24 (+12 en option) AH-64E Apache Helicopters for Morocco

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Citation :

Morocco – AH-64E Helicopters

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­­­WASHINGTON, November 20, 2019 - The State Department has made a determination approving a possible Foreign Military Sale to Morocco of thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache attack helicopters and related equipment for an estimated cost of $4.25 billion.  The Defense Security Cooperation Agency delivered the required certification notifying Congress of this possible sale on November 19, 2019.

The Government of Morocco has requested a possible sale of thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache attack helicopters (24 new, 12 optional); seventy-nine (79) T700-GE-701D engines (72 installed, 6 spares); thirty-six (36) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS); eighteen (18) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units (REU); eighteen (18) AN/APR-48B Modernized - Radar Frequency Interferometers (MRFI); five hundred fifty-one (551) AGM-114R Hellfire missiles (441 new, 110 optional); sixty (60) AGM-114L Hellfire missiles; seventy-two (72) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); five hundred eighty-eight (588) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS) kits (478 installed, 110 optional); seventy-eight (78) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation (EGIs) (72 installed, 6 spares); thirty-nine (39) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (36 installed, 3 spares); and two hundred (200) AIM-92H Stinger missiles.  Also included are twenty-one (21) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) video receivers (18 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) air-air-ground kits (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APR-39D(V)2 radar signal detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APX-123 or AN/APX-123A common transponders (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems (36 new, 3 spares); six (6) Link-16 terminals; thirty-nine (39) Improved Countermeasure Dispensing System (ICMD) (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 automatic direction finders (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) Doppler ASN-157 Doppler radar velocity sensors (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APN-209 radar altimeters (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) sets (36 installed, 3 spares); four (4) TACAN ground stations; thirty-six (36) Very High Frequency Omni-Directional Range/Instrument Landing Systems (VOR/ILS) (36 installed, 3 new); twelve (12) AN/PYQ-10(C) simple key loader (12 new); thirty-six (36) M230E1 + M139 AWS automatic gun (36 new); eighty-one (81) M261 rocket launchers (72 new, 9 spares); seventy-eight (78) M299 missile launchers (72 new, 6 spares); fifty-three (53) Stinger Air-to-Air launchers (53 new); twenty-nine (29) Stinger Captive Flight Trainers (CFT) (29 new); eight  8 Stinger Aerial Handling Trainers (AHT) (8 new); five thousand two hundred sixteen (5,216) 2.75-inch rockets (3,896 new, 1,320 optional); ninety-three thousand (93,000) 30mm rounds (65,500 new, 27,500 optional); secure voice radios; training devices; communication systems; helmets; simulators; generators; transportation and organization equipment; spare and repair parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical assistance, technical and logistics support services; and other related elements of logistics support.  The estimated cost is $4.25 billion.

This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and national security of the United States by helping to improve the security of a major Non-NATO ally that is an important force for political stability and economic progress in North Africa.

The proposed sale will improve Morocco's capability to meet current and future threats, and will enhance interoperability with U.S. forces and other allied forces.  Morocco will use the enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense and provide close air support to its forces.  Morocco will have no difficulty absorbing the Apache aircraft into its armed forces.

The proposed sale of this equipment and services will not alter the basic military balance in the region.

The prime contractors involved in this program will be Boeing Company, Mesa, AZ and Lockheed Martin, Orlando, FL.  There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection with this potential sale.  The purchaser typically requests offsets.  Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations between the purchaser and the contractor(s).

Implementation of this proposed sale will require the assignment of eleven U.S. Government personnel and three contractor representatives to Morocco as part of the Technical Assistance Fielding Team and Field Service Representatives.

There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale.

This notice of a potential sale is required by law and does not mean the sale has been concluded.

https://www.dsca.mil/major-arms-sales/morocco-ah-64e-helicopters

m'brok 3alina
en esperant de les utiliser contre le polisario le plus tot possible

(36) AH-64E Apache attack helicopters (24 new, 12 optional);

ENFIN.

