Wikileaks,fuites et révélations

Rappel du premier message :

suite au post d´Aslan..y´aura des degats,l´Allemagne aussi alertée

Citation :

Le monde se prépare à de nouvelles révélations par WikiLeaks, Washington appréhende

(AFP) – Il y a 11 heures

WASHINGTON — Des gouvernements du monde entier se préparaient en ce début de week-end à de nouvelles révélations par WikiLeaks, sous la forme d'un tourbillon de câbles diplomatiques américains potentiellement embarrassants pour les Etats-Unis et leurs partenaires.

L'administration Obama avait annoncé dès mercredi que ses services diplomatiques avaient entrepris de préparer des gouvernements étrangers à la publication prochaine de documents secrets susceptibles de créer des "tensions" avec eux.

Dans un entretien sur CNN qui sera diffusé dimanche dont l'AFP a obtenu la retranscription vendredi, le chef d'état-major interarmées américain, l'amiral Michael Mullen, a estimé que les agissements de WikiLeaks étaient "extrêmement dangereux", notamment pour la sécurité des soldats américains, appelant les responsables du site à renoncer à ces révélations.

De son côté, le porte-parole du département d'Etat Philip Crowley a déclaré que les Etats-Unis se préparaient au "pire scénario". Le département d'Etat avait indiqué plus tôt s'attendre à la publication de documents diplomatiques concernant "un large éventail de dossiers et de pays".

Le porte-parole a spécifié que parmi les pays contactés par la secrétaire d'Etat Hillary Clinton figuraient l'Allemagne, l'Arabie saoudite, les Emirats arabes unis, la Grande-Bretagne, la France, l'Afghanistan.

A Moscou, le quotidien Kommersant a affirmé que les fuites comportaient des appréciations "désagréables" qui pourraient blesser Moscou.

Ces révélations "peuvent provoquer une brouille entre les Etats-Unis et la Russie", tout comme avec la moitié des pays de la planète, écrit le quotidien.

A Rome, le ministre des Affaires étrangères Franco Frattini a été prévenu par Washington que des documents concernaient l'Italie.

Le Canada a indiqué que son ambassade à Washington "s'occupe actuellement de cette question avec le département d'Etat".

A Bagdad, l'ambassadeur des Etats-Unis, James Jeffrey, avait affirmé plus tôt que sa mission était "inquiète" face à des révélations susceptibles de saper "des discussions de confiance".

Le site spécialisé dans la révélation de documents confidentiels a promis lundi de mettre en ligne sept fois plus de documents confidentiels que les 400.000 récemment publiés sur la guerre en Irak.

Les premières fuites de WikiLeaks, en juillet sur l'Afghanistan, contenaient peu d'importantes révélations, et celles émanant d'Irak se concentraient en majorité sur des exactions commises entre différentes factions irakiennes.

Washington pourrait être plus embarrassé par la divulgation de documents rédigés par ses diplomates, en particulier s'ils mettent en cause des partenaires étrangers des Etats-Unis.

Selon le ministère finlandais des Affaires étrangères, l'ambassade américaine dans ce pays pense que cette publication allait être "la plus grave".

Selon un haut responsable israélien, Israël, dont Washington est le plus important allié, a été informé que ces fuites de câbles diplomatiques pourraient porter sur des rapports confidentiels adressés par l'ambassade américaine à des responsables israéliens.

A Ankara, un diplomate turc de haut rang a indiqué que la Turquie avait également été mise au courant.

Selon des informations de presse, les nouvelles révélations porteraient notamment sur une aide de la Turquie aux militants d'Al-Qaïda en Irak et un soutien des Etats-Unis aux rebelles kurdes du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), réfugiés en Irak.

Le ministre turc des Affaires étrangères, Ahmet Davutoglu, a ensuite jugé qu'il serait "hors de question" de tolérer des actes terroristes "ayant la Turquie pour origine et visant un pays voisin". Il a aussi insisté sur "la coopération étroite" entre Washington et Ankara face au PKK.

Des responsables en Grande-Bretagne, Norvège et Danemark ont aussi indiqué que leurs pays avaient été informés par les Etats-Unis.

Citation :

ID: 235420
Date: 2009-11-18 16:58:00
Origin: 09JEDDAH443
Source: Consulate Jeddah
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 09JEDDAH292 09JEDDAH79
Destination: VZCZCXRO1684
RR RUEHDE RUEHDH RUEHDIR RUEHROV
DE RUEHJI #0443/01 3221658
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 181658Z NOV 09
FM AMCONSUL JEDDAH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1602
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUEHRH/AMEMBASSY RIYADH 8582
RUEHDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 0157
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 JEDDAH 000443

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR NEA/ARP, NEA/PPD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/31/2014
TAGS: SA, SCUL, SOCI, ZR, KISL
SUBJECT: UNDERGROUND PARTY SCENE IN JEDDAH: SAUDI YOUTH
FROLIC UNDER "PRINCELY PROTECTION"

REF: A. JEDDAH 0292
B. JEDDAH 0079

JEDDAH 00000443 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Consul General Martin R. Quinn for reasons 1.4 (b) and (
d)

1. (C) Summary: Behind the facade of Wahabi conservatism
in the streets, the underground nightlife for Jeddah's elite
youth is thriving and throbbing. The full range of worldly
temptations and vices are available -- alcohol, drugs, sex --
but strictly behind closed doors. This freedom to indulge
carnal pursuits is possible merely because the religious
police keep their distance when parties include the presence
or patronage of a Saudi royal and his circle of loyal
attendants, such as a Halloween event attended by ConGenOffs
on October 29. Over the past few years, the increased
conservatism of Saudi Arabia's external society has pushed
the nightlife and party scene in Jeddah even further
underground. End summary.

Elite party like the rest of the world,
---------------------------------------
just underground
-----------------

2. (C) Along with over 150 young Saudis (men and women
mostly in their 20's and early 30's), ConGenOffs accepted
invitations to an underground Halloween party at Prince
XXXXXXXXXXXX residence in Jeddah on October
29. Inside the gates, past the Nigerian security guards and
after the abaya coat-check, the scene resembled a nightclub
anywhere outside the Kingdom: plentiful alcohol, young
couples dancing, a DJ at the turntables, and everyone in
costume. Funding for the party came from a corporate
sponsor, Kizz-Me, a U.S.-based energy-drink company that now
distributes out of Saudi Arabia, as well as from the princely
host himself.

Royalty, attended by "khawi," keep religious police at bay
--------------------------------------------- -------------

3. (C) Religious police/CPVPV (Commission for the Promotion
of Virtue and Prevention of Vice) were nowhere to be seen and
while admission was controlled through a strictly-enforced
guest list, the partygoers were otherwise not shy about
publicizing the affair. According to a young Saudi from a
prominent Jeddah merchant family, the Saudis try to throw
parties at princes' houses or with princes in attendance,
which serves as sufficient deterrent to interference by the
CPVPV. There are over 10,000 princes in the Kingdom, albeit
at various levels and gradations -- "Royal Highnesses"
("Saheb Al Sumou Al Maliki") signified by direct descent from
King Abdulaziz, and mere "Highnesses" ("Saheb Al Sumou") from
less direct branches of the Al Saud ruling family. Our host
that evening, XXXXXXXXXXXX,
traces his roots to Thunayan, a brother of Mohammad, Amir of
Diriyyah and Nejd (1725-65), King Abdullah's direct ancestor,
six generations back. Although XXXXXXXXXXXX is considered a
second-tier "Cadet" prince, not in line for the throne, he
still enjoys the perks of a mansion, luxury car, lifetime
stipend, and security entourage. (Note: Most of the prince's
security forces were young Nigerian men. It is common
practice for Saudi princes to grow up with hired bodyguards
from Nigeria or other African nations who are of similar age
and who remain with the prince well into adulthood. They are
called "khawi," derived from the Arabic word "akh," meaning
"brother." The lifetime spent together creates an intense
bond of loyalty. End note.)

Availability of black market alcohol, prostitutes, and drugs
--------------------------------------------- ---------------

4. (C) Alcohol, though strictly prohibited by Saudi law and
custom, was plentiful at the party's well-stocked bar,
well-patronized by Halloween revellers. The hired Filipino
bartenders served a cocktail punch using "sadiqi," a
locally-made "moonshine." While top-shelf liquor bottles
were on display throughout the bar area, the original
contents were reportedly already consumed and replaced by
sadiqi. On the black market, a bottle of Smirnoff can cost
1,500 riyals when available, compared to 100 riyals for the
locally-made vodka. It was also learned through
word-of-mouth that a number of the guests were in fact
"working girls," not uncommon for such parties.

JEDDAH 00000443 002.2 OF 002


Additionally, though not witnessed directly at this event,
cocaine and hashish use is common in these social circles and
has been seen on other occasions.

5. (C) Comment: Saudi youth get to enjoy relative social
freedom and indulge fleshly pursuits, but only behind closed
doors -- and only the rich. Parties of this nature and scale
are believed to be a relatively recent phenomenon in Jeddah.
One contact, a young Saudi male, explained that up to a few
years ago, the only weekend activity was "dating" inside the
homes of the affluent in small groups. It is not uncommon in
Jeddah for the more lavish private residences to include
elaborate basement bars, discos, entertainment centers and
clubs. As one high society Saudi remarked, "The increased
conservatism of our society over these past years has only
moved social interaction to the inside of people's homes."
End comment.
QUINN

Citation :

WikiLeaks : les ombres d'une campagne saoudienne
Le Monde | 07.12.10 | 22h31

Pendant près de cinquante jours, du 5 novembre au 22 décembre 2009, l'Arabie saoudite est engagée dans une courte guerre avec la rébellion yéménite houthiste (du nom de son initiateur Abdel Malek Al-Houthi) retranchée dans le nord du pays et qui s'était déployée au-delà de la frontière entre les deux pays.

Pour un royaume habitué au "soft power" et qui a longtemps sous-traité sa sécurité aux Etats-Unis, ce qui ressemble au départ à une escarmouche se transforme très vite en épreuve. Elle est suivie de très près par les Américains, appelés à la rescousse pour ravitailler l'armée saoudienne.

"Il s'agit de l'engagement le plus significatif depuis qu'Abdel Aziz a combattu pour établir le royaume saoudien", il y a plus d'un siècle, écrit en décembre l'ambassade américaine à Riyad, selon un télégramme obtenu par WikiLeaks et révélé par Le Monde.

Mais le bilan dressé par les Américains des bombardements saoudiens jugés "disproportionnés", aussi massifs qu'imprécis dans un théâtre d'opération montagneux, est particulièrement sévère, même si au final les Saoudiens assurent avoir repoussé les rebelles.

Au point que lors d'une rencontre avec le vice-ministre saoudien de la défense qui a dirigé les opérations, le prince Khaled Bin Sultan, quelques semaines plus tard, l'ambassadeur américain s'inquiète du bon usage fait par l'aviation saoudienne des images prises par satellite transmises par les Etats-Unis.

CINQ VÉHICULES ET HUIT PNEUS

L'ambassadeur présente au prince la photo d'un bâtiment bombardé qui, selon les Etats-Unis, est un hôpital. "Cela me dit quelque chose", remarque le prince, avant d'ajouter: "Si nous avions eu des Predator, peut-être que nous n'aurions pas eu ce genre de problème." Et le prince de mettre en cause la qualité des informations données par les Yéménites.

Selon cette note, datée du 7 février, les Saoudiens auraient ainsi reçu les coordonnés d'un site correspondant au quartier général du commandant de la région nord du Yémen, le général Ali Mohsen Al-Ahmar, "qui est considéré comme un opposant politique au président [Ali Abdallah] Saleh", précise la note.

Des critiques, les Saoudiens en ont également à faire valoir aux Etats-Unis. Sur la qualité des armes fournies tout d'abord notamment les bombes GBU-10 à guidage laser, dont des dizaines n'auraient pas explosé.

Les Saoudiens reprochent également les procédures américaines qui ont, selon eux, freiné le ravitaillement en munitions aux moments les plus critiques. C'est "comme lorsqu'une maison brûle et que les voisins disent qu'ils vont intervenir mais qu'ils ne le font pas", se plaint un général saoudien.

Le même responsable compare alors les Etats-Unis à un vendeur de voiture qui cèderait "cinq véhicules mais avec seulement huit pneus". Une guerre brève, donc, mais avec quelques dégâts collatéraux.

Citation :

Le pari syrien de M. Sarkozy laisse les Américains sceptiques
Le Monde | 07.12.10 | 22h30 • Mis à jour le 07.12.10 | 22h57

La politique d'ouverture de Nicolas Sarkozy au régime du président syrien Bachar Al-Assad aura suscité beaucoup de scepticisme côté américain. Washington aurait préféré une approche moins précipitée et plus clairement soumise à conditions, considérant que Damas demeure une source majeure de problèmes (transferts d'armes au Hezbollah libanais, soutien au Hamas, ingérences en Irak.

Dans les télégrammes américains obtenus par WikiLeaks et consultés par Le Monde, l'approche du président français est décrite comme "un gros pari" comportant des "risques". Certains câbles expriment une "consternation" face à l'attitude de l'Elysée, et notent des différences avec le Quai d'Orsay, perçu comme plus strict à l'égard de Damas.

"La présidence française a appris sa leçon depuis ses tentatives ratées l'an dernier de travailler avec la Syrie", écrit ainsi un diplomate américain à Paris, en mai 2008. Un autre télégramme semble ironiser, en juin 2008, sur le fait que "les émissaires de l'Elysée considèrent leur visite à Damas comme un succès".

Les Américains avaient bien relevé qu'au début de sa présidence, M. Sarkozy avait envoyé un signal de continuité avec la ligne de Jacques Chirac, qui coopérait étroitement avec Washington depuis 2004 sur la Syrie, et boycottait Bachar Al-Assad depuis l'assassinat à Beyrouth de l'ancien premier ministre libanais, Rafic Hariri. Le 10 mai 2007, M. Chirac organisait une rencontre à l'Elysée entre Saad Hariri, le fils de l'homme politique assassiné (aujourd'hui premier ministre du Liban), et M. Sarkozy, qui "assura qu'il garderait le cap" à propos du Tribunal spécial pour le Liban, selon un télégramme américain. Le passage de relais semblait assuré.

Par la suite, la diplomatie de George Bush s'interroge, en particulier à propos des déplacements à Damas de Claude Guéant, le secrétaire général de l'Elysée. Après une pause début 2008, l'Elysée renoue de plus belle avec Bachar Al-Assad pour préparer le sommet à Paris de l'Union pour la Méditerranée, projet phare de M. Sarkozy pour le monde arabe.

Bachar Al-Assad est invité à la tribune d'honneur, lors du défilé du 14 Juillet. Lui qui "n'a pas été invité dans une capitale occidentale depuis des années", note un câble, sort "de son isolement". "Les Syriens se considèrent en position de force", ajoute le document. "Etre reçu à Paris représente pour Al-Assad, à défaut d'autre chose, un gain en “relations publiques”".

