Un porte-avions ou un porte-aéronefs est un navire de guerre permettant de transporter et de mettre en œuvre des avions de combat. C'est une base aérienne flottante qui permet de déplacer une force de frappe offensive et autonome à n'importe quel endroit du globe sans aucune entrave diplomatique. Navigant dans les eaux internationales, il reste en effet indépendant de toute souveraineté territoriale. Pour de nombreuses marines, les porte-avions et porte-aéronefs sont des capital ships. Ce sont de véritables villes flottantes truffées d'électronique, embarquant plusieurs dizaines d'avions .
Il est constituè des éléments suivants :
un pont d'envol continu (flush-deck) à tribord permettant le décollage et l'atterrissage des avions qu'il emporte,
un îlot, placé sur un côté du pont et servant entre autres de tour de contrôle,
des monte-charges permettant de transférer les aéronefs entre le pont et les hangars,
Sous le pont, on trouve les hangars de stockage et de maintenance des avions, les réserves de carburant et de munitions, les logements des équipages, et le groupe de propulsion,
sur le pont se trouvent les catapultes permettant de donner aux avions une accélération initiale au décollage ainsi que les brins d'arrêt pour le freinage à l'appontage. Sur les porte-aéronefs, un tremplin remplace les catapultes ; les brins d'arrêt étant optionnels selon le type d'appareil embarqué.
Un porte-avions nécessite l'appui de nombreux autres bâtiments, non seulement pour assurer sa défense (notamment patrouilleurs, croiseurs, frégates antiaériennes, frégates anti-sous-marines et sous-marin nucléaire d'attaque (SNA)), mais également pour assurer son ravitaillement. Ainsi, chaque porte-avions est systématiquement accompagné de toute une escorte d'autres bâtiments avec lesquels il compose un groupe de combat aéronaval. Sa dépendance fait que l'usage d'un porte-avions a été de plus en plus contesté (en consommant pratiquement la totalité des moyens d'une marine moderne pour sa seule protection), mais les multiples opérations militaires qu'il permet d'accomplir font de ce bâtiment toujours un atout irremplaçable.
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Sam 15 Oct 2011 - 14:45
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Jeu 24 Nov 2011 - 13:23
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hires
NORFOLK (Nov. 23, 2011) A graphic depicting some of the characteristics of the aircraft
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Mer 4 Jan 2012 - 9:21
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Un satellite américain prend des images du porte-avions chinois
Le Shi Lang vu d'un satellite commercial américain crédits : DIGITAL GLOBE
04/01/2012
La société américaine Digital Globe est parvenue, au moyen d'un satellite civil, à prendre de beaux clichés du nouveau porte-avions chinois, lors de ses essais en mer. Les vues du Shi Lang sont plutôt réussies et permettent de voir l'organisation du pont d'envol. On constatera notamment que par rapport au porte-avions russe Kuznetsov, dont il devait initialement être le sistership, aucune évolution majeure n'est à signaler. L'ex-Varyag, mis sur cale en 1985 et transféré en 2002 en Chine, où il fut achevé, dispose d'une piste oblique et de trois axes de lancement vers le tremplin, deux situés à l'avant et le troisième à la fin de la piste oblique. Le navire devrait, à terme, pouvoir mettre en oeuvre une trentaine de J15, copie chinoise du Su-33 russe. Ce nouveau porte-avions, qui fait couler beaucoup d'encre depuis quelques mois, n'aura probablement pas une vocation de projection de force. D'abord, l'absence de catapultes limite les capacités d'emport des appareils. De plus, le J15 étant avant tout un chasseur, le Shi Lang devrait essentiellement servir à assurer une couverture aérienne de la flotte chinoise, tout en oeuvrant comme base de défense aérienne avancée. Avant cela, la marine chinoise devra, bien évidemment, mener différents essais et prendre en main ce nouvel outil.
