Actualités Algeriennes

Rappel du premier message :

Carlos Gohn parle d'une usine en Algérie.

Citation :

Les négociations pour implanter une usine en Algérie vont-elles aboutir?

Nous sommes numéro un des ventes en Algérie. Nous ne pouvons pas ignorer le souhait du gouvernement algérien de se doter d’une usine qui alimenterait le marché local et éventuellement des marchés hors d’Europe. On n’a pas le choix, on le fera. S’il y a une usine en Algérie, nous ferons tout pour qu’elle soit Renault.

http://bourse.lefigaro.fr/indices-actions/actu-conseils/l-appel-de-carlos-ghosn-au-gouvernement-287565

oui c'est un tres bon documentaire sur France 5 a 22h, je le recommande aussi !
c'est la 2iem partie de 1988 a 2012

farewell a écrit:

mourad27 a écrit:

ça fait 5 ans qu ils negocient on dirait qu ils vont installer une usine d' AIRBUS

C'est clair...quand je vois le temps que sa à mis pour le météo d'Alger je me dis qu'on est dans les temps

jai lu l'article : la partie algérienne souhaite boucler les negociation avant la visite de FH pour signer l'accord pendant sa visite
je ne sait pas si c est une bonne idée car FH cherche plutot a rapatrier les investissement français a l’étranger et puis renault est en partie propriété de l'etat
vue le bruit que ca a fait l'inauguration de tanger en france je ne sait pas si FH est chaud pour un investissement de cette nature car pour l'opinion francais c est des emploies de francais qu on delocalise en ces temps de fermeture d'unité de sidérurgie ça va barder

mourad27 a écrit:

farewell a écrit:

mourad27 a écrit:

ça fait 5 ans qu ils negocient on dirait qu ils vont installer une usine d' AIRBUS

C'est clair...quand je vois le temps que sa à mis pour le météo d'Alger je me dis qu'on est dans les temps

jai lu l'article : la partie algérienne souhaite boucler les negociation avant la visite de FH pour signer l'accord pendant sa visite
je ne sait pas si c est une bonne idée car FH cherche plutot a rapatrier les investissement français a l’étranger et puis renault est en partie propriété de l'etat
vue le bruit que ca a fait l'inauguration de tanger en france je ne sait pas si FH est chaud pour un investissement de cette nature car pour l'opinion francais c est des emploies de francais qu on delocalise en ces temps de fermeture d'unité de sidérurgie ça va barder

c'est une usine de montage avec des KIT qui seront produits en france, le taux d'integration sera de 30% au debut d'apres ce qu'il y avait d'ecrit dans d'autre article et ira jusqu'a 50% donc il y aura pas de perte d'emploi en france surtout que renault ne produit presque rien en france ...

c'est pour le marché interieure qui ecoule a lui seul a peu pres 100 000 renault pas an !!!! cette année plus de 500 000 voiture seont importé, c'est un des plus gros marché d'afrique et c'est important pour renault d'accepter les exigence DZ

othmani représente le maroc au funérailles de chadli lah irahmou .

la diplomatie des funérailles

la 2 ème partie de l'émission de la TV 5 sur l'algerie passée hier soir ....

annabi a écrit:

la 2 ème partie de l'émission de la TV 5 sur l'algerie passée hier soir ....

en voyant ce documentaire, meme avec l'horreur de la situation, on ne peut etre que fiere d'etre Algerien

tu peux etre plus explicite stp ?

un mot n'a pas été prononcé hier et qui pourtant colle parfaitement à la situation : Résilience (théorie développé par B.Cirulnik) :

Citation :

La résilience, une capacité à surmonter les épreuves
En physique, la résilience traduit l’aptitude d’un corps à résister aux chocs et à reprendre sa structure initiale. Adaptée à la psychologie, elle désigne la capacité d’un individu à surmonter les moments douloureux de l’existence et à se développer, en dépit de l’adversité.