"ARGUMENT SPECIEUX"

L'Elysée ne fait qu'une petite tentative, vite abandonnée, sur les droits de l'homme. Le président Assad a rejeté de la manière la plus sèche la suggestion française qu'il libère des prisonniers politiques avant sa venue à Paris. "Les Syriens ont adroitement dévié ce message en suggérant que la France passe par le Qatar pour les demandes liées aux droits de l'homme, afin de “ne pas donner l'impression que la Syrie succombe à des pressions occidentales”", écrit un diplomate américain. "Les Français semblent avoir avalé cet argument spécieux".

En septembre 2008, M. Sarkozy se rend à Damas. Un déplacement "prématuré" selon les Américains, car "il semble récompenser Assad pour de vagues promesses restées sans effet". L'objectif français est d'amener la Syrie à devenir plus constructive sur le Liban, et d'essayer de la détourner de son alliance avec l'Iran. M. Sarkozy est "un pragmatique", explique Boris Boillon, un conseiller de l'Elysée, à un diplomate américain. "Si les Syriens se comportent mal, tant pis pour eux".

La France prétend traiter en toute fermeté avec la Syrie, qui "n'est pas un partenaire commercial important". "Le plan français sur la Syrie" poursuit Boris Boillon, prévoit comme date butoir la fin de l'année 2008, pour l'envoi d'un ambassadeur syrien à Beyrouth. Il ajoute que "Sarkozy a réussi à peser sur l'approche d'Assad sur la question du nucléaire iranienne". "Nous sommes quelque peu sceptiques sur ce moment d'épiphanie", observe un télégramme américain.

Début 2009, les tergiversations syriennes n'ont pas cessé. Un ambassadeur est nommé, mais pas encore envoyé à Beyrouth. En mars, un diplomate américain à Paris rend compte d'une conversation avec le diplomate français Jean-Claude Cousseran, salué comme "l'arabisant le plus distingué de sa génération". En "changeant de ton à l'égard des Occidentaux", la Syrie a opéré un "changement tactique, plutôt que stratégique", analyse M.Cousseran. "Ecarter la Syrie de l'Iran est une bonne idée, mais cela ne marchera jamais".

M.Cousseran "note que les Syriens sont maîtres dans l'art d'éviter de réelles concessions. Ils savent envelopper leurs interlocuteurs dans une atmosphère merveilleuse et des conversations réjouissantes, avant de les renvoyer les mains vides", poursuit le câble.

AMBITIONS FRANÇAISES FRUSTRÉES

Le président syrien joue la montre. Devant l'élu américain, John Kerry, le 21 février 2009, il déclare qu'il ne cédera à aucune "pression pour envoyer rapidement un ambassadeur syrien à Beyrouth". C'est une "question de souveraineté", dit-il, ajoutant que "les Français [lui] ont imposé contre sa volonté" la date butoir de décembre 2008.

L'ambassadeur présentera finalement ses lettres de créances le 21 mars 2009. "Bien que Sarkozy soit contrarié" par ce retard, note un câble américain, "lui et ses conseillers ont choisi de minimiser, et demeurent convaincus que le dialogue avec la Syrie a apporté des dividendes".

Fin novembre 2009, la diplomatie de Barack Obama se penche sur les résultats d'un nouveau déplacement à Paris du président Assad. La France espère un rôle de médiation entre la Syrie et Israël. "On ne voit pas clairement, écrit un diplomate américain à Damas, comment Paris analyse la façon dont, selon beaucoup d'observateurs ici, Bachar Al-Assad instrumentalise les ambitions de Sarkozy".

Plus tard, l'ambassade américaine à Paris commente que "les ambitions françaises au Moyen- Orient" sont "frustrées". "Les officiels français sont convaincus que la main tendue de Sarkozy à la Syrie a fait du président Al-Assad un partenaire plus productif pour la résolution des problèmes dans la région – bien qu'ils aient du mal à fournir des exemples concrets de ce changement".

Citation :

WikiLeaks : les diplomates américains pointent le régime "sclérosé" de Ben Ali en Tunisie
Le Monde | 07.12.10 | 22h31

La Tunisie n'a pas grand-chose à se reprocher en matière de droits de l'homme. Il y a bien eu "quelques problèmes", mais le gouvernement y remédie, puisque "des dizaines" d'officiers de police ont été jugés pour "corruption ou autres délits". Malheureusement, "certaines ambassades", à Tunis, et "des organisations de défense des droits de l'homme" ont pris prétexte de la lutte antiterroriste menée par le gouvernement pour multiplier les critiques. Ça n'est pas une "attitude amicale"… Le télégramme américain qui résume la rencontre, au printemps 2008 à Tunis, entre le président Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali et le sous-secrétaire d'Etat américain chargé des affaires du Proche-Orient et de l'Afrique du Nord, David Welch, ne dit rien de la réponse du diplomate.

Mais d'autres mémos, obtenus par WikiLeaks et révélés par Le Monde, permettent de se faire une idée précise du régime tunisien vu par les diplomates américains. Dans un câble daté de juin 2008, sous le titre "Ce qui est à vous est à moi", l'ambassade décrit la corruption organisée par l'entourage familial du chef de l'Etat -"la Famille"- qualifié de "quasi-mafia".

Plus d'une dizaine d'exemples sont cités. Ici, c'est l'épouse du président qui se voit accorder gratuitement par l'Etat un terrain, qui sera viabilisé tout aussi gratuitement, pour construire un établissement scolaire privé, revendu depuis. Là c'est un gendre qui récupère "un immense manoir tape-à-l'œil" construit sur un terrain exproprié par l'Etat, officiellement pour les besoins de l'Agence de l'eau.

Plus loin, c'est un autre gendre qui acquiert 17% de la Banque du Sud à la veille de sa privatisation, et qui revendra ses actions "avec un confortable bénéfice" à un consortium bancaire hispano-marocain, lui assurant ainsi le contrôle majoritaire qu'elle souhaitait…

"LE PRÉSIDENT PREND DE L'ÂGE"

A l'été 2009, un autre mémo élargit le champ de vision et, non sans avoir salué la robuste croissance économique (5% en moyenne depuis dix ans) et le statut avancé de la femme, recense les "gros problèmes" du pays. "Le président Ben Ali prend de l'âge, son régime est sclérosé, et il n'y a pas de successeur avéré, peut-on lire. Beaucoup de Tunisiens sont frustrés par le manque de liberté politique et en colère contre la corruption de la famille de la première dame, le taux de chômage élevé et les disparités régionales. L'extrémisme reste une menace. Confronté à ces problèmes, le gouvernement n'accepte ni critique ni conseil, qu'il vienne de l'intérieur ou de l'extérieur. A l'inverse, il ne cherche qu'à imposer un contrôle plus strict, souvent en s'appuyant sur la police. Résultat : la Tunisie est à la peine et notre relation [avec elle] également."

Pour les diplomates, travailler en Tunisie est devenu très difficile. Les contrôles, "mis en place par le ministre des affaires étrangères", les contraignent à avoir une permission écrite avant tout contact avec un officiel. Une demande de réunion doit être accompagnée d'une note diplomatique. "Beaucoup restent sans réponse", précise un mémo.

PRIVILÉGIER LA DISCRÉTION

Maintenir des contacts avec les militants de la société civile est une gageure. Et les Tunisiens invités à des réceptions par l'ambassade font l'objet d'intimidations par des policiers en civil postés à proximité.

Quelle devrait être la politique de l'administration Obama en Tunisie ? Poursuivre les contacts avec l'opposition et la société civile. Continuer à critiquer "l'absence de démocratie et le peu de respect pour les droits de l'homme", le faire "de façon très claire, le plus souvent possible, et à très haut niveau", mais, à rebours de l'administration Bush, en privilégiant la discrétion.

Les Etats-Unis, ajoute le télégramme, devraient aussi demander aux pays européens d'intensifier leurs efforts pour "persuader le gouvernement tunisien d'accélérer les réformes politiques".

L'Allemagne et la Grande-Bretagne sont acquis à cette idée, mais "des pays-clés comme la France et l'Italie hésitent à faire pression" sur la Tunisie.

Citation :

WikiLeaks : la Syrie ne bougera pas en cas de conflit entre l'Iran et Israël

Selon des révélations WikiLeaks, la Syrie a rejeté, fin 2009, la demande de l'Iran de se joindre à ses côtés si les installations nucléaires de la République islamique étaient attaquées ou bien même en cas de guerre entre Israël et le Hezbollah. Des diplomates syriens auraient également déclaré : "que les Iraniens ne comptent pas sur nous ou sur le Hezbollah ou le Hamas pour faire leur guerre (aux Iraniens) , nous sommes trop faibles, quant aux Iraniens, ils sont suffisamment puissants puisqu'ils ont les moyens de développer un programme nucléaire."

Guysen.com

Citation :

WikiLeaks : les Saoudiens ont proposé une force arabe commune contre…le Hezbollah

Selon d'étonnantes révélations WikiLeaks, l'Arabie Saoudite a suggéré aux Américains, en 2008, la mise sur pied d'une force arabe commune afin de détruire le Hezbollah. Le ministre saoudien des Affaires étrangères avait fait cette proposition pour mettre fin à la main mise du Hezbollah et de l'Iran sur le Liban.

Guysen.com

Citation :

WikiLeaks : la Lybie a menacé Londres de conséquences "extrêmes" dans l'affaire Lockerbie

La Libye a menacé, l'an dernier, la Grande-Bretagne de conséquences "extrêmes" si l'auteur libyen de l'attentat de Lockerbie, malade, décédait en prison, révèlent des télégrammes diplomatiques américains dévoilés par WikiLeaks. Les menaces incluaient la fermeture de toutes les activités commerciales britanniques en Libye, des manifestations contre les représentations britanniques et des allusions menaçantes pour les sujets britanniques dans ce pays. Et si Washington manifestait publiquement son opposition à la libération du Libyen, "l'ambassade américaine et les citoyens américains en Libye pourraient s'exposer à des conséquences similaires", selon ces télégrammes. Abdelbaset Ali Mohmet al-Megrahi a été libéré pour des "raisons humanitaires" en août 2009 de sa prison en Ecosse

Guysen.com

-------------------------------------
Maghreb: Resolving the Western Sahara
-------------------------------------

¶13. (S) On the Maghreb, Ben Ali suggested extremism is a real
and growing problem. Morocco, he said, was at the "beginning
of the beginning" of its problem. It had
ignored, he added, the issue for too long and former King
Hassan II had refused to discuss it. Nevertheless, Morocco
was a strategic partner for Tunisia and the GOT was working
to strengthen cooperation. On Algeria, Ben Ali, said the
problem was a "little better" and may be at the beginning of
the end. Ben Ali said Tunisia has strong and direct
cooperation on counter-terrorism with Algeria. Welch noted
that Morocco and Algeria trust Tunisia more than they trust
each other. Welch agreed that there is a terrorism problem
in Morocco.


¶14. (S) On the Western Sahara, Ben Ali said the Algerians
are responsible for the ongoing impasse. Welch agreed,
saying the issue was blocking progress in the region. He
said the Algerians need to accept that there is not going to
be an independent state in the Western Sahara. Ben Ali said
the problem is complex, and will take years to resolve. He
added it cannot be settled through the UN Security Council.
He noted Tunisia had tried to convene a Maghreb meeting on it
in Tunis. While Morocco and Libya had agreed to attend,
Algeria refused, saying there was nothing to discuss.

Leo Africanus a écrit:

Chere yassine ca serait d'une grande aide si tu pouvais editer ton post et mettre le cable complet, comme ca on pourrait toujours consulter wikileaks et echaper toute manipulation. Merci d'avance.

Tu refait la meme chose meme si je t'ai empris de bien vouloir mettre les cables entiesrs, et ainsi connaitre la date et autres details et ainsi mieux comprendre le contexte de l'info, mais je vois que tu revient sur tes pas. Ca c'est un manque de respect envers un camarade forumeur. N'oublit surtout pas que nous ne sommes pas ici pour montrer nos habilites et desstres a l'use de google mais pour partager et s'enrichir mutuellement. J'espere que cette fois tu prennes le temps de me lire. Merci.

Elle viens d'içi sa source.

Citation :

VZCZCXYZ1909
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTU #0193/01 0631651
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 031651Z MAR 08
FM AMEMBASSY TUNIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 4520
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITYSE C R E T TUNIS 000193

SIPDIS

NOFORN
SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/FO (WELCH, GRAY) AND NEA/MAG (HOPKINS, HARRIS)
STATE ALSO FOR S/WCI (WILLIAMSON, GOREY)
NSC FOR ABRAMS, YERGER

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/28/2018
TAGS: PREL PTER PHUM PGOV KPAL KDRG KDEM TS
SUBJECT: PRESIDENT BEN ALI MEETS WITH A/S WELCH: PROGRESS
ON COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION, REGIONAL CHALLENGES

Classified By: Ambassador Robert F. Godec for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

-------
Summary
-------

¶1. (S/NF) President Ben Ali and NEA Assistant Secretary
David Welch discussed regional and bilateral issues in a
wide-ranging, warm and open meeting on Thursday, February 28.
In response to A/S Welch's remarks and requests, President
Ben Ali:

-- promised counter-terrorism cooperation "without
reservation," including US access to a terrorist in Tunisian
custody;
-- said the GOT would accept the ten remaining Tunisian
detainees in Guantanamo on the basis of the constitution;
-- welcomed the Annapolis peace process, adding that
Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas is "optimistic"
a deal will be concluded and plans to visit Tunis in March;
and,
-- said there is "no reason" for an Arab League Summit in
Damascus unless there is a Lebanese president and opined that
the meeting might be postponed or representation
downgraded.

¶2. (S/NF) Welch and Ben Ali also covered US-Libyan
relations, relations between Morocco and Algeria, the
situation in Iraq and the challenge of Iran. The
constructive session underscored again that Tunisia is
prepared to play a moderate, but not a leadership, role on
regional problems. Overall, Ben Ali was clearly pleased with
Welch's visit and it received wide media coverage. End
Summary.

--------------------
Meeting: The Setting
--------------------

¶3. (S/NF) During his February 27 - 29 visit, NEA A/S David
Welch met with President Zine El Abidine Ben Ali for one hour
45 minutes at the Presidential Palace in Carthage on
Thursday, February 28. Foreign Minister Abdelwaheb Abdallah
and Ambassador Godec were also present. The Director of
Tunisia's External Communications Agency (ATCE), Oussama
Romdhani, was the interpreter.

--------------------------------------------- ------------
Bilateral Relations: CT Cooperation "Without Reservation"
--------------------------------------------- ------------

¶4. (S/NF) Ben Ali began by emphasizing the excellent,
"strategic" relations between the United States and Tunisia.
He continued, however, that he understood the United States
had concerns about cooperation on counter-terrorism. Ben Ali
said he had ordered Minister of
Interior Rafik Belhaj Kacem and other senior officials to
cooperate with the United States "without reservation" on
counter-terrorism.

