quand la chine s'éveillera le monde tremblera

Citation :

Former Northrop Grumman engineer found guilty of selling defense secrets

Read more: Former Northrop Grumman engineer found guilty of selling defense secrets - Pacific Business News (Honolulu)

Noshir Gowadia, a Maui resident and former Northrop Grumman Corp. engineer, could spend the rest of his life in prison after he was found guilty Monday of selling secret defense information to China.
A federal jury found Gowadia, 66, guilty on 13 of 16 counts that accused the former defense contractor of willfully communicating classified national defense information to China. Gowadia also was found guilty of filing false tax returns in 2001 and 2002, and for money laundering.
Gowadia will be sentenced Nov. 22 by Chief U.S. District Judge Susan Oki Mollway. He faces a maximum life imprisonment on the two counts of communicating the classified information to China. The other counts carry sentences ranging from three to 10 years.
The jury, which deliberated for six days, acquitted Gowadia on three counts of illegally communicating information to China. The trial lasted 40 days.
Gowadia was arrested in October 2005 after prosecutors said he assisted China in the development of a cruise missile system. He was accused of traveling to China six times between July 2003 and June 2005 to help develop a stealth exhaust nozzle for the missiles and was paid at least $100,000.
Gowadia was an engineer with Northrop Grumman Corp. from 1968 to 1986 and contributed to the development of the propulsion system of the B-2 Spirit bomber, commonly referred to as the Stealth bomber. He worked on classified matters as a contractor with the U.S. government until his security clearance was terminated in 1997, prosecutors said


http://pacific.bizjournals.com/pacific/stories/2010/08/09/daily6.html

YOUPI, les Chinois vont devenir les nouveaux policiers du monde ( l'USA doit prendre un repos bien méritait )

L'Empire américain est loin de s'être définitivement écroulé et la Chine est loin de vouloir assumer une responsabilité de gendarme du monde. Pour l'instant, elle cherche juste à s'assurer de son approvisionnement en énergie et matière premières. Pour le reste, elle compte sur le dynamisme de son économie pour gagner encore plus en poids, avant de prétendre à un rôle plus important dans le monde. Les Chinois sont pragmatiques et patients. Et de par leur histoire, ce n'est pas un peuple de conquérants. Le principal ouvrage militaire de Chine, la grande Muraille, est à vocation essentiellement défensive. Contrairement aux Daïmio japonais, sorte de gouverneurs de régions, qui étaient des samouraïs au sommet de la pyramide de cette ordre militaire, les mandarins chinois étaient des fonctionnaires.
Pour l'instant, ils sont entrain de renforcer leur flotte maritime militaire et songent à sécuriser les voies de passages de leur commerce maritime, avec la création de bases le long du sud de l'Asie, ce qu'ils ont appelé la stratégie du 'collier de perles'

Ta pas tord Samy, même moi je disais cela dans une perspective a moyenne-long termes ( 30-50 ans).

Mais, un peuple (HAN) qui n'est pas conquérant... Rien que le TURKESTAN ORIENTAL LAISSE DIRE QUE C'EST UN PEUPLE EXPANSIONNISTE (ANNEXÉE PAR LA CHINES DANS LES ANNÉES 1940 JE SUPPOSE)


Tout les peuples, a mon avis, veulent annexé son voisins et le contrôlée!!!!

Les Chinois ne sont pas des conquérants dans le sens romain, perse, macédonien, carthaginois, ottoman, mongol, etc, du terme. Cela ne veut pas dire qu'ils n'ont jamais fait la guerre à leurs voisins. Le tracé actuel des frontières de la République populaire de Chine est à peu près celui de l'Empire chinois depuis des siècles. Ça fait des siècles que ses minorités, actuellement en lutte contre Pékin et manipulés par les services secrets occidentaux, faisaient partie de l'Empire. Les Occidentaux ont profité de la décadence de l'Empire pour créer de nouveaux Etats aux confins de la Chine, comme celui du Tibet. Mais tout ceux qui s'intéressent un peu à l'histoire de la Chine savent que ces Etats n'avaient jamais existé auparavant.
C'est au 18 ème siècle que la dynastie des Mandchous a annexé le Turkestan oriental, actuel Xianjiang. En 1940, les Chinois du parti nationaliste 'Kuomintang' n'ont fait que récupérer un territoire qui faisait déjà partie de l'Empire chinois. Comme le Maroc n'a pas occupé, non plus, le sahara occidental en 1975, il n'a fait que récupérer ce qui lui appartenait bien avant que les colonisateurs ne taillent le pays en pièce.

C'est sur Samy, ils ne sont pas comme les mongols ou les romains!!!

La chine est imprévisible et sa les états-unis le savent.Des rumeurs circule que ses tendu entre la chine et la russe et que dans le futur il pourrai avoir un conflit entre ses deux pays .

jer444 a écrit:

La chine est imprévisible et sa les états-unis le savent.Des rumeurs circule que ses tendu entre la chine et la russe et que dans le futur il pourrai avoir un conflit entre ses deux pays .

La Chine est gouverné par des gens très sages, qui savent très bien ce qu'ils font. Ce ne sont peut être pas des démocrates, ni des enfants de choeur, question droits de l'homme, mais ils sont tout, sauf imprévisibles. Les USA et tous les pays occidentaux savent très bien ou la Chine venir. Elle veut redevenir première puissance économique mondiale, comme elle l'a été jusqu'au XVII éme siècle.
Quand aux relations tendues entre la Russie et la Chine, j'aimerai bien connaître tes sources, Jer. Ces deux pays collaborent sur plusieurs projets très importants pour les deux parties, comme celui du gazoduc devant amener du gaz sibérien au marché chinois.
Ils ont plus d'intérêts communs que de sujets de discordes. Quand à se faire la guerre, aucune des classes dirigeantes de deux pays n'est politiquement inconsciente et irresponsable pour se lancer dans une telle folie

La guerre de coree est bien les chinois se sont battu avec les coreen du nord contre les americain donc c'est encore tous chaud les relations entre les etats unis et la chine meme si sa date .Pourquoi les chinois font de l'espionnage industrielle et militaire ? Je pense que c'est pas pour rien .C'est en quelque sorte pour avoir la meilleur armée du monde et meilleur economie mais la chine n' en reste pas la apres je pense que la chine se tourne vers les vastes territoires de la russie.Tous ce que je dis peut venir d'un scenario d'un film catastrophe mais c'est juste une analyse de ma part sur le futur .Je predit ce moment quand le petrole , le gaz manquera et la surpopulation .

lla chine manque de ressource d'energie ainsi de materiaux(fer ,cuivre...),en plus de ca la chine n'est encore qu on phase de l'imitation et pas dans le stade d'invention.

