bolton was very vague about what exactly it entails and the instruments that will be employed for executing it. Representing a businessman-turned-president, he clearly understands the need for his country to support American investments in Africa and make competitive bids for countering Chinese infrastructure projects. Concurrent with this, Bolton spoke about “strengthening the rule of law”, and it’s here where he may have hinted at the real methods that his country will utilize in pursuit of its interests. Recalling the rampant corruption in all levels of most African governments and the way in which the US exposed this in Brazil to facilitate a “constitutional-electoral coup” through the NSA-backed “Operation Car Wash”, America might resort to using its national infowar strategy for catalyzing similar Hybrid War outcomes all across Africa.

The Wily Trap

In the New Cold War context, this simply means that Chinese- and Russian-friendly governments could be undermined “from below” after NGO-affiliated “grassroots activists” collaborate (whether knowingly or not) with US intelligence services to spread supposed proof of corrupt practices and other “politically compromising” material across society in an effort to encourage a Color Revolution, “constitutional-electoral coup”, and/or an Unconventional War that would increase the security costs and overall strategic risks of multipolar investments in these targeted states. By taking a step back and somewhat “withdrawing” under the pretext of saving the American taxpayers more money, including by pulling out support for certain UN peacekeeping missions, the US ipso facto forces China and Russia to take on more multidimensional responsibilities in Africa before they’re ready, which could bait them into “mission creep” and its quagmire consequences if they aren’t careful. At the same time, however, this wily trap could also backfire if China and Russia succeed in replacing the US.

Concluding Thoughts

The “Prosper Africa” strategy that was just unveiled by the US is a lot wilier than it first appears because it initially seems to be nothing more than a long-overdue acknowledgement that America’s previous approach to the continent has failed and that the country is therefore going to scale back its military involvement there in exchange for reprioritizing more cost-effective economic engagement. While that’s veritably true, observers nevertheless shouldn’t be deceived into thinking that the US is surrendering its previous hegemonic position, let alone without a fight. What America’s actually doing is preparing a trap for its Chinese and Russian competitors by baiting them into “mission creep” through a combination of security vacuums (after possibly pulling out support for some peacekeeping missions) and forthcoming US-backed infowar-driven “anti-corruption” Color Revolution unrest in some of their partnered states. The outcome of this gambit is still far from certain, but what’s clear is that the New Cold War has now officially spread to Africa.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Les nôtres arriveraient-ils à s'y insérer?? et jusqu'à quelle limite devrions-nous tourner le dos aux français??

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Comme pour le Millenium Challenge de Bush ( décidément ces plans de developpement sont l'appanache des Républicains) je pense que le Maroc peut s'amarer pour financer l'INDH

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AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités - Page 8 Marche12

Oui sûrement. Le MAC de bush avait permis l'acquisition des F16...c'est des subventions déguisées en faveur des produits US. Le maroc vient d'ouvrir la porte au boeuf et oeufs US et des contrats militaires sont dans le pipe.

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Eurasia Future a écrit:: Sudan Might Be The Next Geopolitical Victim Of The New Cold War

The North African state of Sudan is currently experiencing serious Hybrid War unrest as it attempts to gradually transition from the Saudi-led camp to the Turkish-Qatari one, and the geopolitical fate of this beleaguered but strategically positioned country will have serious implications for the future of multipolarity in Africa.

Sudan, no stranger to externally provoked conflicts within its borders, is once again suffering from serious Hybrid War unrest as a violent anti-government protest movement exploded onto the national scene over the past week. The North African country had recently invited Russia to construct the segments of the North-South and East-West Trans-African Railways that are expected to traverse through its territory and President Bashir just paid the first-ever visit of an Arab head of state to Syria since that country’s conflict first broke out almost eight years ago, making many observers suspect that the timing of the latest destabilization attempt wasn’t coincidental.

Before going any further, it needs to be objectively recognized that there are genuine socio-economic concerns in Sudan that created the preexisting political conditions that foreign actors are presently exploiting. This means that the blame for the latest turmoil should be partially shared by the government for its many shortcomings, the so-called “international community” for failing to support the country after going along with the US’ decades-long policy of “isolating” it, and the external elements that are actively provoking violence there. This already complex situation is further complicated by the context in which it’s occurring.