¶5. (S/NF) The President stressed that Tunisia cooperated
with the United States on terrorism out of conviction, and
said broader, deeper international cooperation is essential.
Many countries, he said, have suffered as the result of
terrorism. He expressed regret, however, over the human
rights criticism Tunisia has faced as the result
of its efforts to combat terrorism. Some governments have a
"double standard," he said, on the issue. He added "some
embassies" in Tunis and human rights groups had taken
positions that were "not friendly" over such cases such as
the imprisonment of activist Mohammed Abbou and of the
"Zarzis group." (NB. The "Zarzis group" refers to six
Tunisians detained in 2003 for allegedly preparing to commit
terrorist attacks. The six were pardoned by Ben Ali in 2006
following international pressure.) Ben Ali acknowledged that
there had been some problems with human rights in Tunisia,
but stressed the GOT is addressing them. For example, he
said, "tens" of police officers have been tried for
corruption and other abuses. He said he would welcome the US
Embassy receiving further information. He stressed that the
GOT is committed to freedom and human rights, but no one is
above the law.

¶6. (S/NF) A/S Welch thanked Ben Ali and expressed
appreciation for his commitment to cooperation on
counter-terrorism. He said he had two specific requests: 1)
access for US officials to interview Tunisian terrorist

Noureddine Taam and 2) a commitment to accept the Tunisian
detainees in Guantanamo on the basis of earlier assurances on
treatment. Ben Ali responded that the United States would
have immediate access to Taam. (NB. Additional details
reported in GRPO channels.) He continued that the GOT would
accept the detainees and do so on the basis of the Tunisian
constitution. (NB. The Tunisian constitution offers
guarantees on human rights, humane treatment and respect for
international commitments.) Ben Ali emphasized again that on
counter-terrorism and intelligence Tunisia would "cooperate
with the United States without inhibitions" and the
cooperation would be "total."

-------------------------------------
Libya: Trying to Improve US Relations
-------------------------------------

¶7. (S/NF) A/S Welch said the United States is improving
relations with Libya, but from time to time has difficulties
with leader Muammar Qadhafi. Welch asked that Ben Ali
communicate to Qadhafi that the United States wants to
continue to improve relations. Ben Ali replied that Qadhafi
also wants better relations, but there remain "anti-American
radicals" in the government. Qadhafi plans, according to Ben
Ali, a cabinet reshuffle that would address the problem and
we should see how the situation evolves. Qadhafi, Ben Ali
opined, is "not a normal person" and had experienced
disappointments over the failure of Arab and African unity.
Ben Ali promised to raise the US interest in improving
relations with Qadhafi in person or by phone.

--------------------------------------------
Middle East: The Peace Process Needs Support
--------------------------------------------

¶8. (S) Welch stressed that President Bush's highest priority
this year is progress toward two states, Palestine and
Israel, living side-by-side in peace. While Palestinian
Authority President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert genuinely
want peace, some of the Palestinian and Israeli people and
leaders are skeptical. Welch stressed that all countries
interested in peace need to make every effort to help move
the process forward.

¶9. (S) Ben Ali agreed on the importance of the Annapolis
process, adding he had spoken with Abbas who is "optimistic"
an agreement will be reached by the end of the year.
Nevertheless, progress will remain very difficult. Ben Ali
stressed Fatah and Hamas must try to reach an understanding.
He noted that Abbas will visit Tunisia in March and there is
a proposal for a Fatah-Hamas meeting in Tunis. Ben Ali said
he will wait to hear Abbas' views before proceeding on the
proposal.

--------------------------------------------- -------
Arab League Summit: Not Without A Lebanese President
--------------------------------------------- -------

¶10. (S) Welch asked Ben Ali about his views of Syria and the
proposed Arab League Summit. Ben Ali responded that Syria is
a source of concern. He said Syria is acting for Iran and
the latter is fueling regional problems. He said he had met
(on February 18) with Syrian Foreign Minister Walid Mu'allim
who handed over an invitation from President Bashar Asad to
attend the summit in Damascus. He said he told Mu'allim that
Syria should help resolve the problems in Lebanon. Ben Ali
emphasized the complexity of the situation in Lebanon, noting
the unhelpful involvement of many regional actors. He added
that there was some support for inviting Iran to the Damascus
Summit. Ben Ali said, however, that he saw no reason for the
summit unless there is a Lebanese president in attendance.
Welch agreed. Ben Ali continued the summit may be postponed,
or representation downgraded from the Chief of State level.
He noted other states in the region, including Morocco,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia agreed. In any event, Ben Ali said
he would not attend such a summit.

---------------------
Iraq: Bleak Situation
---------------------

¶11. (S/NF) Ben Ali said the situation in Iraq is "bleak," but
we must face it. The only party benefiting currently is
Iran, and suggested that Turkey's current actions against the
PKK are making matters worse. Welch noted there is some
progress on the security situation and the political front in
Iraq.


-------------------
Region: "Explosive"
-------------------

¶12. (S) Looking more broadly, Ben Ali noted that Tunisia was
happy it was part of the Maghreb, and not part of Levant or
Gulf. He opined that the situation in Egypt is
"explosive," adding that sooner or later the Muslim
Brotherhood would take over. He added that Yemen and Saudi
Arabia are also facing real problems. Overall, the region is
"explosive."

-------------------------------------
Maghreb: Resolving the Western Sahara
-------------------------------------

¶13. (S) On the Maghreb, Ben Ali suggested extremism is a real
and growing problem. Morocco, he said, was at the "beginning
of the beginning" of its problem. It had
ignored, he added, the issue for too long and former King
Hassan II had refused to discuss it. Nevertheless, Morocco
was a strategic partner for Tunisia and the GOT was working
to strengthen cooperation. On Algeria, Ben Ali, said the
problem was a "little better" and may be at the beginning of
the end. Ben Ali said Tunisia has strong and direct
cooperation on counter-terrorism with Algeria. Welch noted
that Morocco and Algeria trust Tunisia more than they trust
each other. Welch agreed that there is a terrorism problem
in Morocco.

¶14. (S) On the Western Sahara, Ben Ali said the Algerians
are responsible for the ongoing impasse. Welch agreed,
saying the issue was blocking progress in the region. He
said the Algerians need to accept that there is not going to
be an independent state in the Western Sahara. Ben Ali said
the problem is complex, and will take years to resolve. He
added it cannot be settled through the UN Security Council.
He noted Tunisia had tried to convene a Maghreb meeting on it
in Tunis. While Morocco and Libya had agreed to attend,
Algeria refused, saying there was nothing to discuss.

--------------
Iran: A Threat
--------------

¶15. (S) Welch noted that President Bush considered Iran a
threat "yesterday, today and tomorrow." Noting the recent
National Intelligence Estimate on Iran, Welch underscored
that while the Iranians "may have put the gun in the closet,
they are still trying to make the bullet." Nevertheless, he
added, there are signs economic pressure is working. Ben Ali
concurred. Welch said the chances of a third Security
Council resolution are good and President Bush wants a
diplomatic option.

¶16. (S/NF) Ben Ali replied this is "quite wise" of President
Bush. He stressed he opposed the use of force, and that "a
second front is not needed." Economic pressure on Iran will
take longer, but it is working. Ben Ali added that he "does
not trust" the Shia.

----------------------------------
Invitation: President Bush Welcome
----------------------------------

¶17. (S) President Ben Ali closed the meeting stressing his
open invitation to President Bush to visit Tunisia before or
after his time in office. Welch expressed his appreciation
to Ben Ali for the meeting.

------------------------------
Comment: Warm and Open Ben Ali
------------------------------

¶18. (S/NF) Throughout the meeting, President Ben Ali was
warm, open, and occasionally animated (at which point he
sometimes slipped into Tunisian dialect). His quick and
strong assurances on counter-terrorism cooperation were
welcome, and may be an important step forward on what has
been a troubling issue. Significantly, the President's
promise was followed within hours by action from GOT
officials. The key test will be whether cooperation
continues and is both broad and deep. Similarly, the
President's commitment on Guantanamo detainees was welcome.

¶19. (S/NF) On regional issues, Ben Ali showed again that he

is a moderate. While the Tunisians will not take the lead on
foreign policy challenges, they will help where they can
(e.g., support for the Annapolis process). Finally,
President Ben Ali was clearly very pleased to see A/S Welch
and to exchange views with him. The meeting and visit got
broad, major media coverage in Tunisia. End Comment.

¶20. (SBU) A/S Welch did not have a chance to clear this
cable.
GODEC
http://wikileaks.ch/cable/2008/03/08TUNIS193.html

Merci bien mox.

De rien

Citation :

ID: 158964
Date: 2008-06-20 06:26:00
Origin: 08MADRID685
Source: Embassy Madrid
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 08MADRID678
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #0685/01 1720626
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 200626Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4960
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4000
RUEHBP/AMEMBASSY BAMAKO 0040
RUEHDK/AMEMBASSY DAKAR 0143
RUEHLI/AMEMBASSY LISBON 1712
RUEHNJ/AMEMBASSY NDJAMENA 0013
RUEHNM/AMEMBASSY NIAMEY 0130
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 1161
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT 6097
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000685

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, SP

SUBJECT: JUNE 8-11 VISIT TO SPAIN OF COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA
COMMAND

REF: MADRID 678

Classified By: DEPUTY CHIEF OF MISSION HUGO LLORENS, REASONS 1.4(B) AND
(D).

1. (C) Summary: General William E. "Kip" Ward, Commander
U.S. Africa Command, visited Spain June 8-11 for meetings
with Spanish officials regarding AFRICOM. The primary
purpose of the visit was to meet with Spanish leaders to
discuss AFRICOM as well as listen and learn from their
experiences on the continent and island nations. General
Ward met with Chief of Defense General Felix Sanz, Secretary
General of the Presidency Bernardino Leon, MFA Secretary of
State for Foreign Policy Angel Lossada, and MOD Secretary
General for Defense Policy Luis Cuesta. He also gave an
interview to leading Spanish daily El Pais. Throughout,
General Ward stressed that AFRICOM represented not the
"militarization" of Africa but a serious and important effort
by the U.S. to make its engagement with the nations of Africa
security and humanitarian issues more effective. He
solicited Spanish views and heard that, while Spain's
historical interest in North Africa has not diminished, its
interest sub-Saharan Africa is growing rapidly. The Spanish
response to General Ward's briefings on AFRICOM was very
positive and indicated a strong willingness to work
cooperatively with the new command. End summary.

What AFRICOM Is and Is Not
--------------------------

2. (C) In all of his meetings, General Ward stressed that
AFRICOM was not about the militarization of Africa. Security
assistance activities with many African nations were already
underway and had been for some time. There were already
Offices of Security Cooperation in many African countries.
The U.S. was heavily engaged in humanitarian and development
efforts on the continent. AFRICOM's role was to bring
greater focus to existing security assistance programs and
enhance the ability of the U.S. military to support USG
efforts across the board in Africa. He explained that
AFRICOM would be combining functions presently performed by
EUCOM, CENTCOM, and PACOM. The change was less in what the
U.S. did than in how it was done. AFRICOM had a construct
that was inclusive of a large number of civilian agencies
(including the Departments of Treasury and Commerce and
USAID) and this would increase the command's awareness and
understanding of what other agencies were doing to execute
U.S. policy in Africa. The large number of civilians
assigned to AFRICOM were not simply liaison officers, but
integral members of the command. AFRICOM's role was not to
take over those activities but to support them effectively.
General Ward noted that AFRICOM had two deputy commanders, a
flag officer for military operations and a Department of
State former ambassador to handle civil and humanitarian
affairs.

3. (C) General Ward stressed to all his Spanish interlocutors
that AFRICOM wanted to avoid conflicting with other
international actors and donors. General Ward said AFRICOM
also wanted to reinforce positive European engagement with
Africa, not replace it. AFRICOM wanted to support and
complement what others were doing. AFRICOM meant Africa
would be getting added focus from the U.S. and over time that
would make a positive difference to Africa and foster
stability on the continent. General Ward stressed his
interest in Spanish views and the importance of Spanish
cooperation. He asked that Spain continue the dialogue with
the U.S. on Africa.

4. (C) General Ward said the terrorism threat in Africa was
very real. Al Qaida made no secret of its aims against the
west. He noted AFRICOM would play an important role in
helping the states of the Sahel develop the capacity to face
these threats. He explained that AFRICOM had a
multi-disciplinary construct that would facilitate
coordination with other USG agencies as well as international
partners working in Africa. General Ward commended Spain for
the participation of its naval personnel in Africa
Partnership Station activities. He noted the Operation
Enduring Freedom - Trans-Sahara components of the

Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership would pass from
EUCOM to AFRICOM. General Ward noted U.S. interest in
tracking the movements of foreign fighters via the Sahel.

5. (C) The Spanish were interested in the basing issue, but
General Ward made clear that his priority is standing up his
headquarters and his command. The question of AFRICOM's
permanent home was one for the future.

Chief of Defense
----------------

6. (C) Spanish Chief of Defense General Felix Sanz was quick
to tell Ambassador Aguirre and General Ward that he needed no
convincing: he was already a strong supporter of AFRICOM.
He said he had confidence in U.S. undertakings and valued his
long association with the U.S. military. Sanz said AFRICOM's
success would be Spain's success. He noted an appreciation
for the comprehensive approach AFRICOM was taking, beyond the
strictly military to military, and the strong civilian
component within the command.

7. (C) Sanz said he was trying to educate the political
levels of the government and welcomed any information AFRICOM
could provide to assist him in that effort. He said he would
report on General Ward's visit, using that as yet another
opportunity to remind senior civilian leaders of what AFRICOM
meant for Spain. He urged General Ward to stay in close
contact. He said the Spanish military would be there for
AFRICOM, subject of course to the policy direction of the
political leadership. Sanz noted Spain's long historical
association with North Africa (he recounted that a few years
ago three of the four members of Spain's Joint Chiefs of
Staff were born in Africa), but he also stressed Spain's
growing interest in Africa as a whole, triggered in part by
illegal immigration to the Canary Islands. Sanz said no
other area of the world affected Spanish interests more than
Africa.

8. (C) Sanz urged General Ward to be stubborn in building an
understanding of and support for AFRICOM's mission. He noted
there were political factors that could not be ignored, but
insisted the key was to be persistent and keep explaining the
positive goals of AFRICOM. He predicted those in Spain who
understood the problems of Africa would be supportive. Sanz
also suggested stressing to political interlocutors the
benefits to Spain of AFRICOM. He suggested that in terms of
Spanish involvement, a modest start would give people a
chance to become accustomed to the idea.

Secretary General of the Presidency
-----------------------------------

9. (C) Secretary General of the Presidency Bernardino Leon
spent nearly 90 minutes with General Ward and talked
extensively about Spanish views on Africa. Leon said Spain
worked closely with Algeria and Morocco and, like the U.S.,
was very concerned about the movement of foreign fighters in
the Maghreb. Leon said although the date had not been
announced, President Zapatero would travel to Morocco July 7.


10. (C) On Western Sahara, Leon said Algeria had rebuffed a
Moroccan proposal to open the border. The excuse was concern
over Western Sahara but Leon doubted this. He suspected
Algeria remained unhappy over what they regarded as Morocco's
unhelpful attitude during Algeria's civil war. Leon said it
was time for Algeria to accept Morocco's apology and open the
border. He said Spain had proposed a joint energy project
which Algeria had not yet opposed although Leon noted an
Algerian tendency to raise objections at the last moment and
to use Western Sahara as an excuse. Leon said Algeria was
aware Morocco would never leave Western Sahara. Algeria was
simply trying to make things more complicated for Morocco and
use the issue as leverage on other matters. Leon noted five
percent of Morocco's GDP was tied up in Western Sahara. He
predicted current talks would fail but said he did not expect
a military response from Polisario.