Les savoir-faire nécessaires à la mise en oeuvre et la maîtrise d'un porte-avions sont, en effet, très complexes et longs à acquérir. Evoquée dans de nombreux journaux, la menace potentielle représentée par le premier porte-avions chinois est donc bien limitée. Et toutes les réactions et déclarations intervenues en marge de l'achèvement de ce bâtiment tiennent bel et bien de la gesticulation politique. La Chine va certes accéder au club des nations possédant des porte-avions, mais pas dans le haut du panier, loin s'en faut. Le Shi Lang adopte en effet un design datant de la fin des années 70, le Kuznetsov ayant été mis sur cale en 1982. Même remis à jour, ce modèle, s'il présente quelques capacités, notamment en termes de défense aérienne, peut donc déjà être considéré comme dépassé technologiquement. Quant aux nouveaux appareils chinois, eux aussi n'ont de nouveau que le nom. Le Su-33 a, en effet, réalisé son premier vol en 1987. Malgré tout, ce premier porte-avions permettra aux Chinois de commencer à se familiariser avec l'aviation embarquée et, à défaut d'aligner une unité équivalente aux porte-avions américains ou au Charles de Gaulle français, de disposer d'une base de défense aérienne mobile en mer de Chine. Long de 304.5 mètres pour un déplacement d'environ 60.000 tonnes en charge, le Shi Lang aura d'ailleurs des sisterships, deux autres porte-avions du même type devant être réalisés, la construction de ces bâtiments ayant débuté près de Shanghai. Pékin envisage également de se doter d'un porte-avions nucléaire au cours de la prochaine décennie. Les plans de l'ex- Ul'yanovsk auraient été acquis. Mais, là encore, si le porte-avions aurait de quoi impressionner, avec des 93.000 tonnes de déplacement (et sa capacité à disposer de catapultes), il s'agirait d'un bâtiment à la conception dépassée. Mis sur cale en Ukraine fin 1988, l'Ul'yanovsk avait été finalement démoli en 1992, alors que sa coque était à 20% d'achèvement.
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Sam 10 Mar 2012 - 17:05
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The strategic utility of the Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers
By James Bosbotinis
The development of the Queen Elizabeth-class (QEC) aircraft carrier programme and wider Carrier Strike capability remains a controversial issue and subject to much debate within British defence circles. This was reinforced by the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review which, aside from the retiring of HMS Ark Royal and Joint Force Harrier, also redefined the future for UK Carrier Strike. Only one of the QEC – HMS Prince of Wales – would be converted to a catapult assisted take-off but arrested recovery (CATOBAR) configuration, enabling operation of the F-35C carrier variant of the Joint Strike Fighter, and only twelve F-35s would be routinely embarked (albeit whilst retaining the capability to embark thirty six jets). HMS Queen Elizabeth may be retained as a helicopter carrier, placed into extended readiness or sold (it has not been ruled out that Queen Elizabeth could be converted to a CATOBAR configuration). In addition, at the conceptual level, the UK has introduced ‘Carrier Enabled Power Projection’ (CEPP); a hybridised power projection capability, combining carrier strike and littoral manoeuvre. This will include operating a mixed air group from the operational aircraft carrier including concurrently up to twelve Merlin, a small number of Chinook and up to eight Apache helicopters alongside twelve F-35s.
This paper examines the strategic utility of the QEC and potential alternative courses of action to that currently enunciated by the British Government to maximise the contribution of the QEC to British national policy. This paper also argues that the British Government does not understand the strategic utility of aircraft carriers nor the opportunities offered by the QEC.
The Aircraft Carrier as a National Strategic Asset
In a general sense, the utility of aircraft carriers reflects the broader utility of maritime power. The ability to utilise the sea as a means of communication and access, provides maritime forces with the ability to exploit a manoeuvre space encompassing 70 per cent of the Earth’s surface, free from restriction (the high seas are a global commons and warships have the right of innocent passage through international straits and archipelagic waters). The key attributes of access, mobility, versatility, sustainability and leverage enable maritime forces to exercise influence via a forward presence on a sustained basis. An aircraft carrier, especially one designed to be as capable as a Queen Elizabeth-class ship, adds to this the ability to provide organic airpower, independent of access, basing and over-flight issues, whilst moving up to 500 hundred miles a day, in support of a state’s interests. Moreover, an aircraft carrier does not operate in isolation; it constitutes one component of a task group including escorts, support vessels and submarines – the US Navy’s Carrier Strike Groups (CSG) being the epitome of this – that can, through their presence, contribute to regional deterrence and reassure local allies in addition to a spectrum of other activities.