It’s one thing for the impoverished masses to protest against their dismal socio-economic conditions and another thing entirely for them to do so violently by torching the local headquarters of the ruling party like they did in the strategic railway hub of Atbara, which was meant to interfere with the rest of the country’s access to the outside world via the nearby Red Sea coastal city of Port Sudan and potentially exacerbate the national crisis. On top of that, an opposition leader returned to the country after self-imposed exile around the same time and openly called for regime change, which proves that an incipient Color Revolution is indeed underway.

Whoever the foreign forces behind this unrest may be, they aren’t targeting Sudan only because of its economic cooperation with Russia and political support to Syria since these are relatively recent developments whereas the ongoing developments evidently took some time to plan beforehand. The real reason why Sudan is under Hybrid War attack is because it’s gradually transitioning from the Saudi-led camp to the Turkish-Qatari one in what is increasingly becoming one of the New Cold War’s most impactful “defections” because of the far-reaching consequences that it could have for multipolarity.

Sudan’s geostrategic position makes it indispensable to China’s Silk Road vision for Africa, but it’s also of premier attractiveness for Turkey too after Ankara clinched a deal almost exactly 12 months ago to rebuild the Red Sea port of Suakin. This alarmed the GCC for a few reasons, not least of which is because Turkey is allied with Saudi Arabia and the UAE’s Qatari nemesis but also because Sudan is supposed to be their military ally in the War on Yemen. Khartoum reiterated its commitment to that conflict just a few days ago but then Qatar extended its full support to Sudan right afterwards.

There’s no doubt that Sudan is trying to realign itself away from the GCC and closer to Turkey and Qatar, both of which are very close to Russia nowadays too, and it shouldn’t be forgotten that Khartoum invited Moscow to build a naval base along its coast during President Bashir’s meeting last year in Moscow with his Russian counterpart. He even warned during that time that the US wants to balkanize his country into five separate parts, a scenario that might be in the process of happening if the current Hybrid War unrest isn’t properly dealt with before it acquires critical mass and passes the point of no return.

Another point to keep in mind is that Sudan is actively cooperating with Russia in seeking to broker a political solution to the long-running conflict in the neighboring Central African Republic (CAR) where Moscow is militarily involved in an indirect capacity per UNSC approval. Although the Khartoum peace process earlier this year didn’t yield any tangible results, it was nevertheless a step in the right direction, one which might be endangered if Sudan continues to slide further into chaos and ultimately becomes a failed state. That could have profoundly negative implications for the CAR’s fledgling peace process and might reverse the progress over the past year.

Altogether, the destabilization of Sudan could undermine China’s Silk Road connectivity plans for Africa as well as spill over into the neighboring countries of CAR, South Sudan, and Ethiopia, all of which are currently struggling with various degrees of unrest of as it is. Russia and Turkey’s strategic interests in the Red Sea region and their Sudanese gateway into the Sahel could also be jeopardized, as could the foothold that Qatar is trying to establish on the other side of the Arabian Peninsula. While the GCC might lose a valuable military ally in the War on Yemen, Sudan’s collapse could conceivably be to their benefit if it spoils Turkey and Qatar’s plans.

That’s not to say that the GCC has a direct hand in what’s happening just because of a superficial interpretation of the “qui bono” principle, but just that it’s nevertheless capable of turning Sudan’s deepening destabilization into a relative advantage when compared to the strategic losses that China, Russia, Turkey, and Qatar would receive in that scenario. Likewise, Sudan’s successful reorientation away from the GCC would comparatively harm their interests much more than the aforementioned states’, which stand to gain in the event that this happens. Considering this, it’s clear to see that Sudan has suddenly become a country of consequence in the New Cold War.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Citation :: Le président du Gabon s'exprime de Rabat pour la première fois depuis sa convalescence

