Wikileaks,fuites et révélations

Rappel du premier message :

suite au post d´Aslan..y´aura des degats,l´Allemagne aussi alertée

Citation :

Le monde se prépare à de nouvelles révélations par WikiLeaks, Washington appréhende

(AFP) – Il y a 11 heures

WASHINGTON — Des gouvernements du monde entier se préparaient en ce début de week-end à de nouvelles révélations par WikiLeaks, sous la forme d'un tourbillon de câbles diplomatiques américains potentiellement embarrassants pour les Etats-Unis et leurs partenaires.

L'administration Obama avait annoncé dès mercredi que ses services diplomatiques avaient entrepris de préparer des gouvernements étrangers à la publication prochaine de documents secrets susceptibles de créer des "tensions" avec eux.

Dans un entretien sur CNN qui sera diffusé dimanche dont l'AFP a obtenu la retranscription vendredi, le chef d'état-major interarmées américain, l'amiral Michael Mullen, a estimé que les agissements de WikiLeaks étaient "extrêmement dangereux", notamment pour la sécurité des soldats américains, appelant les responsables du site à renoncer à ces révélations.

De son côté, le porte-parole du département d'Etat Philip Crowley a déclaré que les Etats-Unis se préparaient au "pire scénario". Le département d'Etat avait indiqué plus tôt s'attendre à la publication de documents diplomatiques concernant "un large éventail de dossiers et de pays".

Le porte-parole a spécifié que parmi les pays contactés par la secrétaire d'Etat Hillary Clinton figuraient l'Allemagne, l'Arabie saoudite, les Emirats arabes unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Afghanistan.

A Moscou, le quotidien Kommersant a affirmé que les fuites comportaient des appréciations "désagréables" qui pourraient blesser Moscou.

Ces révélations "peuvent provoquer une brouille entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie", tout comme avec la moitié des pays de la planète, écrit le quotidien.

A Rome, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Franco Frattini a été prévenu par Washington que des documents concernaient l'Italie.

Le Canada a indiqué que son ambassade à Washington "s'occupe actuellement de cette question avec le département d'Etat".

A Bagdad, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, James Jeffrey, avait affirmé plus tôt que sa mission était "inquiète" face à des révélations susceptibles de saper "des discussions de confiance".

Le site spécialisé dans la révélation de documents confidentiels a promis lundi de mettre en ligne sept fois plus de documents confidentiels que les 400.000 récemment publiés sur la guerre en Irak.

Les premières fuites de WikiLeaks, en juillet sur l'Afghanistan, contenaient peu d'importantes révélations, et celles émanant d'Irak se concentraient en majorité sur des exactions commises entre différentes factions irakiennes.

Washington pourrait être plus embarrassé par la divulgation de documents rédigés par ses diplomates, en particulier s'ils mettent en cause des partenaires étrangers des Etats-Unis.

Selon le ministère finlandais des Affaires étrangères, l'ambassade américaine dans ce pays pense que cette publication allait être "la plus grave".

Selon un haut responsable israélien, Israël, dont Washington est le plus important allié, a été informé que ces fuites de câbles diplomatiques pourraient porter sur des rapports confidentiels adressés par l'ambassade américaine à des responsables israéliens.

A Ankara, un diplomate turc de haut rang a indiqué que la Turquie avait également été mise au courant.

Selon des informations de presse, les nouvelles révélations porteraient notamment sur une aide de la Turquie aux militants d'Al-Qaïda en Irak et un soutien des Etats-Unis aux rebelles kurdes du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), réfugiés en Irak.

Le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères, Ahmet Davutoglu, a ensuite jugé qu'il serait "hors de question" de tolérer des actes terroristes "ayant la Turquie pour origine et visant un pays voisin". Il a aussi insisté sur "la coopération étroite" entre Washington et Ankara face au PKK.

Des responsables en Grande-Bretagne, Norvège et Danemark ont aussi indiqué que leurs pays avaient été informés par les Etats-Unis.

en tout cas le cable usparu chez wikileaks est super critique vis à vis des far!

la moral e tout cela les us vont mettre du temps avant de remonter dans l estime de beaucoup de pays apres toutes ses revelations

Maatawi,elpais a versé dans le mensonge encore une fois(rien de nouveau)
les US n´ont dit ni inefficace des FAR,ni corruption au Palais,ils manipulent l´article comme tu peux voir
par contre voila ce qu´ils pensent

Citation :

Comment
-------
9. (SBU) Morocco has been an exemplary partner in the struggle against terrorism, and our military and political cooperation is growing. Morocco serves as a regional model for economic and political reform, and continued U.S. political/military assistance and engagement will help advance the positive changes underway and ensure the country remains a stable ally and a leader in the North Africa region.

malgrés elpais

said a écrit:

en tout cas le cable usparu chez wikileaks est super critique vis à vis des far!

la moral e tout cela les us vont mettre du temps avant de remonter dans l estime de beaucoup de pays apres toutes ses revelations

pas si critique que ca,dans le degrés que tout ca a ete debattu ici,dans les journaux marocains/internationals,livres et partout,on caonnait tous ca.mais le changement est souligné aussi!
parfois y´a seulement des guess(estimations),et des bourdes aussi(cessez feu en 81)

pour les cables,Kornblum,un ex-ambassadeur a berlin a dit a la tele que les diplomates US ne seront peut etre plus approchés comme avant,comme une peste qu´on fuit
deja un parti liberal ici a viré un secretaire,a cause il a "trop bavardé"...les US ont declenché une grave crise de confiance,dont ils ne se remettront peut etre jamais.

chaque chose a son coté positif

j'ai aimé le passage où el Mansouri confirme avec confiance que le Maroc est le seul pays de la région qui peut réellement contrôler ses frontières, empêchant les infiltrations de l'AQMI, qui voudrait bien annoncer le jihad pour ""chasser les infidèles""" de Sebta et Mellilia
de plus on peut noter que nos responsables ne se confessent jamais même à nos alliées les plus intimes et c'est une bonne chose ! la performance d'un service de renseignement se mesure par sa discrétion, la DGEG on sent jamais sa présence, c'est comme les poumons on sait qu'ils existent mais leurs présence est silencieuse
alors que chez nos voisins, la drs et son chef sont les sujets favoris de la rue....

Le nombre de câble, pays par pays..

1) Usa
2) Turquie
3) Chine

Citation :

Le conflit au Sahara occidental, né il y a une quarantaine d'années, n'est pas près de trouver une solution. Les positions sont trop éloignées, les rivalités trop profondes, les procès d'intention trop nombreux entre les deux principaux protagonistes: le Maroc, qui occupe le Sahara occidental en dehors de toute légalité internationale, et l'Algérie sans l'appui de laquelle le Front Polisario, favorable à un référendum pour fixer l'avenir de l'ancienne colonie espagnole (indépendance ou rattachement au Maroc), aurait le plus grand mal à exister.


La position algérienne est clairement exprimée dans le compte-rendu d'une audience (d'une durée de 3 heures 30) accordée en mai 2007 par le président algérien Abdelaziz Bouteflika à Frances Fragos Townsend, la conseillère du président Bush pour les affaires de sécurité, obtenu par Wikileaks et révélé par Le Monde.

"Si je pouvais résoudre le problème je le ferais, affirme le président algérien. Mais je ne peux pas parler à la place des Sahraouis ." Ce qu'il faut c'est que "le Maroc et le Polisario trouvent une solution, et ils peuvent le faire avec l'aide des Américains".

Les Français, confiera-t-il à une autre occasion, "du fait du poids de leur histoire coloniale au Maghreb, sont incapables de jouer un rôle constructif dans le conflit". D'ailleurs, ajoute-t-il, "la France n'a jamais vraiment accepté l'indépendance algérienne". Pour lui, elle tente de régler ses comptes avec l'Algérie "en appuyant le Maroc".

LE JUGEMENT DE M. BOUTEFLIKA SUR LE ROI DU MAROC

Un an plus tard, en février 2008, recevant un diplomate américain, changement de registre. Le président algérien dénonce "le plan d'autonomie" voulu par Rabat à la place du referendum d'autodétermination. Celui-ci n'offre qu'un semblant d'autonomie. Les provinces algériennes en ont d'avantage vis-à-vis d'Alger, soutient M.Bouteflika.

Puis, au fil de l'entretien, le président algérien se laisse aller: il comprend que les Marocains se sentent menacés par la perspective d'un Sahara occidental indépendant mais, dit-il, ils sont les premiers responsables de la situation. Au lieu de faire preuve d'une approche "élégante" en acceptant une indépendance du Sahara occidental qu'ils auraient pu "contrôler" ou "superviser", ils veulent "un Anschluss, comme Saddam Hussein avec le Koweït". S'ils n'avaient pas été aussi maladroits, les Marocains "auraient pu obtenir ce qu'ils voulaient", assure le président algérien à son hôte.

L'année suivante, en novembre 2009, devant le chef du commandement américain pour l'Afrique (Africom), le général William Ward, le chef de l'Etat algérien revient à la charge. Selon lui, le projet d'autonomie est à rejeter. "Vous ne pouvez pas défendre l'application d'un principe pour la Palestine et un autre principe pour le Sahara occidental", fait valoir le président algérien.

Le jugement négatif de M. Bouteflika sur le roi du Maroc n'est pas fait pour arranger les choses. Autant le président algérien apprécie Moulay Rachid, le frère du roi ("On a plaisanté et discuté agréablement" à l'occasion d'une rencontre à Séville, en Espagne) autant le courant ne passe pas avec Mohammed VI. "Il n'est pas ouvert, et manque d'expérience", se plaint-il. Pour M. Bouteflika, aucun dialogue n'est possible entre lui et le roi du Maroc.

LES APPRÉCIATIONS SÉVÈRES DES MAROCAINS

Côté marocain, la suspicion n'est pas moindre. Non pas que Mohammed VI se confie un tant soit peu aux très rares interlocuteurs américains qu'il reçoit. Mais ses proches le font pour lui. Or, ils sont sévères dans leur jugement. Selon leur lecture, la clé du dossier du Sahara occidental se trouve non pas à Tindouf, où siège les indépendantistes du Polisario, mais à Alger. Là-bas, expliquent-ils en juin 2009 au représentant personnel du secrétaire général de l'ONU, Christopher Ross, le pouvoir est toujours entre les mains de généraux dogmatiques, incapables de bouger et "pétrifiés" à l'idée du plan d'autonomie présenté par Rabat.