Avec les achats récents (satellites, radars, f16v, sky dragon, abrahms entre autre), on est en train de gagner en densité technologique. Nous avons là clairement une armée capable de tenir en respect nos adversaires directs. Nos capacités offensives sont désormais au diapason des armées modernes.
Ceci-dis nous avons toujours su mettre notre matériel militaire à jour, à travers d'achats intelligents ou de modernisation efficiente, mais là, avec les achats récents, excusez moi mais on prends une autre dimension (coucou les satellites) technologique.

Le travail doit maintenant se poursuivre sur la DAT, les drones armées et les véhicules de maintenance pour les abrahms).
Il faudra aussi muscler notre marine.

APKWS Laser Guided Rocket



Un article français bien comme on les aime

Citation :

FEU VERT À L’ACHAT D’AH-64E GUARDIAN PAR LE MAROC.

Voila qui risque de ne pas plaire du tout à ses voisins. Ce mercredi 20 novembre 2019 le gouvernement américain a avalisé le projet d’acquisition d’hélicoptères de combat Boeing AH-64E Guardian par les Forces Royales Air marocaines. Rabat continue donc son rapprochement avec Washington, au détriment des Européens. Il s’agit de remplacer deux modèles d’hélicoptères dont le principal est d’ailleurs français.

À l’origine le gouvernement marocain comptait acheter vingt-quatre de ces hélicoptères mais finalement après négociation avec Boeing ce sont donc trente-six exemplaires qui sont commandés. Pour mémoire l’AH-64E Guardian est l’ultime variante du célèbre Apache développé par Hughes puis McDonnell-Douglas entre les années 1970 et 1980. Pour autant c’est un hélicoptère ultra-adapté à son environnement ; et donc un redoutable compétiteur pour les deux meilleurs modèles du genre aujourd’hui : les Airbus Helicopters Tiger européens et Kamov Ka-52 russes.

Il est d’ailleurs intéressant de voir qu’aucun appel d’offre international n’a été formulé par le ministère marocain de la défense. Il a décidé seul dans son coin d’attribuer ce marché public à la branche voilure tournante du célèbre avionneur américain. C’est son droit légitime, même si en ces temps de transparence cela peut surprendre. Les concurrents européens de Boeing, comme Airbus Helicopters et Leonardo n’ont pas été sollicité, même si un temps le Maroc envisagea l’AW.129 Mangusta comme potentiel hélicoptère de combat. Même l’hélicoptériste américano-canadien Bell et son pourtant très efficace AH-1Z Viper sont passés à la trappe.
Les constructeurs russes auraient de toutes manières été hors-compétitions, les relations avec Moscou n’étant pas au beau fixe depuis plusieurs années.

Outre donc ces trente-six hélicoptères de combat la commande concerne également l’armement. Si on ne connait pas le détail en terme de volume par contre nous savons quelles munitions les futurs AH-64E Guardian marocains emporteront. Des missiles air-sol AGM-114L et AGM-114R Hellfire évidemment, mais également des missiles air-air AIM-92H Stinger, ou encore des roquettes de 70mm à guidage laser APKWS. Le Maroc compte donc sur ces aéronefs pour être les plus polyvalents possibles.

Il est intéressant de remarquer qu’à peine la décision du gouvernement américain connue des articles sont parus dans la presse algérienne voisine, majoritairement dans des publications à tendance nationaliste. À croire que leurs articles étaient écrit d’avance. Ces journaux critiquent la décision marocaine d’avoir recours à des hélicoptères occidentaux, et pis américains. Et leurs journalistes n’hésitent pas à comparer ces nouveaux aéronefs à ceux en service dans l’Al Quwwat Aljawwiya Aljaza’eriiya. Et désolé de les contredire mais non les Mil Mi-24V ne peuvent pas rivaliser avec des Guardian. Les Mil Mi-28N par contre oui, et c’est sans doute à cause de la présence de ces derniers dans l’arsenal algérien que le Maroc a décidé d’investir dans de vrais hélicoptères de combat.