11. (C) Leon noted sub-Saharan Africa was becoming a very

important of Spain's national security concerns and presented
multiple complex challenges. He said Spain was especially
concerned about the Sahel which he described as a line
running from troubled states such as Somalia and Sudan all
the way across to the Canary Islands. He noted Spain had
recently opened new embassies in Mali, Niger, and Sudan.
Leon stated Spain was working on an updated (2008-2012)
version of its Plan Africa for the sub-Sahara. He also said
the Foreign Ministry was elevating sub-Saharan Africa to a
full director generalship (until recently it had been handled
by a sub-DG under a DG also responsible for North Africa and
the Middle East) and that Spanish aid for the region had
multiplied five times since 2004 (approaching one billion
euros).

12. (C) Leon predicted President Zapatero would travel often
to sub-Saharan Africa in his second term. He also noted
Spain planned to organize a summit with the Western African
states and would be open to U.S. participation or
observation. Leon said his personal experience in Africa
went back over many years and included postings in Liberia
and Zaire. He mentioned Spain's deployment of troops to the
UN mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the
current deployment of two cargo aircraft and support
personnel to the EU mission in Chad. Leon said Spain was
trying to organize a framework for cooperation in West Africa
to help those countries confront the threat from organized
crime. He said states such as Guinea-Bissau were weak and
vulnerable to drug, arms, and alien traffickers. Leon noted
Sudan was very complicated with the north-south problem
unresolved and Darfur getting even more complicated. He
opined that the current system of sanctions was ineffective
given the attitude of China.

13. (C) Leon mentioned he had recently visited Chad. He said
it was important to work with the AU, but he was pessimistic.
He did not expect anything from the Libyans, and he
suggested a need to find some way to work with the Chinese in
Africa. He noted they were widely present on the continent
but did not see many of the troublesome regimes as the West
saw them.

14. (C) Leon predicted Mali and Niger could do well with the
support of the international community. He noted Spain was
trying to help and that the Ministry of Interior was engaging
with counterparts there. He noted Spain had embassies and
developmnt offices in both countries and was setting up a
language institute in Bamako. He suggested the U.S. and
Spain look at donor coordination and information sharing.
Leon was optimistic about Ivory Coast, opining that Gbagbo
was very intelligent and that the Ivory Coast was important
to stability in the region. Leon said Spain was interested
in helping in the region. He said Conakry Guinea had a good
president but suffered from corruption. He noted Spain had
seen a problem with merchant vessels leaving Conakry headed
for the Canary Islands, and Spanish intelligence services
were trying to keep an eye on the situation. He was even
more critical of Guinea Bissau. He said he had visited and
urged the president to fire the MOI, which he did, but Leon
said everyone in the government was tainted to some degree by
corruption. He noted the islands operated almost as
independent states (he cited a French hotel with its own
airstrip which operated without regard to the country's
customs and immigration authorities). He said some of the
islands had airstrips which were being used by South American
drug traffickers. Spain was considering providing some job
training, repairing a road to improve access to the main
harbor and perhaps sending a patrol boat to be jointly manned
by Spanish and local officials.

15. (C) Turning to Senegal, Mauritania, and the Gambia, Leon
said Spain was working to improve their capacity. He said
law enforcement cooperation with Senegal was good and noted
Spain had helped set up a small command center connected to
the Spanish authorities in the Canary Islands. Leon said
the government in Mauritania was weak, and he worried
terrorists might attempt to destabilize the country. He said
Spain would probably send some security assistance trainers.

16. (C) With regard to Liberia and Sierra Leon, Leon noted

Liberia used to produce rice for the entire region and the
destruction of other crops more recently introduced might
present an opportunity to reintroduce rice. He said Spain
was studying an ECOWAS electricity project that would consist
of funding a feasibility study for electric integration in
West Africa aimed at the rural population. He said the study
would cost $10 to $11 million. He also mentioned some sub
regional infrastructure projects such as repair of the
Dakar-Bamako railway and the Bamako-Conakry road. He noted
these projects would be very expensive and were not things
Spain could do alone.

17. (C) Leon said Spain had developed good relations with
Angola and Mozambique in the wake of Portugal's withdrawal.
He noted Spain's interest in Equatorial Guinea, which he said
had a good chance for progress thanks to its natural
resources. He noted the last elections were a missed
opportunity to create more space for the opposition. He said
Spain was trying to convince the government of the need for
reform and mentioned they had given the government of list of
27 political prisoners who should be released, most of whom
had been set free. He noted the good cooperation between the
U.S. and Spanish Embassies in Equatorial Guinea and suggested
both countries should deliver a message on democracy.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
--------------------------------------

18. (C) Angel Lossada, the new number two in the Foreign
Ministry, stressed that Africa was no longer a far away place
to Spain. Thanks to globalization, terrorism, immigration,
and organized crime -- not to mention the proximity of the
Canary Islands -- sub-Saharan Africa was now on Spain's
doorstep. Engagement and investment was increasing. Lossada
noted Spain had opened six new embassies in the region in
recent years, mainly in the Sahel. Development assistance
was now approaching the one billion euro mark. Plan Africa
was being continued out to 2012 and would provide coherency
to Spain's activities in sub-Saharan Africa.

19. (C) Lossada stressed the porosity of borders in Africa
and the threat from Al Qaida in the Maghreb. He noted the
engagement by the Ministry of Interior on law enforcement and
security issues (e.g. Frontex, joint maritime patrols with
some West African countries, etc.). Lossada identified lack
of economic opportunity and good governance as key challenges
and said Spain was trying to help address these problems.
Lossada said Spain was trying to stem illegal immigration not
only by improving the law enforcement response but by working
with source countries on creating more opportunity at home,
directing remittances towards productive economy activity,
etc. Lossada noted Spain's recent contribution of two
military transport aircraft and support personnel to the EU
effort in Chad. Echoing what Leon had said, Lossada stressed
that the Sahel was in effect a lateral highway into the
Middle East.

20. (C) Keying off General Ward's remarks on the Africa
Partnership Station, Lossada said he could see many avenues
for cooperation in Africa. Lossada said he was certain the
U.S. and Spain could find ways to mutually reinforce each
other's work in Africa.

Secretary General for Defense Policy
------------------------------------

21. (C) Secretary General for Defense Policy Luis Cuesta
commended the comprehensive approach of AFRICOM and said
Spain likewise was trying to take a broad vision of the
continent. Cuesta likened AFRICOM to a provincial
reconstruction team for Africa. He noted the objectives of
AFRICOM meshed well with Spain's own interests in
counter-terrorism and fighting drug trafficking and illegal
immigration. As did all General Ward's interlocutors, Cuesta
stressed that Africa had become a priority for Spain. Cuesta
said the objectives of AFRICOM were favorable to Spain's
interests in the region. He noted the increased Spanish
diplomatic presence and increased aid.

22. (C) Cuesta noted the rise in illegal immigration to Spain

from Africa and Spain's efforts to stem that, in part by
increasing security engagement with West Africa (Frontex,
Operation Noble Sentinel, joint patrols, etc.). Cuesta
also pointed to Spain's efforts to support economic
development in the source countries, including job training
both to encourage people to stay home and to ensure those
coming to Spain via legal channels had the skills they needed
to succeed. Cuesta mentioned technical assistance and
training to police in Niger and Mali. He said Spain had
offered military training in 18 African countries and had
eight bilateral agreements on defense and was negotiating
another six. Cuesta also noted Spain's involvement in EU and
UN operations in Africa (e.g., Chad, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo, etc.). Cuesta mentioned Spain was leading an
EU mission on security sector reform in Guinea Bissau. He
noted Spain was offering training via its center for
international demining.

23. (C) Cuesta said the Spanish view of AFRICOM would to a
great extent be shaped by the views of the African countries
with which Spain had close relations. He said Spanish
observers in AFRICOM exercises and training evolutions would
be a positive step. Cuesta suggested there might be an
increase in operational tempo at Rota and Moron due to
AFRICOM and assured General Ward that Spain was ready to
support that in accordance with the bilateral Agreement on
Defense Cooperation, although he noted it would be difficult
for Spain to participate in or support direct action missions
in Africa without some stamp of international legitimacy such
as the consent of the country in question or a UNSCR.

24. (C) Cuesta said transparency would be a key element for
success in terms of securing Spanish support for AFRICOM's
activities. General Ward noted the Africa Partnership
Station experience with Spain had been positive. He also
mentioned involving Spain in Flintlock. General Ward said as
AFRICOM becomes fully operational Spain should not expect
changes except in the sense of more information and greater
willingness to include Spain. General Ward said observers
were welcomed but participants from Spain would be even
better. He noted the Spanish who had participated in the
Africa Partnership Station had contributed a great deal.

25. (C) Asked about what concerns he had heard expressed
about AFRICOM, Cuesta said Spain had heard skepticism from
the Sudanese and South Africans. Nevertheless, Cuesta said
security force reform, security assistance, development aid,
etc. was music to Spain's ears and that was why General
Ward's visit was so important. Cuesta noted Africa was only
12 kilometers from Spain and said Spain had long watched the
Maghreb closely but was now paying more attention to
sub-Saharan Africa.

Spain Eager to Send Liaison Officer
-----------------------------------

26. (C) Both General Sanz and Luis Cuesta expressed strong
interest in sending a liaison officer to AFRICOM. Cuesta
said he had mentioned this idea to the MOD (Note: As
detailed in reftel, the MOD in turn mentioned the idea to
Ambassador Aguirre during a June 10 breakfast. She also told
the Ambassador Spanish public opinion would be critical in
determining the level of GOS engagement with AFRICOM and said
that while the GOS was interested in being a part of efforts
in Africa, much work remained to be done. She asked that the
USG coordinate closely with Spain on next steps. End note).
General Ward explained he would be very open to the
possibility of a Spanish military liaison officer at AFRICOM
once the command was prepared to receive liaison officers.

Somali Pirates
--------------

27. (C) Leon, Lossada, and Cuesta all stressed the problem of
piracy off Somalia and cited the recent capture of a Spanish
fishing vessel in April (and repeated that Spain was grateful
for U.S. assistance in that instance). They indicated Spain
was taking a serious look at a possible multinational
response. Leon mentioned he had just returned from
Washington where he had discussed the idea with the NATO SYG.

Leon hoped that with UNSCR 1816 it would be possible to
organize an international response. Cuesta said Spain might
be organizing a meeting for the defense and foreign
ministries of the countries that had supported UNSCR 1816 to
see what concrete action might be taken. Cuesta added that
Spain might also try and work this issue via the EU. General
Ward agreed piracy was a common threat. He noted the passage
of the UNSCR 1816 had been a positive step. He acknowledge
there could be opportunities for cooperative action but made
clear that decisions regarding anti-piracy operations would
be made on a political level.
Press
-----

28. (U) General Ward was interviewed by a journalist from
leading Spanish daily El Pais and had the opportunity to make
many of the same points he had made in his private meetings
regarding the purpose of AFRICOM and its benefits to Spain
and other countries with interests in the region. The
article that resulted was straightforward, and we are sure
will help demystify AFRICOM for many Spaniards.

Comment
-------

29. (C) General Ward's visit to Spain was a resounding
success from our point of view. He was able to meet with
senior Spanish officials and reassure them about the purpose
and vision of AFRICOM. In each case, he encountered a very
serious and thoughtful response as well as a clear
disposition to work with AFRICOM. General Ward conveyed very
effectively a genuine interest in Spain's views and a
disposition to work cooperatively with our Spanish allies.
We are convinced this visit and General Ward's deft handling
of his Spanish interlocutors will pay enormous dividends down
the road as we try to coordinate or even combine U.S. and
Spanish efforts in Africa or if we ever decide to base some
portion of AFRICOM in Spain. We are extremely grateful that
General Ward committed so much time and effort here and look
forward to a return visit at his earliest opportunity.
AGUIRRE

Citation :

ID: 156778
Date: 2008-06-04 17:31:00
Origin: 08MADRID620
Source: Embassy Madrid
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHMD #0620/01 1561731
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 041731Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY
INFO RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4884
RUEKJCS/OSD WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L MADRID 000620

SIPDIS

FOR GENERAL WARD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018
TAGS: PREL, MARR, AF, SP
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JUNE 8-11 VISIT TO SPAIN OF
COMMANDER, U.S. AFRICA COMMAND

Classified By: AMBASSADOR EDUARDO AGUIRRE, JR., REASONS 1.4(B),(D).

1. (SBU) Summary: We warmly welcome your visit. We are
convinced there is much Spain can do to support the AFRICOM
mission, so this will be a key opportunity. The challenge
will be to engage them constructively on what the U.S. is
trying to accomplish with this new and innovative command.
We have a strong military to military relationship upon which
to build and a number of common interests in Africa. Our
Spanish interlocutors will be very interested in what you
have to say, and we strongly encourage you to solicit their
views on Africa, particularly the Maghreb and Sahel, where
they have significant experience. End summary.

Military Cooperation
--------------------

2. (C) Spanish military cooperation is important to the USG.
The bases of Rota and Moron are strategic hubs, midway
between the U.S. and Afghanistan and Iraq. U.S. planes and
ships account for over 4,000 flights and 250 port calls a
year in Spain. The Spanish military, particularly the Navy,
is pro-U.S. and pro-NATO. The Navy employs the AEGIS system
in its frigates, is eager to acquire Tomahawk, and is
interested in the Joint Strike Fighter. Spanish defense
industry is a supplier to the U.S. Although the Zapatero
government has imposed a ceiling of 3,000 on troop
deployments, Spain has troops in Lebanon (1,100), Afghanistan
(750), Kosovo (500), Bosnia (260), and a smattering of others
in various UN & EU observer missions (including the
Democratic Republic of the Congo). This month Spain approved
plans to send two cargo aircraft and 100 support personnel to
the EU mission in Chad.

3. (C) Last August, we raised with the GOS the possibility of
basing at Rota an AFRICOM component (the Joint Intelligence
Operations Center). FM Moratinos later told the Ambassador
that both President Zapatero and then-Defense Minister Alonso
had said Spain would enthusiastically like to be considered
for the project. Both Moratinos and Alonso thought this
could be a great opportunity for increased bilateral
cooperation in Africa, a region of great long-term importance
to Spain and growing importance to the U.S. We also have
been advised informally by OSD and JCS that Rota may be one
of several locations under consideration for locating your
headquarters. We think the Spanish will be receptive to
whatever concrete proposal we make (although clearly hosting
the headquarters presents more domestic political issues for
Spain). The key will be making it clear AFRICOM wants to
work closely with Spain and respects Spanish views on Africa,
hence the importance of your visit. We should discuss
carefully the timing and content of any requests we make to
the Spanish in this regard.