Faut-il miser sur le temps et attendre qu'une nouvelle génération soit aux commandes en Algérie pour résoudre le conflit au Sahara occidental ? Certains conseiller du roi en sont convaincus, mais pas le chef des services de renseignements extérieurs, Mohamed Yassine Mansouri. Dans un "mémo" du printemps 2008, il se dit convaincu qu'un changement de génération "pourrait compliquer la situation". "L'ancienne génération qui a créé le problème est la mieux placée pour le résoudre", dit-il à son interlocuteur américain.

Dans un télégramme de juin 2009, le même Mansouri confie que Rabat a demandé au président français Nicolas Sarkozy de faire en sorte "de n'être pas perçu, comme par le passé comme aussi pro-marocain sur le Sahara occidental".

C'était aussi le cas de l'administration Bush, "qui apparaissait trop favorable au Maroc". A l'équipe diplomatique du président Obama, le patron des services d'espionnage fait observer qu'"il ne serait pas très judicieux d'abandonner ses vrais amis au profit du pétrole".

Mr.Jad a écrit:

Citation :

I

1981 cease-fire

les diplomates américains coopère beaucoup avec "moul 7anout"

Citation :

ID: 159651
Date: 2008-06-25 17:52:00
Origin: 08ALGIERS733
Source: Embassy Algiers
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 08ALGIERS261
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 000733

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E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/25/2028
TAGS: PREL, MO, WI, AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA ON WESTERN SAHARA: OUR BACKS ARE
AGAINST THE WALL - HELP US

REF: ALGIERS 261

Classified By: Ambassador Robert S. Ford,
reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) President Bouteflika pleaded for U.S. assistance to
find a breakthrough on the Western Sahara stalemate during
Ambassador's farewell call on June 24. Bouteflika said the
U.S. had always supported self-determination, and the
apparent change in policy to support Morocco's position is
painful and confusing to Algerians. He added that he has
been very careful not to let the bilateral relationship
suffer due to the U.S. change of policy on Western Sahara,
but with the U.S. and France backing Morocco, "we have our
backs against the wall."

2. (C) Ambassador told Bouteflika that the U.S. always
supported the idea of autonomy as a way to remove forward in
a pragmatic manner. He said that if the two parties did not
adopt a realistic stance, the current stalemate could last
another 30 years or even longer. Ambassador said that it
would be better for the Sahrawi refugees to live under a good
autonomy plan rather than to continue living in refugee
camps. He added that the U.S. did not ask the Polisario to
accept Morocco's plan, but to accept negotiation on autonomy
and put their own proposal on the table. Ambassador
continued that the U.S. would be supportive of a broad
measure of autonomy. He cited the example of the Kurds in
Iraq who enjoy wide authorities within a united Iraqi state.

3. (C) Bouteflika responded that Algeria will not compromise
its position on the Sahrawi right to choose independence,
adding that the Algerians consider this a matter of
principle. Powerful states should not be allowed to crush
the weak. Bouteflika said that the U.S. had supported the
independence of East Timor and therefore should also support
the Sahrawis. The Polisario has its own diplomatic influence
on the African continent, he added, which is something
Algeria cannot simply ignore. Bouteflika commented that the
Moroccans had erred in linking the security of the throne to
the Western Sahara. Algeria did not seek to de-stabilize
Morocco. Moroccan stability, he insisted, was vital for
Algerian stability.

4. (C) Bouteflika told Ambassador it should be up to the
Sahrawis to decide if they want independence even if the
final solution comes in stages over a course of years. He
added that this was the reason Algeria was so fond of the
Baker plan. After Ambassador emphasized that the Baker plan
had not generated any movement towards a solution, Bouteflika
was non-committal and again pleaded for U.S. help to resolve
the current stalemate.

5. (C) Comment: Clearly Bouteflika will not press the
Sahrawis very hard on sitting with the Moroccans to discuss
only autonomy; the Algerians have told us this consistently
throughout the last nine months. That said, as he did with
NEA Assistant Secretary Welch (ref), Bouteflika indicated
that he wanted to find a way out of the impasse. There just
isn't any creative thinking here about how to do it.
FORD

Citation :

ID: 143518
Date: 2008-02-28 16:08:00
Origin: 08RABAT185
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXRO9993
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000185

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STATE FOR NEA, EUR/SCE AND AF/W

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/26/2018
TAGS: PREL, OVIP, MO
SUBJECT: NEA A/S WELCH,S MEETINGS WITH KING MOHAMMED VI AND
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS TAIEB FASSI FIHRI

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) SUMMARY: King Mohammed VI received NEA A/S Welch for
an hour on February 25. The wide-ranging exchange of views
focused on bilateral cooperation, the Middle East Peace
Process (MEPP), Iran, Kosovo, Lebanon, Mauritania, Syria,
Algeria and Western Sahara. In most respects, the audience
mirrored the meeting that preceded it with Minister of
Foreign Affairs Fassi Fihri and MFA Director General for
Multilateral Affairs Mohamed Azeroual. However, we heard
that Amr Moussa,s latest visit to Beirut had been "a
catastrophe;" the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend the
Arab summit in Damascus; and Morocco was looking at other
Arab countries' reaction to Kosovo's declaration of
independence. The King asked us to assist Mauritania and
warned that the POLISARIO must not attempt to occupy the area
east of the berm in Western Sahara. In his meeting with the
Foreign Minister, Ambassador Welch pressed for an agreement
on the status of the American schools in Morocco and informed
the Minister of a planned accord with the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum. END SUMMARY.

BILATERAL COOPERATION
---------------------
2. (C) Receiving NEA A/S Welch, the Ambassador, DCM and Erin
Yerger, the Executive Assistant to Deputy Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs Elliot Abrams, at the
royal palace in Marrakech on February 25, the King thanked
the United States for the excellent cooperation on
counterterrorism, the Millennium Challenge Account and the
Free Trade Agreement. Foreign Minister Fassi Fihri also
attended the audience.

KOSOVO
------
3. (C) The King noted that he had just met with the Greek
Foreign Minister, who urged him not to recognize Kosovo. The
King and the Foreign Minister indicated that they intended to
discuss recognition with other Arab leaders at the
Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) Summit in Dakar
in March. Fassi Fihri said the Serbian Foreign Minister has
also requested a meeting.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
----
4. (C) Ambassador Welch began by underscoring that this is
an important year for the region and that the President is
determined to make progress on the MEPP. Welch briefed the
King and the Minister on the process and assured them that
the Israelis and the Palestinians are making progress, but
the public is unaware of it. On Gaza, Welch averred that
Israeli Prime Minister Olmert is focused on the least bad
option. For his part, the King expressed deep concern about
the humanitarian situation in Gaza.

LEBANON
-------
5. (C) Turning to the continuing leadership vacuum in
Lebanon, A/S Welch said that we see three options: 1) to
continue efforts to elect a President by consensus; 2) to
elect a President with 50 percent of the vote plus one; or 3)
to support the Siniora government. Welch indicated that we
increasingly believe the third option affords the best means
to support Lebanon,s institutions. Asked about Arab League
Secretary General Amr Moussa's visit to Beirut, Fassi Fihri

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characterized it as 'a catastrophe.'

SYRIA AND THE ARAB LEAGUE SUMMIT
--------------------------------
6. (C) Noting that Kings Mohammed VI and Abdullah II of
Jordan had come to power at approximately the same time as

RABAT 00000185 002 OF 003


President Bashar al-Assad, Welch decried Syria,s lost
opportunities. Welch said that he understood that the Syrian
Foreign Minister would be in Marrakech on February 26 to
deliver an invitation to the Arab Summit in Damascus, and
Welch predicted that attendance would be poor. The King said
he understood that the Emir of Kuwait did not plan to attend,
implying that Morocco would be represented at the ministerial
level at best.

IRAN
----
7. (C) Ambassador Welch asked if he might say a few words
about Iran and its pursuit of nuclear weapons. The King
responded that he understood that Iran had suspended its
nuclear weapons program. Welch thanked the King for the
opportunity to clarify, declaring that the U.S. intelligence
estimate had been misunderstood and that the reporting on
this issue has been unclear. Welch said that we continued to
believe that Iran was pursuing nuclear weapons; so President
Bush was seeking a middle ground "between the bomb and
bombing," without giving up any option. Diplomatic pressure
is best for now. When the King asked what that middle ground
might look like, Welch said that more Security
Council-approved sanctions loom and that Iran must accept a
diplomatic solution.

ALGERIA
-------
8. (C) The conversation then turned to Algeria, and Welch
asked if the GOM had any views on President Abdelaziz
Bouteflika,s plans. The King said he understood that
Bouteflika was amending the Constitution to permit a third
term, and Welch noted wryly that Bouteflika was doing so
without Syrian assistance. The King praised the "frustrated"
Algerian Ambassador in Rabat for his tireless efforts to
improve bilateral relations, stating, &We have no relations
with Algeria, except for limited cooperation on security
issues." In spite of obvious opportunities for cooperation
in agriculture, energy and a host of other areas, President
Bouteflika and his government clearly prefer the status quo.
The King noted that he had even traveled to Algiers to try to
break the impasse, but the GOA continues to insist on the
Western Sahara issue being resolved before proceeding with
other bilateral or regional initiatives.

WESTERN SAHARA
--------------
9. (C) The King and Fassi Fihri expressed grave concern
about the POLISARIO's stated plans to move people into the
area east of the berm. The King said bluntly that Morocco
could not allow that. Praising the King,s autonomy
initiative, Welch urged the GOM to press ahead with the
Manhasset talks. He said support for Morocco,s position is
growing ever so slowly. Separately, Welch cautioned the
King's intelligence chief against militarization of the
dispute.

MAURITANIA
----------
10. (C) Looking at Western Sahara's neighbor Mauritania, the
King stressed that Mauritania needs help and that he will see
the Mauritanian President in Dakar.

AMERICAN SCHOOLS
----------------
11. (U) Welch took advantage of a few private minutes with
Fassi Fihri to underscore the need for an agreement on the
status of the American schools in Morocco. Noting that he
had attended the Rabat American School (RAS)as a child, Welch
said if a solution is not found soon that RAS could not
produce more David Welches. Fassi Fihri replied that he had

RABAT 00000185 003 OF 003


been in contact with Prime Minister Abbas El Fassi and
Director General of Taxation Nouredine Bensouda about our
proposal.

U.S. HOLOCAUST MEMORIAL MUSEUM
------------------------------
12. (U) Welch also raised made the Minister aware of the
planned signing of an accord between the U.S. Holocaust
Memorial Museum and the Moroccan National Archives. Welch
also mentioned that the Museum still planned to host a
conference on the Holocaust in Arab lands.

COMMENT
-------
13. (C) Although his face looked puffy, the King appeared
relaxed and rested after four weeks in France. The meeting
itself underscored how much U.S. and Moroccan views coincide.
END COMMENT.