Le président gabonais Ali Bongo Ondimba, victime d'un accident vasculaire cérébral le 24 octobre, s'est exprimé pour la première fois depuis le début de sa convalescence, dans une vidéo enregistrée à Rabat, au Maroc, et diffusée lundi soir par les médias gabonais et les réseaux sociaux.
"Il est vrai que j'ai traversé une période difficile, comme cela arrive parfois dans la vie", a-t-il dit lors de ses voeux du Nouvel An.
Le président gabonais est en convalescence au Maroc depuis fin novembre.
Ali Bongo y apparaît de face, le visage marqué par un strabisme. Son élocution est fluide, sa tête et ses mains bougent légèrement.
"Aujourd'hui, comme vous pouvez le constater, je vais mieux, et me prépare à vous retrouver très vite", a ajouté M. Bongo.
"Ce discours est la preuve que le président Ali Bongo est totalement rétabli. Ses ennuis de santé sont désormais derrière lui", a indiqué le porte-parole de la présidence, Ike Ngouoni.
En deux mois, seule une photo du président et deux vidéos, sans son, tournées à Rabat, avaient été diffusées.
Ces images n'avaient pas rassuré de nombreux Gabonais sur les capacités physiques et intellectuelles du président.
L'opposition et la société civile avaient demandé à la Cour constitutionnelle de déclarer une vacance du pouvoir, conformément à la Constitution.
La vacance n'a pas été déclarée par la Cour constitutionnelle, qui a transféré en partie des pouvoirs du président au Premier ministre et au vice-président.
L'absence du président Ali Bongo a également favorisé les tensions internes au sein du pouvoir gabonais, selon des analystes politiques gabonais.
(Source : Agence AFP)

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AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités - Page 8 Signat10

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Mar 1 Jan 2019 - 0:32

Samyadams a écrit:

Citation :: Le président du Gabon s'exprime de Rabat pour la première fois depuis sa convalescence

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 8:46

Coup d'etat en cours au GABON

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 8:58

Oui j'ai vu ça sur Twitter. Des militaires ont pris la radio nationale, lecture d'un communiqué... a l'africaine quoi.

Putain le Gabon c'est un allié solide.

Edit : Sur Twitter il y a un suivi complet, la partie de l'armée fidèle a Bongo encercle le siège de la radio nationale, et tire sur les putchistes a l'intérieur. Les putchistes répliquent.

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 9:07

C'est trés light comme Coup d'Etat, les pushiste vont se faire laminer...

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AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités - Page 8 Marche12

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 9:17

RED BISHOP a écrit:: C'est trés light comme Coup d'Etat, les pushiste font se faire laminer...

Sur Twitter certains disent que ce sont les americains qui sont derrière ce coup d'État. Ils ont fait le déploiement de militaires dernièrement au Gabon, pour selon eux sécurisé la frontière avec la RDC élections etc

Les americains sont capables de le faire. On ne sait pas clairement ce qui se passe la bas, certains disent que l'armée a pris le pouvoir. Le chef des putchiste et un commandant de la Garde Républicaine.

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 9:23

Rien du tout.
Sur RFI, la Présidence annonce que la ville est sous controle.

Confirmé sur twitter, on y voit l'armée gabonaise se déployer et encerclé la Radio ou se trouvent les rebelles. Certain disent meme qu'un hélicoptère a ouvert le feu dessus.

Ce coup d'Etat a foirer

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AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités - Page 8 Marche12

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 9:58

Le GIGN Gabonais a lancé l'assault dans la Maison de la Radio, les mutins ont était arreter. C'est fini

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AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités - Page 8 Marche12

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 10:01

Il ya deriere cela une guerre totale pour l'influance sur l'afrique entre les US et la France.
L'afrique constitue encore un gouffre de ressources inepuisable pour certains pays europeans, l'enjeu a long terme est d'affaiblir le concurent UE et couper les voies commerciales de l'autre concurent chinois.
L'ue doit connaitre ses vrais ennemis.

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 18:45

Citation :: 07.01.2019

Gabon : le putsch fait pschitt mais la reprise en main s’annonce violente

Le putsch des bérets verts gabonais a fait long feu. Six heures après la diffusion d’un message radiophonique annonçant la création d’un "Conseil national de restauration", les forces loyalistes ont repris le contrôle de Libreville.

