Armée Chinoise / People's Liberation Army (PLA)

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Wolf 4x4 light armoured vehicle personnel carrier Datasheet

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China’s new submarines to get long-range nuclear missiles for first time ever

Washington: China’s newest class of submarines is getting long-range missiles special upgrade for the first time.

The head of U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Samuel Locklear III, told Congress that the ballistic missiles on China’s newest submarines would have an estimated range of 4,000 nautical miles.

According to the Washington Times, Admiral Locklear told the Senate Armed Services Committee that the up gradation will give China its first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent, probably before the end of 2014.

He added that China’s advance in submarine capabilities is significant, as they possess a large and increasingly capable submarine force.

The head of the U.S. Pacific fleet said that within the next decade China would possess 60 to 70 submarines, with its JIN-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines armed with new JL-2 missiles, the report added.

http://freepressjournal.in

Ce n'est pas un missile, mais certainement un satellite militaire expérimental !

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  Chine : lancement d'un satellite expérimental  



JIUQUAN, Gansu, 31 mars (Xinhua) -- La Chine a lancé avec succès le satellite expérimental Shijian-11-06 lundi à 10h58 (heure de Beijing) à l'aide d'une fusée Longue Marche 2C depuis le Centre de lancement des satellites de Jiuquan situé dans le désert de Gobi.

Le satellite Shijian-11-06, qui a été développé par la société China Spacesat Co. Ltd affiliée à la China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation, sera utilisé pour mener des expériences scientifiques dans l'espace.

Il s'agit du 189e lancement effectué par une fusée porteuse de la série Longue Marche.

http://french.xinhuanet.com/science/2014-03/31/c_133227028.htm

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La Chine lance un satellite militaire expérimental  

Le 31/03/2014 à 13h01, par Stefan Barensky  


Lancement du satellite Shijian 11-06 © Xinhua

La Chine vient d'effectuer son premier lancement de l'année avec la mise sur orbite d'un satellite expérimental depuis le site de Jiuquan, dans la province de Gansou.

Shijian 11-06 a été placé sur une orbite héliosynchrone (681 x 703 km, inclinée à 98,27°)  par un lanceur Chang Zheng 2C (« Longue Marche ») de troisième génération qui a décollé le 31 mars à 02h46 TU.

Selon les sources, le satellite aurait été construit par la China Spacesat Co. Ltd ou la DongFangHong Satellite Co. (DFH Sat) sous l'autorité de la China Aerospace Science & Technology Corp. (CAST) pour une mission « technologique » sur laquelle la Chine ne donne aucune information.

Ce satellite est le cinquième de la série Shijian 11 à atteindre l'orbite depuis 2009 (Shijian 11-04 a été perdu au lancement en août 2011). Selon certains analystes il s'agirait en fait d'une constellation expérimentale d'alerte antimissile.

http://www.air-cosmos.com/2014/03/31/21368-la-chine-lance-un-satellite-militaire-experimental

Je me disait bien sa ressemble a un satellite . J'édite alors . Merci

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Third Dongdiao class AGI Electronic Reconnaissance Ship.


Launched today in Shanghai.







http://china-defense.blogspot.fr/2014/03/third-dongdiao-class-agi-electronic.html

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La Russie livrera des missiles S-400 à la Chine



La Chine deviendra le premier pays étranger à acheter les nouveaux systèmes de défense antiaérienne russes S-400 Triumph, rapporte vendredi le journal Kommersant citant des sources proches du dossier.
Selon le quotidien, les parties sont en train de négocier le nombre de systèmes à livrer ainsi que le montant final du contrat, dont la conclusion a été approuvée par le président Vladimir Poutine début 2014.
Le consortium Almaz-Anteï, qui produit les S-400, a déjà livré les premiers systèmes à l'armée russe, qui devra en compter 28 à l'horizon 2020. Dans le même temps, le ministère de la Défense poursuit la conception d'un système de missiles de cinquième génération S-500.
D'après Kommersant, l'achat des S-400 permettra à la Chine de contrôler non seulement son propre espace aérien, mais également celui de Taiwan ainsi que le ciel au-dessus des îles Senkaku/Diaoyu, qui constituent l'objet d'un litige territorial entre Pékin et Tokyo.