La Chine a déjà commencé à "exporter" son surplus de population à travers le monde, et c'est plus intéressant pour les commerçants qu'ils sont d'être éparpillés en petites communautés à travers le large globe, que de chercher à s'étendre dans un territoire riche et étendue mais hostile à tous les niveaux qu'est la Sibérie. Historiquement, la Chine a toujours été plus portée sur la défense de son territoire que sur les guerres d'expansions, même si elle en a eu. La fameuse muraille de Chine est un ouvrage à vocation défensive dont la construction a été poursuivie par de successives dynasties impériales. C'est dire que cet empire naturel, ou les fonctionnaires ont toujours eu plus de poids que les militaires, n'est pas naturellement porté sur les guerres de conquêtes pour étendre son territoire, déjà suffisamment étendu, mais plutôt sur sa défense.
La Chine a encore plusieurs raisons de renforcer son armée. Récupérer Taïwan est la seule opération militaire offensive qui semble réellement probable. Pour le reste, les Chinois, qui commercent avec le monde entier, cherchent surtout à protéger leur commerce maritime. Et garder un oeil sur leurs frontières ouest, celles dont sont toujours venus les pires ennuis de l'Empire.
Avec les Russes et les Indiens, les Chinois, exemples de pragmatisme, ont bien d'autres projets. Ils savent pertinemment que la puissance américaine est sur le déclin, leur économie physique étant presque entièrement laminée, alors que la Chine est "l'atelier du monde". Que l'Europe, dont les grandes nations ont perdu, de toute manière, leurs puissances il y a bien longtemps, ne se portent pas tellement mieux, pour avoir suivis les Américains et les Britanniques dans leur folie de financiarisation de leurs économies, à effets désindustrialisants. Avec les Russes, et leurs richesses naturelles de la Sibérie et leur niveau technologique de toute manière plus élevé que celui des Chinois, il y a mieux à faire que la guerre. Et avec la dépopulation de la Russie, en plein déclin démographique, pourquoi se battre pour ce que l'on peut obtenir avec le temps par la force des choses ?
Élémentaire mon cher Sun Tzu, aurait dit Famas

Tres bon argument que tu ma envoyer sa va etre dur de te contredir .Mais c'est le futur qui nous le dira

A la lecture d'un ouvrage de stratégie militaire de guerre de 4éme génération rédigé par deux colonels chinois, Qiao et Wang, intitulé "Guerre sans limites", les Occidentaux ont été horrifiés par tout ce que pouvaient imaginer les chinois comme moyens, militaires et non militaires, pour faire la guerre
Il y a toutefois un détail important sur les motivations qui ont poussé la réflexion stratégique chinoise vers la G4G. Les deux colonels, à l'instar de tout l'état major chinois, ont été eux mêmes horrifiés par les capacités technologiques militaires déployés par les USA au cours de la 1ére guerre du Golfe et c'est essentiellement dans une perspective de défense de leur territoire qu'ils ont mené leur réflexion stratégique dans ce sens.
Avec tout ce que leur ont fait voir les pays occidentaux depuis les guerres de l'opium, les Chinois cherchent surtout à s'éviter de nouvelles humiliations. Sinon, ce pays a lui même assez de problèmes internes, autres que sécuritaires, qui ont de quoi occuper le temps de réflexion des dirigeants chinois et absorber les moyens de la Chine pour très longtemps. Ils devraient, par exemple, songer à abandonner Pékin, s'ils n'arrivent pas à stopper la désertification galopante. Ce pays ne va pas tarder à être confronté à des crises écologiques de rare ampleur. Et donc, sanitaires, sociales, économiques, etc.
Les pollueurs finissent toujours par payer, d'une manière ou d'une autre

il y a eu une émission tres interessante sur l'hisotire du pétrole cette semaine sur arte
a voir c'est tres interessant
pour la chine, le principal problème est le manque de capacité à inventer
les relations russo chinoise sont tendues depuis belle lurette, celà va des incidents frontaliers aux
problème d'appropriation par la copie de matériel divers autant civil que militaire
en ce qui concerne le dévelloppement effréné de l'économie,la chine paye deja un lourd tribu
sur le plan écologique(les inondations par exemple) et celà apres des décenies d'imprévoyance
l'écologie n'est pas un sujet interessant pour les chinois
les chinois devraient faire tres attention car la surexploitation des matières premieres va provoquer leurs effondrements rien n'est éternel, ils ont dejà beaucoup de problemes pour l'exploitation du charbon par exemple
enfin un constat,l'armement qui est aujourd'hui acheté par les chinois et ou produit par eux est disproportioné par rapport à leurs besoins propre,les chinois se préparent à la guerre, guerre qui aura pour but de protéger leurs approvisionements en matières premières, comme c'est le cas pour l'Inde ou d'autres puissances
enfin le dernier point dont il faut tenir compte c'et la démographie malgré des mesures tres strictes
la chine comme l'inde ou le pakistan ou comme de nombreux pays africains par exemple ont des démographies énormes non controlées,les besoins augmentent mais les ressources diminuent
de plus en plus de pays ne sont plus capables de produire assez de nourriture pour leurs propres
population et le jeu financier en cours actuellement n'arrange rien
enfin l'"impérialisme américian " celà me fait sourire,de quel imperialisme parlons nous?
l'économique?touts les grands groupes financiers industiels ne sont plus us,mais internationaux
le monde d'aujourd'hui est gouverné par les actionaires de touts bords ,le gouvernement us ne fait qu'agir pour sauvegarder les approvisionements pour le reste, que ce soit en europe aux usa ou ailleurs
les decisions se prennent dans les conseils d'administrations
ce serait peut être bien de mediter sur ce sujet et de revoir un peu le jugement de la situation actuelle et future,vous en pensez quoi?

Sa donne a réflechir, ce que tu dis Thierry!!!

l'inde a ne pas negliger dans le calcul elle entre dans l'equation d'equilibre soit regionnale ou continnetale,autre chose sur l'inde il ne fait pas de copie il invente 'logiciel et autre...'.

Citation :

SEA POWER AND THE CHINESE STATE: CHINA'S MARITIME AMBITIONS

States News Service
States News Service
July 11, 2011
The following information was released by the Heritage Foundation:

Abstract: The expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is in many ways a logical and even forgone conclusion. China is the world's second-largest economy; its heavy dependence on trade inevitably makes the seas of growing importance to national well-being. Yet as China's maritime ambitions continue to expand, the U.S. is faced with a challenging task: recognizing Chinese interests without acceding to Chinese demands. How America meets this challenge will determine the future of the Asia-Pacific region and whether America's maritime dominance will continue through the next century.