Le lieutenant Kelly Ondo Obiang, dirigeant d’un autoproclamé Mouvement patriotique des jeunes des forces de défense et de sécurité du Gabon (MPJFDS), a été arrêté, ainsi que la poignée de militaires putschistes. Ces soldats entendaient évincer le président Bongo et remplacer les institutions "illégitimes et illégales".

Ali Bongo, qui est âgé de 59 ans et qui est au pouvoir depuis 2009, a été hospitalisé le 24 octobre après avoir été victime d’un AVC lors d’une conférence économique en Arabie Saoudite. Hospitalisé plusieurs jours à l’hôpital Roi Fayçal de Ryad, il a poursuivi sa convalescence au Maroc, laissant son vice-président exercer le pouvoir en son absence sur décision de la Cour constitutionnelle. Le 31 décembre, le président Bongo a pris la parole pour la première fois depuis son hospitalisation. Cette prise de parole, peu fluide, était pour le MPJFDS une "honte" pour un "pays (qui) a perdu sa dignité". D’où la décision d’un putsch et d’un appel au "peuple afin de sauver le Gabon du chaos".

L’échec de ce putsch, putsch certainement téléguidé, risque de provoquer une sérieuse reprise en main par le camp supposé être évincé.

En effet, l’entourage d’Ali Bongo est divisé, chacun revendiquant l’héritage politique et financier du Président. "Un clan des durs rassemble plusieurs généraux et conseillers autour de Frédéric Bongo, le frère du Président et chef des services de renseignements", confiait en novembre un connaisseur des arcanes gabonais. "Il s’oppose au clan rassemblant le directeur de cabinet Brice Laccruche, la Première dame et des membres du Mouvement des amis d’Ali Bongo Ondimba".

L’enjeu est de taille : le pouvoir politique au Gabon, la fortune personnelle du chef de l’État (460 millions d’euros) et, plus largement, "toute l’économie du Gabon sous la coupe d’Ali et de Pascaline", sa soeur, selon Gilles Gaetner, l’auteur d’un récent Pilleurs d’Afrique.

En décembre, c’est le Franco-Gabonais Brice Laccruche, directeur de cabinet d’Ali Bongo depuis 2017, qui a été visé par des accusations de tripatouillage et de fraudes et traité d'"escroc vénal obsédé par l’argent et le pouvoir". Laccruche a riposté lors de ses vœux, dénonçant "les professionnels de la polémique, ainsi que les sycophantes modernes qui font profession de la calomnie et de la diffamation". Qui visait-il ? Certainement Frédéric Bongo, le chef des services de renseignements, qui aimerait bien que le pouvoir reste aux mains du clan Bongo. Un clan qui contrôle pouvoir et économie depuis 1967.

Simultanément a été établie et dénoncée la présence à Libreville d’une douzaine de Français, anciens militaires proches des Services français. La présence de ce "mystérieux commando français" a fait polémique. Certains ont pensé que cette présence n’avait pas pu échapper aux Services gabonais et à leur chef, Frédéric Bongo. Mais celui-ci aurait découvert le déploiement de cette équipe chargée, prétendument, d’un audit de sécurité commanditée par le porte-parole de la présidence gabonaise, Ike Ngouoni, lui-même aux ordres de Brice Laccruche. Le chef de cette équipe française, Stephan Privat, a été interpellé et interrogé par les services gabonais avant d’être relâché.

Encore une fois, le scénario s'organise autour de la rivalité entre Frédéric Bongo et Brice Laccruche.

Les machettes de sortie

La "drôle de guerre" de succession d’Ali Bongo a donc pris fin et la vraie guerre a démarré. Elle va opposer deux camps qui ont tout à perdre ou tout à gagner.

L’enquête qui va suivre, après le pitoyable putsch de ce lundi, pourrait bien dévoiler les responsabilités des uns et des autres et porter un coup fatal à l’un des clans qui se battent pour la "présidence bis" du petit pays pétrolier où la France garde toujours une (la?) main et s'immisce dans les affaires les plus intimes de l'Etat.

http://lignesdedefense.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2019/01/07/gabon -le-putsch-fait-pschitt-mais-la-reprise-en-main-s-anno-19924.html

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 18:52

Si Trump et son constipé de conseiller, Bolton, commencent à mener des opérations de -regime change-, dans nos pré-carrés africains, nos investissements et nos alliances au sein de l'UA, seraient sévèrement en danger..