14. (U) NEA A/S Welch has cleared this message.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************

Riley

Citation :

ID: 70010
Date: 2006-07-01 11:15:00
Origin: 06ALGIERS1219
Source: Embassy Algiers
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
PP RUEHWEB

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C O N F I D E N T I A L ALGIERS 001219

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NOFORN
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E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2016
TAGS: PREL, PBTS, WI, MO, AG
SUBJECT: BOUTEFLIKA ON WESTERN SAHARA, RELATIONS WITH
MOROCCO


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman: Reasons 1.4 (b), (d)

1. (C) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend met with President
Bouteflika for three and a half hours June 18. NSC Senior
Director for Combating Terrorism Michele Malvesti and DCM
accompanied Townsend. Bouteflika's Counterterrorism Adviser
Rezzag Bara and a notetaker were also present. This cable
reports their discussion of the Western Sahara and relations
with Morocco.

2. (C/NF) Well into the meeting, Bouteflika raised Western
Sahara, noting that U.S. visitors always wanted to discuss it
with him. Townsend noted that President Bush had asked both
Bouteflika and Moroccan King Mohamed VI to find a way to
resolve their differences. Townsend said the President
appreciated Bouteflika's role in last summer's release by the
Polisario of the remaining 404 Moroccan prisoners, noting
that "this would not have happened without your courage."
She asked Bouteflika about his view on fully resolving this
issue. .

3. (C/NF) Bouteflika responded that as the world's biggest
power, the U.S. should respect the decisions of the UN on the
Western Sahara. He recalled that in his first meeting with
President Bush in 2001, the President had asked him to work
faithfully with James Baker and he had done so. Bouteflika
noted that he had supported the Baker Plan, even though he
would not have done so without President Bush's request.
Now, he said, Algeria was "stuck in the middle" with Morocco;
"we reject anything they accept and vice versa." Bouteflika
commented that despite this stalemate, he had made two
important decisions: the Western Sahara would never be a
casus belli for Algeria, and he had made clear to the
Moroccans that Algeria had no claims on the Western Sahara's
territory or resources.

4. (C/NF) Bouteflika asserted that there was no bilateral
problem between Algeria and Morocco. The Moroccans, he went
on, claimed the Western Sahara was an issue between Morocco
and Algeria. "I would solve it if I could," he stated, "but
I cannot speak for the Sahrawis." Morocco and the Polisario
must find a solution, and they can do so with American help.
Algeria will support any agreement reached by Morocco and the
Polisario. But, Bouteflika cautioned, a solution cannot be
imposed on the Sahrawis. In that case, Algeria will defend
to the end the Sahrawis' right to self-determination.

5. (C/NF) Bouteflika complained that Algeria was in a
situation whereby any gesture toward Morocco would be held up
by the Moroccan side as the beginning of a process of working
out a settlement bilaterally with Algeria. "So I do not want
to shake the King's hand." However, Bouteflika said he had
recently met the King's brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, in
Seville, where they were both guests of King Juan Carlos.
Bouteflika observed that he had found he could have a broad
discussion with Moulay Rachid. "We joked and chatted
comfortably," Bouteflika commented, "but I cannot do this
with the King, we do not have the same sense of humor!" He
added that he could also joke with the King's late father,
King Hassan II. King Mohamed, however, "is not open, and he
lacks experience." In a rare moment of self-criticism,
Bouteflika said he had found his own weak point: he believed
others should resolve problems through dialogue, but he did
not believe in dialogue for himself with Mohamed VI.

6. (C/NF) Townsend said the Western Sahara continued to be a
matter of great interest to President Bush. She added that
the lack of a settlement was impeding regional cooperation on
counterterrorism and preventing the Maghreb from achieving
the level of economic relations that it should enjoy.
Bouteflika suggested that James Baker would be a good source
of advice to the President, he was a man of "exceptional
qualities." It was a "shame Baker quit," Bouteflika
commented. He then wondered whether the President might
convince Baker to resume his previous role. Bouteflika
concluded that offering concessions to Morocco would be
tantamount to "giving a bonus to the most undisciplined
student in the class." The U.S. "should not award Morocco's
bad behavior."

7. (U) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and

Counterterrorism Frances Fragos Townsend has cleared this
message.
ERDMAN

Citation :

ID: 38855
Date: 2005-08-19 11:35:00
Origin: 05ALGIERS1753
Source: Embassy Algiers
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.


C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ALGIERS 001753

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/19/2015
TAGS: PREL, PHUM, PBTS, WI, AG, MO, Algeria-Morocco Relations, Polisario
SUBJECT: SENATOR LUGAR DISCUSSES WESTERN SAHARA,
ALGERIAN-MOROCCAN RELATIONS WITH BOUTEFLIKA


Classified By: Ambassador Richard W. Erdman, Reason 1.4 (b) (d)

1. (C) Summary. Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Chairman Richard Lugar, accompanied by Ambassador, Supreme
Allied Commander in Europe General James Jones, and members
of his delegation met with President Abdelaziz Bouteflika the
morning of August 18. Following the meeting, Senator Lugar
and his delegation departed for Tindouf to oversee the
release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario.
Lugar expressed appreciation for Bouteflika's efforts to
create new momentum for resolving the Western Sahara
conflict. Bouteflika recalled his commitment to President
Bush in 2001 to support James Baker, noting that he had done
so and accepted the Baker Plan, but when Baker quit he had
left a vacuum that had not been filled. Bouteflika
reiterated his assurance that Western Sahara would not be a
casus belli for Algeria, but said the Polisario had the right
to resume fighting "on its own territory" if it chose to do
so. Bouteflika insisted that Algeria would respect the
outcome of a referendum no matter what it was, but would not
be a party to negotiations with Morocco on behalf of the
Sahrawis. Bouteflika sharply complained about Morocco's
last-minute cancellation of a planned meeting with King
Mohammed in Rabat in June by Prime Minister Ouyahia, saying
he could not accept "dealing with diplomatic relations in
such an irresponsible manner." Referring to advice from
Presidents Bush and Chirac that he bear in mind King
Mohammed's youth, Bouteflika said, "I am not Jesus Christ,
and will not turn my other cheek." Algeria was ready to
discuss "objective interests" with Morocco, but only if the
Moroccans were "serious." Senator Lugar noted that President
Bush had asked him to undertake this humanitarian mission,
adding that the U.S. wanted Algeria and Morocco to reopen the
land border and reengage at the highest level. Did
Bouteflika think the Moroccans understood his position on a
referendum? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara had been on
the UN's agenda since the 1970s. Algeria favored respecting
international law and was defending the right of
self-determination, but would not accept being a negotiating
partner on the fate of the Western Sahara with France, Spain,
Morocco or the U.S. End summary.

LUGAR MISSION
-------------

2. (U) Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Senator Richard
Lugar and his delegation, which included Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe General James Jones, visited Algeria
August 17-18 as part of a Presidential Mission to oversee the
release of the last 404 Moroccan POWs held by the Polisario
Front in Tindouf. Senator Lugar, Ambassador, General Jones,
and members of Lugar's delegation met with President
Abdelaziz Bouteflika for two and a half hours the morning of
August 18 before flying to Tindouf. NEA DAS Gray, EUCOM J-5
General Gration, NSC Director Pounds, and DCM also attended
the meeting, at which Bouteflika was flanked by Presidential
Chief of Staff Belkheir, Chief of Defense General Gait Saleh,
Council of the Nation President Bensalah, and Minister
Delegate for Maghreb and African Affairs Messahel. Septel
reports Lugar and Bouteflika's discussion of U.S.-Algerian
relations and a number of regional issues.

A HUMANITARIAN MISSION
----------------------

3. (C) Senator Lugar began by conveying the greetings of
President Bush, who fully supported the humanitarian mission
to secure the release of the Moroccan POWs. The initiative
taken by Bouteflika should create new opportunities for
Algeria and Morocco and develop momentum toward resolving the
Western Sahara conflict. Lugar noted the UNSYG's appointment
of a new personal envoy, van Walsum, as a positive sign of
the UN's support as well. Bouteflika warmly welcomed Senator
Lugar and his delegation, adding that he was aware of the
Senator's record of reaching consensus. Bouteflika said he
was aware that there were some concerns in Washington about
Lugar's planned meeting in Tindouf with Polisario leader
Abdelaziz, but commented that there was no need for concern
since this was a strictly humanitarian mission. The
Sahrawis, he said, would talk about their concerns, but this
should "not offend anyone from the land of Washington and
Wilson," the leader of a war for independence and the
founding father of the idea of self-determination.

4. (C) Bouteflika recalled his first meeting with President
Bush in 2001, at which the President had asked him if he was
ready to work with James Baker. Bouteflika promised the
President he would work cooperatively with Baker and had done
so (i.e., accepting the Baker Plan and getting the Polisario
to accept it as well) until Baker had resigned. Baker's
resignation had left a vacuum in the settlement process that
still had not been filled. Bouteflika praised Baker for
being able to see the needs of both sides, Morocco and the
Polisario's. Baker "represented the American values we
admire."

WESTERN SAHARA NOT A CASUS BELLI,
BUT POLISARIO HAVE THE RIGHT TO FIGHT
-------------------------------------

5. (C) Recalling the Houston Agreement negotiated by Baker
with Morocco and the Polisario, Bouteflika said he had still
been out of politics then. But at the time, he had thought
the agreement flawed because it did not set a deadline for
implementation. He said that if he had been the Polisario,
he would have signed the agreement but insisted on the right
to take up arms after six months or one year if it were not
implemented. The Polisario was now paying the price for not
insisting on a time limit.

6. (C) Bouteflika said that when he became President in 1999
he had taken a position that was not completely accepted at
the time by the army and intelligence services, i.e. that the
Western Sahara would never be a casus belli for Algeria. The
Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if
they decided to fight "on their own territory," that would be
their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to
fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base.


MOROCCO MUST GO BACK TO UN
--------------------------

7. (C) Bouteflika said he had urged Morocco to return to the
UN framework. When Iraq invaded Kuwait, the international
community mobilized itself, but the Western Sahara was
considered a "mere tribal issue" even though it had been a
Spanish colony. Bouteflika criticized Spain, saying the
Spanish Socialists had not been honest with the Sahrawis.
From time to time, Spain approached Algeria about entering
negotiations with France, Morocco and Spain to resolve the
conflict. Algeria, however, had no claim to the Western
Sahara and would not negotiate on the Sahrawis' behalf.
Bouteflika stressed that he was only advocating
self-determination, a principle enshrined in the UN Charter.
Morocco wanted improved relations with Algeria, but Algeria
would not respond until Morocco agreed to return to the UN
framework. The only thing Algeria asked of Morocco was to
accept UNSC resolutions and international law. That is my
sincerest hope, Bouteflika said.