4. (C) Our U.S. Navy colleagues have discussed with us the
possibility of adding Tarragona and Las Palmas to the list of
ports where we can take nuclear powered warships (presently
the list is Cartagena, Palma de Mallorca, and Rota). We are
very supportive of this effort, particularly in light of the
potential benefit to AFRICOM of adding Las Palmas. However,
the preliminary signals from the Spanish military have been
that there will be resistance to this request at the
political level. We need to proceed carefully. We will
discuss this issue further with Admiral Fitzgerald during his
June 4-6 visit and look forward to discussing it with you.
Timing of the formal request will be critical.

Spanish Policy Towards Africa
-----------------------------

5. (U) Because of history, proximity, immigration, terrorism,
and the presence of Spanish enclaves in Ceuta and Melilla,
North Africa is strategic for Spain. At the outset of his
second term, President Zapatero said that in the
Mediterranean, Spain would work to guarantee security, fight
terrorism, and increase law enforcement cooperation. He
reportedly recently tasked FM Moratinos with reinvigorating
engagement with North Africa, particularly with regard to
immigration and security cooperation. The Ministers of
Interior of Spain, France, Portugal, Italy, Malta, Algeria,
Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, and Tunisia agreed May 22 to
strengthen counter-terrorism information exchange.

6. (C) In the case of Western Sahara, there are press reports
indicating Zapatero plans to intensify efforts to promote a
political solution. It is not yet clear how Spain proposes
to do this. Spanish diplomats have told us Spain's primary
concern is for regional stability through a negotiated

solution that leads to a just, lasting outcome. While they
note an independent Western Sahara is not a realistic option,
they are concerned that excessive pressure on the Polisario
to accept Morocco's proposals for some form of autonomy under
Moroccan sovereignty will lead to a total breakdown in the
process.

7. (U) Sub-Saharan Africa has not traditionally been a
Spanish priority, but that may be changing. In 2006 Spain
launched Plan Africa (2006-2008) which provided for increased
diplomatic and development assistance with sub-Saharan
Africa. Zapatero, who promised at the beginning of his
second term to make sub-Saharan Africa a top priority, has
reportedly approved a new version for 2008-2012. Nigeria
(which supplies 25% of Spain's oil) and South Africa are
likely to be priorities within sub-Saharan Africa. Spain has
been increasing its diplomatic presence with new embassies
(Sudan, Mali, and Guinea Bissau are the latest) and new
development offices (Niger, the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, and Kenya). There are reportedly plans afoot to open
several more development offices. The Spanish equivalent of
USAID has a budget of about 700 million euros for Africa.
Spain also maintains political and economic interests in its
former colony of Equatorial Guinea.

8. (C) You may hear about the April 20-26 incident in which a
Spanish fishing vessel (the "Playa de Bakio") was taken by
Somali pirates. In their May 19 meeting FM Moratinos thanked
Secretary Rice for the intelligence and military support the
U.S. provided during the incident. Moratinos stressed
continued Spanish concern with pirates off Somalia given that
Spain has dozens of vessels in the area and no way to protect
them. He noted that Spain strongly supported U.S. efforts to
get an anti-piracy resolution adopted in the UNSC.
Testifying before the Spanish Congress May 22, Moratinos said
Spain would be willing to take its turn leading an
anti-piracy force off Somalia if there was UN backing for the
mission (he ducked questions about whether Spain had paid a
ransom to free the Playa de Bakio crew).

Counter-Terrorism, Narcotics, and Illegal Immigration
--------------------------------------------- --------

9. (C) Spain is an al-Qaeda target and a critical player in
U.S.-EU counter-terrorism efforts due to its proximity to the
Maghreb and a population that includes more than one million
Muslims, mostly immigrants. Al-Qaeda has called for attacks
to recapture the medieval "Al Andalus." Ceuta and Melilla
are a fixation for some extremists. In 2004 Madrid suffered
bloody train bombings perpetrated by Islamic extremists. The
Spanish Government considers the threat from Islamic
terrorism to be one of its top national security priorities
and has identified numerous Islamic extremist groups
operating within its borders. The Spanish are actively
pursuing Islamic extremism terrorism-related investigations
and have scores of suspects in jail. Public opinion polling
shows nearly three quarters of Spaniards worried about the
threat of Islamic fundamentalism, more than in the U.S. or
Europe as a whole.

10. (C) Bilateral cooperation is strong. Spain pursues an
aggressive agenda in law enforcement, judicial, and
information-sharing efforts with us. One example is the
HSPD-6 agreement we signed in 2007 to facilitate the sharing
of information between our national counter-terrorism
authorities. Spain participates in the Container Security
Initiative (in the ports of Algeciras, Barcelona, and
Valencia) and the Megaports Initiative to detect radioactive
cargo (in the port of Algeciras with anticipated expansion to
Barcelona and Valencia in the upcoming year). Spain also
participates in the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Stovepipes within the Spanish system and interagency
rivalries are a continuing challenge both for them and us.
In addition to the threat from Islamic extremists, Spain has
been fighting the domestic terrorists of the Basque
Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) for four decades.

11. (C) The Spanish Government ranks drug trafficking as one
of its most important law enforcement concerns and maintains
excellent relations with U.S. law enforcement. Spain remains
the principal entry, transshipment, and consumption zone for
the large quantities of South American cocaine and Moroccan
cannabis destined for European consumer markets, and is also
a major source and transit location for drug proceeds
returning to South and Central America. There is mounting
evidence that West Africa is beginning to play an
increasingly important role in this trafficking. Spain also
faces a sustained flow of hashish from its southern

neighbors, Morocco and Algeria, which makes maritime
smuggling across the Mediterranean a large-scale business.
Seizures of multi-ton loads of Moroccan hashish are not
uncommon, some of it brought into Spain by illegal
immigrants. Spanish authorities cooperate closely with the
DEA Madrid Country Office. In May 2007, Spain hosted the
International Drug Enforcement Conference (IDEC) in Madrid,
the first time IDEC had been held outside of the Western
Hemisphere. Also in 2007, Spain and six other EU countries
deepened their counter-narcotics cooperation by signing an
international agreement creating the Maritime Analysis and
Operations Center (MAOC), headquartered in Lisbon.

12. (C) The premier Spanish law enforcement agencies are the
National Police and the Civil Guard, both of which fall under
the Ministry of Interior. Their jurisdictions overlap to a
significant degree, although historically the Civil Guard has
a stronger presence in rural areas and small towns. Both
agencies have investigative jurisdiction over all types of
crimes including alien smuggling, human trafficking,
terrorism and terrorist financing, and narcotics. The
National Police also have jurisdiction over documentation for
nationals and foreigners (passports, residence cards, and
national identity documents). The Civil Guard's authorities
include contraband and customs control. The Spanish Customs
Service, under the Ministry of the Treasury, also carries a
mandate to enforce anti-drug legislation at Spain's borders
and in Spanish waters. Spain's Organized Crime Intelligence
Center (CICO) coordinates (with varying degrees of success)
counter-narcotics operations among various government
agencies, including the National Police, Civil Guard, and
Customs Service. Although it does not have a domestic law
enforcement function, the Spanish Navy acts on the high seas
and also has assets operating in coastal waters. Protecting
Spain from threats such as terrorism, narcotics trafficking,
and alien smuggling requires joint and multi-agency action,
and it is strongly in the U.S. interest to deepen cooperation
with both MOD and MOI on maritime threats.

13. (U) Historically Spain received few immigrants, but the
rapidly increasing prosperity of recent decades has changed
that. Immigrants now account for about ten percent of the
population. There are over three million registered
immigrants, many from Latin America and Romania. However,
the single largest nationality is Moroccan (about 600,000).
There is also a significant Pakistani community. The number
of sub-Saharan African immigrants in Spain is only about two
percent of the total. In general, Spain has been welcoming
to immigrants, but a souring economy may change that. Spain
is also awakening to the danger illegal immigration
represents in terms of terrorism and organized crime.
Reports of illegal immigrants arriving from Africa via mother
ships receive significant press play as do frequent arrivals
of boatloads of illegal immigrants in the Canaries. The
Civil Guard has responsibility for policing as well as social
and humanitarian functions with respect to illegal
immigration. Of the three routes for illegal immigration
(air, land, and maritime), the maritime flow has expanded
most significantly with the appearance of small boats
(pateras or cayucos). During the Summer of 2006 these small
boats carried over 30,000 illegal immigrants to the Canaries.
The Civil Guard manages a coordination and communications
center in Las Palmas. From this center, Spanish and EU air
and sea operations are directed against maritime alien
smuggling. The center's objectives are deterrence,
interdiction, and rescue. The center has brought about a
significant reduction in illegal immigration to the Canary
Islands. Members of the National Police and Civil Guard are
also deployed in Africa (Morocco, Cape Verde, Senegal, and
Mauritania) in Project Sea Horse. This includes liaison,
equipment, and training. Numerous other projects are
underway to work in concert with other countries to stem the
flow of illegal immigration (e.g., joint projects with
Morocco related to Ceuta and Melilla, FRONTEX, and the
Euro-Africa Conference).

Political and Economic Climate
------------------------------

14. (C) President Zapatero's center left Spanish Socialist
Workers, Party (PSOE) was the victor in the March 9 general
election. The principal opposition party remains the center
right Popular Party (PP). The Spanish public is skeptical of
U.S. foreign policy but supportive of good bilateral
relations. Spain has enjoyed one of the fastest growing
economies in Europe, but growth is slowing significantly. A
housing boom that had contributed greatly to growth for
several years ended abruptly last year and prices are

stagnating, construction slowing, and unemployment and
inflation rising. The rapid increase in unemployment may
make Spain a somewhat less welcoming destination for African
immigrants. U.S. investment has long been important to the
economy (more so than bilateral trade), but the tables have
turned. In 2007, Spain was the fourth largest foreign
investor in the U.S., with particular emphasis in banking,
construction, and renewable energy.

Conclusion
----------

15. (C) Again, we are looking forward to your visit. We are
firmly convinced AFRICOM's mission and Spain's strategic
interests coincide in many important respects and that there
is much the U.S. and Spain can do together.
Aguirre

Citation :

ID: 245346
Date: 2010-01-25 16:45:00
Origin: 10MADRID80
Source: Embassy Madrid
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXRO7217
RR RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #0080/01 0251645
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 251645Z JAN 10
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1744
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEWMFD/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 MADRID 000080

SIPDIS

FOR EUR/WE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2020
TAGS: PREL, SP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR SOLOMONT'S JANUARY 22, 2010 MEETING
WITH SPANISH PRESIDENT ZAPATERO

Classified By: Ambassador Alan D. Solomont, Reasons 1.4(b),(d).

1. (C) Summary: In a wide-ranging two-hour meeting with the
Ambassador January 22, President Zapatero praised USG
humanitarian efforts in Haiti, reiterated his personal
commitment to resettle as soon as possible five detainees
from Guantanamo, pledged Spanish support on Iran and
Afghanistan, and endorsed the Ambassador,s efforts to
promote job creation both in the U.S. and Spain through
enhanced economic ties and investment. Zapatero told the
Ambassador that his government considered him special and
would open "all doors" to him. He pledged to work towards
concrete deliverables leading to a U.S.-EU Summit and said
Spain was open to an expanded USG presence at the Rota Naval
Base for Africom objectives. Zapatero made a strong case for
Spain,s ongoing participation in the G-20, noting that he
appreciated D/NSA Froman,s openness to Spain,s possible
participation if the EU reduces its institutional membership.
Zapatero expressed sincere admiration for President Obama and
his belief that the President's election had transformed the
U.S. standing and image in the world. He also evinced a deep
fascination with the U.S. political system and recent
electoral developments, noting his life-long obsession with
politics. End Summary.

Bilateral Relations
-------------------

2. (C) The Ambassador thanked Zapatero for receiving him so
quickly after his arrival in Spain, and for the warm welcome
by his cabinet, in particular NSA Leon, Foreign Minister
Moratinos, and Interior Minister Rubalcaba. The Ambassador
said President Obama, NSA Jones, and the USG appreciated
Spain,s expressed desire to work closely and collaboratively
with the United States. He welcomed Zapatero,s upcoming
visit to Washington to participate in the forthcoming
National the Prayer Breakfast as well as King Juan Carlos,
mid-February visit to the White House. Despite the negative
press Zapatero had received for attending a "religious"
event, the Ambassador noted the close connection between
religious and political values in promoting the cause of
justice, compassion and service to a cause greater than
ourselves.

3. (C) The Ambassador said his priorities are to strengthen
the GOS-USG partnership; explain USG policies to the Spanish
public, particularly on our mutual interests in Afghanistan;
and to promote job creation through enhanced investment and
economic activity, both in the U.S. and in Spain. He thanked
President Zapatero for publicly praising USG humanitarian
efforts in Haiti, which are an important expression of
American values. Zapatero said not only he but the European
Parliament and the whole world recognized that the U.S. is
doing an exemplary job in Haiti. He lauded the U.S. military
forces, and thanked the Ambassador for his condolences for
Spanish casualties in Haiti. The Ambassador also welcomed
ongoing law enforcement and counter-terrorism cooperation
with Spain and thanked Zapatero for the warm reception DHS
Secretary Napolitano had received during her three visits to
Spain over the past year.

Guantanamo
----------

4. (C) In view of the mixed signals and confusing messages
from Interior Minister Rubalcaba and other GOS senior
officials, the Ambassador said he wanted to express clearly
and concisely the importance of Spain following through on
its commitment to take five detainees at Guantanamo. He
welcomed Leon,s clarification that Spain would act quickly,
including taking the detainee from Yemen which it had agreed
to. Zapatero reiterated his personal commitment. The
Ambassador stressed the need for the GOS to follow through
and to be consistent in its public messages. Zapatero
acknowledged that Spain's desire to be helpful on Guantanamo
was in response to its desire to have the USG close the
facility, and said he would talk to Minister Rubalcaba to
ensure the government was speaking with one voice on this
important matter.

Iran
----

5. (C) On Iran, the Ambassador said we appreciated Foreign

MADRID 00000080 002 OF 003


Minister Moratinos, public comments about the importance of
sanctions as a diplomatic tool. He briefed on U/S Burns
recent meetings with EU Foreign Ministers to lay the ground
for a UNSC resolution. While we were not closing the door to
dialogue, Iran had not been responsive and the international
community must stand together in bringing pressure to bear on
Iran. Spain,s leadership in the EU is very important on
these key foreign policy challenges.

Economy and Climate Change
--------------------------

6. (C) On the economic front, the Ambassador noted the great
potential for investments in alternative energy,
infrastructure, and banking both in the U.S. and Spain.
Spanish companies had benefited from their investments in the
United States, receiving significant USG support and tax
credits. U.S. companies similarly wanted to compete on a
level playing field in Spain, with two companies in
particular poised to make hundreds of millions of dollars in
renewable energy investments in Spain. Ambassador noted his
and Senator Menendez,s plans to reinvigorate the US-Spain
Forum, which is an important vehicle for enhancing economic
and investment opportunities. He also emphasized our desire
to work closely with Spain on climate change, and noted his
conversation with Teresa Ribera, Spain,s point person on
climate change, and her efforts to achieve Latin American
support for a global comprehensive climate change agreement.
Zapatero said he was pleased to learn of the Ambassador,s
keen interest and direct involvement in promoting enhanced
economic ties. He said we needed a model of cooperation to
spur investment in both directions, and noted that he had
proposed to the White House the establishment of a high level
Forum for Trade and Investment to help U.S. and Spanish
businesses. The Ambassador noted that there were already a
number of vehicles for achieving progress on this front,
including the US.-Spain Foundation chaired by Senator Bob
Menendez.