Autrement dit, la résilience consiste à prendre acte d’un traumatisme (deuil, abandon, inceste, violence sexuelle, maladie, guerre), à apprendre à «vivre avec» et à rebondir en changeant de perspective, voire même à se délivrer d’un passé empoisonnant pour en sortir grandi

Ca peut légitimement être appliqué à l'exemple algerien, bien que l'on ne mesure pas encore les conséquences à long terme, sur le plan psychique, de la tragédie des années 90. Ce point est souvent motif de "fierté", dans la mesure ou le pays n'a pas flanché.

La résilience intègre une dimension culturelle. Les asiatiques par exemples, interriorisent rapidement les situations dramatiques (guerre du vietnam par ex.).

PGM

ravi qu´ils n´envoient que le MAE,faut pas refaire les memes fautes.

Article interessant sur le terrorisme au mali et le controle par le DRS. Une analyse d'une personne qui s'y connait,c'est aussi un conseille pour les securitaire marocains de ne pas faire trop confiance a la france et les USA.lisez le bien

Citation :

Algerian ‘state terrorism’ and atrocities in northern Mali
JEREMY H. KEENAN , 25 September 2012 Subjects:France UK United States Algeria Mali Arab Awakening Violent transitions Security in Middle East and North Africa Security sector reform - a global challenge Maghreb Islamist insurgency


The Islamist ‘terrorist’ groups that have taken over control of northern Mali are not only the creations of Algeria’s secret police, the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS), but they are being supplied, supported and orchestrated by the DRS.

What began ostensibly in January 2012 as just another rebellion by the Sahara desert’s Tuareg tribesmen had evolved within 3-4 months into what media commentators were calling “Africa’s Afghanistan”.

The Tuareg are Berbers, not Arabs, and are the indigenous population of much of the Central Sahara and Sahel. Their population is estimated at 2-3 millions. Their largest numbers, some 800,000, live in Mali, followed by Niger, with smaller concentrations in Algeria, Burkina Faso and Libya. In addition, a diaspora extends to Europe, North America, other parts of North and West Africa, the Sahel and beyond.

Since Independence in 1960, the Tuareg of Mali and Niger have rebelled against their central governments on several occasions. In 1962-4, a rebellion by Mali’s Tuareg was crushed ruthlessly. Major rebellions in both countries in the 1990s were forcibly repressed, with government forces specifically targeting civilians. Since then, Niger experienced a small rebellion in 2004 and a much greater one from 2007 to 2009. In Mali, a brief rebellion in May 2006 was followed by a two-year uprising from 2007 until 2009 when it dissipated into an inconclusive and transient peace. While the Niger and Mali governments have both been guilty of provoking Tuareg into taking up arms, all Tuareg rebellions have been driven by a sense of political marginalisation.

However, the rebellion that began in Mali in January 2012 was different. The Tuareg had more and better equipped fighters than in previous rebellions. This was because many had returned from Libya after Gaddafi’s overthrow, bringing with them extensive supplies of modern and even heavy armaments. For the first time in the long history of Tuareg rebellions, there was a real likelihood that the Tuareg might drive Malian government forces out of northern Mali, or Azawad, as it is known to Tuareg.

In October 2011, the Malian Tuareg who had returned from Libya joined up with fighters belonging to Ibrahim ag Bahanga’s rebel Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali (MTNM) to form the Mouvement National de Libération de l'Azawad (MNLA). Even though Bahanga had died under mysterious circumstances in August, his men were still intent on continuing their fight against the central government. They were also joined by several hundred Tuareg who had deserted from the Malian army.

The first shots in the new rebellion were fired on January 17 when the MNLA attacked the town of Ménaka. The following week, the MNLA attacked both Tessalit and Aguelhok. Tessalit was besieged for several weeks before falling to the MNLA in March. At Aguelhok, some 82 Malian troops, who had run out of ammunition, were massacred in cold blood on January 24. This ‘war crime’ has been referred to the International Criminal Court (ICC).

Such a humiliating demise of Mali’s poorly equipped forces led to an army mutiny on March 22 and a junta of low-ranking officers taking power in Bamako. Within a week, the three provincial capitals of Azawad - Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu - all fell to the rebels without resistance, leaving the whole of Azawad in rebel hands. On April 5 the MNLA declared Azawad an independent state.