ALGERIA WILL ACCEPT RESULT OF REFERENDUM
----------------------------------------

8. (C) Bouteflika said he was ready to sign a document now
committing Algeria to accept the result of a referendum,
whichever way it turned out. He said he realized a
referendum was a "Pandora's box," but Algeria would accept
the outcome. Algeria would defend the right of
self-determination even if it was the last UN member-state to
do so.

"I AM NOT JESUS CHRIST"
-----------------------

9. (C) According to Bouteflika, bilateral relations with
Morocco had started to gain momentum earlier this year.
Prime Minister Ouyahia was ready to visit Rabat with a large
delegation. There were many bilateral agreements with
Morocco dating to the 1960s and they were in serious need of
review. The Moroccans informed Bouteflika that King Mohammed
would see Ouyahia and his delegation. Then, only an hour
later, the Moroccans said that "circumstances were not
favorable" for the visit, even though it had been prepared
months in advance. Bouteflika underscored that he could not
accept dealing with diplomatic relations "in such an
irresponsible manner." Morocco would always be Algeria's
neighbor, neither country would move and they had to get
along. But it was unacceptable to handle serious issues in
an "infantile manner." Bouteflika said that in his
discussions with Presidents Bush and Chirac, among other
leaders, he was told that the king was young while he was a
veteran diplomat. But, he said, "I am not Jesus Christ" and
will not turn the other cheek.

10. (C) Bouteflika recalled that he was born in Morocco and
knew that country very well. Morocco stood to gain a great
deal from reopening the land border, since north-east Morocco
depended on trade with the Oran region of Algeria. Even with
the border closed, Morocco makes three billion Euros a year
from smuggling, he claimed. Both countries have objective
interests in better relations, but if the Moroccans want to
discuss normalizing relations they must be serious about how
they treat Algeria.

11. (C) Turning to the Arab Maghreb Union, Bouteflika said
that if the Libyans organized a summit, he would attend in
order to make it a success, not to embarrass anyone. As soon
as Morocco returned to the UN framework for the Western
Sahara, Algeria would engage on bilateral relations and the
AMU.

U.S TRIES TO DO THE RIGHT THING
-------------------------------

12. (C) Senator Lugar said the United States tried to act in
a manner consistent with democratic values of human rights
and respect for the right of self-determination that
Bouteflika had mentioned. The U.S. acted even when its own
national interests were not directly engaged when it was the
right thing to do. It was in this context that President
Bush had asked that the Senator undertake this mission. The
President respected Bouteflika's initiative to gain the
release of the prisoners and was looking for ways to improve
Algerian-Moroccan relations. The U.S. believed the two
countries should reopen their border and reengage at the
highest level. The U.S. wanted to work with Algeria to see
how we could make a difference.

13. (C) Senator Lugar asked whether Bouteflika thought the
Moroccan Government understood his position that Algeria
would support the results of a referendum no matter what they
were? Was the question of who would have the right to vote
still a significant issue? What were the other principal
issues? Bouteflika said the Western Sahara was not a new
issue for the UN. Baker had done very good work, and the
UNSYG had a complete list of voters in a referendum. Algeria
will accept the results of a referendum, but that did not
mean it would "condone Moroccan tricks." The Western Sahara
has been on the UN agenda since the 1970s, at the same time
as Brunei, Suriname, and Belize, all of which were long since
independent. Algeria supported respecting international law.
It would not accept being a negotiating partner on the
Western Sahara with France, Spain, Morocco or the United
States, but Algeria would defend the right of
self-determination.

14. (U) Senator Lugar did not have an opportunity to clear
this message.

15. (U) Minimize considered.
ERDMAN

Leo Africanus a écrit:

Si ceux ci sont les rapports que l'US embassy remet a Washington alors je comprend mieux certaines choses, mais ce que m'a vraiment schoke' c'est:

Citation :

Previous interactions with GOM officials indicate that military leaders are opposed to AFRICOM basing a headquarters element in Morocco.

moi j'approuve l'avis de l'armée, une installation us chez nous risque d'attirer les extremistes de nul part

Le monde qui fait un petit résumé des positions algériennes et marocains sur le sahara, a partir de wikileaks

Citation :

Le conflit au Sahara occidental, né il y a une quarantaine d'années, n'est pas près de trouver une solution. Les positions sont trop éloignées, les rivalités trop profondes, les procès d'intention trop nombreux entre les deux principaux protagonistes: le Maroc, qui occupe le Sahara occidental en dehors de toute légalité internationale, et l'Algérie sans l'appui de laquelle le Front Polisario, favorable à un référendum pour fixer l'avenir de l'ancienne colonie espagnole (indépendance ou rattachement au Maroc), aurait le plus grand mal à exister.

La position algérienne est clairement exprimée dans le compte-rendu d'une audience (d'une durée de 3 heures 30) accordée en mai 2007 par le président algérien Abdelaziz Bouteflika à Frances Fragos Townsend, la conseillère du président Bush pour les affaires de sécurité, obtenu par Wikileaks et révélé par Le Monde.

"Si je pouvais résoudre le problème je le ferais, affirme le président algérien. Mais je ne peux pas parler à la place des Sahraouis ." Ce qu'il faut c'est que "le Maroc et le Polisario trouvent une solution, et ils peuvent le faire avec l'aide des Américains".

Les Français, confiera-t-il à une autre occasion, "du fait du poids de leur histoire coloniale au Maghreb, sont incapables de jouer un rôle constructif dans le conflit". D'ailleurs, ajoute-t-il, "la France n'a jamais vraiment accepté l'indépendance algérienne". Pour lui, elle tente de régler ses comptes avec l'Algérie "en appuyant le Maroc".

LE JUGEMENT DE M. BOUTEFLIKA SUR LE ROI DU MAROC

Un an plus tard, en février 2008, recevant un diplomate américain, changement de registre. Le président algérien dénonce "le plan d'autonomie" voulu par Rabat à la place du referendum d'autodétermination. Celui-ci n'offre qu'un semblant d'autonomie. Les provinces algériennes en ont d'avantage vis-à-vis d'Alger, soutient M.Bouteflika.

Puis, au fil de l'entretien, le président algérien se laisse aller: il comprend que les Marocains se sentent menacés par la perspective d'un Sahara occidental indépendant mais, dit-il, ils sont les premiers responsables de la situation. Au lieu de faire preuve d'une approche "élégante" en acceptant une indépendance du Sahara occidental qu'ils auraient pu "contrôler" ou "superviser", ils veulent "un Anschluss, comme Saddam Hussein avec le Koweït". S'ils n'avaient pas été aussi maladroits, les Marocains "auraient pu obtenir ce qu'ils voulaient", assure le président algérien à son hôte.

L'année suivante, en novembre 2009, devant le chef du commandement américain pour l'Afrique (Africom), le général William Ward, le chef de l'Etat algérien revient à la charge. Selon lui, le projet d'autonomie est à rejeter. "Vous ne pouvez pas défendre l'application d'un principe pour la Palestine et un autre principe pour le Sahara occidental", fait valoir le président algérien.

Le jugement négatif de M. Bouteflika sur le roi du Maroc n'est pas fait pour arranger les choses. Autant le président algérien apprécie Moulay Rachid, le frère du roi ("On a plaisanté et discuté agréablement" à l'occasion d'une rencontre à Séville, en Espagne) autant le courant ne passe pas avec Mohammed VI. "Il n'est pas ouvert, et manque d'expérience", se plaint-il. Pour M. Bouteflika, aucun dialogue n'est possible entre lui et le roi du Maroc.

LES APPRÉCIATIONS SÉVÈRES DES MAROCAINS

Côté marocain, la suspicion n'est pas moindre. Non pas que Mohammed VI se confie un tant soit peu aux très rares interlocuteurs américains qu'il reçoit. Mais ses proches le font pour lui. Or, ils sont sévères dans leur jugement. Selon leur lecture, la clé du dossier du Sahara occidental se trouve non pas à Tindouf, où siège les indépendantistes du Polisario, mais à Alger. Là-bas, expliquent-ils en juin 2009 au représentant personnel du secrétaire général de l'ONU, Christopher Ross, le pouvoir est toujours entre les mains de généraux dogmatiques, incapables de bouger et "pétrifiés" à l'idée du plan d'autonomie présenté par Rabat.

Faut-il miser sur le temps et attendre qu'une nouvelle génération soit aux commandes en Algérie pour résoudre le conflit au Sahara occidental ? Certains conseiller du roi en sont convaincus, mais pas le chef des services de renseignements extérieurs, Mohamed Yassine Mansouri. Dans un "mémo" du printemps 2008, il se dit convaincu qu'un changement de génération "pourrait compliquer la situation". "L'ancienne génération qui a créé le problème est la mieux placée pour le résoudre", dit-il à son interlocuteur américain.

Dans un télégramme de juin 2009, le même Mansouri confie que Rabat a demandé au président français Nicolas Sarkozy de faire en sorte "de n'être pas perçu, comme par le passé comme aussi pro-marocain sur le Sahara occidental".

C'était aussi le cas de l'administration Bush, "qui apparaissait trop favorable au Maroc". A l'équipe diplomatique du président Obama, le patron des services d'espionnage fait observer qu'"il ne serait pas très judicieux d'abandonner ses vrais amis au profit du pétrole".

Les télégrammes utilisés pour cet article :

http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08ALGIERS261.html
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/05/07ALGIERS652.html
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/02/08RABAT185.html
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2008/03/08RABAT194.html
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2009/12/09ALGIERS1077.html
http://cablegate.wikileaks.org/cable/2007/07/07RABAT1229.html

Source: lemonde.fr

Casablanca le 23/05/2008

Citation :

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 CASABLANCA 000104

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND NEA/PI

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018
TAGS: ECON EFIN EINV KDEM MO
SUBJECT: SOURCES OF WEALTH IN CASABLANCA - INTERNAL, EXTERNAL, ILLICIT

REF: A) CASABLANCA 86
B) CASABLANCA 93
C) CASABLANCA 270

Classified By: Principal Officer Douglas Greene for reasons 1.4 (B)
AND (D)

¶1. (SBU) Summary: In Casablanca, Morocco's largest city and economic capital, prosperity is increasingly on display, raising the question of where it comes from. Family money, the banking and real estate sectors, and a strong-performing stock market account for some wealth. Remittances from Moroccans living abroad, tourism, and foreign investment, especially from Gulf countries, comprise the
major external sources of money. Illicit sources of income including drug trafficking, money laundering and endemic corruption play a role in the growing economy as well. Increased consumption has been a
boon to the economy, but Casablanca's wealth must be shared more broadly to benefit all segments of society. End Summary.