Depuis plusieurs années la Chine figure dans le top 5 des importateurs mondiaux de matériel militaire russe. Ainsi, en 2013, Pékin a acheté des armes et des équipements russes pour plus de 1,8 milliard de dollars.
Le S-400 Triumph (code Otan: SA-21 Growler) est un système de missiles sol-air de grande et moyenne portée destiné à abattre tout type de cible aérienne: avions, drones et missiles de croisière hypersoniques. Le système est capable de tirer simultanément 72 missiles sur 36 cibles éloignées à une distance de 400 km.

http://fr.ria.ru/defense/20140328/200830320.html

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Sweden Sells UAVs to China

The Swedish CybAero will sell unmanned helicopters to China, in an order estimated at $7.5 million. The helicopters is destined to be operated from ships by the Chinese costumer
 
CybAero, a vertical lift UAV developer, said the Swedish Agency for Non-Proliferation and Export Controls approved export permits for a $7.5 million order a Chinese customer placed for its APID 60 unmanned helicopter, the company’s largest order, as published on ainonline website.
The approval of the transaction seems puzzling given the fact that similar transactions by Israeli manufacturers were vetoed by the US.
In a press release, CybAero said the end user will operate the APID60 from ships. The company will begin deliveries later this year.
“We are extremely excited about the confidence we received from the customer. This is our biggest-ever order and proof that we are an interesting provider in a geographic market that is rapidly growing in use and needs of our system,” said Mikael Hult, CybAero CEO
CybAero, based in Linköping, Sweden, was formed in 2003 from a research collaboration between Linköping University and the Swedish Defense Research Agency dating to 1992. The company became profitable in 2010.
The APID 60 is the successor to CyAero’s earlier APID 55, which the company developed with funding and technical assistance from Saab Aerosystems. In 2004, CybAero signed its first major contract to supply seven APID 55 systems to the UAE armed forces.

http://rpdefense.over-blog.com/2014/04/sweden-sells-uavs-to-china.html

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China's East China Sea Fleet launched a live-fire air drill recently, aimed at improving the overall combating capability of the naval air force.

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Dutch minister of Defence Jeanine Hennis-Plasschaert is in China this week to 'enhance the co-operation' between China and the Netherlands

un nouveau type de SM chinois

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The new Yuan variant (039C??) ready to journey down river form Wuhan to Shanghai before sea trial

http://china-defense.blogspot.fr/

04/04/2014

annabi a écrit:

un nouveau type de SM chinois

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The new Yuan variant (039C??) ready to journey down river form Wuhan to Shanghai before sea trial

http://china-defense.blogspot.fr/

Les chinois ont fait d'énormes progrès,m'etonnerai pas qu'il dépasse le voisin russe dans les 5 a 10 ans.

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Putin Approves Sale of S-400 to China

The advanced air and missile defense system will strengthen China vis-à-vis Taiwan, Japan and India.

Vladimir Putin has approved in principle the sale of Russia’s most advanced air and missile defense system to China, Russian media outlets have reported.

According to a report on the Russian business channel RBK TV, which was reproduced by BBC Monitoring, Russian President Putin has approved the sale of between two and four S-400 air and missile defense systems to China. Such a deal has long been under negotiation, and if approved would make China the first foreign customer of the advanced defense system. Already, China deploys a number of the Soviet-era S-300 defense system.

Despite the ongoing talks, some had felt that Russia would ultimately refuse to sell China the S-400 surface-to-air missile system for a number of reasons. First, there were reports that Russia planned to withhold all foreign sales of the S-400 until Moscow’s own military needs had been satisfied, sometime later this decade. More importantly, there were widespread concerns in Russian military circles that China would purchase a few of the systems with the intent of stealing the technology and reverse engineering a domestic version. This has been a common problem with military systems Russia has sold to China in the past.

Russia and China have sought to overcome this problem by signing stronger intellectual property protection (IPP) agreements. One IPP agreement was signed in 2008, but Russian officials later dismissed it as being insufficient. Russia and China also reportedly signed a stronger IPP agreement in 2012, although few details about this deal have been released.

With regards to the S-400, Jane’s reports that Russia and China hope to overcome the issue of reverse-engineering using a combination of stronger IPP agreements as well as larger volumes of sales. If China purchases a larger quantity of S-400 missile systems up front, Russia’s arms industry will suffer less if Beijing turns around and reverse-engineers the system.