The declaration of Azawad’s independence received no international support, nor was it ever likely to do so. One reason for this was because of the alliance between the MNLA and the Islamist group called Ansar al-Din, a jihadist movement led by a local Tuareg notable, Iyad ag Ghaly. Ansar al-Din was in alliance with another jihadist group, Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya (Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa - MUJAO), with both being supported by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

At the start of the rebellion in January, the MNLA claimed to number several thousand, while Ansar al-Din numbered scarcely a hundred. However, by April, and for reasons that have remained a mystery to the media, it was the Islamists rather than the MNLA who were calling the shots in Azawad. Indeed, on June 25, fighting between the Islamists and MNLA led to the latter being displaced from Gao, leaving Kidal, Gao and Timbuktu being ruled respectively by Ansar al-Din, MUJAO and AQIM.

With the MNLA marginalized, the Islamists quickly began imposing shari’a law in Azawad. In Gao, a young man died after having his hand amputated for alleged theft; in Aguelhok, a couple were stoned to death for alleged adultery; in Timbuktu, ancient Sufi tombs, UNESCO world heritage sites, were destroyed. Throughout the region, music, smoking, alcohol, TV, football, traditional forms of dress and lifestyle were all banned as Islamists dished out beatings, amputations and executions with a vengeance. By August, nearly half a million people had fled or been displaced.

In spite of concern being expressed at the apparent emergence of ‘Africa’s Afghanistan’ in the heart of the Sahara, no one has been prepared to address the key issue behind what is really going on in northern Mali. This is that the Islamist ‘terrorist’ groups that have taken over control of the region are not only the creations of Algeria’s secret police, the Département du Renseignement et de la Sécurité (DRS), but they are being supplied, supported and orchestrated by the DRS.

In my two volumes on terrorism and the global war on terror (GWOT) in the Sahara-Sahel, The Dark Sahara (Pluto, 2009) and The Dying Sahara (Pluto 2012, in press), I describe and give detailed evidence of how Algeria’s DRS has colluded with western military intelligence in fabricating ‘false-flag’ terrorism to justify the West’s GWOT in Africa. The two volumes detail how AQIM was created by the DRS; how the DRS has been behind almost all of the more than 60 kidnaps of western hostages in the region since 2003 and how it has worked with the US, UK and French intelligence services in promoting the GWOT, state terrorism and co-called counter-terrorism policies.

What we have seen unfold in Mali during 2012 is merely the latest manifestation of the way in which the DRS has used the ‘terrorists’ that it has created to further the interests of Algeria’s ‘mafiosi’ state.

Corroboration of my long-standing analysis of the Algerian regime’s use of terrorism (‘state terrorism’) in helping to further and justify the west’s GWOT in North Africa and beyond was provided by John Schindler on July 10 (2012). In an article in The National Interest entitled ‘The Ugly truth about Algeria’, Schindler, a former high-ranking US intelligence officer and long-standing member of the US National Security Council (NSC) and currently Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College, ‘blew the whistle’ on Algeria when he described how:

“the GIA (Armed Islamic Group) [of the 1990s] was the creation of the DRS; using proven Soviet methods of penetration and provocation, the agency assembled it to discredit the extremists. Much of GIA’s leadership consisted of DRS agents, who drove the group into the dead end of mass murder, a ruthless tactic that thoroughly discredited GIA Islamists among nearly all Algerians. Most of its major operations were the handiwork of the DRS, including the 1995 wave of bombings in France. Some of the most notorious massacres of civilians were perpetrated by military special units masquerading as mujahidin, or by GIA squads under DRS control.”

The DRS’s ‘state terrorism’ of the 1990s has changed little during this millennium. In the same way as Schindler describes how the DRS assembled the GIA in the 1990s, so, in this century, the DRS, in collusion with US, British, French and other NATO intelligence agencies, as well as the EU Commission (as documented in my two volumes: The Dark Sahara and The Dying Sahara), has created AQIM, or what I have referred to as ‘Al Qaeda in the West for the West’.