--------------------------
INTERNAL SOURCES OF WEALTH
--------------------------

¶2. (SBU) The easily-observable phenomenon of wealth in Casablanca begs the question of where the money comes from. Many Casablancans cite family money as one key contributor to the city's affluence.
According to Samir Benmakhlouf, president of Century 21 Morocco, the textile industry, based in Fez, traditionally drove the Moroccan economy. In the 1970s and 80s, textile producers relocated to Casablanca for retail opportunities, creating economic momentum and bringing money to the city. An article in the Middle East Report on Morocco's bourgeoisie supports this historical view, though dates the shift to the end of World War II: "The economic center of gravity shifted to the coastal cities, especially Casablanca. Enterprising businessmen left Fez for Casablanca, where they continued to be known as Fassis." Even today, natives of Fez retain their reputation as members of a business-savvy elite. One of Morocco's richest men, Othman Benjelloun, hails from Fez and is Chairman and CEO of BMCE,
Morocco's third largest bank. According to BMCE employees, a 'Fez mafia' dominates the bank's culture. Benjelloun and others like him belong to a long-standing, moneyed elite who contribute to
Casablanca's prosperity.

¶3. (U) The banking sector, based in Casablanca, also generates wealth. Morocco's 15 banks include five Moroccan-owned private banks and five foreign banks. Thanks to expanding geographic networks and
increased banking products and services, including e-banking, mortgages and consumer credit, the sector has enjoyed impressive growth. Overall, bank revenues rose 10.5 percent in 2006 to reach USD 2.56 billion. The same year, Morocco's banks registered net profits of USD 825 million, a 68 percent increase over the previous year. Such strong performance has triggered an increase in hiring, particularly of young, well-educated Moroccans. It has also led several of the six banks listed on the Casablanca Stock Exchange to
offer employee stock options, enabling staff members to share in their bank's profitability. BMCE Bank's 2007 Annual Report notes that employees averaged gains of 380 percent from the bank's second public offering, "which is the equivalent of roughly 15 times the net monthly salary." Such tremendous performance has a spillover effect on Casablanca's economy.

¶4. (SBU) Just as the banking sector contributes to Casablanca's wealth, so does the real estate market, due to a convergence of factors. The scarcity of land in densely-packed Casablanca puts property at a premium. According to the Oxford Business Group, the city covers 69.5 square miles of land, but needs over 100 square miles to support the current population of over three million. As Moroccans have moved from rural areas to Casablanca, land prices have risen. The influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) compounds this effect. Of the seven billion dollars of FDI that Morocco received in 2007, real estate accounted for 26 percent - second only to tourism at 29 percent. Given that 63 percent of investors find Casablanca the most attractive locale for investment in Morocco, FDI has had a significant impact on property values in the city - and on the development of a market for high-end goods and services.

¶5. (SBU) In such an environment, speculation occurs, pushing prices upward and enabling landowners to make staggering profits. No sooner is a new Master Plan for Urban Development (SDAU) announced than
speculators buy up property in targeted areas with the sole intention of flipping them. According to Century 21's Benmakhlouf, "you can buy property for one million dirham and it'll be worth 1.5 million in
six months."

¶6. (SBU) The tremendous performance of Casablanca's Stock Exchange is also a factor in wealth-creation. According to Jawad Kerdoudi, an economist who is President of the Moroccan Institute of International Relations, many companies attract investors by listing shares at weak prices for the initial public offering. After a few weeks, prices shoot up, allowing shareholders to sell at a considerable profit. As
Morocco's largest city and economic center, Casablanca sees much of the money that Moroccans make in the stock market.

--------------------------
EXTERNAL SOURCES OF WEALTH
--------------------------

¶7. (U) As indicated above, Casablanca has benefited from an influx of money from outside the country. First, remittances from Moroccans resident abroad (MREs) have risen since Mohammed VI became king in
1999, reaching about USD 7.8 billion in 2007. Second, tourism brings in significant capital. The sector has increased 12 to 14 percent per year since 2001, when the king launched the strategic tourism development policy "Vision 2010." According to a 2007 report issued by Casablanca's Regional Investment Center, tourism accounted for more investment in Casablanca than any other sector.

¶8. (U) Foreign investment is a third significant source of wealth in Casablanca. Benefiting heavily from rising oil prices, oil-exporting Gulf countries seek substantial investment opportunities in the Middle East, including Casablanca. Dubai Holding, for example, has begun a USD 500 million project to build a multi-purpose marina adjacent to Casablanca's port. A Kuwaiti-Moroccan group has plans for a residential development in the city. Investors outside the Gulf are also pursuing financial opportunities in Casablanca. As money from MREs, tourism and foreign investors is channeled into banks, real estate, the stock market and other investments, Casablanca's economy expands.

-------------------------
ILLICIT SOURCES OF WEALTH
-------------------------

¶9. (C) Most Casablancans acknowledge that at least some of Casablanca's wealth comes from illicit activities such as drug-trafficking and money laundering. In the words of Khalid Belyazid, CEO of the publishing group Eco-Medias, "We have dirty money. The problem is we don't know how much." Statistics do not exist to quantify how much of Casablanca's wealth can be traced to illicit activities. However, one indication can be found in the USG's own 2007 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report:
"Morocco is the world's biggest producer of cannabis resin (hashish) and is consistently ranked among the world's largest producers of cannabis." The report estimates that Morocco's drug trade (mostly to
Europe) nets about USD 13 billion per year, more than twice the amount brought in by tourism in 2007. Some portion of this money finds its way to Casablanca, where it is either spent on jewelry, cars, houses and other items, or it is laundered. Referring to the use of cafes as fronts for illegitimate business activities, one finance professional joked that "money laundering creates a nice cafe culture in Casablanca."

¶10. (C) Corruption also accounts for a certain amount of Casablanca's wealth. "You cannot imagine how big the impact is," said one long-time resident after explaining the phenomenon of officials exploiting inside information and/or power for financial gain. In one notorious case, a police officer created a business to import BMW motorcycles after learning that the police force had plans to equip a motorcycle brigade. Century 21's Benmakhlouf noted that building permits for land set aside by the city sometimes become available to developers who pay bribes. Such corruption enables those who benefit from it to amass significant, if undeclared, wealth.

¶11. (SBU) The informal economy is yet another vector by which individuals amass wealth. While the term conjures up images of small-scale retailers or undocumented laborers, it can include full-fledged businesses that operate outside the legal framework and its requirements. In Morocco's textile industry, for example, entire plants have closed their formal operations, only to reopen outside city limits as all-cash enterprises that function under the radar of Moroccan authorities (or with their complicity ). The Casablanca mattress factory that burned down in late April 2008, killing 58 workers (REF A), offers a prime example of a situation in which a business owner flouted labor, safety and building codes in the name
of profit.

¶12. (C) The Consulate's own experience trying to purchase land for a new facility illustrates how entrenched informal, under-the-table arrangements are in the Moroccan economy. Ninety percent of property transactions in Casablanca are done informally. Of over 30 sites identified, more than 20 fell off the list immediately because the brokers were unwilling to sell in an official deal. Others declined to sell because they are waiting for prices to appreciate. Of those who would sell, many wanted money under the table in addition to the asking price. Whether selling property, running a company or starting a business, the high volume of activity conducted outside of formal channels is part and parcel of doing business, and often
enables individuals to skirt regulations and increase financial gain.

-----------
CONSUMPTION
-----------

¶13. (SBU) Explaining the sources of Casablanca's wealth, however, does not necessarily explain consumption. As Khalid Rouggani of BMCE's research division sees it, Moroccans are 'cultivated to be
open' and want to know what exists outside their country. As a result, they are aware of foreign brands and products, and willingly purchase them, particularly in cosmopolitan Casablanca. In contrast, Rouggani cited Algeria - a country with USD 120 billion in reserves that is less open to foreign culture and less apt to consume foreign goods. Sales clerks at Dior and Roberto Cavalli seemed to support the view that culture plays a role in stimulating consumption, noting that "Moroccans like to be stylish" and make up the majority of their clientele.

¶14. (SBU) Strict foreign currency exchange controls may also contribute to consumption in Casablanca. While Morocco has loosened restrictions on the amount of currency Moroccans can take out of the
country, external controls are still in place. Unable to put significant savings overseas, many Moroccans invest and spend locally.

¶15. (C) Comment: The wealth that is evident in Casablanca indicates many positive developments, including stock market and real estate booms, fueled by remittances and strong foreign investment. It also
suggests some tough-to-track, but significant, negative elements, such as drug-trafficking and deep-seated corruption. No matter what the sources of wealth, however, the contrasts between rich and poor
in Casablanca are likely to persist, as there are few signs of trickle down. If Casablancans do not have opportunities to share in the wealth that surrounds them, the risk of broader social tensions
is likely to increase. End Comment.

GREENE

Boutef trouve que notre Roi n'a pas de sens d'humour, Hassan II lui manque

Citation :

Bouteflika said he had
recently met the King's brother, Prince Moulay Rachid, in
Seville, where they were both guests of King Juan Carlos.
Bouteflika observed that he had found he could have a broad
discussion with Moulay Rachid. "We joked and chatted
comfortably," Bouteflika commented, "but I cannot do this
with the King, we do not have the same sense of humor!"

un passage important de boutef

Citation :

The
Polisario cannot drag Algeria into war, he stressed. But if
they decided to fight "on their own territory," that would be
their decision. If they did so, they would not be allowed to
fight in Western Sahara and then return to Algeria as a base.

il précise que si le polisario entre en guerre, l'Algérie ne lui permettra pas de revenir se cacher à Tindouf
autrement dit ils se feront déchiqueter vif par les FAR

Le president algerien sait tres bien comment parler aux americains. Je ne dirais pas, seulement, fin diplomat mais un fennec qui sait survivre dans les environments les plus dificiles. Il a dit aux americains que quand il arriva au pouvoir l'ANP etait prete et resolue pour la guerre contre le Maroc mais qu'il a change cette donnee. L'EM marocain doit etre pret car je crois que ces declarations aux americaines sont part du jeu, good cop - bad cop, je pense que la realite est toute a fait la differente et qu'il n'y a aucune dissention entre l'ANP et El Mouradia en ce qui concerne le Maroc et son sahara, il ne faut pas oublier que Boudiaf paya de sa vie. Desole Yak je sais que tu soutien la these du president Bouteflika, moi, par contre, j'ai une grande peur qu'un coflit rapide mais destructeur puisse avoir lieu avant 2015 date ou le Maroc serait a la hauteur de repondre a tout attaque. Alors c'est au peuple marocain d'etre vigilant pendant que votre armee se reestructure et se met a jour.