U.S.-EU Summit
--------------

7. (C) Regarding Spain,s desire for a U.S-EU summit during
its EU Presidency, the Ambassador said the matter was under
consideration at the highest levels of the U.S. government,
but that no commitment had been made. We are hoping for a
specific response soon. While it is a White House call, what
matters most is coming up with deliverables to ensure the
meeting was substantive rather than symbolic. He noted that a
prospective E.U.-U.S agreement on data protection and
information-sharing would be of great interest to Washington.
Zapatero reiterated on several occasions the importance of
having a Summit in Madrid, noting that Spain and the U.S.
have many common interests and that there are many ways Spain
can exert its leadership and influence in the world. He
mentioned Latin America, North Africa, and Turkey's accession
to the EU as key areas of cooperation. He said he
appreciated the U.S. expectation for Summit deliverables,
recalling that President Obama during one of their first
encounters had observed the cumbersome process of the many
U.S.-European organizational architectures. Zapatero agreed
that while regular meetings among U.S. and European leaders
were important, concrete results needed to emerge from such
meetings. He added that NSA Leon was working closely with
the NSC on a Summit menu we could find attractive.

8. (C) Zapatero said that he was pleased to finally have the
Ambassador in Madrid and promised that the Spanish government
would ensure he had a successful tenure. "All doors are open
to you. I have told my team that the U.S. Ambassador to Spain
and personal representative of President Obama is not just
another Ambassador but rather someone special," he said. "We
want to reinforce our excellent relationship with the United
States and for you to know that my government is one you can
count on and trust."

9. (C) On the Middle East, Zapatero said Spain appreciated
the imperative of bucking up the Palestinian Authority
leadership and getting them back to the negotiating table,
notwithstanding Israeli,s unhelpful actions on settlements.
The Ambassador briefed on Special Envoy Mitchell,s
diplomatic endeavors, in particular his efforts to get the
Palestinians to return to the bargaining table. Although
critical of Israel's settlements policy, Zapatero noted that

MADRID 00000080 003 OF 003


if any Israeli leader could forge a peace agreement with the
Palestinians, it was PM Netanyahu, who had little incentive
for returning to power other than achieving a lasting,
sustainable peace agreement.

10. (C) Zapatero said he was pleased the U.S., as the
world,s leading power, wanted to nurture and strengthen its
alliance with Europe. The West would do well to bear in mind
our long term strategic mutual interests in dealing with
emerging powers such as China and India. Zapatero expressed
particular anxiety regarding China, underscoring that it was
a huge player and the West should be watchful of its growing
influence on the world stage. He hoped the U.S. appreciated
Europe's importance. The Ambassador reassured Zapatero the
U.S. fully appreciated the importance of Europe as our
partner.

11. (C) Zapatero praised President Obama,s leadership and
influence throughout the world. The Ambassador agreed that
President Obama had positively influenced America,s standing
in the eyes of the world. He said the U.S. looks first to a
strong, united Europe for assistance, and sees Spain as an
essential partner. Europe is the most reliable partner for
the United States, which cannot solve the world,s problems
alone. As President Obama said, now is the time for all of us
to take our share of responsibility for a global response to
global challenges.

Afghanistan
-----------

12. (C) Zapatero reiterated that Spain would continue its
responsibilities in Afghanistan. He lamented that it has not
been easy convincing Spanish public opinion about the
objectives in Afghanistan, and welcomed the Ambassador,s
assistance.

Africom
-------

14. (C) In response to the Ambassador,s gratitude for use of
Spanish military bases, Zapatero acknowledged the strategic
importance of the Rota Naval base, querying if the USG
remained interested in basing Africom or one of its
components there. Zapatero noted Spain,s continuing concerns
about Al Qaeda in the Lands of the Maghreb (AQIM). Ambassador
undertook to get a status report, underscoring the importance
of the African continent. Zapatero thanked the USG for its
intelligence support in Mauritania and Mali with a view to
getting Spanish hostages released from AQIM.

G-20
----

15. (C) Zapatero emphasized Spain,s overriding goal to
continue its participation in G-20 meetings. The Ambassador
relayed D/NSA Froman,s consideration in principle to accept
Spain as the fifth European country if the EU reduces its
institutional membership from two to one. He cautioned that
this must be done in the context of what the EU is willing to
accept and with the understanding that we do not want to open
up G-20 membership. The Ambassador said that Froman believes
that Spain understands that it cannot be a formal member of
the G-20 but might be allowed to be a permanent participant,
if the EU agrees. Froman also noted that it was important for
Spain to have an effective G-20 Sherpa. Zapatero said he
appreciated Froman,s openness to Spain,s participation.

Domestic Politics
-----------------

16. (C) Discussion then turned to Spanish and American
domestic politics. Zapatero spent considerable time querying
the Ambassador on the U.S. political system, including the
January 19 Massachusetts senatorial election outcome. The
Ambassador described the body politic's mandate for change
and the public's impatience. In the U.S. as everywhere the
political imperative of addressing everyday struggles people
have, with respect to jobs, was paramount. Zapatero agreed,
describing himself as a passionate, life-long student of
politics who continued to be impressed and fascinated by the
American political scene.
SOLOMONT

Citation :

Mastercard bloque Julian Assange, le web bloque Mastercard.com
Les décisions de blocages prises par de multiples organismes bancaires à l’encontre de Julian Assange, fondateur de Wikileaks, ne sont pas restées sans effet.

Après plusieurs appels sur Twitter, le site de Mastercard.com est totalement inaccessible. « Le serveur à l'adresse www.mastercard.com met trop de temps à répondre » indique une erreur de délai d’attente dépassé lorsqu’on tente de se rendre sur le site. Le site subit ainsi le même sort que la banque postale suisse qui a fait l’objet d’une attaque par déni de service. Ce genre d’attaques vise à saturer un site en le noyant sous un grand nombre de requêtes. Incapable de répondre aux requêtes légitimes, le serveur renvoie alors un message d’erreur similaire à celui constaté sur Mastercard.com.

L’opération Payback vise à arroser l’arroseur, ou plutôt bloquer le bloqueur. Ultime réaction d’individus qui accordent leurs clics contre les claques assénées contre Julian Assange. Arrêté en Angleterre pour une histoire de rapports sexuels non protégés, après un mandat européen adressé par la Suède, l’intéressé risque d’être extradé à terme vers les États-Unis sur fond de Spy Act.

Pour suivre les différents soubresauts de l’opération Payback, on consultera ce compte Anon_Operation ou la requête #DDOS sous Twitter.

elpais

Citation :

Armes russes pour Caracas: Washington a fait pression sur Moscou (WikiLeaks)

Les livraisons d'armes russes au Venezuela ont toujours irrité les autorités américaines qui ont souvent tenté d'exercer des pressions sur Moscou, rapporte le quotidien El Pais, citant des documents dévoilés par WikiLeaks.
Selon le journal, la livraison de 100 missiles antiaériens russes Igla (code OTAN: Grouse) a suscité de vives préoccupations de la part de Washington. Cette arme capable d'abattre les hélicoptères et les avions volant à faible altitude a été acquise par Caracas après que le contrat prévoyant l'achat de missiles suédois SAAB eut échoué en raison de la pression des Etats-Unis.
Les câbles diplomatiques américains mis en ligne sur le site WikiLeaks attestent que Washington redoutait de voir les missiles sol-air russes tomber entre les mains des Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC), groupe gauchiste inscrit par les Etats-Unis et l'UE sur la liste des organisations terroristes.
Lors de la visite à Moscou du président Barack Obama en juin dernier, la livraison des Igla a été évoquée au plus haut niveau, rappelle El Pais, précisant que la Russie a alors déclaré avoir vendu au Venezuela 100 missiles de ce type et 90 rampes de lancement.
Comprenant que rien ne pouvait plus être modifié, les Américains ont demandé de ne pas livrer de systèmes portables, mais des modèles conçus pour être installés sur des véhicules. Moscou a répondu par la négative, car Hugo Chavez a insisté sur la livraison de systèmes portables et individuels, affirme une dépêche diplomatique américaine dévoilée par WikiLeaks.
La Russie a pour sa part garanti que ces systèmes ne tomberaient en aucune circonstance entre les mains des terroristes.
Un autre câble secret indique qu'un ordinateur portable saisi par les services spéciaux colombiens lors d'une opération contre le chef des FARC, Raul Reyes, contenait des informations attestant que des militaires vénézuéliens étaient prêts à livrer des Igla aux rebelles colombiens.
Après que les Etats-Unis et l'UE eurent décrété l'interdiction de la vente d'armes au Venezuela, la Russie et la Chine sont restées les seuls fournisseurs de ce pays.

RIA Novosti

MAATAWI a écrit:

Citation :

Armes russes pour Caracas: Washington a fait pression sur Moscou (WikiLeaks)

Les livraisons d'armes russes au Venezuela ont toujours irrité les autorités américaines qui ont souvent tenté d'exercer des pressions sur Moscou, rapporte le quotidien El Pais, citant des documents dévoilés par WikiLeaks.
Selon le journal, la livraison de 100 missiles antiaériens russes Igla (code OTAN: Grouse) a suscité de vives préoccupations de la part de Washington. Cette arme capable d'abattre les hélicoptères et les avions volant à faible altitude a été acquise par Caracas après que le contrat prévoyant l'achat de missiles suédois SAAB eut échoué en raison de la pression des Etats-Unis.
Les câbles diplomatiques américains mis en ligne sur le site WikiLeaks attestent que Washington redoutait de voir les missiles sol-air russes tomber entre les mains des Forces armées révolutionnaires de Colombie (FARC), groupe gauchiste inscrit par les Etats-Unis et l'UE sur la liste des organisations terroristes.
Lors de la visite à Moscou du président Barack Obama en juin dernier, la livraison des Igla a été évoquée au plus haut niveau, rappelle El Pais, précisant que la Russie a alors déclaré avoir vendu au Venezuela 100 missiles de ce type et 90 rampes de lancement.
Comprenant que rien ne pouvait plus être modifié, les Américains ont demandé de ne pas livrer de systèmes portables, mais des modèles conçus pour être installés sur des véhicules. Moscou a répondu par la négative, car Hugo Chavez a insisté sur la livraison de systèmes portables et individuels, affirme une dépêche diplomatique américaine dévoilée par WikiLeaks.
La Russie a pour sa part garanti que ces systèmes ne tomberaient en aucune circonstance entre les mains des terroristes.
Un autre câble secret indique qu'un ordinateur portable saisi par les services spéciaux colombiens lors d'une opération contre le chef des FARC, Raul Reyes, contenait des informations attestant que des militaires vénézuéliens étaient prêts à livrer des Igla aux rebelles colombiens.
Après que les Etats-Unis et l'UE eurent décrété l'interdiction de la vente d'armes au Venezuela, la Russie et la Chine sont restées les seuls fournisseurs de ce pays.

RIA Novosti

Merci pour l'information. Et dire que pas plus tard que ce matin, je parlais de l'ingérence des états-unis et de l'occident en générale à mes élèves! lol

Message supprimé car déjà posté dans actualité national Boumetda3

j'ai beau chercher, je ne trouve toujours pas la section "actualité national"

ok


Edit Fahed64: https://far-maroc.forumpro.fr/infos-et-nouvelles-nationales-f13/actualites-nationales-t2896-1080.htm

Ouvrez bien vos yeux et lisez comment El Pais commence l'analyse de ce cable:

Citation :

El rey de Marruecos, Mohamed VI, interviene en los procesos electorales, a veces incluso bruscamente (un aspirante a alcalde acabó en coma) con un objetivo: frenar a los islamistas que gozan de un estatuto legal.

Citation :

Le roi du Maroc, Mohamed VI, intervient dans les processus électoraux, parfois même brusquement -un candidat à maire finit dans le coma- avec un objectif: freiner les islamistes même si leur formation est légale.

Article en francais:
http://www.elpais.com/articulo/internacional/Mohamed/VI/intervient/rudement/politique/pour/contrer/les/islamistes/elpepuint/20101211elpepuint_34/Tes

Je sais qu'il y a des gens qui ont vu M6 s'arreter sur le feu rouge mais quelqu'un l'a vu t-il la mattraque a la main entrain d'intervenir dans les elections a derb simbriru?

Citation :

ID: 216679
Date: 2009-07-15 10:38:00
Origin: 09RABAT607
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: SECRET
Dunno: 09RABAT517
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0001
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0607/01 1961038
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 151038Z JUL 09
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0419
INFO RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T RABAT 000607

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/15/2019
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PINS, KDEM, MO
SUBJECT: MOROCCO'S MANAGED MAYORAL ELECTIONS MAY STRENGTHEN
PJD

REF: RABAT 0517

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires, a.i., Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1
.4 (b) and (d).

-------
Summary
-------

1. (C) Despite the relative transparency of the recent
election of town (or communal) council members across Morocco
on June 12, the subsequent election by council members of
city and communal council leaders (mayors), may represent a
step backward for Moroccan democracy. The high-stakes
indirect balloting for mayors has traditionally been a forum
for vote buying and pressure. This year, not content with
its already impressive and fair electoral performance, the
Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM) of Fouad Ali El
Himma reportedly used extra-political pressure tactics,
including invoking the name of King Mohammed VI, to pressure
other parties into entering pro-PAM mayoral coalitions and
withdrawing from alliances with the Islamist-oriented Party
of Justice and Development (PJD). This resulted was non-PJD
led coalitions in Casablanca, Tangier (PAM-led), and Sale.
Most troubling, the Palace appears to have intervened in
several places to keep the PJD from controlling Morocco's
major cities, while allowing them to run second-tier cites,
such as Kenitra and Tetouan. Palace interference was most
blatant in the city of Oujda. There, the Ministry of
Interior-appointed local governor blocked a vote that would
have produced a PJD-led coalition on June 25, allowing the
centrist parties time to pressure coalition allies. National
police and intelligence officials reportedly intimidated PJD
coalition supporters and beat a local PJD leader into a coma.
A former Minister, a French government contact and other
sources confirmed Palace complicity in the pro-PAM/anti-PJD
effort. The PAM has sullied its reputation as a reformist
party and bolstered criticism that it is an instrument of the
Palace. The picture as usual is mixed, and palace
intervention appears more anti-PJD than pro-PAM. In Laayoune
in the Western Sahara, the PAM suffered a crushing defeat at
the hands of Istiqlal's Ould er Rachid machine. In total,
these machinations may further erode public support for
Morocco,s fledgling democratic processes and increase
sympathy for the PJD. End Summary.