This diabolical strategy, straight from the tradecraft manual of the KGB (who, incidentally trained Mohamed Mediène, the current DRS boss, and other top DRS Generals), was reactivated in 2003, when a DRS agent, Saifi Lamari (known as El Para), supported by DRS agent Abdelhamid Abou Zaïd, at the head of some 60 genuine members of the Groupe Salafiste pour le Predication et le Combat (GSPC), the successor to the GIA, in collusion with U.S. military intelligence, took 32 European tourists hostage in the Algerian Sahara. This operation, which received world headlines and was the subject of my book The Dark Sahara, was used by the US and other western countries to justify the launch of a new or ‘second front’ in the GWOT into the Sahara and Africa.

In September 2006, the nondescript GSPC, with the help of the DRS and US intelligence agencies, internationalised itself by adopting the Al Qaeda brand and renaming itself as AQIM. AQIM’s three emirs (leaders) in the Sahara, Abdelhamid Abou Zaïd, Yahia Djouadi and Mokhtar ben Mokhtar (they have many aliases), were and still are DRS agents. They have now been responsible for the kidnapping of over 60 western hostages (two have been killed and two have died) and most of the other acts of terrorism perpetrated in the Sahara-Sahel region over the last few years. This is known to most western intelligence agencies.

The creation of the MNLA in October 2011 was not only a potentially serious threat to Algeria, but one which appears to have taken the Algerian regime by surprise. Algeria has always been a little fearful of the Tuareg, both in Algeria and in the neighbouring Sahel States. The distinct possibility of a militarily successful Tuareg nationalist movement in northern Mali, which Algeria has always regarded as its own backyard (the Kidal region is sometimes referred to as Algeria’s 49th wilaya), could not be countenanced.

The DRS’s strategy to remove this threat was to use its control of AQIM to weaken and then destroy the credibility and political effectiveness of the MNLA. Although denied by the Algerian government, it sent some 200 Special Forces into Azawad on December 20, stationing them at Tessalit, Aguelhok and Kidal (and possibly elsewhere). Their purpose appears to have been to:

(1) protect AQIM which had moved from its training base(s) in southern Algeria into the Tigharghar mountains of northern Mali around 2008. Most of AQIM’s subsequent terrorism, especially hostage-taking, had been conducted from bases in northern Mali. The MNLA, however, was threatening to attack AQIM and drive its estimated 300 members out of the country;

(2) assess the strengths and intentions of the MNLA;

(3) help establish two ‘new’ salafist-jihadist terrorist groups Ansar al-Din and MUJAO, alleged ‘offshoots’ of AQIM, in the region.

Ansar al-Din and MUJAO, which had not been heard of before, first appeared on local websites on December 10 and 15 respectively. The leaders of both groups were closely associated with the DRS. Iyad ag Ghaly first became acquainted with the DRS when he worked for an Algerian enterprise in Tamanrasset (Algeria) in the 1980s. He had subsequently been used and paid by the DRS to help manage their resolution of EL Para’s 2003 hostage-taking. He had been used again by the Algerians and the US in 2006 to engineer the short-lived May 23 Kidal rebellion and to then undertake two fabricated terrorist actions in northern Mali in September and October 2006. These were used to draw attention to seemingly renewed ‘terrorism’ in the Sahara and to advertise the name change of the GSPC to AQIM. After 2008, he became heavily involved, with his cousin Hamada ag Hama (alias Taleb Abdoulkrim), in AQIM’s hostage-taking operations.

MUJAO’s leadership is less clear. Its initial leaders are believed to have included both Mohamed Ould Lamine Ould Kheirou, a Mauritanian, and Sultan Ould Badi (alias Abu Ali). Ould Badi is a Malian, said to be half Tuareg and half Arab, from north of Gao with good connections with the Polisario movement of the Western Sahara. It seems to have been through this later connection that he established himself as a major drugs (cocaine) trafficker in the region, working under the direct protection of General Rachid Laalali, head of the DRS’s external security branch. One reason for the DRS’s interest in northern Mali is that the region is the focal point on the cocaine trafficking route from South America to Europe. The UN estimates that some 60% of Europe’s cocaine, with a street value of some $11 billion, crosses through this region. It is a trade which, until the MNLA threatened to take over the region, has been controlled in large part by elements within Algeria’s DRS.