Car jusqu’à présente le Maroc alignait des hélicoptères plutôt désuets pour ses missions de combat et de reconnaissance armée. Majoritairement il s’agit d’Aérospatiale SA.342L Gazelle armés de missiles antichars HOT ou de roquettes Brandt de 68mm achetés à la fin des années 1970. En outre depuis le début des années 1990 l’aviation marocaine utilise huit Bell 206B civils pour de la reconnaissance armée. Ce sont ces deux modèles qui vont devoir laisser la place à l’AH-64E Guardian à l’horizon 2023.
Il s’agira alors d’un véritable bond technologique.

Photo US Department of Defense

https://www.avionslegendaires.net/2019/11/actu/feu-vert-a-lachat-dah-64e-guardian-par-le-maroc/

https://www.congress.gov/116/crec/2019/11/20/modified/CREC-2019-11-20-pt1-PgS6708.htm

Citation :

ARMS SALES NOTIFICATION

Mr. RISCH. Mr. President, section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control
Act requires that Congress receive prior notification of certain
proposed arms sales as defined by that statute. Upon such notification,
the Congress has 30 calendar days during which the sale may be
reviewed. The provision stipulates that, in the Senate, the
notification of proposed sales shall be sent to the chairman of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
In keeping with the committee's intention to see that relevant
information is available to the full Senate, I ask unanimous consent to
have printed in the Record the notifications which have been received.
If the cover letter references a classified annex, then such annex is
available to all Senators in the office of the Foreign Relations
Committee, room SD-423.
There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in
the Record, as follows:

Defense Security


Cooperation Agency,

Arlington, VA, November 19, 2019.
Hon. James E. Risch,
Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations,
U.S. Senate, Washington, DC.
Dear Mr. Chairman: Pursuant to the reporting requirements
of Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 19-63
concerning the Army's proposed Letter(s) of Offer and
Acceptance to the Government of Morocco for defense articles
and services estimated to cost $4.25 billion. After this
letter is delivered to your office, we plan to issue a news
release to notify the public of this proposed sale.
Sincerely,

Charles W. Hooper,

Lieutenant General, USA,
Director.
Enclosures.


Transmittal No. 19-63

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act, as
amended
(i) Prospective Purchaser: Kingdom of Morocco.
(ii) Total Estimated Value:
Major Defense Equipment* $3.00 billion.
Other $1.25 billion.
Total $4.25 billion.
(iii) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or
Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Major Defense Equipment (MDE):
Thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopters (24 new,
12 optional).
Seventy-nine (79) T700-GE-701 D Engines (72 installed, 6
spares).
Thirty-six (36) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition
and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized Pilot Night Vision
Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS).
Eighteen (18) AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with
Radar Electronic Units (REU).
Eighteen (18) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency
Interferometers (MRFI).
Five hundred fifty-one (551) AGM-114R Hellfire Missiles
(441 new, 110 optional).
Sixty (60) AGM-114L Hellfire Missiles.
Seventy-two (72) M36E9 Hellfire Captive Air Training
Missiles (CATM).
Five hundred eighty-eight (588) Advanced Precision Kill
Weapon System (APKWS) Kits (478 installed, 110 optional).
Seventy-eight (78) Embedded Global Positioning Systems with
Inertial Navigation (EGIs) (72 installed, 6 spares).
Thirty-nine (39) AAR-57 Common Missile Warning Systems
(CMWS) (36 installed, 3 spares).
Two hundred (200) AIM-92H Stinger Missiles.
Non-MDE: Also included are twenty-one
(21) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) video receivers (18
installed, 3

[[Page S6709]]