The S-400 itself is likely to significantly enhance Chinese military power in a number of different contingencies. No country will be more affected by China’s S-400 missile systems, which—with a range of 400 kilometers—experts suggest will allow Beijing to achieve air dominance over the Taiwanese strait. York Chen, a former member of Taiwan’s National Security Council, told Defense News last year: “When S-400s work together with Chinese land- and sea-based fighters, the Chinese will have more confidence in sustaining airspace dominance over the Taiwan theater, thus depriving any organized resistance by the Taiwan Air Force and deterring the American intervention.”

While Taiwan is likely to be the most affected by China’s deployment of S-400s, it will not be alone in having to deal with this new capability. Japan also will have to contend with China’s S-400, which are expected to cover the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. The impact the S-400 system will have on Japan’s ability to project power against China will be mitigated somewhat by Tokyo’s procurement of F-35 fighter jet. The joint strike fighters are built with enough stealth to operate in environments with advanced air defense systems.

India will also be impacted by the S-400. Because the system can defend against ballistic missiles, China’s deployment of the S-400 could jeopardize India’s strategic deterrent, which currently relies heavily on land-based missiles. This is likely one of the reasons that India’s next government is expected to reassess India’s no-first use nuclear doctrine. Should China launch a first strike on India’s nuclear arsenal that was able to wipe out most of its strategic forces, it could use missile defense systems like the S-400 to potentially defend against the remaining missiles.

http://thediplomat.com

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PLA Navy to commission two Zubr-class landing craft




At least two out of four Zubr-class air-cushioned landing craft which China purchased from Ukraine are ready to be commissioned by the People's Liberation Army Navy, according to a report by the state-run Global Times on Apr. 10.
China signed a contract worth US$315 million to purchase four Zubr-class landing craft from Ukraine back in 1999. While two of those vessels were built by Feodosiya Shipbuilding Company in Ukraine, the construction of the other two Zubr-class will be completed in China. After the arrival of the first Zubr-class landing craft in China from Ukraine in May 2013, the construction of the first domestic landing craft is almost complete as well.
Just as the second landing craft from Ukraine is set to be handed over to China, the newspaper said that the nation's first fleet of Zubr-class is almost ready to be commissioned. At least two of the vessels are ready for combat in the East or South China Sea in the event of a conflict. The Zubr-class landing craft is capable of carrying three battle tanks or ten armored vehicles with 140 troops. Without any vehicles, it is able to carry 500 troops on board according to Shenzhen Satellite TV, a current affairs and finance news station based in Guangdong.
The top speed of a Zubr-class landing craft is about 63 knots or 111 kilometers per hour. The Zubr-class landing craft were purchased to replace the East Sea Fleet's older Type 072 landing ships, according to the paper. The Type 072 ships have served the PLA Navy for more than 30 years. With these new Zubr-class landing craft, the power projection capability of the PLA Navy will be increased, and greater number of troops could be sent ashore in a potential conflict over Taiwan or the Diaoyutai (Diaoyu or Senkaku) islands.
Global Times suggested that the Zubr-class should be used in combination with the Type 056 corvette when deployed by the South Sea Fleet. The Type 056 corvette is capable of providing cover for the Zubr-class landing craft in shallow waters while the latter conducts landing missions on isolated islands or reefs, similar to the conditions on the disputed Spratly islands. The landing craft can also be used to supply PLA troops if they were to be stationed in the South China Sea.
The Spratlys, the largest group of islands in the resource-rich South China Sea, is also the archipelago with the greatest number of claimants. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei claim the islands in whole or in part.

http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=11&id=20140411000035

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China’s Nuclear Modernization and the End of Nuclear Opacity