For the past several decades, the Chinese military has been steadily improving its operational capabilities. Based in part on lessons learned from observing foreign militaries and foreign wars, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has expanded some of its forces (e.g., the number of ballistic missiles), improved its command and control, and begun implementing joint operations. It has also moved from being centered primarily on ground operations to improving its air and, increasingly, its naval forces.

The expansion of the People's Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is in many ways a logical and even forgone conclusion. China is the world's second-largest economy; its heavy dependence on trade, both for raw materials to fuel that economy and to ship its exports abroad, inevitably makes the seas of growing importance to national well-being. Moreover, throughout the period of "Reform and Opening," begun under Deng Xiaoping, growing emphasis on international trade has shifted China's economic center of gravity to the coast.[1] Maritime defenses are also of increasing importance to the Chinese leadership in a manner that was not true during much of the Cold War.

Not all navies are created equal. Intentions matter as much as-if not more than-capabilities. China's maritime development may simply be aimed at safeguarding its economic lifelines, or it may be intended also to coerce and compel China's neighbors, many of which are also dependent on the seas. China's naval expansion must therefore be carefully and soberly appraised.

China and the Seas: A Growing Dependence

China is often thought of as a continental or land power. Historically, this has generally been the case, although there have been periods of Chinese interest in the seas. The most recent occurred in the 1400s, during the late Ming Dynasty, when Admiral Zheng He (or Cheng Ho) led "treasure fleets" on several expeditions that explored the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean as far as modern-day Mogadishu on the East African coast. When Zheng He returned from his final voyage, though, China turned its back on the seas.

Today's China is far more dependent on the seas than Imperial China ever was. The Chinese note that, since joining the World Trade Organization (WTO), Chinese trade with other nations has steadily expanded as a proportion of national economic activity, to the point where it affects some 60 percent-70 percent of China's economy.[2] Without trade, China could not sustain its economy, let alone maintain the growth rates necessary to maintain high employment figures, a key justification used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to retain power.

Seaborne commerce is an essential part of Chinese trade. According to recent Chinese statistics published in the 2010 China's Ocean Development Report, ocean commerce in 2008 alone represented 9.87 percent of China's gross domestic product, with a valuation of nearly 3 trillion RMB (approximately $456 billion). Moreover, some 85 percent of its international trade moves by the sea lanes. [3]

A key part of this ocean commerce is China's increasing reliance on oil imports to sustain its economy. China imported over half of the oil it consumed in 2009 and is expected to import some 65 percent of its oil consumption by 2020.[4] Much of that oil comes from the Middle East, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, requiring a steady flow of tankers to Chinese ports. Recent problems in Kazakhstan, including the withdrawal of Western oil companies from development of the major Kashagan oil fields on the Caspian Sea, will exacerbate this reliance on Middle East oil and maritime shipping.[5]

China 's Maritime Development Strategy

Given this growing reliance on the sea, the Chinese have concluded that they must develop a strategy to govern their maritime development. According to Chinese analysts, any such strategy must address three considerations:

The broad maritime interests of the People's Republic of China (PRC), which include its growing reliance on the global sea lanes for its trade;

The national security interests of the PRC including access to ocean resources, countering "hegemonic" interference in Chinese affairs, security of the sea lanes, potential for military conflict arising from conflicting claims over maritime frontiers or islands, and the Taiwan issue; and

The need to build a "harmonious society" at sea that recognizes the inevitability of increased global competition for the sea's resources.[6]

With these interests in mind, Chinese maritime strategy is grounded in certain guiding thoughts (zhidao sixiang) and basic principles (jiben yuanze). These begin with the importance of maintaining national control of territory and supporting national interests while staying on Deng Xiaoping's path of "Peace and Development" (i.e., expecting that there will not be a major war any time soon).

Key maritime mission areas for future Chinese development include:

Protecting China's maritime authority over "relevant waters;"

Developing China's maritime economy;

Strengthening ocean use and island management;

Sustaining the ocean environment;

Developing maritime industries and oceanographic sciences; and

Improving China's contributions to global oceanography.[7]

There are ways China can pursue these missions without being aggressive. The Ocean Development Report notes, for example, the importance of engaging in cooperative international ventures. At the same time, though, it also notes that China should not concede its maritime claims or interests in order to avoid charges of a "China threat" or to appease major powers. Instead, the report emphasizes that China's broad national interests require that it pursue maritime development. In short, China is prepared to pursue an assertive set of national policies to control its littoral waters and nearby seas-even if such policies might antagonize other maritime powers and neighboring states.

Instruments of China's Maritime Power

To help fulfill these missions and support these interests, China has steadily expanded all of its instruments of maritime power, including its shipbuilding industry, shipping companies, and maritime and naval forces.

As China's trade has grown, Chinese goods are often carried to their destinations aboard Chinese-owned hulls. Two of the 10 largest container-shipping companies in the world are Chinese state-owned enterprises: China Ocean Shipping (Group) Corporation, or COSCO, and China Shipping Container Lines, LTD, or CSCL.[8]

Many of these ships are built in Chinese shipyards. China became the world's largest shipbuilder in 2010, eclipsing long-time leader South Korea; "China built ships with a total deadweight capacity of 65.6 million tons, accounting for 43 percent of the deadweight capacity of ships built in the world."[9] Chinese shipbuilders are not simply servicing Chinese companies, however. In 2010, Chinese shipyards also captured a majority of new orders for ships worldwide.

China's shipbuilding industry includes a range of smaller private shipyards but is mostly centered on two major shipbuilding conglomerates, China State Shipbuilding Corporation (CSSC) and China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation (CSIC). These are also both state-owned enterprises (SOEs).

CSIC has 140,000 employees and $27.5 billion in assets. The company's product line includes a range of vessels, such as tankers, bulk carriers, containerships, roll-on/roll-off (RO/RO) transports, and specialized vessels. It also builds warships for the Chinese military. Like many other Chinese SOEs, the company is in effect a vertically integrated entity and includes not only dockyards and ship repair facilities, but also design institutes, research centers, and laboratories, which employ some 30,000 engineers. Similarly, CSIC produces not only ship hulls, but also diesel engines, electronic instruments, and a variety of marine equipment including port machinery.[10]

With about 95,000 employees, CSSC is slightly smaller than CSIC. Like CSIC, it produces both military and civilian ships and engages in a broad array of research and design efforts. CSSC produces a wide range of vessels for civilian customers, but its primary focus is the military. The company's Web site describes CSSC as "the backbone forces backing up the Chinese navy in terms of its construction."[11]

Several different forces safeguard these growing Chinese maritime interests. One is the Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), an arm of the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture's Fisheries Management Bureau, which is responsible for patrolling Chinese fisheries. It has three flotilla headquarters as well as control of local units established in major cities and each coastal province. The FLEC fields between 10 and 20 larger vessels, which range from 1,000-ton patrol boats to a former submarine salvage vessel displacing nearly 5,000 tons. The FLEC has been interacting regularly with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), including the Ship-rider program, under which FLEC officers traveled aboard USCG vessels during driftnet fishing season.[12]

The PRC Ministry of Transport controls the China Maritime Safety Administration (MSA). Analogous to the U.S. Coast Guard, the MSA is responsible for maritime safety issues and pollution monitoring and control on China's major rivers as well as its coast. It also manages navigational aids and control measures. The MSA oversees 20 provincial-level MSA subordinates, including in the coastal provinces and along the Yangtze, Pearl, and Heilongjiang Rivers, which in turn control 97 local branches. The MSA controls its own fleet of cutters, including at least three that displace more than 1,000 tons.