This is contingent on the credibility of the deployed task group. The strategic utility of the QEC will ultimately be dependent on the extent to which the ship and embarked air group is deemed by both friends and potential adversaries to constitute an effective and credible capability. To achieve this will require dedicated assets (fixed and rotary wing), joint service support and full political support and direction with a complete awareness of the environmental risks associated with operating from an aircraft carrier. This will be especially so if the current CEPP approach is developed, that is, concurrent operations involving fixed wing aircraft alongside multiple rotary wing types. Furthermore, attaining the necessary level of credibility to coerce or reassure, will require a substantial investment both financial and temporal in embarked training at sea to ensure that both aircrew and support personnel are proficient in operating on-board and from the carrier. This will determine a potentially significant aspect of the QEC’s strategic value – its interoperability with allies, in particular the US Navy and French Navy and contribution to coalition operations.
Interoperability was cited as a key justification in the SDSR for the shift to a CATOBAR configuration for at least one of the QEC. However, to achieve interoperability will require the UK to possess a fully worked-up and proficient ship-air interface in order to facilitate effective cross-decking operations. Both the USN and French Navy are very well versed in carrier operations and would demand as a prerequisite to deploying onto a British carrier, a similarly high level of basic day and night proficiency in carrier operations. This will require the air group to be regularly embarked for sustained periods in order to attain this necessary level of proficiency. The occasional detachment to the ship of some aircraft, in isolation from other aircraft types, will neither constitute a credible capability nor develop cohesive operational performance. The experience of HMS Ocean in Operation Ellamy off Libya in 2011 provides an indication of the potential opportunities for combined operations from a QEC carrier in the future. HMS Ocean provided a base for US Air Force HH-60G Pave Hawk combat search and rescue helicopters – a capability that Britain lacked – alongside British Apache, Lynx and Sea King helicopters. In a future scenario, where the UK has deployed an aircraft carrier for an operation and the US has an interest and a wish to provide a contribution but not to the extent of deploying one of its own CSGs, it could choose to deploy a detachment to the British carrier. This could take the form of a specialist capability such as unmanned combat air vehicles or electronic warfare aircraft or conventional combat aircraft. Similarly, the French Navy which currently only operates the Charles De Gaulle and thus does not have a continuously available carrier capability, may seek to deploy detachments aboard a British carrier for training or combined operations when its carrier is not available. What this serves to highlight is that an aircraft carrier provides policy-makers with choice.
Maritime airpower grants flexibility, a sovereign base from which to operate and a small footprint; it is independent of host nation support or caveats. In addition, a carrier task group is substantially less vulnerable to insurgent/terrorist/proxy attack than a deployed operating base and does not impinge on the local population. Moreover, a carrier can be redeployed immediately after an operation, in contrast to the many months involved in recovering national personnel and assets from far-flung land-based corners of the globe. The aircraft carrier also has the advantage of being combat-ready at the point of arrival. Although aircraft can nominally arrive at a destination faster than a ship, albeit depending on whether over-flight permissions, in-flight refuelling support, intermediate and terminal basing are available, land-based combat aircraft also require their logistic support to deploy in order to undertake operations. The carrier air group in contrast deploys with its logistic support and munitions on-board ship. This contributes to the carrier’s utility as a means of providing influence; the capability to generate combat power at short notice constitutes an overt means of conveying intent whether to coerce an adversary or reassure an ally. Due to the inherent mobility of maritime forces, the carrier could also maintain a covert presence, over the horizon, pending further orders in response to a dynamic situation in an area of interest. This again provides policy-makers with choice. As a situation develops, it may be deemed necessary to make the carrier task group’s presence known in the region; alternatively, the force could withdraw without either side having to appear to climb down or lose face diplomatically should circumstances change; or if necessary, conduct a show of force (as Buccaneers from HMS Ark Royal did in 1972 to counter a Guatemalan threat to then British Honduras, now Belize). That is, the strategic utility of an aircraft carrier is its ability to provide choice and a flexible, scalable response to dynamic situations; if combined with a forward presence, this may deter conflict from breaking out (the British response to an Iraqi threat to Kuwait in 1961 is a valuable example of this in action).The specific utility of an aircraft carrier is dependent on the capability it delivers, reflected in the size, composition and credibility of its embarked air group. Therefore, ultimately the utility of the QEC will be determined by the willingness or not of the British Government to provide the carrier(s) with an appropriate air group.