---------------------
PAM: The Palace Party
---------------------

2. (SBU) For over two weeks, Morocco has witnessed
widespread media coverage of political party irregularities,
corruption and government interference in the recent city
leadership election races. In contrast with the public June
12 elections for communal councils, which saw Moroccans
electing town council members in a relatively transparent
manner (Ref A), the roughly week-long process for selecting
mayors (in large cities) and communal council presidents (in
small cities and rural areas) has been characterized by
multiple reports of irregularities. Because mayors are
selected indirectly from the pool of recently elected
communal council members, which come from a myriad of over 30
political parties (six of which dominate Moroccan politics),
the process comes down to intense negotiations (with various
incentives and disincentives) to establish majority
coalitions in each city. The ranking member of the leading
party in these coalitions typically becomes the mayor or
chief executive. See Paragraph 9 for new mayoral selection
results.

3. (C) Several days into this negotiation process, leaders
of the self-described Koran-referent PJD began to complain
that the PAM had been using extra normal pressure tactics,
i.e., outside of the normal petty bribery often associated
with the process, to enlist other parties and their members
to support PAM-led coalitions and desert PJD-led coalitions
in key cities. D/PolCouns attended a political debate on
June 29 among party leaders at which PJD leader Benkirane
roundly criticized the PAM for using the extra-normal
pressure tactic of invoking King Mohammed VI's name to
underscore His Majesty's alleged preference for other parties
to join PAM-led coalitions and to thwart PJD-led coalitions
in cities like Casablanca, Tangier, and Oujda. Because PAM
party founder, Fouad Ali El Himma is widely known as "a
friend of the King" and the PAM's success has largely hinged
on the perception that he "has the monarch,s ear,"
Benkirane's accusations received thunderous applause from the
crowd, even as the local PAM representative deflected the
accusations as "sour grapes."

4. XXXXXXXXXXXXX, confirmed Benkirane's accusations. In addition,
XXXXXXXXXXXXX said that the PAM also employed malicious and
untruthful smear campaigns against individual PJD members,
calling some drug dealers, terrorists, and criminals and
getting guidance from the security services. This focused on
Morocco's largest cities, as the PJD did win elsewhere. "If
you look at all of the cities where PJD was permitted to win
mayoral slots, e.g., Tetouan, Chefchaouen, Kenitra and
Larache, they all have several points in common: they are
relatively small, poor, and lacking central government
investment," XXXXXXXXXXXXX.

5. (C) A French Embassy source (strictly protect) confided
to D/PolCouns July 9 that his contacts in the Moroccan
leadership report that King Mohammed VI had indeed ordered
that the PJD not be allowed to assume mayoral positions in
several Moroccan cities like Tangier and Oujda. PAM's taking
the top job in Tangier seems particularly suspicious. With
the PJD tying the Rally of National Independents Party (RNI)
for the plurality of votes there, the two parties initially
formed a coalition with RNI taking the mayor,s slot in
exchange for a PJD taking the Vice mayor,s position.
However, the coalition dissolved just before it was to be
finalized with RNI representatives claiming enigmatically to
reporters that "they came under extraordinary pressure" to
withdraw from the coalition, without further elaboration.
This coalition was replaced with a PAM-led coalition, despite
the fact that PAM finished fourth in Tangier.

--------------------------------------------- -------
Oujda Mayor,s Race Marred by Government Intervention
--------------------------------------------- -------

6. (C) MOI complicity in supporting PAM, or at least
blocking the PJD from securing the mayor,s position in major
Moroccan cities, however, appeared most blatant in the city
of Oujda where PJD won a plurality of council seats. In the
council chambers, MOI officials prevented a PJD-led coalition
with members of the Popular Movement Party (MP) and other
parties on June 25, declaring an insufficient quorum. In the
ensuing days, 13 local council members allied with the PJD,
including all six communal council members from the MP,
reported harassment from the Renseignements Generaux (RG),
i.e., an internal intelligence branch of the National Police,
to withdraw their support from a PJD-led coalition. On July
27, one of the MP communal councilors supporting the PJD-led
coalition, Fadwa Manouni, posted on YouTube a scathing
commentary on the security force,s intimidation tactics,
which included lengthy questioning by local police and
attempted blackmail by the RG of the 13 communal council
members supporting the PJD-led coalition. MP councilors said
that party chief Mohand Laenser originally approved the
coalition; then only after the PJD mayoralty was blocked,
changed his position. Subsequently, Manouni and the five
other MP communal council members that had continued to
support the PJD were expelled from the MP on July 9. She
then reportedly dropped out of sight. On July 11, Manoumi
recanted her YouTube speech in another web posting, but has
not appeared in public.

7. (SBU) PJD, MP, and other elected council members
protested the government's intervention on July 3. Police
were called in to break up the protests, according to the
press. During an ensuing melee, PJD leader Noureddine
Benbakr, who would have been Mayor if the PJD-led coalition
had been permitted to stand, suffered a cerebral hemorrhage
and fell into a coma as a result of a blow to his head by
security personnel. Other elected council members suffered
less serious injuries, were detained, and later released.
Later that day, a PAM-supported Party Istiqlal (PI)-led
coalition secured the mayoral post for the brother of
Transport Minister Hejira. PJD parliamentary leader Mustapha
Ramid, who had come to support local PJD members in Oujda,
was blocked from entering the Oujda municipal center,
according to the press reports.

8. (C) A Parliamentary staffer and former MP member
confirmed to D/PolCouns on July 13, that the six MP council
members in Oujda had come under "intense pressure" from local
security authorities and PAM members, through threats and
intimidation, to withdraw their support from coalition with
the PJD. He said these threats bore the moniker of the
Palace, adding, "they (the MP members) were put in a terrible
position." He also confirmed that he had heard from his
political contacts that the Palace was taking all necessary
measures to prevent the PJD from securing the leadership of

any of Morocco,s major cities. He went on to say that he
knew of communal council members that came under the same
combination of pressure tactics from PAM and government
security authorities in the cities of Sale and even Rabat.
The media reported that a move to select PJD parliamentary
leader Lahcen Daoudi as Mayor of Rabat subsequently collapsed
under rumors of government pressure, but the PJD stayed in
the coalition to support socialist USFP member and former
Finance Minister Oulalalu.

9. (U) Mayors and Their Coalitions follow:


City Mayor Party Coalition
---- ----- ----- ---------
Meknes Ahmed Hilal PAM RNI, UC
Marrakesh TBD PAM PI, RNI, MP, UC
Tangier Samir Abdelmoula PAM RNI, MP
Fes Abdelhamid Chabat PI RNI, FFD
Oujda Omar Hejira PI PAM, MP
Laayoune Hamdi Ould er Rachid PI PI majority
Chefchaouen Mohamed Soufiani PJD USFP
Tetouan Mohamed Ida Ammar PJD USFP
Sale Noureddine Lazrak RNI PI, FFD
Agadir Tarik Kabbage USFP PJD, PT
Rabat Fathallah Oualalou USFP PJD, PI, RNI,
and PPS

Key:
Constitutional Union UC
Democratic Forces Front FFD
Istiqlal Party PI
Party of Authenticity and Modernity PAM
Party of Justice and Development PJD
Popular Movement Party MP
Progressive Socialist Party PPS
Rally of National Independents RNI
Union of Socialist Forces Party USFP
Workers Party PT

------------------------------------
Normal Irregularities Are Bad Enough
------------------------------------

10. (C) Even without the extraordinary events described
above, the process of selecting city leaders has always been
one of the most opaque and corrupt aspects of Morocco's
communal elections process. XXXXXXXXXXXXX, the mayoral selection process is heavily
influenced through the giving and taking of bribes. She said
that while this election was no exception to the rule,
increased government scrutiny over government-provided
campaign funds had given increased incentive to parties to
recruit wealthy individuals into parties to contribute to
parties' "slush funds." Tronnes pointed to political
"kidnapping," of council members to resort hotels (with their
families) for the duration of the selection negotiations,
rewards the councilors and denies competitors the opportunity
to make counter offers so that, "once a candidate is bought,
they stay bought."

11. (C) Former Minister of Human Rights Mohamed Aujjar told
Charge that the GOM,s heavy-handed tactics may have
backfired and increased support for the PJD. The former
Minister also noted that the RNI split with the PAM has
certainly deepened. He felt the only positive development
from this exercise was the possible entry of the MP and the
UC into the Istiqlal-led coalition. Aujjar believed that a
looming cabinet reshuffle will be limited in scope, with the
PAM remaining in opposition but voting with the Government on
most issues.

12. (U) On July 13 and 14, the Ministry of Interior and the
PAM, respectively,separately refuted any inappropriate and
anti-democratic tactics.

-------
Comment
-------

13. (C) As usual in Moroccan politics, this is a mixed bag
with an unclear bottom line that points to both ongoing
evolution and continued monarchical autocracy. Despite the
relative transparency and success of the local communal
elections on June 12 (Ref A), the subsequent elections of
mayors appears to represent at least a partial step backward
for Moroccan democracy. For the PAM, despite having secured
a plurality of council seats nationwide, elected hundreds of
young reformers new to politics, and won leadership of some

major cities, it has tarnished its effort to paint itself as
a standard bearer of democratization. The combination of the
PAM,s extra-normal pressure tactics and its joint efforts
with security officials to block PJD city leadership has
largely confirmed previous criticism that it is an instrument
of the Palace. But it too suffered several setbacks, as in
Western Sahara. While probably still destined for victory in
2012, it will be subject to greater scrutiny.

14. (C) PAM success has been blunted a bit by a large number
of legal challenges, at least two of which it has already
lost, including its new star, the young women mayor it had
gotten elected in Marrakesh, who has been ordered to face a
rerun of the election in her district (septel). PAM
officials indicate they will be fighting these challenges in
court and appealing decisions that have gone against them.

15. (S) One uncertainty in this is the role of the King. He
was in the north through much of the unfortunate events in
Oujda. Unconfirmed accounts have indicated that it was at
his personal order that the PJD was kept out of the large
cities. One source claimed that the King was pouring a lot
of the government's money into the previously neglected north
and particularly into the Oujda region, on Algeria's border,
in order to prepare regional infrastructure for a potential
reopening. The source said the King did not want the PJD to
be able to claim credit for this largesse and the development

it would promote.

16. (C) For the PJD, it may have been kept out of running
major cities, both by normal hardball politics and, at least
in Oujda by apparently blatant intervention by security and
domestic intelligence services, denying it the chance
showcase any example of good governance in a high profile
city prior to the 2012 general election. Still, the modern
Islamists of the PJD now run more cites than ever before and
their number of local councilors remains 50 percent above
what it scored last time around. In sum, this is enough of a
blow to frustrate them, but probably not enough to drive them
from the game. The outcome may well erode further public
support for Morocco's democratic processes and future voter
participation. However, while the political season of
cascading regional and upper house elections will continue
run until October, and the legal fights will continue, on the
local level, the public will turn to see how the new mayors
and councils govern. End Comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Moro cco
*****************************************

Jackson

Conversation avec FAH.

Citation :

ID: 142016
Date: 2008-02-19 17:19:00
Origin: 08RABAT154
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno:
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0008
PP RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0154/01 0501719
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 191719Z FEB 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8155
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS 4674
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID 5909
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT 3659
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 4930
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS 9509
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA 3893

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000154

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/19/2018
TAGS: PGOV, PHUM, KDEM, PINR, MO
SUBJECT: MR. EL-HIMMA GOES TO PARLIAMENT: AMBASSADOR'S
CALL ON CHAMBER FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE HEAD FOUAD ALI
EL-HIMMA


Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: In a February 13 meeting, prominent
parliamentarian and royal confidante Fouad Ali El-Himma
discussed with the Ambassador his efforts to better
coordinate local, regional and national governance in the
poor constituency he represents. El-Himma asserted that
Morocco's legislature has "all the legal authority it needs"
and complained bitterly about mismanagement of resources and
lack of vision among the parliamentary leadership.
Interestingly, El-Himma declined to engage on issues like
Western Sahara (in which he was intimately engaged as Deputy
Interior Minister) and did not even mention his "All
Democrats Movement," an initiative which has prompted
clamorous speculation in the domestic media about his
political ambitions. End summary.

2. (C) The Ambassador met on February 13 with Fouad Ali
El-Himma, Chairman of Parliament's Foreign Affairs, Islamic
Affairs, and Defense Committee. El Himma is also leader of
the parliamentary bloc with provides lynch-pin support to
Prime Minister El-Fassi's minority government. The former
Deputy Interior Minister and childhood friend and confidante
of King Mohammed VI, is still commonly viewed as perhaps the
most influential person in Morocco, after the monarch. In a
90-minute, one-on-one meeting, El-Himma talked at length
about his efforts to help Skhour Rhamna, the poor
constituency north of Marrakech he was elected to represent
in September 2007. El-Himma said he had been leading a
continuing dialogue between local officials, NGOs, and
private sector leaders to discuss ways to attract investment,
generate employment, and upgrade economic development
activities in the district.

3. (C) El-Himma claimed that Skhour Rhamna was the poorest
district in Morocco and lamented that it had not been
selected as a beneficiary for Millennium Challenge Account
projects, the first of which are being launched in early
2008. El-Himma urged that the USG look closely at Skhour
Rhamna as it planned future assistance activities, pledging
that he would make sure the USG received the full cooperation
of all levels of the GOM in such an endeavor. If you invest
in Skhour Rhamna, "we will give you your success story," he
asserted. One potential asset he mentioned was the air base
at Ben Guerir, the former NASA alternate landing site.

4. (C) Asked about his perspective as a new parliamentarian,
El-Himma complained bitterly about the mismanagement of staff
resources at the institution. Upon arrival, El-Himma
discovered, to his dismay, that he could not hire even one
staff member of his own choosing. Parliament's entire human
resources budget was already tapped out, with 600 persons on
the staff payroll, of whom "maybe 30 or 40 actually do
something," he complained. He directly criticized former
lower house speaker Abdelouahed Radi (now Minister of
Justice) for having allocated jobs as political party favors
and paybacks rather than on merit. El-Himma also clearly
implied that his relations with Radi's successor, speaker
Mustapha Mansouri, were chilly. (Comment: We had heard this
from independent sources.)

5. (C) El-Himma challenged the widely held view that
parliament was a weak institution because its powers were
circumscribed by the constitution. The existing legal
framework provides all the power it needs to effect change,
he argued. The problem has been the myopic vision of the
political parties in the parliament, he contended. If
parliament got together and presented effective legislation
based on strong consensus, the GOM could not and would not
say no, he argued.

6. (C) Returning to the theme of helping his district,
El-Himma told the Ambassador he had decided to step down from
his post as Minister-Delegate for the Interior (i.e. Deputy
Minister) to go back to a quieter life in his home town and
focus on his family and his community. Once there, he
decided he needed not to rest but to work hard to improve his
community, concluding that he could best do so by
representing his district in parliament.

7. (C) Comment: As Deputy Minister of the Interior from
2002 to the summer of 2007, he overshadowed the actual
Minister (Chakib Benmoussa) and was widely considered, mainly


because of his proximity to the King, to be the second most
influential man in Morocco. Many still believe this is the
case. It is hard not to think him disingenuous in claiming
that he stepped down from his ministerial post in the summer
of 2007, not to enter parliament but to return to his dusty
and rural hometown to spend time with his family.