Another part of China's maritime forces is the China Marine Surveillance (CMS) force of the State Oceanic Administration. It also has three main flotillas and controls "300 cutters, including 30 with a displacement over 1,000 tons."[13] None of these appear to be armed. The CMS is responsible for surveillance in what China calls its "near seas (jinhai)." It also monitors for pollution, environmental damage, and resource exploitation and conducts oceanographic surveys.[14]

Like the FLEC, the CMS has conducted patrols in disputed waters in such places as the South China Sea, thereby asserting Chinese sovereignty while keeping disputes "civilianized." Recently, for instance, a Vietnamese-contracted survey ship exploring for oil 80 miles off Vietnam's coast had its cables snapped by Chinese patrol vessels-an incident that apparently involved units of the CMS.[15] At the same time, CMS vessels have been reported in Philippine waters, with Manila claiming that the Chinese are erecting structures in the area-a clear violation of China's 2002 understanding with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) regarding conduct in the South China Sea.[16]

A fourth maritime force is the China Coast Guard (CCG), a paramilitary force that operates under the Ministry of Public Security but is manned by members of the People's Armed Police (PAP). The China Coast Guard is organized into some 20 flotillas, each comparable to a regimental-level organization within the PLA. Its vessels range from 130-1,500 tons with many of them armed. In some cases, CCG vessels are former frigates, transferred from the PLAN. It is expected that, like the PAP, the CCG would have a wartime role, relieving PLA forces of rear-area duties.

The PLAN: An Overview

The most important guarantor of Chinese maritime power, however, is the People's Liberation Army Navy. Indeed, the evolution of the PLAN reflects China's growing dependence on the seas.

For much of the Cold War, the Chinese navy was primarily a coastal defense force. It had few major surface combatants (frigates or larger) or modern submarines and instead appeared to rely on plans to conduct a "People's War" at sea, using masses of torpedo and missile attack craft as well as older-design submarines to overwhelm more sophisticated opponents. For much of the 1970s and 1980s, these forces' perceived "main strategic direction" was the eastern shore and the northern border, as the Chinese worried about conflict with the USSR.[17] The North Sea Fleet was therefore the main Chinese naval force.

Since the end of the Cold War, there have been several fundamental shifts in Chinese thinking. Most important, the Chinese navy, like the rest of the PLA, has moved away from a reliance on mass. Consistent with the "Two Transformations" enunciated by Jiang Zemin, the PLAN has been preparing to fight and win "Local Wars under Modern, High-Tech Conditions."[18] It has also shifted toward emphasizing quality and technological sophistication rather than quantity but limited capability.

These trends are reflected in the recent changes in the PLAN's fleet. Over the course of the past decade, the absolute size of China's navy has shrunk as many obsolete vessels have been decommissioned. Scores of older, missile-armed, fast attack craft-many of which carried 1960s vintage Styx-class anti-ship missiles-have been retired. China has continued to produce missile-armed fast attack craft, however. The most numerous single ship class has been the Type 022 Houbei missile-armed catamaran. The PLAN has deployed over 60 of these 022s since 2007. These vessels, carrying the sea-skimming YJ-82 supersonic anti-ship cruise missile, are far more capable than the vessels they are replacing.

Similarly, China has reduced the number of larger combatants in its navy, choosing instead platforms with much greater individual capabilities. The Type-052C Luyang-II destroyer, for example, is equipped with a phased-array radar for its HQ-9 surface-to-air missile (SAM) system. The HQ-9 is believed to be comparable to early-model Patriot missiles with its ability to combat most air-breathing systems and a limited anti-ballistic missile capability. Similarly, the Type 054A Jiangkai-II frigate is equipped with the HQ-16 SAM system, which is much more effective than previous Chinese naval air defense systems. Although these new ships are not replacing older Chinese surface combatants on a one-for-one basis, the overall capability of the PLAN surface force is nonetheless steadily improving.

It should be noted, however, that the PLAN has been building only a handful of each new class of destroyer and frigate (typically, between two and four). It is quite possible that the Chinese have been using each new class as an opportunity to test different weapons and electronics suites, as well as to improve habitability, until they find an optimal design for larger-scale production.

By contrast, the PLAN has been maintaining the size of its submarine force while it modernizes its fleet. Since 2000, the PLAN has consistently fielded between 50 and 60 diesel-electric submarines, but the age and capability of the force has been improving as older boats, especially 1950s-vintage Romeo-class boats, are replaced with newer designs. These new designs include a dozen Kilo-class submarines purchased from Russia, as well as domestically designed and manufactured Song and Yuan class, with 16 and four boats, respectively.[19] All of these are believed capable of firing not only torpedoes, but also anti-ship cruise missiles. The Chinese have also developed variants of the Yuan with an air-independent propulsion (AIP) system, which reduces the boats' vulnerability by removing the need to use noisy diesel engines to recharge batteries.

In addition, the PLAN has been augmenting its aerial maritime strike capability. Along with more modern versions of the H-6 twin-engine bombers (a version of the Soviet/Russian Tu-16 Badger), the PLAN Air Force (PLANAF) has introduced a range of other strike aircraft into the inventory. These include the JH-7/FBC-1 Flying Leopard, which can carry between two and four YJ-82 anti-ship cruise missiles, and the Su-30 strike fighter. Within Chinese littoral waters, the PLANAF can bring a significant amount of firepower to bear.

The PLAN has also been working to improve its "fleet train," and the 2010 defense white paper, China's National Defense in 2010, notes the accelerated construction of "large support vessels."[20] It also specifically notes that the navy is exploring "new methods of logistics support for sustaining long-time maritime missions."