spares); thirty-nine (39) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2)
air-air-ground kits (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine
(39) AN/APR-39D(V)2 radar signal detecting sets (36
installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/AVR-2B laser
detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/
APX-123 or AN/APX-123A common transponders (36 installed, 3
spares); thirty-nine (39) IDM-401 Improved Data Modems (36
new, 3 spares); six (6) Link-16 terminals; thirty-nine (39)
Improved Countermeasure Dispensing System (ICMD) (36
installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-149 (V)3
automatic direction finders (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-
nine (39) Doppler ASN-157 Doppler radar velocity sensors (36
installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APN-209 radar
altimeters (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-
153 Tactical Air Navigation (TACAN) sets (36 installed, 3
spares); four (4) TACAN ground stations; thirty-six (36) Very
High Frequency Omni-Directional Range/Instrument Landing
Systems (VOR/ILS) (36 installed, 3 new); twelve (12) AN/PYQ-
l0(C) simple key loader (12 new); thirty-six (36) M230E1 +
M139 AWS automatic gun (36 new); eighty-one (81) M261 rocket
launchers (72 new, 9 spares); seventy-eight (78) M299 missile
launchers (72 new, 6 spares); fifty-three (53) Stinger Air-
to-Air launchers (53 new); twenty-nine (29) Stinger Captive
Flight Trainers (CFT) (29 new); eight ( Stinger Aerial
Handling Trainers (AHT) (8 new); five thousand two hundred
sixteen (5,216) 2.75-inch rockets (3,896 new, 1,320
optional); ninety-three thousand (93,000) 30mm rounds (65,500
new, 27,500 optional); secure voice radios; training devices;
communication systems; helmets; simulators; generators;
transportation and organization equipment; spare and repair
parts; support equipment; tools and test equipment; technical
data and publications; personnel training and training
equipment; U.S. Government and contractor technical
assistance, technical and logistics support services; and
other related elements of logistics support.
(iv) Military Department: Army.
(v) Prior Related Cases, if any: MO-B-UTN.
(vi) Sales Commission, Fee, etc., Paid, Offered, or Agreed
to be Paid: None.
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology Contained in the Defense
Article or Defense Services Proposed to be Sold: See Attached
Annex.
(viii) Date Report Delivered to Congress: November 19,
2019.
*As defined in Section 47(6) of the Arms Export Control Act.