These two Islamist groups, Ansar al-Din and MUJAO, although starting out as few in number, were immediately supported with manpower from AQIM in the form of seasoned, well-trained killers, and by the DRS with fuel, cash and other logistical necessities. This explains why the Islamists were able to expand so quickly and dominate the MNLA both politically and militarily.

The DRS’s strategy has been brilliantly effective, at least so far, in achieving its object of completely discrediting the MNLA (and Tuareg nationalism) and minimising its threat as both a political and military force.

The DRS’s strategy has, however, been extremely dangerous. Apart from turning the region into a human catastrophe, there has been, and still is, a major risk of military intervention and the possibility of a conflagration that could embrace much of the wider region. From the outset, various parties, notably the 15-member Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), backed in varying degree by the African Union, France and other parties, has threatened to intervene militarily. There are also a considerable number of internal Malian forces, including a range of largely ethnic-based militia, straining on the leash to revenge themselves against both the MNLA and more especially the Islamists.

A potential bloodbath has not yet been averted. However, having said that, the likelihood of such military intervention is progressively diminishing. One reason for this is because neither the African Union (whose Peace and Security Commission is headed by an Algerian) or the UN Security Council (UNSC) have given the green light for such intervention. The reason for the UNSC’s position is, I believe, quite simply because all five of its permanent members – the US, UK, France, Russia and China – are aware of Algeria’s strategy and therefore do not see the situation as being ‘Africa’s Afghanistan’, as described in the media and by those self-proclaimed ‘security analysts’ who are unaware of the true nature of Al Qaeda in this part of the world.

This is not to imply that Algeria will be able to call off its dogs easily. However, signs are that Algeria and other powers in the region are trying to move towards a negotiated solution. But that will not be easy. With so many armed militias in the wings and so much anger, suffering and desire for revenge in the air, the likelihood of individual agency coming to the fore is very high. While the DRS leadership of the Islamist groups is obviously managed easily, the question of the genuine Islamists, the footsoldiers, may not be resolved so easily. Already, there are signs that Algeria is pushing towards a solution centering around the creation of some sort of shari’a based political party, amongst others, in the region. Such a party is unlikely to be endorsed wholeheartedly by the bulk of the population, and if introduced coercively is more than likely to lead to further conflict.

Whatever sort of dispensation is found for the region, it will almost certainly be tied to Algeria’s hegemonic designs on the region and drugs trafficking, both of which are recipes for future regional instability.

Finally, there is the matter of the ICC’s investigation. If the ICC does progress from its current preliminary investigation to a full-blown investigation of war crimes and associated atrocities in the region, it could conceivably pave the way for justice and a more stable future. However, I believe that there will be huge pressure on the ICC from western powers not to proceed with the investigation. A full ICC investigation is likely to expose the involvement of US, British and French intelligence services in their support for the DRS and therefore, it could be argued, their complicity in the atrocities that have been committed.

Jeremy H. Keenan is Professorial Research Associate, Department of Social Anthropology and Sociology, School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), London University.


William_deB_Mills
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The pattern of a non-Western dictator winding American officials around its little finger by pretending to fight terror is now a frighteningly well established one, done not just by Algeria but Yemen, more than one Pakistani general, and of course Netanyahu.

This article is important precisely because the story seems, to Americans, to be occurring in a far-away galaxy. With the provocative "assistance" of outside forces such as the Algerian intelligence service or Westerners bent on fighting a "war on terror," little distant problems rapidly morph into global disasters, and then Americans will whine about being attacked "out of the blue." If this report is correct, the chickens from the Sahara will come home to roost just as the chickens from the U.S. informal alliance with bin Laden against the Soviets in Afghanistan came home to roost on 9/11. We pay for our sins.
For those interested in more details about the historical behavior of the Algerian intelligence service, whose leaders studied not just at the KGB school of terror but also at the French school of terror, see Lounis Aggoun, Francalgerie.