EurasiaFuture a écrit:: Trump’s Gabonese Bait-And-Switch Might Have Been An AFRICOM Coup Attempt

Trump’s deployment of 80 military personnel to Gabon last week on the basis of preparing for a response to “violent protests” in the nearby Democratic Republic of the Congo might have been a ruse designed to cover up America’s complicity in the Gabonese coup attempt that just took place at the beginning of this week, which was actually an ingenious AFRICOM power grab in the strategic Gulf of Guinea that aims to give the US a base of operations from which to carve out an expanded “sphere of influence” for itself in the region irrespective if this regime change ploy succeeds or not.

Just a day after confirming the assassination of the USS Cole bomber in Yemen, Trump tried to score a second foreign policy success in yet another “Global South” nation, this time the Central African state of Gabon. The news just broke that some members of the country’s armed forces attempted to stage a coup against President Ali Bongo, who’s been recovering in Morocco over the last few months after suffering a stroke back in October, though the government claims that most of the conspirators have been arrested and that the “situation is under control”. Even though it appears as though the state succeeded in thwarting this plot, the US is still poised to geopolitical profit from it by manipulating the outcome to its AFRICOM favor.

Background Basics About Gabon

Bongo narrowly won reelection by less than 6,000 votes, which was used by the opposition as their excuse to torch their parliament in the historically peaceful country and bring it to the brink of Hybrid War chaos. The author wrote about the developing crisis at the time in his piece about “What’s Going On With The Hybrid War On Gabon”, in which some important domestic and foreign policy basics about the country were also described. Gabon had been ruled by the Bongo family since the President’s father took power in 1967, or in other words, 7 years after its independence. It had previously been regarded as one of France’s most prized neo-colonial “possessions” in the continent and was known to be very rich in natural resources, which is why it was an OPEC member from 1975-1995 before returning again in 2016, one year after it interestingly joined the Saudis’ “anti-terrorist coalition”.

It might sound strange to many that a majority-Christian nation on the Atlantic Coast of sub-Saharan Central Africa would join this Mideast-based military organization, but one of the reasons might be because Bongo is a member of Gabon’s Muslim minority and that he might have fallen sway to the Saudis’ “personal diplomacy” in wooing his country over to their side. Another complementary explanation could also simply be that Gabon had begun “rebalancing” its foreign policy during that time too, having transitioned from being a French neo-colonial “possession” to a more sovereignty-minded state following its post-Old Cold War partnership with China, though prudently understanding the need for a third strategic partner in order to maintain the best possible “balance” between Africa’s two most important non-regional countries during the opening stages of the New Cold War.

Apart from its energy, fishery, and forestry resources, Gabon is also very important for geostrategic reasons, too. As the author wrote in his previously mentioned piece when describing why France retains nearly 1,000 troops in this tiny country, “Paris is able to keep troops on standby for snap-response deployment to Central African hotspots such as the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Additionally, because of its location, Gabon provides France with a midway location between the two rising African powers of Nigeria and Angola, a position which Paris could leverage to maximum effect if need be.” Presciently, it was for the “official” purpose of responding to “violent demonstrations” that might break out in the nearby Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) (which is the world’s largest producer of cobalt) after its latest elections that Trump deployed 80 US troops there last week.

The Purpose Of The American Deployment

In hindsight, his signaling about these soldiers being in the Central African nation to supposedly respond to “violent demonstrations” in the DRC might have been nothing more than a ruse to cover up their role in trying to deter the same in Gabon following what is more than likely the AFRICOM-assisted coup attempt that just took place in the country. The true state of the situation still remains unclear, though it’s beginning to look like the government did indeed arrest most of the conspirators and that everything is now under control. Nevertheless, the domestic strife that Gabon experienced two and a half years ago during its last elections could have also been in the process of simmering over once more following rumors about Bongo’s health, which might have prompted the armed forces to preemptively act in the first place seeing as how the organizers declared their sympathy with the opposition supporters who were killed during those riots.