The Utility of the Air Group
The air group constitutes the weapon system of an aircraft carrier: it is an integral component of the ship and thus is fundamental in determining the utility of the overall carrier capability. The QEC were designed to embark nearly fifty aircraft and helicopters, including thirty six Joint Combat Aircraft (JCA). This would approach a US carrier in terms of strike capability and would confer upon Britain significant influence in the planning and conduct of US-led coalition air operations in addition to providing Britain with the means to assume the leadership of coalition operations not involving the US (especially when considered alongside Britain’s submarine-launched Tomahawk cruise missile capability). It would also provide Britain with the only carrier-borne force of ‘night one’ strike-fighters outside of the US.
The decision in the SDSR to acquire the F-35C rather than the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) F-35B was sensible due to the former’s longer range, greater persistence, payload and lower through-life cost. In contrast the statement that the government could not foresee the requirement for the scale of capability previously envisaged for carrier strike, indicates the government’s lack of understanding of the role and utility of the QEC. The SDSR-mandated figure of twelve embarked JCA constitutes the credible minimum number of CATOBAR jets (including provision of aircraft for buddy air-to-air refuelling – AAR) but would arguably not constitute a sufficient force to be a deterrent and in the context of planning for coalition operations, may be perceived as tokenism especially viewed alongside the French aircraft carrier Charles De Gaulle and its air group of up to forty Rafale, Super Etendard and E-2C Hawkeye and helicopters. It also ignores the intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities that the F-35C will provide due to its advanced integrated sensor system, stealth and persistence. The F-35 is intended to provide a unique combination of ISTAR, command and control and electronic attack capabilities in addition to its air-to-air and air-to-surface functions and will thus constitute a critical asset in future operations.
Due to the increasing cost of and delays to the F-35 programme and the fragility of the British economy and with it the need to seek budgetary savings, it may be prudent to consider an alternative approach to the air group for the QEC. In this regard, the acquisition of the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet – particularly the Block III variant (corresponding to the International Roadmap version) – for the Fleet Air Arm would be a viable alternative. Although the Block III is not a fifth generation aircraft, it would nonetheless provide a high-end capability and is significantly more affordable than the F-35C. The acquisition of the Super Hornet would also yield savings because the development of an AAR system would not be needed as the USN has already fielded this with the Super Hornet. Acquiring the Super Hornet would in addition create the opportunity to acquire the EA-18 Growler airborne electronic attack variant thereby providing Britain with an additional niche capability of value in coalition operations with or without the US. In procurement terms, the most recent large contract (September 2010) between the USN and Boeing was for 124 Super Hornet and Growler aircraft costing $5.297 billion - or approximately £3.342 billion. A further benefit of acquiring the F/A18E/F would be a return to Fleet Air Arm ownership of British maritime airpower; this is because it would be hard to justify (aside from arguments concerning the ‘indivisibility of airpower’) RAF involvement in the acquisition of a fourth generation multi-role fighter when it already operates the Typhoon. This would enable the deployment of dedicated maritime squadrons and thus the re-development of maritime aviation awareness at sea and sustaining an effective and proficient ship-air interface. The acquisition of the Super Hornet need not be in lieu of the F-35C; rather it could constitute an interim measure in order to facilitate the re-generation of British carrier airpower via the procurement of greater numbers of aircraft (to enable both QEC to be operational) that are already proven, de-risked, in service and available sooner than the F-35C.