William deB. Mills
www.shadowedforest1000.wordpre...

http://www.opendemocracy.net/jeremy-h-keenan/algerian-%E2%80%98state-terrorism%E2%80%99-and-atrocities-in-northern-mali

Triste Histoire pour les Algériens. Brahimi me conforte dans ma perception qu'il est une personnalité ambiguë (massacre des Harkis, Boudiaf pas tué par le DRS, Algérie pas contrôlé par le DRS).

On voit un Otokar ZPT à 33'25.

J'aime beaucoup la voix de Bouteflika jeune, j'aurai aimé avoir la même voix.

inanc a écrit:

Triste Histoire pour les Algériens. Brahimi me conforte dans ma perception qu'il est une personnalité ambiguë (massacre des Harkis, Boudiaf pas tué par le DRS, Algérie pas contrôlé par le DRS).

On voit un Otokar ZPT à 33'25.

J'aime beaucoup la voix de Bouteflika jeune, j'aurai aimé avoir la même voix.

Il a raison pour le massacre des harki, il faut revoir le contexte anarchique de l'epoque ou il n'y avait pas veritablement de gouvernement et d'ordre tacite pour le massacre des harki, chaquevilageois s'est occupé de son voisin Harki, c'est plutot la vengeance qui est a l'origine de leur massacre et c'est l'etat francais qui devait etre responsable.
LAu lendemeain de l'independance et de l'anarchi quil regnait, le gvt algerien n'avait en realité aucun poid

pour Boudiaf, celui qui l'a tué est encore en prison, et il a toujours dit qu'il été pro islamiste, ca fait maintenant 20 ans ... et il a jamais dit qu'il été du DRS,
le DRS avait besoin de boudiaf.

pendant le reportage, nezzar et autre ne ni pas avoir mis en place Chadli et Zeroual, ce dernier, zeroual a été adoré par la population algerienne a l'epoque !! c'est un vrai chef ERADICATEUR !!! il a pas rigolé avec les terroriste tout les moyens été bon pour les tué.

lakhdar brahimi essai d'etre le plus objectif possible, dans le cas de l'algerie, ca courte histoire d'a peine 50 ans est en realité tres complexe.

ma signature est prise du film ... je trouve qu'elle resume bien ce pays et sa complexité

annabi a écrit:

la 2 ème partie de l'émission de la TV 5 sur l'algerie passée hier soir ....

Collegue annabi regardez votre ministre de culture madame toumi a la. Minute 8:16 elle porte l'etoile de David comme pendent aux alentours de son coup.

juba2 a écrit:

annabi a écrit:

la 2 ème partie de l'émission de la TV 5 sur l'algerie passée hier soir ....

Collegue annabi regardez votre ministre de culture madame toumi a la. Minute 8:16 elle porte l'etoile de David comme pendent aux alentours de son coup.

salut juba ...je ne vois pas une étoile de david même si ça ressemble ....mais peu importe qu'elle soit compétente c'est tout ce qu'on lui demande ...david ou davida c'est son problème

plus que ça je pense .....une chicha avec un peu d'herbes le week-end c'est un régal aussi il faut l'admettre ...:
http://www.algerie-focus.com/blog/2012/10/09/la-consommation-de-cannabis-explose-500-000-consommateurs-algeriens/

la presse américaine parle du décés de chadli et reconnait en lui un homme d'ouverture et initiateur de démocratie en algerie....
http://www.elkhabar.com/ar/autres/dernieres_nouvelles/305579.html

Citation :

L'Algérie décide de fournir 5 mds de dollars au FMI (officiel)