POLICY JUSTIFICATION

Morocco--AH-64E Helicopters

The Government of Morocco has requested a possible sale of
thirty-six (36) AH-64E Apache attack helicopters (24 new, 12
optional); seventy-nine (79) T700-GE-701D engines (72
installed, 6 spares); thirty-six (36) AN/ASQ-170 Modernized
Target Acquisition and Designation Sight/AN/AAR-11 Modernized
Pilot Night Vision Sensors (M-TADS/PNVS); eighteen (18) AN/
APG-78 Fire Control Radars (FCR) with Radar Electronic Units
(REU); eighteen (18) AN/APR-48B Modernized-Radar Frequency
Interferometers (MRFI); five hundred fifty-one (551) AGM-114R
Hellfire missiles (441 new, 110 optional); sixty (60) AGM-1
14L Hellfire missiles; seventy-two (72) M36E9 Hellfire
Captive Air Training Missiles (CATM); five hundred eighty-
eight (588) Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System (APKWS)
kits (478 installed, 110 optional); seventy-eight (78)
Embedded Global Positioning Systems with Inertial Navigation
(EGIs) (72 installed, 6 spares); thirty-nine (39) AAR-57
Common Missile Warning Systems (CMWS) (36 installed, 3
spares); and two hundred (200) AIM-92H Stinger missiles. Also
included are twenty-one (21) Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-
2) video receivers (18 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39)
Manned-Unmanned Teaming-2 (MUMT-2) air-air-ground kits (36
installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/APR-39D(V)2 radar
signal detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine
(39) AN/AVR-2B laser detecting sets (36 installed, 3 spares);
thirty-nine (39) AN/APX-123 or AN/APX-123A common
transponders (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) IDM-
401 Improved Data Modems (36 new, 3 spares); six (6) Link-16
terminals; thirty-nine (39) Improved Countermeasure
Dispensing System (ICMD) (36 installed, 3 spares); thirty-
nine (39) AN/ARN-149 (V)3 automatic direction finders (36
installed, 3 spares); thirty-nine (39) Doppler ASN-157
Doppler radar velocity sensors (36 installed, 3 spares);
thirty-nine (39) AN/APN-209 radar altimeters (36 installed, 3
spares); thirty-nine (39) AN/ARN-153 Tactical Air Navigation
(TACAN) sets (36 installed, 3 spares); four (4) TACAN ground
stations; thirty-six (36) Very High Frequency Omni-
Directional Range/Instrument Landing Systems (VOR/ILS) (36
installed, 3 new); twelve (12) AN/PYQ-l0(C) simple key loader
(12 new); thirty-six (36) M230E1 + M139 AWS automatic gun (36
new); eighty-one (81) M261 rocket launchers (72 new, 9
spares); seventy-eight (78) M299 missile launchers (72 new, 6
spares); fifty-three (53) Stinger Air-to-Air launchers (53
new); twenty-nine (29) Stinger Captive Flight Trainers (CFT)
(29 new); eight ( Stinger Aerial Handling Trainers (AHT) (8
new); five thousand two hundred sixteen (5,216) 2.75-inch
rockets (3,896 new, 1,320 optional); ninety-three thousand
(93,000) 30mm rounds (65,500 new, 27,500 optional); secure
voice radios; training devices; communication systems;
helmets; simulators; generators; transportation and
organization equipment; spare and repair parts; support
equipment; tools and test equipment; technical data and
publications; personnel training and training equipment; U.S.
Government and contractor technical assistance, technical and
logistics support services; and other related elements of
logistics support. The estimated cost is $4.25 billion.
This proposed sale will support the foreign policy and
national security of the United States by helping to improve
the security of a major Non-NATO ally that is an important
force for political stability and economic progress in North
Africa.
The proposed sale will improve Morocco's capability to meet
current and future threats, and will enhance interoperability
with U.S. forces and other allied forces. Morocco will use
the enhanced capability to strengthen its homeland defense
and provide close air support to its forces. Morocco will
have no difficulty absorbing the Apache aircraft into its
armed forces.
The proposed sale of this equipment and services will not
alter the basic military balance in the region.
The prime contractors involved in this program will be
Boeing Company, Mesa, AZ and Lockheed Martin, Orlando, FL.
There are no known offset agreements proposed in connection
with this potential sale. The purchaser typically requests
offsets. Any offset agreement will be defined in negotiations
between the purchaser and the contractor(s).
Implementation of this proposed sale will require the
assignment of eleven U.S. Government personnel and three
contractor representatives to Morocco as part of the
Technical Assistance Fielding Team and Field Service
Representatives.
There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness
as a result of this proposed sale.


Transmittal No. 19-63

Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to
Section 36(b)(1) of the Arms Export Control Act
Annex Item No. vii
(vii) Sensitivity of Technology:
1. The AH-64E Apache Attack Helicopter weapon system
contains communications and target identification equipment,
navigation equipment, aircraft survivability equipment,
displays, and sensors. The airframe itself does not contain
sensitive technology; however, the pertinent equipment listed
below will be either installed on the aircraft or included in
the sale. The highest classification of the AH-64E Apache
Helicopter is CONFIDENTIAL, and the highest classification of
data and information is SECRET.
a. The AN/ASQ-170 Modernized Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight/ AN/AAQ-11 Pilot Night Vision Sensor
(MTADS/PNVS) provides day, night, and limited adverse weather
target information, as well as night navigation capabilities.
The PNVS provides thermal imaging that permits nap-of-the-
earth flight to, from, and within the battle area, while TADS
provides the co-pilot gunner with search, detection,
recognition, and designation by means of Direct View Optics
(DVO), EI2 television, and Forward Looking Infrared (FLIR)
sighting systems that may be used singularly or in
combinations. Hardware is UNCLASSIFIED. Technical manuals for
authorized maintenance levels are UNCLASSIFIED.
b. The AN/APG-78 Fire Control Radar (FCR) is an active,
low-probability of intercept, millimeter-wave radar, combined
with a passive AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency
Interferometer (M-RFI) mounted on top of the helicopter mast.
The FCR Ground Targeting Mode detects, locates, classifies
and prioritizes stationary or moving armored vehicles, tanks
and mobile air defense systems as well as hovering
helicopters, and fixed wing aircraft in normal flight. If
desired, the radar data can be used to refer targets to the
regular electro-optical Modernized Target Acquisition and
Designation Sight (MTADS). The content of these items is
classified SECRET. User Data Module (UDM) on the RFI
processor, contains the Radio Frequency threat library. The
UDM, which is a hardware assemblage, is classified
CONFIDENTIAL when programmed.
c. The AN/APR-48B Modernized Radar Frequency Interferometer
(M-RFI) is an updated version of the passive radar detection
and direction finding system. It utilizes a detachable UDM on
the M-RFI processor, which contains the Radar Frequency (RF)
threat library. The UDM, which is a hardware assemblage item
is classified CONFIDENTIAL when programmed. Hardware becomes
CLASSIFIED when populated with threat parametric data.
Releasable technical manuals are UNCLASSIFIED/Restricted
distribution.
d. The AGM-114R is used against heavy and light armored
targets, thin skinned vehicles, urban structures, bunkers,
caves and personnel. The missile is Inertial Measurement Unit
(IMU) based, with a variable delay fuse, improved safety and
reliability. The highest level for release of the AGM-114R is
SECRET. The highest level of classified information that
could be disclosed by a proposed sale or by testing of the
end item is up to and including SECRET. The highest level
that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or
training is up to and including SECRET. Vulnerability data,
countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and
threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.
Reverse engineering could reveal SECRET information.
e. The Hellfire M36E9 CATM is a flight-training missile
that consists of a functional