A second aspect of such an alternative approach would be British involvement in the Unmanned Carrier Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike System (UCLASS) programme which is intended to develop a stealthy unmanned carrier-based persistent intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and strike system. The fighter-sized X-47B is contributing to this developmental effort under the Unmanned Combat Air System Aircraft Carrier Demonstration (UCAS-D) programme. The USN intends to deploy its first squadron of twelve UCLASS aircraft aboard a carrier in 2018, thus providing it with a deep (1,500 mile radius), persistent (50-100 hour sorties with autonomous refuelling) ISR and strike capability (equivalent internal payload to the F-35C). The acquisition of even a small number of such a system would provide Britain with an extremely potent and credible long-range ISR/strike capability, including the ability to operate within otherwise denied airspace, and one unique outside of the US; moreover, such an investment would provide instant interoperability benefits with the US for both manned and unmanned fast air capabilities. It would also constitute a critical asset for coalition operations with or without the US, especially taking into account that the only system currently providing a long-range strike capability in denied airspace is the B-2 stealth bomber.
At present, it is envisaged that the Merlin Mk 2 helicopter will provide the QEC’s organic ISTAR and air-space management capability, that is, the situational awareness of the battlespace in which the ship, its air group and wider task group are operating. This will not however fully exploit the opportunity provided by the shift to a CATOBAR configuration and the implications for the ship’s strategic and operational utility. Ideally, the US E-2D Advanced Hawkeye airborne battle management command and control aircraft would be acquired in order to provide a high-end airborne early warning and control capability and contribute more broadly to the national and coalition network-enabled battlespace. The E-2D would be of particular value as it would constitute a key force multiplier and enabler providing both surveillance of air (including ballistic and cruise missile threats) and surface threats (maritime and overland) and thus aid in developing situational awareness ahead of the arrival of land-based ISTAR assets. Based on IISS figures from 2011, the unit cost of an E-2D is approximately $234.5 million (£145 million). It is therefore an expensive asset, in particular if one considers that three or four would be required in a carrier air group but its value to the operational commander and wider national and coalition activities would be substantial. Further, the advanced surveillance capabilities of the E-2D would be especially valuable in developing situational awareness as part of maintaining a forward presence thereby contributing to the credibility and influence of the carrier, its task group and the state guiding its employment.
Alternatively, it may be valuable to examine the potential utility of hybrid air vehicles as providers of persistent ISTAR. The British company Hybrid Air Vehicles in partnership with Northrop Grumman, is developing for the US Army (with a first deployment to Afghanistan due in 2012), its HAV 304 Long Endurance Multi-intelligence Vehicle (LEMV). The LEMV will provide up to twenty one days endurance (in unmanned configuration) with a 2,000 mile radius of action whilst maintaining an altitude of 20,000 feet: it also possesses an amphibious capability. The advantages of such an air vehicle include low operational costs, persistence and flexibility; for example, the HAV could operate in support of single ship or task group deployments as it would not be dependent on a particular ship for operations. Further, switching from a fixed wing ISTAR solution to an HAV-based solution would aid in de-cluttering the flight deck of the carrier (by removing the ISTAR aircraft) thereby enabling additional national or coalition assets to be deployed.