The presence of US soldiers on the superficially plausible pretense of preparing to evacuate Americans from the DRC in the event that the nearby conflict-prone country re-erupts into violence following the impending announcement of its election results might just have been to signal the US’ tacit support to the plotters and deter Bongo loyalists from reacting, the latter purpose of which seems to have failed. The US didn’t want to get too directly involved because it wagered that it could leverage its position in the country irrespective of the coup’s outcome. As such, this event is of supreme significance for AFRICOM because the US now has a reason to further embed itself in this strategically positioned country along the energy-rich Gulf of Guinea, which is also surrounded by several weak but similarly strategic states presided over by long-serving elderly leaders and each of which have recently experienced different degrees of domestic unrest.

To put it another way, the US deployment might have been ‘bait’ to encourage the coup plotters to go ahead with their attempt, after which the US could take advantage of its outcome one way or another in order to get Gabon to function as AFRICOM’s long-desired base in the continent. On the one hand, had the coup succeeded, then the US could have partnered with the “pariah” government that would have naturally been shunned by the African Union and most other international actors, helping it stabilize the domestic situation and resume a sense of “normality” as soon as possible. On the other, despite the apparent success of the government forces in quelling this coup, this dramatic incident might have shown the state that its domestic political tensions are still simmering and now affecting part of its “deep state” apparatus, thus necessitating the need for another security partner such as the US to maintain stability in case something like this happens again.

Either way, the US is poised to profit from what happened in order to pursue its regional agenda.

Here’s What Gabon Has Going For It

In The Middle Of All The Action:

Like it was mentioned earlier in pertinence to the author’s previously cited piece on Gabon, the country is in very close proximity to rising African Great Powers Nigeria and Angola, as well as the mineral-rich DRC. Furthermore, it’s also just a short distance away from the Central African Republic (CAR), which has taken on more importance over the past 12 months since Russia’s UNSC-approved “mercenary” intervention there, which forms the core component of Moscow’s “balancing” strategy in Africa. Given that France has all but lost CAR as a neo-imperial colony and could very well be in the process of losing Gabon too following the coup, it can be said that the “Scramble for Africa” that the author predicted would intensify this year is leading to profound geopolitical changes in the Central African region whereby the former extra-regional hegemon of France is being squeezed out by Russia, the US, and China.

Surrounded By Aging Leaders:

Another crucial point to keep in mind is that the surrounding countries of Cameroon, the Republic of the Congo (ROC), and Equatorial Guinea are led by aging leaders who have recently come under different forms of regime change pressure. The first-mentioned is led by Paul Biya (who has been in office for 36 consecutive years) and is unofficially in a state of civil war between the central government and the Anglophone region astride part of the Nigerian border, the second is led by Denis Nguesso (who has been in office for 34 non-consecutive years – 13 years and 21 years, with a 5-year interim break) and only recently reconsolidated peace in the restive southern Pool region outside the capital, while the last-mentioned is led by Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo (who has been in office for 39 years) and recently thwarted a mercenary-led coup attempt last year.

Hybrid War Staging Ground:

In terms of regional Hybrid War dynamics, Gabon is therefore the perfect place for the US to encourage and guide regime change movements all throughout Central Africa, ultimately carving out an exclusive “sphere of influence” for itself in the eastern Gulf of Guinea from which to exert further influence into the West, Central, and Southern African countries of Nigeria, DRC, and Angola if it’s successful in turning the country into AFRICOM’s base of operations on the continent. Should that happen, then the newly imposed authorities will probably justify this move on the basis of “balancing” even though it’ll obviously be pivoting towards the US and away from France, China, and Saudi Arabia. AFRICOM doesn’t even have to be formally invited into the country either for this to happen, the US just needs to keep its proverbial ‘foot in the door’ and the rest might ‘naturally’ follow.