[[Page S6710]]

guidance section coupled to an inert missile bus. The M36E9
CATM does not have a functional rocket motor or warhead, and
cannot be launched. The missile has an operational semi-
active laser seeker that can search for and lock-on to laser-
designated targets. It functions like a tactical missile
(without launch capability) during captive carry on the
aircraft, making it suitable for training the aircrew in
simulated Hellfire missile target acquisition and lock. The
missile comes in a reusable aluminum container designed to
protect the missile from shock, vibration, and other
environmental conditions encountered during shipment,
handling, and storage. The highest level for release of the
CATM is SECRET, based upon the software. The highest level of
classified information that could be disclosed by a proposed
sale or by testing of the end item is SECRET; the highest
level that must be disclosed for production, maintenance, or
training is CONFIDENTIAL. Reverse engineering could reveal
confidential information. Vulnerability data,
countermeasures, vulnerability/susceptibility analyses, and
threat definitions are classified SECRET or CONFIDENTIAL.
f. The Embedded Global Positioning System/Inertial
Navigation System plus Multi Mode Receiver (EGl+MMR). The
aircraft has two EGIs which use internal accelerometers, rate
gyro measurements, and external sensor measurements to
estimate the aircraft state, provides aircraft flight and
position data to aircraft systems. The EGI is a velocity-
aided, strap down, ring laser gyro based inertial unit. The
EGI unit houses a GPS receiver. The receiver is capable of
operating in either non-encrypted or encrypted. When keyed,
the GPS receiver will automatically use anti-spoof/jam
capabilities when they are in use. The EGI will retain the
key through power on/off/on cycles. Because of safeguards
built into the EGI, it is not considered classified when
keyed. Integrated within the EGI is an Inertial Measurement
Unit (IMU) for processing functions. Each EGI also houses a
Multi-Mode Receiver (MMR). The MMR is incorporated to provide
for reception of ground based NAVAID signals for instrument
aided flight. Provides IMC I IFR integration and
certification of improved Embedded Global Positioning System
and Inertial (EGI) unit, with attached MMR, with specific
cockpit instrumentation allows Apaches to operate within the
worldwide IFR route structure. Also includes integration of
the Common Army Aviation Map (CAAM), Area Navigation (RNAV),
Digital Aeronautical Flight Information File (DAFIF) and
Global Air Traffic Management (GATM) compliance.
g. The AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) detects
energy emitted by threat missiles in-flight, evaluates
potential false alarm emitters in the environment, declares
validity of threat and selects appropriate countermeasures.
The CMWS consists of an Electronic Control Unit (ECU),
Electro-Optic Missile Sensors (EOMSs), and Sequencer and
Improved Countermeasures Dispenser (ICMD). The ECU hardware
is classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical manuals for
operation and maintenance are classified SECRET.
h. The AN/APR-39 Radar Signal Detecting Set is a system
that provides warnings of radar-directed air defense threats
and allows appropriate countermeasures. This is the 1553
databus compatible configuration. The hardware is classified
CONFIDENTIAL when programmed with threat data; releasable
technical manuals for operation and maintenance are
classified CONFIDENTIAL; releasable technical data (technical
performance) is classified SECRET. The system can be
programmed with threat data provided by the purchasing
country.
i. The Stinger RMP Block I Missile, hardware, embedded
software object code and operating documentation contain
sensitive technology and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. The
highest classification of the Stinger 92H Reprogrammable
Micro-Processor (RMP) Block I missile hardware is
CONFIDENTIAL, and the highest classification of data and
information is SECRET. The guidance section of the missile
and tracking head trainer contain highly sensitive technology
and are classified CONFIDENTIAL. Missile System hardware
components contain sensitive critical technologies. Stinger
Block I critical technology is primarily in the area of
design and production know-how and not end-items. Information
on countermeasures vulnerability to electronic
countermeasures, system performance capabilities and
effectiveness, simulation and test data and software source
code are classified up to SECRET.
2. If a technologically advanced adversary were to obtain
knowledge of the specific hardware and software elements, the
information could be used to develop countermeasures that
might reduce weapon system effectiveness or be used in the
development of a system with similar or advanced
capabilities.
3. A determination has been made that Morocco can provide
substantially the same degree of protection for the sensitive
technology being released as the U.S. Government. This sale
is necessary in furtherance of the U.S. foreign policy and
national security objectives outlined in the Policy
Justification.
4. All defense articles and services listed in this
transmittal are authorized for release and export to the
Government of Morocco.