As with other aspects of PLA modernization, even as the PLAN is upgrading its weapons, it is also improving its doctrine and training, including increased emphasis on joint operations and the incorporation of electronic warfare into its training regimen. Such improvements, for example, suggest that PLA Air Force assets, space and cyber operations, and even Second Artillery forces might support PLANAF strikes. The new anti-ship ballistic missile forces, centered on the DF-21D (which is now reportedly at initial operational capability), should be seen as part of joint Chinese efforts to control the seas, complementing PLAAF and PLAN air, surface, and sub-surface forces.[21]

Change in Strategic Direction

Since the end of the Cold War, the PLAN's main strategic direction-which focuses on the most likely area of conflict-has also undergone a fundamental shift. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Pacific Fleet was no longer the main concern for PLAN planners. Instead, the main concern became the possibility of Taiwan's seeking independence. As a result, the "main strategic direction" shifted from the North to the East. During the 1990s, the East Sea Fleet, part of the Nanjing Military Region opposite Taiwan, became the priority.

Today, the South Sea Fleet, which is responsible for the South China Sea, seems to be gaining resources, suggesting perhaps a further shift in the main strategic direction toward the South and East. However, the East Sea Fleet remains well funded, and even the North Sea Fleet has been modernizing.

In this regard, it is possible that the main strategic direction for the PLAN is no longer focused on a particular contingency (e.g., Taiwan or the South China Sea) and instead has turned its attention to securing Chinese littoral waters up to the "first island chain."[22] This "first island chain" runs roughly from the Japanese Home Islands, along the Ryukyus chain, through Taiwan and the Philippines, to the Strait of Malacca. This shift toward a capabilities-oriented planning framework would be consistent with the "Military Strategic Guidelines for the New Period" enunciated by Jiang Zemin and the PLA's "New Historic Missions" as set forth by Hu Jintao.[23]

The 2010 Chinese defense white paper would seem to support this view, as it provides unprecedented detail regarding not only ongoing naval construction efforts, but also the PLAN's missions.[24] Besides playing a role in maintaining strategic deterrence with ballistic missile submarines, the 2010 white paper notes that the Chinese navy is also responsible for conducting operations in distant waters (yuanhai) and countering non-traditional security threats.

Another indication that the PLAN is focusing on global capability rather than on specific contingencies is China's decision-often derided and doubted by some Western analysts-to acquire an aircraft carrier. When the Shi Lang-named for the Manchu-era Chinese admiral who conquered Taiwan in 1681-launches later this year, the PLAN will extend its reach beyond the limits of Chinese land-based naval air power. This is an essential step if the PLAN is to be a navy that is capable of extended operations at sea-what is sometimes termed a blue-water navy.

Future Chinese Directions

As the PLA has steadily modernized its fleet, some have posited that the world is on the verge of a naval arms race, comparable to that between the United Kingdom and Imperial Germany at the turn of the 19th century or between the U.S. and Imperial Japan in the 1930s. In each case, the two sides built comparable fleets, centered on battleships and aircraft carriers, and focused on decisive "fleet actions" between their respective battle lines.

Chinese naval development, however, does not fit this pattern. For one thing, the PLAN today is hardly on the verge of challenging the U.S. for maritime dominance. The Chinese acquisition of an aircraft carrier does not, in and of itself, make China a sea power comparable to the United States. The Shi Lang is a former Ukrainian carrier that has been refitted in Chinese yards-an economical approach toward rapidly fielding an aircraft carrier-but even after it is launched, the Shi Lang will still have to engage in harbor trials, sea trials, and a shakedown cruise. The ship itself is unlikely to be ready for normal operations for at least six months to a year.

Moreover, the Chinese will also have to spend time training a core group of pilots capable of conducting flight operations from a rolling, pitching deck. In addition, they will have to assemble the supplementary support ships, including escorts and replenishment vessels, in order to allow a carrier to operate with a modicum of safety while going in harm's way. It is this intricate ballet of ships and aircraft that allows an aircraft carrier group to exert the influence and power; such a dance, however, cannot be mastered overnight.

Equally as important is the fact that the PLAN does not resemble the U.S. Navy. Beijing has been building fast attack craft and submarines in large numbers, but only a handful of each of its surface combatant designs. At present, the PLAN does not look like a navy designed to exercise sea control across vast distances for extended periods of time. What the substantial numbers of submarines and fast attack craft, coupled with development of the DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missile and anti-ship cruise missiles, do suggest is that the PLA may be pursuing an asymmetric strategy at sea: one of anti-access/area denial (A2AD). It may be that the PLAN's first priority is to keep the U.S. Navy at arm's length, away from China's coasts and the waters within the first island chain, rather than challenging the U.S. from the Pacific to the Atlantic.

The PLAN's present limitations will not prevent China from ultimately becoming a major maritime power; nor do they mean that it does not intend to build a substantial navy. Indeed, even before the Shi Lang launches, it is increasingly clear that the People's Liberation Army Navy will join the ranks of major maritime powers, not only in number of major naval combatants, but also in missions it can undertake. The PLAN has already been expanding its operational sphere ever farther from its own shores. Its Gulf of Aden anti-piracy task force, now in its eighth rotation, epitomizes China's growing ability to operate at sea for extended periods of time. China is also building a fleet of hospital ships so that it can project Chinese power from the sea in peacetime.

Moreover, a Chinese navy that can dominate the waters within the first island chain is not necessarily a defensive one. Control of the sea lanes that pass within the first island chain would also allow China to coerce such states as Japan and South Korea, which also depend on the seas for their national survival. A Chinese navy that could dominate the waters within the first island chain could also overpower the far smaller forces of Southeast Asia and pose a threat to Taiwan.

What is far less certain is whether the Chinese navy will ultimately look like the American navy. Perhaps the most important divergence between these two navies is the extent to which Chinese analysts and planners have a continental land power's view of the sea. Chinese writings suggest that Chinese strategists perceive the sea not as a broad highway for international commerce and military deployment, but as an extension of a nation's land borders and territories.

China's concerns with sovereignty over its maritime waters, for example, are analogous to its views of territorial integrity. The China's Ocean Development Report specifically states that the oceans are a nation's "blue soil" and emphasizes that the sea and land should be seen as having comparable strategic value.[25] Similarly, China's concerns about controlling the waters within the first island chain reflect a more static view of control of the oceans that is akin to creating fortified lines on land. That ground forces continue to dominate the Chinese military (although less so than in decades past) may also be a factor influencing PLA and PLAN thinking.