Recent events in late 2013 and early 2014, including China’s demonstration of its nuclear submarine force, have once again brought the issue of the country’s policy of nuclear opacity to the fore. Among the P5 (the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council), China officially communicates the least about the size, status and capabilities of its nuclear forces. Indeed, although some uncertainty remains, the other members of the P5 all give public approximations of the size and characteristics of their deployed arsenal. Beijing’s policy of nuclear opacity or nuclear secrecy is often noted in official reports and mentioned by specialized NGOs as limiting the possibility for strategic dialogue with other great powers (especially the U.S.) and as arousing suspicions and misperceptions about China’s intentions.
Indeed, an absence of information favors the development of alarmist reports about the modernization of China’s nuclear arsenal, which is depicted by some analysts as dangerous, aggressive and destabilizing. Although some of the concerns of those who increasingly worry about Beijing’s nuclear capabilities are surely legitimate, there is an alternative view: the potential for China’s nuclear modernization to remove some of the incentives driving the opacity policy.
Since the first Chinese nuclear test in 1964, opacity has been a strategic tool for Beijing to compensate for the material shortcomings and limitations of its nuclear forces in terms of survivability and destructive power, and thus to increase their overall deterrent effect on would-be aggressors (mainly the Soviet Union/Russia and the U.S.).
Until 2006, China’s only ballistic missile able to deliver a nuclear warhead to the continental U.S. was the liquid-fuelled and silo-based DF-5A, which existed only in very limited numbers (20 or so). These characteristics made the Chinese ICBM force highly vulnerable to a disarming first strike, especially in the absence of an efficient early warning system. Indeed, liquid-fuelled missiles take more time to launch than their solid-fuelled counterparts because the missile must be fueled first. This operation takes at least a few hours, during which the missile remains in the silo and is vulnerable to a direct hit. As such, various actions were required to increase the survivability of the missiles to guarantee they wouldn’t be destroyed before launch. If this aim wasn’t achieved, there could be no credible threat of retaliation against an adversary that could have launched a disarming first strike. Thus, among other possibilities that included for example the building of mock silos, secrecy about the numbers and location of ICBMs helped create uncertainty in enemy planning processes that made a disarming first strike more difficult to plan and execute.
Similarly, the very limited number of missiles capable of reaching the continental U.S. (especially after a potential destruction of some of them through a U.S. preemptive strike) limited the credibility of the threat China could issue against its rivals. The handful of nuclear warheads Beijing could have launched against the U.S. appeared very limited when compared to the total obliteration that the U.S. could have inflicted upon China. Again, secrecy could act as a palliative to the limitations of China’s arsenal, by introducing ambiguity into the mind of enemy decision-makers about actual Chinese strength. This ambiguity would then have a deterrent effect on any cautious decision-maker who would not easily embark on aggression against China without a thorough knowledge of the intensity of the retaliatory strike he might have to face.
Overall, in broad terms, China’s fundamental nuclear inferiority compared to other great powers created structural pressure on Beijing to adopt a policy of opacity during and after the Cold War.
A Modernized Arsenal
Notwithstanding this observation, it appears from all relevant sources that China has been, is, and will modernize its nuclear arsenal in a way that precisely addresses the shortcomings outlined above. The pace of this modernization is slow and China’s nuclear forces are still the least developed of the P5, but their survivability and destructiveness is growing steadily, slowly enabling China to reach a capacity of assured retaliation it has been seeking for so long. In this process, the introduction of the DF-31A and DF-41 ICBMs and the development of a ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) force have been and will be particularly critical.
Several developments protect China’s nuclear forces from a disarming first strike and give them an assured capacity to retaliate. The increasing size of Beijing’s arsenal makes it statistically harder to destroy entirely in a first strike. Indeed, the number of Chinese missiles able to reach the continental U.S. has increased to around 40 today, a number that is expected by the U.S. intelligence community to grow to around 100 in the mid-2020s. Although U.S. intelligence has often exaggerated the Chinese threat, it is clear that the number of threatening missiles will increase in the foreseeable future. Additionally, the replacement of the silo-based and liquid-fueled DF-5A ICBM with the solid-fueled and mobile DF-31A ICBM since 2006 (a process that is still ongoing) critically reduces the preparation time of missiles that could now theoretically be launched immediately if the warheads were already fitted, which means that they are no longer vulnerable during a prolonged preparation process. Moreover, the mobility of the DF-31A makes it much more difficult to attack as its location can be changed quickly. Finally, the DF-31 introduces new countermeasures and capacities that would help it evade a U.S. missile defense shield. This capacity will probably be increased by the hypothetical DF-41, which might include multiple independent reentry vehicles (MIRV). Finally, the slow (and difficult) development of China’s SSBN/SLBM force is a process that is progressively giving the country an assured second strike capability because of the relative undetectability of nuclear submarines.
Similarly, the ongoing modernization and evolution of China’s nuclear arsenal also increases its destructive power. As already explained, the number of Chinese missiles able to reach the entirety of the continental U.S. is growing. As such, although China will not catch up with the U.S. or Russia in terms of absolute numbers of warheads (something Beijing is not aiming to do anyway), it would be increasingly capable of inflicting tremendous and unacceptable damage upon the U.S. This in turn would increase the credibility of Chinese nuclear deterrence by establishing what resembles mutual assured vulnerability and destruction.
Overall, China’s ongoing modernization of its nuclear forces is clearly addressing the shortcomings of its deterrent, which provided some of the incentives for the adoption of a policy of nuclear opacity. However, the removal of some of the fundamental drivers behind the adoption of a policy doesn’t necessarily mean this policy will be scrapped anytime soon. The pace of China’s nuclear modernization is slow and so is the removal of the drivers that lie behind the adoption of nuclear opacity. Other reasons for opacity linked to culture or Chinese diplomatic stance might keep in place incentives to retain as much information as possible about the deterrent.
Still, we can hope that China, freed of the fear of a disarming first strike and assured of its capacity to deter other nuclear powers, might feel sufficiently assured about the security of its arsenal to communicate more openly in the medium and long terms about the status, capacities and programmed evolution of its nuclear forces. This would represent a first step towards creating opportunities for clarification and dialogue about China’s capabilities and intentions and thus help reduce misperceptions and maybe suspicion. More openness on China’s side might then open up more space for confidence-building measures and lay the ground for future arms control discussions.