Citation :

WikiLeaks : le mandat de M. Sarkozy débute par un "affront" au roi du Maroc



Nicolas Sarkozy tout juste élu président de la République, il réserve au Maghreb son premier déplacement hors d'Europe, comme avant lui Jacques Chirac. Mais l'ordre de visite est inversé. Cette fois, le premier pays visité ne sera pas le Maroc. L'Algérie passera avant le royaume chérifien.

Pourquoi ce changement ? Paris a beau expliquer à ses interlocuteurs marocains que le roi Mohammed VI a tout à gagner à ce que la visite se termine à Rabat, et qu'ainsi il aura "le dernier mot". Rien n'y fait. Les Marocains s'estiment trahis et annulent la visite à Rabat du président français en avançant des "considérations d'agenda, un prétexte vide à la mesure de l'affront subi", peut-on lire dans un télégramme du département d'Etat américain obtenu par WikiLeaks et révélé par Le Monde.
"MALADROIT"
Pour ajouter à l'insulte, l'annonce de l'annulation de la visite est faite par le secrétaire d'Etat aux affaires étrangères, Fassi Fihri, directement à l'Elysée, et non au Quai d'Orsay, comme le voudrait l'usage. Qui plus est, Fassi Fihri a attendu d'avoir quitté Paris où il se trouvait et d'être rentré à Rabat pour informer les autorités françaises de la décision.
Le geste marocain est "maladroit", confie un diplomate français à un collègue américain. Il pourrait "affecter les relations normalement paisibles et très proches entre la France et le Maroc, alors que la politique française vis-à-vis du Maroc, y compris au Sahara [occidental], n'a pas changé avec Sarkozy". Pour réparer les dommages, poursuit le diplomate français, il faut que la visite du président français au Maroc, finalement annoncée pour le mois d'octobre, ait bien lieu. Ce sera le cas.
Dans son commentaire, le diplomate américain rappelle "la grande surprise" qu'a constituée pour les Etats-Unis le mauvais coup "fait à la France, un ami proche du Maroc".Jean-Pierre Tuquoi

lemonde.f

Rabat le 09/06/2009

Citation :

Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Morocco and Israel took advantage of Israeli participation in the June 3-5 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism seminar in Rabat to re-launch a diplomatic relationship that had been on ice since the Israeli military action in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009.

Full Document
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TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0242
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
Content
S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000484

SIPDIS
NOFORN

STATE FOR NEA, NEA/MAG AND NEA/IPA
TEL AVIV FOR SE MITCHELL PARTY

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/08/2019
TAGS: PREL, EAIR, KPAL, MO, IS
SUBJECT: ISRAELI DIPLOMATS EXPECT MORE FROM MOROCCO

REF: A. RABAT 0290
B. 08 RABAT 0648

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

1. (S/NF) Summary: Morocco and Israel took advantage of Israeli participation in the June 3-5 Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism seminar in Rabat to re-launch a diplomatic relationship that had been on ice since the Israeli military action in Gaza in December 2008 and January 2009. The Israeli director of Maghreb Affairs later told EconOff that Moroccan Ministry of Foreign Affairs Secretary General Youssef Amrani had indicated willingness to resolve pending issues, including overflight permission, but that the
Government of Morocco (GOM) had not yet delivered, an outcome she found unsurprising. The diplomat expressed the Government of Israel's (GOI,s) wish that the GOM more actively support Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, and identified other possible "win-win" opportunites for Morocco-Israel cooperation. End Summary.

2. (C/NF) Eynat Shlein-Michael, Director of Maghreb, Syria and Lebanon Affairs of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs accompanied her MFA colleague Israel Tikochinski of the Arms Control Department to the Seminar on Preventing Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Radioactive Materials held in Rabat, June 3-5 under the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT). Not engaged by professional interest in the seminar, Shlein-Michael told EconOff she viewed the conference as an opportunity to engage bilaterally
Morocco's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Cooperation (MFA), renewing a relationship which had been cut off by the Israeli military intervention in Gaza.
--------------------------------------------
MFA Eager to Highlight Israeli Participation
--------------------------------------------

3. (S/NF) Shlein-Michael related that MFA Secretary General Amrani sought her out for a pull-aside meeting during the June 3 MFA-hosted dinner for seminar participants, and profusely welcomed her delegation. He also made a point of introducing her to the French and Russian Ambassadors, she noted, apparently very pleased to highlight the Israeli presence. Shlein-Michael assessed, however, that Amrani's enthusiasm was not shared by all of the MFA, and working level officials had delayed issuing a letter authorizing visas on arrival in Morocco for the Israeli delegation until literally hours before the delegation left Israel. Without
the mission's urging the MFA to act, the visit would have
been impossible, she stated.
-------------------------------------------
Delay in Overflight Permission is "Typical"
-------------------------------------------
4. (S/NF) Shlein-Michael reported that her primary agenda item with Amrani was finalizing an agreement that had been pending for over six weeks to allow El Al Airlines to transit Moroccan airspace en route to Brazil, a routing that would save hours of flight time and thousands of dollars in fuel costs, and would also earn Morocco transit fees. Amrani promised her that the permission would be finalized the next
day, Shlein-Michael stated, but the MFA had not yet finalized it as of two days later. Shlein-Michael indicated that she was not surprised by the delay, commenting that Moroccan diplomats frequently express their agreement with Israel but then do not complete what they have promised. "They like to talk a lot, but never deliver," she concluded.
--------------------------------
GOM Was Ready for a Livni Visit?
--------------------------------
5. (S/NF) Shlein-Michael further reported that Amrani enthused about the progress in bilateral relations that had appeared to be blooming in November 2008 (Ref A). It was a shame that former Israeli Foreign Minister Livni's hypothesized trip to Morocco had not materialized, Amrani told her, commenting that "we were ready for her to come in January." Shlein-Michael expressed skepticism of this statement to EconOff, adding that any thoughts of an ministerial visit have been scotched since the formation of the new Israeli government.
-----------------------------------
What Does Israel Want from Morocco?
-----------------------------------
6. (S/NF) When questioned what Israel would most like to see from Morocco, Shlein-Michael immediately responded that the GOI wants the GOM to support the Palestinian Authority (PA). Morocco "does less than anyone," she complained, commenting that smaller states like the UAE and Oman were far more
visible in lending support to Abbas. We want Abbas to succeed, Shlein-Michael continued, and we want Arab
governments to visit him in the West Bank, publicly declare their support for him, and show the Palestinians that he has international legitimacy and influence. Shlein-Michael complained that, while Arab governments were lining up to demand Israeli facilitation of meetings with Arafat when he was confined to Ramallah during the second intifada, few are interested in visiting Abbas now despite the much more welcoming environment, and the PA's need for support against its HAMAS rivals. The GOI has made clear to Arab governments that it will facilitate the visits and that Israel does not request any bilateral component in such a trip. Morocco "has the same domestic concerns about HAMAS-type movements" as Israel and the PA, Shlein-Michael said, and it should have a keen interest in legitimizing the PA and Abbas against HAMAS.

---------------------
Ideas for Cooperation
---------------------

7. (S/NF) In addition to the most pressing issue of approving El Al overflight rights, Shlein-Michael suggested
that another "win-win" issue for Morocco-Israel cooperation is allowing visas on arrival for Israeli tourists. The inconvenience of seeking a Moroccan visa in a third country significantly depresses tourism from Israel, Shlein-Michael asserted. Currently, about 60,000 Israelis visit Morocco each year despite the inconvenience, but that number would jump if Morocco allowed visa on arrival. Tunisia gives Israeli tourists visas on arrival, she noted, "and we have much better relations with Morocco."

8. (S/NF) Additionally, Shlein-Michael asserted that Morocco would benefit by engaging Israel on issues involving international organizations. The GOM does not seek Israel's support on candidates for positions in international organizations or votes on Moroccan proposals to host international events. The GOI would often be willing to support Morocco's position on many of these issues, Shlein-Michael asserted, but finds out about them too late because of the lack of outreach from the GOM.
------------------------
Comment: Slow and Steady
------------------------

9. (S/NF) Amrani's reported enthusiam to renew discussions with Israeli representatives highlights both the productive relationship that Morocco has shared with Israel in the past, as well as the serious damage done to that relationship following the Gaza fighting and the emergence of the Netanyahu government. While Shlein-Michael may see tepid actions by the GOM, public anger over the images of war in December and January have handcuffed the GOM's ability to continue business as usual, and it will take some time for
that aversion to abate. Her critique of Moroccan policy towards the PA does not square with what we have heard from the Moroccans. The GOM still stands solidly with Abbas and has consistently ensured that its engagement with the Palestinians supports the Palestinian Authority against HAMAS (Ref B). We will continue to encourage the GOM to support the PA, and hope to see opportunities for the GOM to reach out to the GOI should conditions permit. End Comment.

*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

Le 06/04/2009 Rabat:

Citation :

Excerpt from document
(S/NF) Summary: Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Iran and began a campaign against its domestic Shi'a minority at Saudi Arabian instigation, according to a Rabat-based Egyptian diplomat. According to the diplomat, Tehran had been using Morocco and its Embassy in Rabat for activities in Mali and Senegal.
Full Document
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PP RUEHBC RUEHDBU RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 RABAT 000289

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/29/2029
TAGS: PREL, PINR, SCUL, KISL, IR, SA, EG, MO
SUBJECT: CORRECTED COPY: EGYPTIAN DIPLOMAT LINKS MOROCCAN
BREAK WITH IRAN TO SAUDI ARABIA

REF: A. RABAT 0196
B. RABAT 0205
C. RABAT 0230
D. CASABLANCA 47
E. RABAT 0247
F. KARP/DESK EMAIL 30 MAR 2009

Classified By: PolCouns Craig Karp for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (S/NF) Summary: Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Iran and began a campaign against its domestic Shi'a minority at Saudi Arabian instigation, according to a Rabat-based Egyptian diplomat. According to the diplomat, Tehran had been using Morocco and its Embassy in Rabat for activities in
Mali and Senegal. Domestically, the diplomat emphasized that the anti-Shi'a campaign was aimed at neutralizing possible challenges to monarchist parties by Islamic groups in upcoming municipal elections. In addition, King Mohammed VI was seeking to reassert his position as a religious leader.
End Summary.