Concluding Thoughts

The Gabonese coup attempt caught a lot of observers off guard, but in hindsight, the “writing was on the wall” the whole time and two important signals were sent beforehand that could have tipped people off about it. Bongo’s New Year’s address to the people, recorded from Morocco where he’s currently recovering from his October stroke, showed that he’s still somewhat physically incapacitated and unable to rule the country following his controversial razor-thin reelection in 2016 that represented almost a full half-century of dynastic rule by his family. The dispatch of 80 US troops there late last week on the pretense of preparing to respond to post-election violence in the nearby DRC was clearly a ruse because Gabon doesn’t even border the country in question, with it now looking that those soldiers’ very presence was designed to encourage the plotters and deter the state from reacting.

Although the latest reports suggest that the government has reestablished full control over the situation, the coup attempt in and of itself is still a success for American foreign policy irrespective of its outcome because the US is now poised to manipulate its result in order to advance its own interests. A “revolutionary government” would have been internationally shunned and fully dependent on the US, while the recovering state might see the US as an important security partner that plays a crucial role in its “balancing” strategy. In both cases, the deepening US-Gabonese relationship would amount more to a pivot than an evolution of the Central African state’s “balancing” act, as an embedding of the US’ military forces in the country will inevitably have regional repercussions.

While a comparatively prosperous and resource-rich country of approximately two million people is a strategic prize in and of itself for any Great Power to “capture” in the New Cold War’s “Scramble for Africa”, Gabon’s deeper significance lays in its geopolitical position in between the rising African Great Powers of Nigeria and Angola, its proximity to the conflict-prone DRC and CAR (where the US’ Chinese and Russian rivals are the predominant patrons of those states, respectively), and its location in the middle of three weaker countries under the leadership of aging presidents who have experienced varying degrees of domestic unrest lately. It’s too early to say whether the Gabonese coup attempt will be a game-changer or not, but it’s obvious that American strategists intend for it to be for the aforementioned reasons, which if successful in full or even part would signify the return of Africa to the US’ international focus.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

Sujet: Re: AFRIQUE - toutes l'actualités Ven 11 Jan 2019 - 15:38

Grant T. Harris - Foreign Affairs a écrit:: Trump’s Africa Policy Is Destined for Failure

The Wrong Way to Counter China
In a speech at the Heritage Foundation, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton announced a new U.S. Africa strategy. Bolton wants to advance U.S. trade and investment, suppress terrorism and conflict, and ensure that U.S. aid is well spent. At its heart, however, the strategy is about countering China. Bolton attacked Beijing for its “predatory” practices in Africa and vowed a determined response.

The administration is right to worry about Beijing’s aggressive diplomacy in Africa, and Bolton’s speech provided a welcome vision after two years of listless U.S. policy toward the continent. But the new strategy misses the mark. While the Trump administration focuses on the commercial threat from China, Beijing is investing in long-term relationships, not just trade and infrastructure. The United States needs to offer African countries a compelling alternative if it is to counter China.

THE CHINA CHALLENGE
The United States is right to be concerned about Chinese investment in Africa. According to the consulting firm McKinsey, more than 10,000 Chinese companies now do business on the continent, earning approximately $180 billion each year. Although the United States still has more foreign direct investment stock in Africa, Chinese investment in the region is growing fast. It more than doubled in 2016 alone. In 2009, China overtook the United States to become Africa’s biggest trading partner.

As Bolton noted, part of Beijing’s strategy has been to extend large loans with opaque terms to African countries, giving China leverage over national governments. But the Trump administration is wrong to cast Chinese commercial activity as all bad: in many cases, Chinese investment spurs growth by providing capital and much-needed infrastructure. According to the African Development Bank, African states need to invest $68 billion to $108 billion more each year in infrastructure to boost growth and need to create enough jobs for their booming populations. So it is understandable that African leaders welcome Beijing’s interest and deep pockets.

For its part, the Trump administration has been largely adrift when it comes to Africa policy. It has engaged little with African leaders. It has been slow to appoint people to Africa-related posts. And White House budgets have sought major cuts to the agencies that carry out U.S. policy on the continent. Nonetheless, the specter of Chinese investment edging out American businesses has had an effect. In October, U.S. President Donald Trump signed bipartisan legislation creating a new development finance institution with $60 billion to support U.S. companies in Africa and elsewhere. That new agency is sure to form one of the greatest legacies of the Trump administration.