Non le Mil Mi 28,technologiquement est bien en dessous..
Sans m'attarder.

Le guardian va piloter un certains nbre de drones devant lui..

Il est réellement une révolution dans la doctrine d'emploi traditionnelle..

Pour info.. L'Égypte a eu la version D..

Le Maroc entre là. .. Sur les 3 composantes... Dans le cercle des armees pointues..

Entre le M 1A2SA, le Block 70, la reconstruction du réseau C4i, transmission et ça..!!!

Sachant que devrai arriver les automoteurs Paladin et les VCI etc

Pour la marine, je pense qu'après la déclaration de Lyoudi.. Nous allons construire nos pHM / Corvette à Casa avec l'aide des Espagnols.. (à suivre) un marché de 12 unités à terme..
Le Maroc peut se positionner en plate-forme pour l'Afrique..
.

Et la montée en puissance des effectifs vers les 250000h
Le Maroc s'inscrit comme l'interlocuteur au sud méditerranée de choix...
Une armée solide, à la réputation bien faite.. Capable d'aider un pays frère...
Il ne faut pas comparer à l' 'Algérie..., elle a raté le train..

El l'infrastructure se développe aussi vite..

Qd on pense que l'on travaille sur Rabat Agadir en TGV.. Le centre de dessalement le plus grand du monde à Tifnit..
Sous l'impulsion de sa Majesté Mohamed 6, le pays à nettement accélère...

Etc etc

Mabrouk 3lina

Les bases d'attaches des Guardian ça sera Meknes, et les mêmes bases que les F-16 ? BG, Marrakech, future base de Ouarzazate, Errachidia ?

Bon retour Klan

Près de la ligne de front toujours prêt à envoyer de la sauce

La base de l'"escadre aerocombat" qui va accueillir les Ah64E sera la future 7°BAFRA ... Khouribga

Les AH64 E americain utilise des MQ-1 C GreyEagle
et les 18 Radar AN-APG78 Longbow

En gros, l'Apache est en lien avec le MQ-1, l'AH64 retransmet en temps réel les images prises par le MQ-1 vers les troupes au sol pour guider leurs actions et bien connaitre leur environnement d'ennemi, et même l'Apache connaît son environnement direct sur des kilomètres, ppur mieux réagir et préparer efficacement son action.