Geographic reality is another important consideration influencing future Chinese naval development. The first island chain represents both a shield and an obstruction: So long as the islands are in the hands of "hostile" states, China's navy and merchant marine will find it difficult to reach the open sea in time of conflict. Militarily, this difficulty would limit the PLAN's ability to project power; economically, it raises the possibility of strangling the Chinese economy. Conversely, if one or more of the islands were under Chinese control, Beijing would find it much easier to prevent opponents from reaching China's coastal cities, the nation's economic center of gravity. Furthermore, Chinese naval and air forces could then penetrate into the central Pacific, not only affecting hostile naval forces, but also potentially wreaking havoc on enemy sea lines of communication.

However, even if Beijing were to secure control of the first island chain, or at least portions of it, China's maritime lifeline would not automatically be secured. If the Chinese military is to fulfill its "new historic missions," including defense of the nation's maritime interests, it will have to extend protection along the entire length of its sea lines of communication. Sea lanes can be threatened on the high seas as much or more as they can near the final destination; interdiction can occur anywhere along its length. China's ability to dominate the first island chain would therefore represent only a first step toward achieving maritime security rather than an ultimate solution.

In short, if it is to protect its seaborne interests, China has to operate in two distinct maritime environments. One is within the littoral waters bounded by the first island chain. Chinese strategists believe China needs to dominate these waters, if only to minimize the threat to its coastal economic centers. Such dominance may be achievable through a combination of submarines, fast attack craft, strike aircraft, and anti-ship ballistic and cruise missiles.

The other environment is the network of global waterways beyond China's "near seas." This is likely to demand a comprehensive set of capabilities including not only an expanded number of naval combatants, but also the ability to conduct power projection, maintain global surveillance and communications, and provide logistical support. These global waterways will be "mare incognita" for the Chinese, who have never had to operate in a sustained manner in such an environment.

America's Response to China's Maritime Expansion

Although China's maritime ambitions do not yet pose a dire threat to the United States, the situation does demand a very specific response: careful, sober policymaking. Sino-American conflict at sea is not a foregone conclusion, but conflicting claims and legal interpretations, lack of agreed terms of engagement, aggressive behavior by China on behalf of its claims, and lack of official transparency regarding Chinese capabilities and aims all increase the potential for miscalculation.

It is essential to recognize that China will be a maritime power. Given the importance of the world's oceans to sustaining China's economic development and its position as the world's second-largest economy, the Chinese leadership undoubtedly views the seas as essential both to national survival and to their own hold on power. Opposing Chinese development in this regard would be futile and antagonistic. Therefore, the United States should accept China as a major sea power with significant maritime interests. In some cases, such as the anti-piracy efforts off Somalia or enforcement of fishing limits, those interests may even converge and offer opportunities for Sino-American cooperation.

Recognizing Chinese interests, however, is not the same as acceding to Chinese demands; there are many areas in which acquiescence to Chinese maritime policy would run contrary to America's interests. For instance, American and Chinese interests rapidly diverge over what China calls its "near seas." China wants to dominate the waters within the first island chain, which it views as its own territory. It therefore seeks to coerce other states into limiting or abandoning their own claims (e.g., Vietnam and the Philippines) and activities (e.g., interfering with U.S. air and naval operations in what China claims as its exclusive economic zone [EEZ]).

In particular, Beijing has employed idiosyncratic interpretations of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea to argue that U.S. naval vessels and auxiliaries should restrict their operations when operating in China's EEZ. It is not in America's national interest to surrender to such tactics. Any congressional consideration of the Law of the Sea Treaty should include a thorough discussion of these Chinese interpretations as well as efforts by China to employ legal warfare, or "lawfare," to achieve through international law what it cannot achieve through overt pressure.

In this regard, even as it recognizes China's maritime interests, the United States must also protect its own maritime interests. Such protection will require action in several different areas of U.S. defense policy.

First, America must sustain a strong set of maritime forces. The United States Navy and Marine Corps are the ultimate guarantors of U.S. maritime interests around the world. Unlike the PLAN, U.S. naval forces must operate far from their own shores, which increases wear and tear on ships while extending transit time from home ports to patrol areas. Consequently, the U.S. must maintain robust and substantial naval forces in the Asia-Pacific region, as well as the Indian Ocean, if it is to be able to dissuade and deter potential opponents and support national interests.

This, in turn, means that reductions in the size of the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps and their operational tempo will have a disproportionate effect not only on actual abilities to operate in the region, but also on perceptions of American commitment and credibility. Far from reducing Navy and Marine resources, it may be that additional resources are necessary. The U.S. cannot afford to see its navy shrink further.

At the same time, training must be strengthened and, in some cases, revived. When the Cold War ended, certain missions-including anti-shipping strikes and open-ocean anti-submarine warfare-were seen as no longer important; certain capabilities, such as the ability to launch anti-ship cruise missiles from submarines, were also abandoned.[26] Those missions and capabilities are likely to become important once again as the Chinese navy presents the first blue-water challenge since the late 1980s. Regaining proficiency will require not just shifts in priorities, but also increases in funds for training and for operations and maintenance.

The rise of the Chinese navy also means that the U.S. Navy must reinvigorate its research and development efforts. Currently, there are no new surface or subsurface combatants in the design phase-an unprecedented situation that could result in the Navy's having to respond to a Chinese challenge with outdated combatants or, even worse, face a PLAN that has more advanced capabilities. To avoid such a scenario, Congress should require the development of a comprehensive naval research and development plan that exploits advances in such technologies as unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned submersibles, and space systems.[27]

The U.S. military operates jointly, so careful attention must also be paid to Air Force and Army operations throughout the Asia-Pacific region. Given that both Chinese naval air capabilities and PLA Air Force systems are being modernized-including the proliferation of advanced SAM systems such as the S-400 and HQ-9-the U.S. Pacific Air Force cannot afford to fall behind in its own modernization program.

Low observable aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are especially important, as are electronic warfare capabilities. It is essential that the U.S. Air Force sustain funding for the F-35, especially in light of the shortsighted decision to end the F-22 program. Meanwhile, Congress should consider acquiring additional E/A-18 Growler electronic warfare aircraft and advanced UAV systems to facilitate air operations within the Chinese air defense envelope. Similarly, special operations forces and space forces can play a role in effecting deterrence and presence. The United States should also seek to expand its already robust interactions in these areas with allied and selected other Asian militaries.

All of these elements should be employed not only to maintain, but also to strengthen the network of American alliances and relationships throughout the western Pacific and Indian Ocean-a region where the United States is more welcome than the PRC. Unlike China, the U.S. has no outstanding territorial disputes with regional states. Similarly, the U.S. provides maritime security for sea lanes globally, which benefits local states-including, whether the PRC acknowledges it or not, China-as much as the U.S. itself. Asian states therefore look to the U.S. as a provider of key "public goods" as well as an essential balancing element against burgeoning Chinese power.