As important as it is for the United States to invest in Africa, Washington shouldn’t see China’s activity as just about economics. Beijing is also deepening its political, cultural, and military ties to African countries. The Chinese Communist Party holds regular exchanges with numerous ruling African political parties. China now hosts more African university students than the United States does, runs nearly 50 institutes to teach Mandarin and Chinese culture in Africa, and is investing billions of dollars to expand China’s state-run news media in African markets. China also sells more weapons to African countries than it used to, is working more closely with African governments on military training and exercises, and contributes more to peacekeeping missions. Bolton noted China’s new military base in Djibouti, which sits just miles from the most important U.S. military base in Africa, but he overlooked China’s broader strategy to build relationships—and the influence that comes with them.

Because it has conceived U.S.-African relations so narrowly, the Trump administration has failed to offer a compelling alternative to China. The administration has made clear that it opposes terrorism, ineffective aid and peacekeeping missions, and Chinese and Russian influence. Those are reasonable positions, but they add up to a short-sighted and reactive vision, unbecoming of the United States. Having decided what it is against, the Trump administration needs to decide what it is for.

Previous administrations of both parties have gone beyond narrow self-interest when it comes to Africa by seeking to strengthen democratic institutions, defend human rights, fight disease, and support promising young leaders. But this time, even the positive aspects of Bolton’s new strategy, such as the commitment to deepening trade and investment ties, are plainly means to an end: competing with China.

Placing relations with Africa into a United States-vs-China frame is a mistake. It will alienate African audiences bysuggesting that they are simply pawns in a great power rivalry. This perception has plagued the West’s relationships with Africa for decades; embedding it in U.S. policy would be disastrous. Although China’s claims of mutually respectful, “win-win” cooperation are hackneyed and often wrong, they will resonate more than the Trump administration’s message: “We care about you because we hate Beijing.”

Worse still, there appears to be little substance behind the administration’s rhetoric. Achieving even the Trump administration’s limited aims will require more than the administration seems prepared to offer, which is confined to potential trade agreements and an inchoate initiative to support U.S. investment in Africa. It’s also difficult to take the Trump administration seriously given its poor record on Africa so far. To name just a few missteps, Trump has downsized a flagship exchange program for young African leaders, reportedly referred to African nations as “shithole” countries, threatened massive cuts to health and other aid programs, and left key ambassadorships unfilled. Although China’s growing interest in Africa long predates this administration, the Trump administration’s policies have undercut U.S. ties and ceded space for greater Chinese (and Russian) engagement. The new U.S. Africa strategy has no hope of succeeding unless Washington fixes the harm it has already done.

AFRICAN DREAMS

The United States should be motivated to engage African states for the same reason China is: Africa’s economic and political clout is growing fast. The continent boasts a young, burgeoning population, which, by 2050, will make up one-quarter of the world’s people and workforce. Buoyed by some of the fastest-growing economies in the world, Africa’s annual consumer and business spending is expected to total $6.7 trillion by 2030. In the long run, U.S. economic competitiveness will increasingly depend on American businesses being able to succeed in Africa, and on African consumers being interested in purchasing American goods and services.

African states are valuable political partners, too. They can help the United States stem flows of cash to terrorist groups, halt nuclear proliferation, and enforce sanctions against North Korea, which maintains economic ties with around 25 African states. China is already using its ties with African governments to support its foreign policy goals, including isolating Taiwan and voting down UN resolutions critical of Beijing’s human rights record.

The new development finance agency is an excellent first move, but Washington will never beat Beijing at its own game: an all-out commercial, political, and cultural campaign led by the state. The United States should differentiate itself from China by staying true to its founding ideals. Only by standing up for democracy, human rights, and economic freedom can the United States both outcompete China and convince African audiences that the United States is the better ally. Not only are these values worth protecting in their own right; they matter for economic competition, too, since how countries are governed shapes their economies—and China is working to rig the system. Halting China’s rise in Africa will take a far more ambitious U.S. strategy than the Trump administration has offered.

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Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.

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