11/10

L'Algérie a décidé de participer à hauteur de 5 milliards de dollars à l'emprunt lancé par le Fonds monétaire international (FMI) pour renforcer ses capacités de prêt, ont annoncé jeudi le ministère des Finances et de la Banque d'Algérie dans un communiqué commun.
La participation algérienne s'effectuera "sous forme d'accord d'achat de titres libellés en Droits de tirage spéciaux (DTS)", un instrument monétaire du FMI destiné à compléter les réserves officielles existantes des pays membres, est-il précisé dans le texte, selon l'agence de presse APS.
En janvier, l'institution avait annoncé être à la recherche des sommes nécessaires pour accroître ses ressources destinées aux prêts de 500 milliards de dollars.
Le ministre algérien des Finances Karim Djoudi avait indiqué en avril que le FMI avait sollicité le soutien de l'Algérie au renforcement de ses capacités de prêt.
Il avait alors précisé qu'Alger ferait connaître sa réponse avant l'assemblée annuelle du FMI et de la Banque mondiale en octobre à Tokyo.
Le G20 s'était engagé à accorder au FMI plus de 430 milliards de dollars de ressources supplémentaires.
Le Japon, deuxième actionnaire du FMI derrière les Etats-Unis, pourrait apporter à lui seul 60 milliards de dollars.

http://www.lesechos.fr/economie-politique/monde/actu/afp-00470136-l-algerie-decide-de-fournir-5-mds-de-dollars-au-fmi-officiel-371415.php

Ils pas parlé d'un prêt de 20mds $ plutôt ?

Pgm

inanc a écrit:

Mais les autochtones algériens, ils vivent de quoi, d'amour et d'eau fraîche ??

d'amour et d'hydrocarbure

chapy a écrit:

t'inquiéte cela viens petite a petit pour rappel boumedienne a bloquer toute les richesses du sol pendant 50 ans histoire d'avoir des gens qualifiées pour les extraires sans l'aide de l'étranger,
c'est avec cela et des gens compétent que l'Algérie sera maitre de son avenir,
il faut du temps c'est tout et c'est pour bientôt,
paris ne sait pas fait d'un seul jour.

Donc pendant 50 ans l'Algérie a chômer?? Faut etre honnete, l'Algerie n'a pas une economie viable et les richesses naturelles on n'en a pas pour longtemps. On aurait dû suivre l'exemple des pays du golfe qui rachete des parts de société qui ont un savoir faire et l'importer en Algerie.

arsenik a écrit:

inanc a écrit:

Mais les autochtones algériens, ils vivent de quoi, d'amour et d'eau fraîche ??

d'amour et d'hydrocarbure

Allah ister de lire sa comme si je disais que les marocains vivent damour et de tourisme!! N'est ce pas dans ce forum ou des posts montraient des algériens et algériennes chercher à manger dans les poubelles!!!

Épargne ces sarcasmes dont l'objectif puéril mal dissimuler à auccune portée

Citation :

«L’Algérie peut prétendre à l’implantation de deux ou trois grands constructeurs»
http://www.elwatan.com/economie/l-algerie-peut-pretendre-a-l-implantation-de-deux-ou-trois-grands-constructeurs-15-10-2012-188909_111.php

Un article qui manquera pas dinteresser fahed...

farewell a écrit:

Citation :

«L’Algérie peut prétendre à l’implantation de deux ou trois grands constructeurs»
http://www.elwatan.com/economie/l-algerie-peut-pretendre-a-l-implantation-de-deux-ou-trois-grands-constructeurs-15-10-2012-188909_111.php

Un passage interessant qui résume tout et qui explique pourquoi je dis toujours qu'en algérie l'industrie automobile est devenue un obsession maladive:

Citation :

-Renault aurait exigé pour venir en Algérie d’avoir la garantie qu’aucun autre investissement étranger dans ce secteur ne soit autorisé pendant un certain nombre d’années ? Pensez-vous que ce type d’exigences soit fondé ?

-Renault se considère en position de force dès lors qu’il est sollicité par nos responsables de l’investissement automobile. On a politisé à outrance cette relation d’affaires au lieu de solliciter sur des bases techniques et commerciales plusieurs constructeurs étrangers et leurs fournisseurs et équipementiers.