Conclusion
In discussing the strategic utility of the QEC, the role of aircraft carriers in providing sovereign deployable airpower and forward presence has been emphasised. This is in order to address a common misperception concerning aircraft carriers and one that is relevant to the QEC and expressed in the SDSR. That is, the cost of acquiring a carrier capability. In the SDSR, this was described as a ‘£20 billion programme [referring to the whole entity of ships and aircraft, in which the latter constitute the largest financial outlay] crowding out other important investment in the Armed Forces’. In comparison, the Typhoon programme has, according to the National Audit Office, so far cost £20.2 billion, still not achieved its full multi-role capability and has a shorter anticipated life span. By focusing on the cost, the value of a carrier is ignored. In the British case, it would be pertinent to consider the cost of commissioning both QEC, in full CATOBAR configuration with air groups consisting of F-35C, an X-47B type system and E-2D, and the contribution to British national policy they would make over a 40-50 year service life against the cost per year of operations in Afghanistan and the legacy costs of equipment procured solely for use in that country, which will require an enormous logistic effort to recover after cessation of hostilities. The cost of the QEC ships and their air groups would indeed appear to be high up-front but set in the long term, the value of a credible forward deployed, carrier task group including capabilities unique outside of the US would be very substantial to both Britain and potential coalition partners. Central to this argument is the deterrent value of such forces and should deterrence fail, the relative cost effectiveness of maritime forces vis-à-vis large garrisoning of forces ashore in static, easily targeted locations. The strategic environment in the coming decades is envisaged to be highly dynamic; military forces will need to be versatile, adaptable and capable of operating across the spectrum of missions in response to rapidly emerging threats and challenges. The strategic utility of aircraft carriers and specifically for Britain, the QEC, is the combination of strategically deployable airpower in conjunction with the versatility, mobility and access afforded to sea-based forces by the maritime environment, in order to project power and influence cost-effectively, free from restriction, where the national interest dictates and offering unparalleled political choice throughout a period of negotiation or conflict. Def-IQ
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Ven 15 Mar 2013 - 11:45
A propos des portes-avions.J'ai entendu il y a pas longtemps que l'US NAVY envisage de remplacer ses catapultes à vapeur par d'autres catapultes magnetiques. Pourquoi ce remplacement et quel amélioration pourait-il apporter au future portes avions?
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allegement par exemples,les catapultes electromagnetiques sont moins encombrantes que les catapultes a vapeur,qui necessitent toute une centrale thermique
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Bon, les images ne montrent que des Mig-29K chargé sur le pont d'envol ou faisant des T&G
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INS Vikramaditya »est en passe d'achever tous les essais opérationnels avant son entrée en service en Marine Indiane, selon un communiqué, jusqu'à ce que le navire moemnto cumrpiu succès et sans heurts de tous les tests qui ont été soumis. Tous les équipements et systèmes ont été testés avec le navire, il a développé une vitesse de 29 nœuds sur le décollage et l'atterrissage des exercices combattant Mig29K exploitation est pleinement chargé et armé, jour et nuit.
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Mar 8 Oct 2013 - 1:01
lien pour agrandir : http://blog-imgs-59.fc2.com/t/o/k/tokihakita/e3c158ce60e78e3293401dd0684ffc02.jpg
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Jeu 31 Oct 2013 - 11:28
Vikra..
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Jeu 31 Oct 2013 - 15:06
Ca me choc la place perdue pour le nouveaux PA Indiens sur la photo de comparaison de Jonas. L'on voit bien la place perdue apres la sortie de la piste oblique ,la longue ligne droite du pont avant. il aurait du garder le decrochage au niveau arriere vers les brins d'arret ,le continuer et agrandir,en largeur, la partie avant. Cela me fait penser a la classe Clemenceau est son pont etriqué.Leur avions sont parqués comme dans un metro Chinois aux heures de pointes.....
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Sujet: Re: Porte-avions / Aircraft Carrier Mar 19 Nov 2013 - 1:07
a écrit:
The Aircraft Carrier: More Than A Warship
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tous les pays le font............... histoire de montrer un peu les muscles et le savoir faire...... Et puis ne pas oublier le coté "recrutement futur" ,des vidéos comme ça ,cela peut faire naitre des vocations pour les plus jeunes.
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Lun 15 Juin 2009 - 0:55
Le Prophéte (saw) a dit: Les Hommes Les meilleurs sont ceux qui sont les plus utiles aux autres
''