Avec le BFT, ce genre de technologie c'est le cas de le dire un game changer lors d'un conflit, en terme de collecte d'informations et de partage, c'est ce qui se fait de mieux  Les FAR rentre dans une autre dimension.

FAR SOLDIER a écrit:

En gros, l'Apache est en lien avec le MQ-1, l'AH64 retransmet en temps réel les images prises par le MQ-1 vers les troupes au sol pour guider leurs actions et bien connaitre leur environnement d'ennemi, et même l'Apache connaît son environnement direct sur des kilomètres, ppur mieux réagir et préparer efficacement son action.

Avec le BFT, ce genre de technologie c'est le cas de le dire un game changer lors d'un conflit, en terme de collecte d'informations et de partage, c'est ce qui se fait de mieux  Les FAR rentre dans une autre dimension.

C5I

Ahlan Klan,  heureux de te relire

Le Guardian, il est au sommet de la chaîne alimentaire en matière d'hélicoptères de combat.
Guardian, Viper, M1, sattelite...
Y a matière à un tas de bannières

Une question, vue le volume et l'importance des achats récents et futures inchallah, ainsi que l'évolution qualitative et quantitative des exercices bilatéraux, est ce qu'on peut espérer une évolution de la qualité et la quantité des EDA à destination du Maroc?

ce n'est pas corrélatif ! les besoins EDA émanent des pays destinataires le Maroc n'a rien exigé de lourd en matière EDA je pense que SM a une politique bien précise il préfère acquérir du neuf on aurait bien pu avoir des choppers en EDA et les retaper ou des F16MLU on a évité cela

c'est une bonne chose de miser sur le neuf, le dernier cri ça reflète de l'ambition !

FAMAS a écrit:

ce n'est pas corrélatif ! les besoins EDA émanent des pays destinataires le Maroc n'a rien exigé de lourd en matière EDA je pense que SM a une politique bien précise il préfère acquérir du neuf on aurait bien pu avoir des choppers en EDA et les retaper ou des F16MLU on a évité cela

c'est une bonne chose de miser sur le neuf, le dernier cri ça reflète de l'ambition !

Ok c'est clair, peut être qu'on veut laisser les EDA pour des choses ou il ne y a pas du neuf comme le contrat des M1

Le père Noel est passé tot cette année.content pour les FAR de cet achat judicieux, le remplacement des gazelles était une nécessite mais il y avait des priorités (F-16, Abrams,..) les FAR font des choix murs et bien réfléchis.

ma question est c'est quoi la protection qui s'offre à nos Appaches contre les Manpads (parce que je pense qu'ils constituent plus de menace que les autres DAT pour plusieurs raisons , vol à basse altitude, la vitesse,....)

romh a écrit:

Une question, vue le volume et l'importance des achats récents et futures inchallah, ainsi que l'évolution qualitative et quantitative des exercices bilatéraux, est ce qu'on peut espérer une évolution de la qualité et la quantité des EDA à destination du Maroc?

Bonjour,
je pense qu'il y aura des Black Hawk et Kiowa

YASSINE a écrit:

romh a écrit:

Une question, vue le volume et l'importance des achats récents et futures inchallah, ainsi que l'évolution qualitative et quantitative des exercices bilatéraux, est ce qu'on peut espérer une évolution de la qualité et la quantité des EDA à destination du Maroc?

Bonjour,
je pense qu'il  y aura des Black Hawk et Kiowa

Ça va être top si c'est le cas surtout avec un bon nombre

Une caractéristique très intéressante du AGM-114R c'est qu'il peut engager tout types de cibles, dont au sol des systèmes de défense aérienne sur une portée maximale de 8000 m.

Citation :

In addition to the new Maritime Targeting Mode, other significant advanced capabilities provided to the AH-64E include: Doubling target detection ranges from the original 8 km to 16 km (4X increased detection volume) – further extending crucial situational awareness; 360 degree surveillance and single target track across land, air and sea missions and improved detection of smaller unmanned aerial vehicles.
https://www.northropgrumman.com/Capabilities/LONGBOWFireControlRadar/Pages/default.aspx