http://thediplomat.com/2014/04/chinas-nuclear-modernization-and-the-end-of-nuclear-opacity/

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China’s Navy Advances as U.S. Budgets Flatten




National Harbor, Md. — The Navy’s top weapons buyer on Wednesday said sequestration is putting the U.S. at a disadvantage in maintaining its technical edge over a rising China in the Pacific.
Sean Stackley, Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development and Acquisition, told a crowd at the Sea Air Space Exposition that U.S. dominance across the world is owed to “constant investment” in the Navy and Marine Corps.
He chose to single out a recent demonstration of U.S. Naval power last August to highlight his point. It was a test of an airborne-relay sensor aboard the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye that directed a surface-to-air missile fired from the USS Chancellorsville, a guided missile cruiser.
That’s the next great leap,” Stackley said referring to the airborne-relay sensor called the Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air System. “This first test of [NIFC-CA] demonstrated our ability to match the reach of our platforms, our sensors, our networks and our weapons in order to extend our battle space beyond the enemy’s reach.”
He chose to highlight the test because it displayed the Navy’s ability to attack over the horizon targets – an important capability should the U.S. enter a war with China and its highly capable radar systems. The Navy must continue to invest in the research and development needed to develop advanced systems like NIFC-CA, Stackley said.
However, the budget cuts have put these investments in danger, he said. Of course, most observers would say the Navy has weathered the recent sequestration cuts the best amongst the services, but the Navy has also seen their expected defense spending flatten.
The reduction in development and procurement of weapons systems reduces the distinct advantage the U.S. military presently enjoys, Stackley said.
“That is our asymmetric advantage, and it is imperiled,” he said mentioning the sequester cuts. “Whether you’re counting numbers of ships, of aircraft, steaming days or flight hours, or training of sailors and Marines … the fact is that by whatever method you choose to count … the measure will be less, and in some cases much less.”
He said that Chinese naval leaders don’t have to worry about sequestration as China’s defense budget has risen over recent years.
“The threat is rising … China knows no sequestration. And their budgets are rising rapidly,” he said.
Of course, China spends only a fraction of what the U.S. does on its military. The U.S. Navy has a larger budget than the entire Chinese military.
However, Stackley said the U.S. still must maintain its military funding and get rid of sequestration.
“It is given to Congress by the Constitution to provide and maintain a Navy,” he said toward the end of the speech. “However it is up to us to educate and inform the Congress on what it is and what it is not the naval strength adequate to provide for our nation’s security.”
For that reason it is imperative that both government and industry do what it can “to rid the budget of any burden that does not go directly to building sea power.”


http://defensetech.org/2014/04/09/chinas-navy-advances-as-u-s-budgets-flatten/#ixzz2ysFdXj00

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April 11th...Chinese PLA Chengdu Military Region artillery regiment live fire drill.

Spoiler:

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JH-7 mock attack on Liaoning?

A news report on China’s CCTV recently showed a group of JH-7 fighter bombers carrying out a naval strike training exercise. Halfway thru the video, an infrared capture of what seems to be aircraft carrier Liaoning was shown.

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AVIC SAC J-15 carrier-borne fighter
To mark the 65th anniversary of the PLAN, AVIC commissioned the first Shenyang J-15 carrier-borne music video.