2. (S/NF) Morocco broke relations with Iran and began a campaign against its domestic Shi'a minority at Saudi Arabian instigation, (information removed) told PolOff on March 30. XXX was aware his comments would be reported. He said there was almost daily contact between Mohammed VI's palace and Riyadh
in the run up to the surprise March 6 severing of Moroccan relations with Iran (Ref A-D); and the intense consultations have continued (Note: He did not provide a source or basis for this comment other than to say "our information shows."
End Note.). embassy believes that Saudi Arabia has enlisted King Mohammed VI personally (and not the Government of Morocco, which was as surprised as the rest of the world at the rupture, XXX noted) in its geopolitical strategy to counter Iranian influence. In return for active Moroccan support, Saudi Arabia will ensure a continued flow of subsidized oil to Morocco, and may plug holes in Morocco's foreign direct investment balance sheet resulting from recent Gulf withdrawals from major projects as a result of the
global financial crisis.

3. (S/NF) XXX said goading Iran, a country with which it had limited economic interests, and demonizing the Shi'a, a powerless minority group, was a small price for Morocc o to pay for a strategy that could have major payoffs. He added that the King was "killing several birds with one stone" with his actions, and was also seeking to reassert his position as Commander of the Faithful (Note: Supreme religious leader for
the Moroccan Malachite branch of Sunni Islam. End Note.).

4. (S/NF) According to XXX, Iran has sought to increase the influence of Shi'ism in West Africa, where Tehran had been using Morocco (which is a regional air hub) and its Embassy in Rabat as a jumping off point for activities in Mali and Senegal. A former Iranian ambassador was also apparently traveling to Tangier, Tetouan and other cities in Morocco to lecture and identify promising young religious students from the Shi'a community for familiarization visits to, and further training in, Iran.

5. (S/NF) Mohammed VI apparently saw this as a personal affront to him and a direct challenge to his religious and economic authority. (Note: Contributions from the wealthy Tijani sect in Senegal and Mali augment Palace coffers. Many Muslims in West Africa look to the Moroccan Monarch as their religious leader. End Note). Although he did not provide any basis for the supposition, XXX said he believed that
Mohammed VI had probably been planning his move for at least a year. XXX also speculated that the Palace was also worried about the prospect of Moroccan foreign fighters returning from Iraq, possibly having been recruited and trained by Iran, and slipping into Iranian networks in Morocco.
6. (S/NF) Domestically, XXX emphasized that the anti-Shi'a campaign was also directed at dissident Islamic
group Adl Wa Ihsane (The Justice and Good Works Organization) which has recently signaled its desire to become a legitimate political party. The group, which has at times called for the abolishment of the monarchy and the establishment of an Islamic republic, is believed to have wide popularity among
poor and middle class populations unhappy with the political system, which they view as corrupt. XXX said that the Palace is trying to be "more conservative than the fundamentalists" in a bid to neutralize their drawing power.
7. (S/NF) On the Doha conference (Ref E and F), XXX said the King's dithering about whether he would or would not attend was a sign of the difficult balancing act he was attempting to carry off by keeping Saudi Arabia happy, while not alienating Qatar. XXX said that by sending his brother Moulay Rachid to the summit, despite his own last minute withdrawal, Mohammed VI showed respect to the Qataris while not enthusiastically endorsing their leadership bid.
Had he sent someone of lower stature, such as the Prime Minister, it might have been read as a snub, XXX
explained. (Comment: We agree.)
8. (S/NF) Comment: Local observers continue to wonder about the King's actions against Iran. Our interlocutor may have had more than one purpose in addressing these issues with us, but many of his observations accord with our own. His concerns are forwarded as an example of the general
discussion on this issue here. We have not been able to independently verify XXX's statements, but he has
provided us with accurate and insightful information on Iranian issues in the past. In a previous conversation with PolOffs, he raised a flag over deep Moroccan concern with
Iranian activity several months before the severing of
relations. End Comment.

*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

la meilleurs analyse objective que j´a lu,sur le sahara,entre le Maroc et l´Algerie
ils minimisent le role du polz et reconnaissent l´effet de la proposition autonomie sur la polpulation locale,et les 5 puissances du CS l´ayant benni

Citation :

Cable sobre la pérdida de apoyo del Polisario(cable sur la perte d´appuis du polz)
La diplomacia estadounidense analiza la evolución de la opinión pública saharaui

03/12/2010


ID: 221137
Date: 2009-08-17 17:34:00
Origin: 09RABAT706
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 09RABAT693
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0706/01 2291734
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171734Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0575
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE
RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 0528
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 0452
RUEHVI/AMEMBASSY VIENNA 0153
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000706

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, IO/UNP, PRM/AF AND DRL/NESCA
NSC FOR MCDERMOTT

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/17/2019
TAGS: PBTS, PHUM, ECON, PREF, WI, AG, MO
SUBJECT: WESTERN SAHARA REALITIES

REF: RABAT 0693

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: Although the Western Sahara negotiations
have now re-started (Reftel), the conflict is 34 years old.
The Government of Morocco (GOM) has invested tremendous
resources in the territory, and some observers estimate that
it spends USD 2.7 billion per year on the territory and its
385,000 residents. The level of development and of social
services clearly exceeds the level in Morocco proper.
Significant voter participation )- despite a Polisario call
for a boycott -- in the June 12 local elections may be a sign
that support for independence is waning although support for
self-government is real. Serious human rights abusers have
been transferred, and respect for human rights in the
territory has greatly improved, reaching the same plane as in
Morocco. However, advocating independence is still a red
line, and the GOM refuses to register pro-Polisario NGOs.
Giving the territory more autonomy, improving
Algerian-Moroccan relations, enhancing regional integration,
building real confidence, and addressing all parties,
propaganda seem essential to resolving the conflict. End
Summary.

2. (C) Since King Hassan II launched the Green March in
1975, the Western Sahara issue has been intimately linked to
the stability of the throne and Morocco itself. Hassan,
twice victim of coup attempts and for years at war with the
left, used Western Sahara to bolster nationalism and park his
army far away in the desert. More recently, however, that
link has blurred. King Mohammed VI is more secure,
maintained in power more by love than fear and facing no
apparent major domestic threat. He recently has somewhat
distanced himself from the issue, however, and has not
visited the territory in three years, a stark contrast to his
peripatetic ribbon cutting throughout the Kingdom.

3. (C) The GOM continues to subsidize the territory and
provide tax and duty exemptions that form the base of much of
the private fortunes there (mostly key clans loyal to the
throne and a few senior military). Despite some siphoning,
the investment has produced higher levels of urban
development than in comparably sized cities in Morocco proper
and made the capital, Laayoune, the first city without any
shantytowns. Social indicators such as access to and level
of education and availability of health care and social
facilities exceed Moroccan norms and far surpass those in
comparably sized Morocco,s cities. Growth in Morocco has
made these expenditures much more bearable to Rabat,s
exchequer than they once were.

4. (SBU) In April 2009, a local weekly newsmagazine TelQuel
published an article laying out and likely even exaggerating
what the Sahara was costing Morocco. TelQuel claimed that
the GOM has spent 1.2 trillion dirhams on the territory since
1975 and is spending 3 percent of GDP or USD 2.7 billion per
year, including the funds to maintain two-thirds of the Royal
Armed Forces in Western Sahara. (Note: TelQuel faced no
consequences for the article. Even with the relative
expansion of the freedom of the press in Morocco to cover
subjects formerly taboo, this was astonishing. End Note.)

5. (C) In the June 12 local elections, &First Friend8
Fouad Ali el Himma,s Party of Authenticity and Modernity
(PAM) challenged local Laayoune strongman and Royal
Consultative Council for Saharan Affairs (CORCAS) head
Kalihenna Ould er Rachid. The PAM lost, despite having an el
Himma protege installed. The Ould er Rachid family and clan
control the Tammany Hall-like Istiqlal party machine that has
run the territory for many years, and played a major part in
winning the Prime Minister,s chair for party head Abbas El
Fassi. Voter participation in the Sahara, stoked by clan
rivalries, was far above the norm, despite a
Polisario-declared boycott. Some pro-independence Sahrawis
reportedly voted for the Ould er Rachid because they alone
were deemed strong enough to stand up to the government in
Rabat. This real political competition, while perhaps not
democracy, seems far more open than the Cuba-like Polisario
system. It underscores the fact that there is a significant
part of the population of the Sahrawi territory, in addition
to most immigrants, who support Moroccan sovereignty.

6. (C) After it took control of Western Sahara, Morocco
tried to affect any vote by promoting immigration by its
nationals, who now are well over half of the some 385,000
residents of the territory. Perhaps half of the immigrants,
however, were themselves Sahrawis, from areas just north of
the dividing line that were also home to some of the most
nationalistic Sahrawis. In a referendum that could include
independence, they are not seen by the GOM as reliable
voters, partly explaining GOM reluctance to go to a vote.
(Comment: Curiously, we know of no advocate of independence
that has ever claimed the &Sahrawi8 territories in Morocco,
Algeria or Mauritania as part of a national homeland,
although some members of the CORCAS unsuccessfully tried to
include the Moroccan parts in the autonomous region, when it
was first proposed. The absence of such larger nationalism,
along with the Polisario,s 1970,s war against Mauritania
--the world,s only Sahrawi state -- suggest the conflict is
less nationalist than geopolitical, linked to the much older
dispute between Algeria and Morocco, and hardly boosts the
case for an independent state. End Comment.)

7. (C) Given the small population at stake, Spain,s
granting of Spanish nationality, with the possibility of
migrating to Spain, its nearby Canary Islands or elsewhere in
Europe, is significant, and, indeed in better times,
resettlement could be a simple way of resolving the plight of
the refugees.

-----------
Who Counts?
-----------

8. (C) The UN process recognizes the parties in the
negotiations as Morocco and the Polisario. This asymmetry
makes any resolution difficult, as it does not recognize the
determinative role of Algiers, which the Moroccans see as
their real adversary in this dispute. It also neglects the
diverse views among the Sahrawis.

--------------------------------------------- -
Human Rights: Progress but Continuing Paranoia
--------------------------------------------- -

9. (U) The human rights situation in the territory has
dramatically improved since a brief &intifada8 in 2005.
Like Morocco itself, Western Sahara has come a very long way
from the mass disappearances of the &years of lead8 during
Hassan II,s reign. Pro-Polisario Sahrawis are able to
organize under the rubric of human rights activists, which
most of them legitimately pursue, such as last year,s RFK
award winner, Aminatou Haidar from the Sahrawi Collective of
Human Rights Defenders (CODESA). In just over a year,
restrictions on their international travel have disappeared.

10. (C) Since mid-2008, once common beatings and arbitrary
imprisonment have also essentially ceased. One key to the
reduction in abuses last year was the transfer of
long-serving security officials with consistent records as
abusers. Activists and officials confirmed in July 2009 that
more transfers (many by promotion) had recently taken place,
and most well known abusers are reportedly now gone. All
sources report the territory is quiet, with residents hopeful
for some political progress.