By supporting regional states that are seeking to ensure their own sovereignty and rights, the United States can leverage its role in the region. For example, at last year's ASEAN regional forum meeting in Hanoi, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's offer to help mediate the South China Sea disputes was a useful way to assert an American diplomatic presence that is consistent with a constructive and peaceful U.S. military presence.

Active participation in regional meetings and conferences underscores American leadership and presence. It also strengthens America's ties to the region. Specifically, free trade agreements with East Asian states and with ASEAN as a whole, as well as the Trans-Pacific Partnership program, would reinforce U.S. economic links across the Pacific.

A withdrawal of U.S. naval forces from the western Pacific to Guam, by contrast, would likely be seen not as a cost-cutting measure or way to mitigate conflict, but as a de facto concession of the western Pacific to Chinese dominance. The importance of maintaining regional presence should be a factor in any discussion of altering the U.S. basing structure on Okinawa.

Nor is preservation of maritime interests solely a military concern. The U.S. Coast Guard interacts with many maritime law enforcement organizations throughout the region. Consequently, the Coast Guard is particularly familiar with the needs and concerns of the region's smaller maritime powers. This familiarity is an essential part of U.S. soft power, and such soft power can greatly enhance U.S. military operations.

The United States should also provide allies and friends, such as the Philippines and Taiwan, with modern arms.[28] This might include the sale of additional advanced combat aircraft and the transfer of retired U.S. Navy warships-something that would especially benefit the Philippines. Coupled with a regular schedule of joint and combined exercises with local militaries, sales of these arms would not only strengthen local capabilities for self-defense, but also ensure that, in the event of a regional contingency (including natural disasters), there would be structural interoperability and familiarity between the U.S. and its allies' tactics and procedures.

Conclusion

Given the growth of China's economy and its attendant dependence on the seas, it is inevitable that China will have a growing presence on the world's oceans. As a result, the Chinese naval presence will naturally increase.

Although a larger naval presence does not mean that China will necessarily challenge the U.S. Navy's preeminence, certain Chinese military developments, such as anti-access/area denial capabilities, suggest a less optimistic appraisal of China's growing maritime operations. It is therefore ultimately in America's interest to pursue a consistent policy of maritime strength-a policy that reminds China that while the United States can afford to be a friendly maritime power, America will also be an undefeatable maritime opponent.

-Dean Cheng is Research Fellow in Chinese Political and Security Affairs in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.

Copyright 2011 States News Service
States News Service
http://www.militaryaerospace.com/index/display/avi-wire-news-display/1454399439.html

Citation :

Chine États-Unis vers une nouvelle guerre du Pacifique

Citation :

Objectif lune : ce que la Chine attend vraiment de sa mission spatiale

http://www.latribune.fr/blogs/pekin-business/20131205trib000799698/objectif-lune-ce-que-la-chine-attend-vraiment-de-sa-mission-spatiale.html

La chine en tant que puissance doit exigeait sa présence dans la région, cela fait de la peine pour d'autre cotés alors tant de préparation sont mis en fonction.

http://fr.ria.ru/presse_russe/20140828/202274391.html a écrit:

Les Américains font la chasse aux sous-marins chinois
La rivalité USA-Chine passe sur le plan militaire: un chasseur chinois a décollé pour intercepter un avion américain, qui avait pour mission de découvrir les itinéraires des sous-marins nucléaires de la République populaire, écrit jeudi le quotidien Nezavissimaïa gazeta.

Le Pentagone a déployé à cet effet six avions de reconnaissance flambant neufs au Japon dont les vols, couplés aux données satellites, indiquent que la Chine est en train de moderniser sa flotte sous-marine. L'arsenal nucléaire de cette dernière reste largement inférieur à celui de l'Amérique, mais Pékin compte bien protéger ses secrets militaires. Selon les experts, la rivalité entre les deux puissances ne fera que croître.

Un chasseur chinois accompagnait, le 19 août dans les eaux internationales non loin de l'île Hainan, l'avion de reconnaissance américain P-8 Poseidon. Washington a exprimé une protestation diplomatique à Pékin mais les USA n'ont pas expliqué, pour des raisons évidentes, ce que faisait cet appareil chargé d'équipements électroniques près des côtes chinoises.

"On suppose qu'il espionnait les sous-marins nucléaires chinois", écrit le Wall Street Journal. D'après le Pentagone, Pékin accroît rapidement sa flotte sous-marine, notamment les engins de classe Jin dotés de missiles. Au moins deux d'entre eux sont manifestement stationnés sur l'île Hainan, où un port sous-marin a été construit.

Le général Viktor Essine, ex-chef d'état-major des Troupes balistiques stratégiques russes (RVSN), a déclaré que la marine chinoise disposait de quatre sous-marins – un ancien et trois nouveaux – embarquant des missiles nucléaires d'une portée de 8 000 km. "Ils ne sortent pas dans l'océan car les marins chinois n'ont pas encore cette expérience. Ils manœuvrent dans les eaux côtières. Cependant, la puissance de la flotte sous-marine augmente. Deux sous-marins sont en cours de construction et d'ici 2020 on en comptera dix. Chacun transportant 12 missiles à têtes multiples", relève l'expert.

Le P-8 est le tout nouveau chasseur de sous-marins américain, dont six exemplaires ont été projeté au Japon en décembre dernier. Hormis cet appareil de reconnaissance, les activités des sous-marins chinois sont également surveillées par les satellites, les navires et les sous-marins américains.

Une altercation a failli se produire en 2009, quand un navire américain a plongé une sonde destinée à détecter des sous-marins. Il a été pris en chasse par cinq navires chinois et un avion militaire tournait autour du bâtiment. Les USA ont qualifié les actions des Chinois de "téméraires", alors que la Chine a déclaré que le navire américain "menait des recherches illégales dans sa zone économique exclusive de 200 milles nautiques".

Selon les publications de la Federation of American Scientists (FAS), l'arsenal nucléaire de la Chine compte environ 250 ogives. L'Amérique possède 2 014 ogives déployées, sachant que mille restent en réserve. Si ces informations sont exactes, l'accroissement du potentiel chinois est donc compréhensible.

D'après les experts russes, la Chine crée des forces armées capables d'attaquer partout en Asie-Pacifique et d'assurer la protection de ses intérêts économiques en Afrique, en Amérique Latine et au Moyen-Orient, alors que les investissements chinois dans ces régions ont dépassé 400 milliards de dollars et que la situation y est instable. Jusqu'à présent, la Chine n'avait jamais revendiqué le premier rôle dans le règlement de conflits, mais s'y prépare. Par conséquent, Pékin constitue des forces armées adaptées à un usage global.