11. (C) What opponents of Morocco cannot do is explicitly
organize in favor of independence or a referendum thereon,
nor can they publish or even distribute tracts on the
subject. In addition, they are denied by the government the
right to operate as legal entities. Establishing these
rights would not only be just, but would help build
confidence in a consensual solution that would involve
re-integration. The Sahrawi Association of Human Rights
Victims (ASVDH) has even obtained court approval for its
registration as an NGO and won on appeal lodged by the
Interior Ministry (MOI), but has not been able to get local
officials to accept its registration. The USG has pushed for
this for some time. We recently heard that the local Wali
has proposed to MOI that it accept the registration but the
decision is pending. We should press the GOM on this both
here and in Washington.

12. (C) Despite this substantial progress, which leaves the
human rights situation in Western Sahara nearly equivalent to
Morocco, Morocco campaigned for most of the year and spent
scarce diplomatic capital in a successful effort to push back
proposals for the UN to have a monitoring role on this issue.
It is possible that they have understood the opportunity
costs of that strategy and appear more recently to have been
somewhat less vocal on the issue.

--------------------
What the People Want
--------------------

13. (C) Extensive interviews and independent sources in the
territory suggest that the principal goal of most Sahrawis is
more self-government than self-determination; a desire more
for protection and identity than independence, an army and
embassies. The small vocally pro-Polisario minority,
including many of the human rights activists, formerly
enjoyed the support of the &silent majority8 of these
Sahrawis, particularly during periods of repression.
Development and reduced oppression have reduced this support.
The Sahrawi &silent majority8 in the territory has been
intrigued by the prospect of autonomy and has generally
quietly awaited its development. Recently, a pro-Polisario
activist, when asked, confided to us that he believed that in
a free election held now a majority of voters in the
territory would choose autonomy.

-----------------------------
On the Other Side of the Berm
-----------------------------

14. (C) While not the competent Mission to comment on the
Polisario or the camps, Embassy Rabat understands the
situation for the refugees in Tindouf is difficult but
support for the Polisario appears strong. Nevertheless, we
hear from credible Sahrawis that there is growing interest
there in a negotiated solution, belying the stories of
unrealistic saber-rattling, frequently attributed to Sahrawi
youth. GOM calls for a census and audit of international
programs seem reasonable to us. Finally, if there is no
prospect of a solution, re-settlement should be considered an
option. The Spanish decision in 2008 to accord passports to
1975 residents of its former colony could be implemented in
Tindouf as it has been in Laayoune (but not in the current
economic climate).

-------------------
Frozen Negotiations
-------------------

15. (C) Meanwhile, the UN Secretary General,s Personal
Envoy for Western Sahara has struggled to get the UN
negotiations back on track. The negotiation process
re-started in 2007, after Morocco tabled a proposal for
autonomy that had been carefully negotiated with the Bush
Administration. The main impetus to getting the plan
produced was then-USUN Permrep John Bolton,s threat (October
2006) to end MINURSO,s mandate. When first released, the
USG called the autonomy proposal &serious and credible.8
In substance, the proposal was serious, including local
police and some independence for the judiciary, and was
accompanied by a declared willingness to negotiate. It was
also viewed as credible by the international community,
including explicitly Russia and implicitly China, which
nearly universally expressed a willingness to accept this as
a possible outcome, if agreed. Credibility was an issue,
however, among Sahrawis on both sides of the berm, as there
was little confidence, given past Moroccan evasions, that
even if agreed, the GOM would implement the plan. This
credibility gap has narrowed, but only slightly, due to the
improvements in the human rights situation. Credibility is,
therefore, key to winning hearts and minds.

16. (C) In April 2007, the United Nations Security Council
lengthened the mandate of MINURSO to 12 months (from six) and
the &Manhasset talks8 (named after the Long Island, New
York town where they were held) began. The Moroccans, while
negotiating with the Polisario, showed them no credence and
sent Moroccan Sahrawis to seek defectors. CORCAS head
Kalihenna questioned the Polisario,s right to be there. The
Polisario broke diplomatic and Middle Eastern protocol by
refusing to shake hands with the Sahrawis on the Moroccan
delegation and walked out or turned away when they spoke.

17. (C) Neither side offered any compromise or considered
the arguments of the other. This was hardened when, at the
end of 2007, King Mohammed VI publicly instructed his
delegation to discuss no solution but autonomy, creating
little room for discussion. This hard-line stance may have
been bolstered by what was perceived in the Palace as
uncritical support from Washington. In the end, there was no
result after four rounds of rotating restatement of static
positions. Former UN Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum cited
immovable Moroccan commitment to retain sovereignty, and
called the prospect of independence unrealistic. For this
unusual frankness, the UN let Van Walsum go, at Algerian and
Polisario insistence.

18. (C) The new Personal Envoy, Ambassador Christopher Ross,
long one of the stars of U.S. diplomacy in the region, seems
better positioned than anyone to budge President Bouteflika
and his government. In recognition, he was granted the
additional mandate to help improve Moroccan-Algerian
relations. King Mohammed VI took note of this and conveyed
through Ross an offer of unconditional, at-any-level and
on-any-subject, bilateral talks. Ross did get Algeria to
agree to go to the &informals8 but only as observers. He
got no response on the bilateral issue, although it is still
early in Bouteflika,s new term. The informal meeting this
month in Vienna has at least re-launched the negotiations.

--------------------------------------------- --------
Regional Link: Algeria-Morocco Key to Sahara Solution
--------------------------------------------- --------

19. (C) Algeria and Morocco are demographically similar but
with differences in historical experience that go back
hundreds of years. About a year after Algeria,s hard-won
independence, it and Morocco fought &The War of the Sands,8
over their then-disputed frontier, drawn by colonial France.
In 1975, when the Algerians sheltered the Polisario, it was
at least as much a reflection of their historical rivalry as
ideological support for a fellow liberation movement. King
Hassan II managed to work out a frontier agreement with the
Algerians which the GOM maintains has been ratified, and
needs only an exchange of instruments of ratification. The
subsequent closure of the Algeria-Moroccan border is now an
anomaly in a Mediterranean region of growing links. There
have been modestly growing functional links in recent years,
much of it under Arab Maghreb Union auspices and in 2008 some
technical agreements were signed. But direct high-level
communication remains cut and both quiet and public GOM
overtures to reopen it have been rebuffed. The Government of
Algeria (GOA) turned down then-Secretary Rice,s invitation
for a trilateral ministerial meeting on the margins of the
2008 UNGA.

-------
Comment
-------

20. (C) Algeria, Morocco and the Western Sahara dispute is a
chicken and egg situation. Algeria has indicated relations
cannot improve until there is self-determination in Western
Sahara. Morocco, following the close links between the
Polisario leadership and their Algerian hosts, remains
convinced that there will be no agreement if relations with
Algiers do not improve. In response, as of June 2009, the
Moroccans have maintained that their principal goal now is
rapprochement with Algeria, which could be discussed
separately.

21. (C) The international community is ready to support
Maghreb rapprochement and integration, which can only occur
in parallel with a settlement of the longstanding dispute
over the Western Sahara and resettlement of the
long-suffering refugees. Then-President Putin of Russia
urged Algerian-Moroccan compromise in vain, as have the
French, the Spanish, and the USG. We are not aware of any of
the P-5 opposing an autonomy-based solution, nor have we seen
real urgency or priority for the international community to
resolve a dispute over which there has been no real fighting
for 18 years. End Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

Trés Trés intéréssant le cable concernant la visite des israéliens au Maroc
1/ vers un reconstitution de nos relations diplomatiques
2/ une forte relation bilatérale
3/ un support israélien dans tous les questions et les sujets concernant le Maroc
4/ des ennemis commun
5/ une information trés importante, c'est que 60000 israéliens visitent le Maroc chaque année !!

on apprend aussi que les relations ont connu un regression aprés les guerre de gaza .. donc on a bien "réchauffer" nos relations bien avant ... aprés 2001

Casablanca le 11/12/2009

Citation :

S E C R E T CASABLANCA 000226

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA AND NEA/MAG

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/10/2019
TAGS: ECON EINV EFIN MO PGOV
SUBJECT: PALACE COERCION PLAGUES MOROCCO'S REAL ESTATE
SECTOR

Classified By: Consul General Millard for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

¶1. (C) SUMMARY: At a December 9 meeting, one of Morocco's leading business entrepreneurs XXXXXXXXXXXX, told EconOff that major institutions and processes of the Moroccan state are being used
by the Palace to coerce and solicit bribes in the country's real estate sector. XXXXXXXXXXXX made clear to his XXXXXXXXXXXX interlocutors that Morocco's major investment decisions were in reality made by three individuals in the Kingdom: Fouad El Himma the former Deputy Minister of Interior who now heads the Party of Authenticity and Modernity, Mohamed Mounir Al Majidi who is the head of the King's private secretariat, and the King himself. "To have discussions with anyone else would be a waste of time", XXXXXXXXXXXX that, contrary to popular belief, corruption in the real estate sector during the reign of King Mohammed VI is becoming more, not less, pervasive. END SUMMARY.

---------------------------
A TALE OF ROYAL PROPORTIONS
---------------------------

¶2. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX major institutions and processes of the Moroccan state are used by the Palace to coerce and solicit bribes in the real estate sector. While corrupt practices existed during the reign of King Hassan II, XXXXXXXXXXXX, they have become much more institutionalized with King Mohammed VI. Institutions such as the royal family's holding company, Omnium Nord Africaine (ONA), which now clears most large development projects, regularly coerce developers into granting beneficial rights to ONA, XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶3. XXXXXXXXXXXX

¶4. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX ONA's XXXXXXXXXXXX
reportedly told his interlocutors that Morocco's major investment decisions were effectively made by three individuals: the King, Fouad El Himma the former Deputy Minister of Interior who now leads the Palace-backed Party of Authenticity and Modernity, and Mohamed Mounir Al Majidi, who is the head of the King's private secretariat and his principal financial advisor.
XXXXXXXXXXXX
-------
Comment
-------

¶5. (C) XXXXXXXXXXXX reality, of which most Moroccans dare only whisper -- the influence and commercial interest of the King and some of his advisors in virtually every major real estate project here. A former U.S. Ambassador to the Morocco, who remains closely connected to the Palace, separately lamented to us what he termed the appalling greed of those close to King Mohammed VI. This phenomenon seriously undermines the good governance that the Moroccan government is working hard to promote.

MILLARD

serait ce Majidi pro-français??

Citation :

one of Morocco's leading business entrepreneurs

ça doit être un concurrent de l'Ona.... je n'en vois pas mille