La Chine forme sa propre aviation de transport militaire stratégique. Elle s'entraîne à effectuer des ravitaillements multiples en vol, travaille également son déploiement sur des théâtres d'opérations éloignés. Des exercices sont périodiquement organisés avec la Turquie: des SU-27 chinois participent alors à des combats aériens sur des aérodromes turcs.

Enfin, deux porte-avions sont en cours de construction, ainsi qu'une grande série de porte-hélicoptères et de bâtiments de débarquement universels. La flotte élargit progressivement la zone géographique de ses exercices en organisant des manœuvres au large de l'Afrique et de l'Amérique Latine. La Chine a donc l'intention de devenir une superpuissance non seulement sur le plan économique, mais également militaire.

farewell a écrit:

Citation :

Objectif lune : ce que la Chine attend vraiment de sa mission spatiale

http://www.latribune.fr/blogs/pekin-business/20131205trib000799698/objectif-lune-ce-que-la-chine-attend-vraiment-de-sa-mission-spatiale.html

je crois aussi que la chine tente de se qualifier dans le rang des grand pour transmettre un message à ceux qui on tant dominer la conquête de l'espace.

The EurAsian Times a écrit:

Another Asian Country Falls Prey To China’s Debt-Trap Diplomacy; Experts Wonder – Who’s Next?

The latest victim of China’s debt-trap diplomacy is the small, resource-rich nation of Laos, that is reportedly struggling to avoid a sovereign default.

Reuters recently reported that the South Asian nation is handing over the majority control of the national electric power grid to China Southern Power Grid Company, a state-owned enterprise headquartered in Guangzhou.



The latest victim of China’s debt-trap diplomacy is the small, resource-rich nation of Laos, that is reportedly struggling to avoid a sovereign default.

Reuters recently reported that the South Asian nation is handing over the majority control of the national electric power grid to China Southern Power Grid Company, a state-owned enterprise headquartered in Guangzhou.

The nation’s foreign exchange reserves have reportedly plummeted below $1 billion, giving a perfect opportunity to China to ensnare Laos with its lucrative investment offering in the country.

Laos was also this year downgraded by Moody’s rating agency from B3 to Caa2, and the debt-ridden nations’ outlook was changed from neutral to negative due to “severe liquidity stress.”

The small Southeast Asian nation has been struggling to pay back Chinese loans, and ended up handing over the majority control of its national electric grid to China, with the state-owned electricity company’s debt worsening to 26% of its gross domestic product.

China has been blamed for similarly trapping many other poor nations by offering lucrative financial packages to ward off immediate defaults, and in return, gaining a strategic hold on the nation’s strategic assets.

Other countries such as Sri Lanka and Pakistan have been trapped in a vicious cycle of taking fresh loans from China and repaying old ones while being forced to compromise on their strategic assets.



China’s flagship BRI project, announced in 2013, is really an attempt to extend Beijing’s influence across the world through both fair and foul means, analysts say. The project has become the Chinese supreme leader Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy project. BRI boasts of participation from around 138 countries and 30 international organizations, with proposed investments to link Asia, Africa and Europe worth a whopping $8 trillion.

The project has generated immense criticism since many of the bilateral and multilateral deals between the participant countries are happening in absolute secrecy. The Washington-based think tank, Center for Global Development warned that 23 of the 68 countries benefiting from Belt and Road investments were significantly or highly vulnerable to debt distress.”

The report highlighted around eight countries — Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Mongolia, Montenegro, the Maldives, Pakistan and Tajikistan — which were at particular risk of debt distress.

On paper, BRI aims to support infrastructure financing in Asian, European and African countries, delivering trillions of dollars. The report, quoted above, however, expressed “concern that debt problems will create an unfavorable degree of dependency on China as a creditor. Increasing debt, and China’s role in managing bilateral debt problems, has already exacerbated internal and bilateral tensions in some BRI countries.”

The fears of the trap China uses against smaller nations to extract strategic benefits from them proved true when Sri Lanka defaulted on the contract to build Hambantota Port, after which a Chinese company got a 99-year lease in return. The term ‘debt-trap diplomacy’ gained credence as theoretical risks turned real, with Beijing’s strategic designs becoming crystal clear for everyone to witness.

“The Hambantota port’s transfer to Beijing was seen in Sri Lanka as the equivalent of a heavily indebted farmer giving away his daughter to a cruel moneylender,” observed Indian strategic analyst Brahma Chellaney in an article.

In the case of Pakistan, China has gained exclusive rights and a tax holiday to run its Gwadar port for the next 40 years, effectively grabbing 91% of the revenues generated from the port. China has plans to build a strategic outpost for its navy next to the Gwadar port.

Pakistan has been severely limited in its foreign policy choices after its dependence on Chinese investments grew to a point where the latter’s withdrawal of financial assets could lead the former bankrupt with no one to turn to.

Pakistan Prime Minister Imran Khan recently indicated that the country was not free to make foreign policy choices, while answering the question from a reporter, stating that, “once the country becomes self-sufficient, then media was free to question him on certain decisions.”

Another country to come under the claws of Chinese debt is Tajikistan, which kept borrowing from the cash-rich communist-ruled nation since 2006 until it was forced to cede a territory of 1,158 square kilometers of the Pamir mountains to China.

The Chinese companies, subsequently, got rights to mine gold, silver and other mineral ores from the region.

China’s neighboring country, Kyrgyzstan, reeling under debt amid the political instability in the country also reached out to Beijing last month. The Export-Import Bank of China (Eximbank) owns more than two-fifths of Kyrgyzstan’s nearly $4 billion foreign debt and has financed major transport and energy projects in the country.

Other nations, spanning from Asia to Africa, constitute a long list of states coming under the debt trap laid by China. The coronavirus pandemic this year has left many countries struggling to pay their debts on the back of dull economic activity, ending up creating more dependence on China, which has strongly bounced back economically after the pandemic struck its Wuhan district.

The United States, and its allies, have been trying to assure these countries financially to lessen their dependence on China. The strategic advantage it gives China has clearly alarmed the US, which is using Quad to control China’s growing influence across the Indo-Pacific.

https://news.usni.org/2021/03/09/davidson-china-could-try-to-take-control-of-taiwan-in-next-six-years a écrit:

Selon L'amiral Phil Davidson qui est à la tête du commandement US dans la région indo-pacifique, la Chine reprendra Taiwan d'ici 2027 (plusieurs raisons à cela la marine chinoise qui a atteint une taille critique suffisante ,la Chine dispose d'un quasi monopole des terres rares nécessaire à la production d'éléments technologiques et électronique )..Pour les occidentaux la Chine a réalisé la ''surprise stratégique''