8. (C) Comment continued: Perhaps most significant in the
conversation was what El-Himma did not say. He ignored the
Ambassador's question on Western Sahara, an issue on which he
worked in the Interior Ministry and as a leader of numerous
diplomatic missions to press Morocco's case in world capitals
and the first Manhasset meeting. El-Himma also declined to
say anything about his leadership of the "All Democrats
Movement" (reftel), an initiative which has provoked
clamorous speculation in the domestic media about his
possible plans to form a new political party that would seem
well placed to steamroll its rivals and transform the
political landscape. Instead, with the Ambassador, El-Himma
clung to his pose as a newly minted parliamentarian who has
come to the capital determined to do something good for his
district.

9. (C) Comment continued: This is doubtful, at least in
part. El-Himma's proximity to the King has apparently not
been diminished. In fact, we have heard that he was called
to join the King on his early February skiing vacation in
France. We think more plausible the commonly held view that
El-Himma has been tasked by the King with going into
parliament, seeing why it doesn't work well, and ultimately
fixing it. Perhaps by forming a dominant new party, or
perhaps through more indirect approaches. We are reminded of
the 1980 Robert Redford film "Brubaker," in which the newly
appointed warden enters a corrupt and brutal prison disguised
as an inmate, to see for himself what the problems are from
the ground level. El-Himma watching will continue to be a
major sport for observers of Morocco's domestic political
scene and will likely yield interesting results in the months
to come. End comment.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************

Riley

On peut voir que les americains controlent de tres tres pres les agissements d'Al Adl wal Ihssan.

Citation :

ID: 183807
Date: 2008-12-18 17:26:00
Origin: 08RABAT1169
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 07RABAT1838 08RABAT462
Destination: VZCZCXRO9909
OO RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV RUEHTRO
DE RUEHRB #1169/01 3531726
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181726Z DEC 08
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9453
INFO RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNMGH/MAGHREB COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0688
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME PRIORITY 1619
RUEHTC/AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE PRIORITY 0895
RUEHTRO/AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI PRIORITY 0387
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 0007
RUEHMIL/AMCONSUL MILAN PRIORITY 0054
RHMFISS/DEPT OF HOMELAND SECURITY WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY 1100
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 RABAT 001169

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, NEA/PI, DRL/IRF AND DRL/NESCA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2023
TAGS: PHUM, PGOV, PTER, PINR, KISL, IT, MO
SUBJECT: AL ADL WA IHSAN: MOROCCO'S ISLAMIST DISSIDENTS
GOING LEGIT?

REF: A. RABAT 462
B. 07 RABAT 1838

RABAT 00001169 001.2 OF 004


Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

1. (C) Summary: The banned Islamist religio-political
organization Al Adl wal-Ihsan (Adl) (more commonly known as
the Justice and Charity or Justice and Good Works
Organization) may be moving toward political participation,
perhaps as a legal political party. Adl spokesman Fatallah
Arsalane highlighted Adl's political project to PolCouns
December 11. Noting stability is Adl's key goal, he
denounced terrorism and violence, while protesting ongoing
repression. Democratic politics was meaningless, he said,
given the powerlessness of Parliament and royal absolutism,
but he did not challenge the legitimacy of the monarchy.
Arsalane echoed Adl's charismatic Sufi leader Abdelsallam
Yassine's public disavowal last summer of Adl's historic call
for a Caliphate, reinforced by the Sheikh's suspension of
outreach, reported December 15. In their often symbolic
dialogue, the authorities transmitted some positive signals
of their own, while still holding some Adl members in jail.
Were Adl to accept the monarchy and become legal, it could
enhance stability but it could also increase Islamic
influence on Moroccan politics. Arsalane closed by extending
a hand to the new U.S. administration, urging changes in
policies toward the region. End summary.

2. (C) Al Adl wal-Ihsan (Adl) spokesman and executive
committee (Majlis al Shura) member Fatallah Arsalane and
Hassab Bennajeh, the director of Adl's public relations
office, met with PolCouns and Casablanca PolOff (notetaker)
at Arsalane's home in Rabat on December 11. Arsalane was
welcoming and spoke openly and at length about Adl's
political aspirations and its difficult relationship with the
GOM.

-------------------------------
Adl: "Stability" and Good Works
-------------------------------

3. (C) Arsalane began discussing the organization by
stressing, "Our first goal, above all others, is the
stability of Morocco." Both left and right have failed,
leaving only Islam as a model. Within Islam there are
moderates and extremists and, "we have chosen moderation."
He said Adl wanted to work with other groups and political
parties to help pull Morocco out of the political, social and
economic crises it now faces.

4. (C) Adl is best known for its grassroots organizational
abilities and for its social welfare programs among the poor
urban Moroccans. Arsalane admitted that Adl's social
programs were a source of its popularity, which was based
more on Adl's message and ideas. The government ban on Adl's
offering these services has only increased Adl's popularity.
(Note: We have heard many of these efforts continue under the
guise of Adl-related independent NGOs. Adl also has focused
on youth; it gained control of the student unions of most
Moroccan universities and the national organization of
students. Its activists on campus continue to harass more
secular students.)

--------------------------------------------- -
Repression and Dialogue: An evolving Approach
--------------------------------------------- -

5. (C) Arsalane reported that GOM repression of Adl is
widespread and includes bans on all public activities as well
as all publications. In recent years police have raided
private meetings in homes, but many of activities are
tolerated. His own house was kept under surveillance and he
was confident that his phones were tapped, but was
unconcerned, noting, "We have nothing to hide." (Note: As we
departed, an apparent surveillance team of three made a
choreographed exit of their vehicle, parked just behind our
embassy car, making sure we noticed. End note.)


RABAT 00001169 002.2 OF 004


6. (C) Arsalane acknowledged that Adl had over the years
maintained informal communication with the Moroccan regime.
This was only rarely direct, and more often one-way and
symbolic. He contended that the "undemocratic regime" was
unwilling to engage in a more open and formal dialogue,
maintained political red lines and imposed conditions on
allowing Adl greater scope for activity. "In Morocco we have
the motto: 'God, Nation, King' but in fact the only thing
that matters here is the King."

7. (C) When asked about the historic support of Adl for a
Caliphate or Islamic state, Arsalane said this was not Adl's
position, claiming legitimacy and authority comes from the
people and the Ulema. He thus substantiated the major but
largely unremarked turnaround on this basic question by
Sheikh Yassine during an interview this summer with the
Arabic satellite TV channel Hiwar that opened the door to
Adl's potential acceptance of the monarchy -- albeit not in
its current state.

------------------------------
Condemning the Use of Violence
------------------------------

8. (C) Arsalane insisted that Adl was a political
organization, and opposition to violence was a key principle.
Adl also demanded that its members reject violence and
expelled those who did not. He acknowledged that one
participant in a failed bombing of a tour bus in Meknes in
2007 had once been a member, but claimed that the bomber had
been out of Adl for a long time before the incident.
Unprompted, Arsalane raised the detention and subsequent
release, at the end of November, of 11 Moroccan immigrants in
Italy, including members of Adl. Arsalane strongly rejected
that these members were involved in terrorism and charged the
Italian police were well aware of their activities. He
contended that the arrests took place at the instigation of
the Moroccan government, which unable to prove any
wrongdoing, falsely continued to try to paint Adl members as
terrorists. Arsalane contrasted Adl to Salafist groups truly
bent on terrorist violence. "We reject these extremists ...
they are against us and call us 'kufar' (non-believers)." He
insisted that Adl regularly condemned terrorist attacks.

9. (C) PolCouns urged that Adl be more vocal in its
condemnation of terrorist attacks, such as the 2007 suicide
attacks against the U.S. Consulate General and other sites in
Casablanca, and other terrorist attacks around the world.
Arsalane responded that Adl in fact had denounced the 2003
Casablanca attacks, all terrorist attacks in Morocco and many
elsewhere.

------------------------------------------
Intra-party dialogue on its Political Role
------------------------------------------

10. (C) Arsalane noted that there is a constant dialogue
within Adl about the extent to which the movement should
participate in elections or the political process. He
recounted that in 1981 Adl had asked to become a political
party, but the GOM refused. In the lead up to the 2007
parliamentary elections, Adl decided not to participate
because it believed that the Parliament does not have any
real power to effect change. "It does not matter which party
is in power, even the Party of Justice and Development
(PJD)." If the GOM were now to allow Adl to become a
political party, Arsalane averred they would accept.

----------------------
Relations with the PJD
----------------------

11. (C) Arsalane characterized Adl's relationship with PJD
as respectful but denied that there is any active political
cooperation except on Arab/international issues, such as
Palestine and Iraq, as in their recent joint demonstrations
in Tangier against a visit by senior Israeli officials.
(Comment: It is unclear just how much the undeclared Adl

RABAT 00001169 003.2 OF 004


boycott of the 2007 parliamentary elections contributed to
the abysmally low turnout. If Adl members had voted for the
PJD, the PJD might have fulfilled the many predictions that
it would emerge as the largest party, and would have been in
a position to form the government. So in the convoluted
logic of Moroccan politics, this boycott served the regime's
purpose. End comment.)

----------------------------
Succession of Sheikh Yassine
----------------------------

12. (C) We asked about what would happen after the death of
Adl's charismatic leader, "Sheikh" Ahmed Yassine, reportedly
80 and poor health. Arsalane said that Adl has internal
rules governing succession, which would be decided by an
election of its executive committee (Majlis Ash-Shura).

----------------------------------------
A Message to the New American Government
----------------------------------------

13. (C) Like virtually all our Moroccan interlocutors,
Arsalane expressed interest in the incoming U.S.
administration and asked that we convey a message to it.
First, he said, the USG should stop supporting dictatorial
regimes in the region and encourage them to be more
democratic. The USG, in his view, has spoken much about
principles of freedom and democracy but has observed them
only when there was no conflict with U.S. regional interests.
Second, he urged that the incoming administration devote its
energy from outset to helping solve the Palestinian issue
which would help solve many of the other problems in the
region. Finally, he noted that prior to 9/11 many in the
Islamic world aspired to visit the United States. Since
then, however, many across the region, particularly moderate
Islamists, are afraid to visit, because they believe that USG
will falsely accuse and imprison them at behest of their
repressive home governments. He also hoped some intervention
could be made on behalf of party members he claimed were
falsely convicted of homicide in Morocco and have gone a long
way towards serving their 20-year sentences.

--------------------------------------
The all-Embracing Makhzen opens a door
--------------------------------------

14. (C) For its part, the authorities have responded with
some positive signals to Adl,s overtures. While the
newspaper remains banned, there appears to be less tampering
with the well-constructed Adl website (www.aljamaa.net in
French and Arabic). Arrests continue but appear to be
diminishing in both frequency and scope. The prosecution of
Nadia Yassine, the Sheikh,s daughter, for verbal assault on
the monarchy continues to be delayed. (Note: Arsalane
described this as equivalent to judicial supervision.) In
another step, earlier in the week Minister of Endowments and
Islamic Affairs Ahmed Toufiq paid a condolence call on the
family of a recently deceased Adl Board member and close
companion of Yassine, whom Toufiq knew long ago in a common
Sufi brotherhood, a visit that likely required palace assent.

15. (U) On December 15, media reported that Sheikh Yassine
decreed that the organization would suspend all public
activity, assemblies, meetings, etc., apparently to avoid any
confrontation with the authorities. (Note: This is in
context of, and may be an attempt to insulate Adl from, a
current GOM crackdown against Islamic extremists.)

-------
Comment
-------

16. (C) Arsalane represents an apparently growing tendency
within Adl that is eager to engage more actively in the
political life of the country. In contrast to past
expressions of religio-political identity, he clearly
acknowledged its principally political nature and

RABAT 00001169 004.2 OF 004


aspirations, pointedly making little or no reference to it
being a religious body. It is unclear to what extent Sheikh
Yassine's own epiphany is behind this evolution of the
movement, or whether he is reflecting the wishes of the
politicized next generation, be it Arsalane and his
politicized cohort or the sheikh's daughter Nadia Yassine --
who appear to be rivals. There has been widespread
speculation that after the sheikh's death there will be a
split in the organization. It now seems clear that either
way the politicos will dominate, with the religious element
possibly becoming a parallel organization, as is the case
with the PJD and its religious counterpart the Movement for
Unity and Reform (MUR).

17. (C) Although Arsalane was adamant that the GOM/Palace
has not engaged in a formal dialogue with Adl, it is clear
that an understanding is developing between them. The GOM
has tolerated the activities of Adl so long as it did not
press the question of the king's legitimacy or take steps to
mobilize its followers against regime. Some analysts believe
that Adl has played a critical role as a release valve for
social and political tensions through a non-violent
organization. Certainly, Adl exploited these frustrations to
swell its ranks. The GOM periodically alleges Adl
involvement in violent or terrorist activities, as it
apparently did in Italy, but has presented no evidence for
this. All indications appear to substantiate Adl's
commitment to avoid violence.

18. (C) Adl's potential buy-in to the system could have an
important effect on enhancing stability in Morocco, just at a
time when it is under pressure due to the global economic
downturn. It would also, however, increase Islamic influence
on politics, adding to the leverage of the PJD, but even
together, Islamists would almost certainly remain a minority.
Like most politics here, this potential "conversion" to
legitimacy will remain for some time obscure, and play out
only over time. End comment.

19. (C) Note A: The last time mission has had contact with
Arsalane was before 9/11/2001, and the government protested.
We have heard no such protest so far. We have avoided
contact with Nadia Yassine since her indictment, and have
been in touch only at a lower level.

20. (SBU) Note B: Al Adl wal-Ihsan has frequently been
translated as the Justice and Charity Organization, with the
familiar acronym JCO. In fact, the organization itself
prefers the translation Justice and Spirituality. While
perhaps the best translation of the Islamic concept of Ihsan
would be "good works," the term encompasses that notion as
well as charity and the performance of spiritual acts.
Following local press usage, we plan to continue to use Adl
(Justice). End Notes.

21. (U) This cable was drafted by Casablanca PolOff and has
been cleared with the Consulate General.

22. (U) Tripoli minimize considered.


*****************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat
*****************************************

Riley

Leo Africanus a écrit:

Je sais qu'il y a des gens qui ont vu M6 s'arreter sur le feu rouge mais quelqu'un l'a vu t-il la mattraque a la main entrain d'intervenir dans les elections a derb simbriru?

Moi je l'ai déjà croisé à l'autoroute et à la plage et il était sans matraque !

Sinon, pour le choix des maires, je ne sais pas comment ça s'est déroulé à tanger et oujda, mais à Rabat il s'agissait simplement de solder quelques affaires personnels je peux t'en dire plus en MP.

Citation :

WikiLeaks. Etats-Unis - Maghreb
Une coopération militaire sur un pied d’égalité

le 13.12.10 | 03h00 Réagissez


Les Etats-Unis tiennent à coopérer d’une manière égale avec les armées du Maghreb et du Sahel. L’idée est exprimée par le général William Ward, chef du commandement militaire pour l’Afrique (Africom), lors d’une visite à Rabat, fin décembre 2009, et cité par un câble de l’ambassade américaine à Rabat, daté du 4 janvier 2010.

«Au Maroc, le général Ward a exprimé sa satisfaction après ses récentes visites en Algérie, en Libye et au Mali. Il a montré qu’un traitement égal est réservé aux armées de la région», est-il noté. Le chef de l’Africom a précisé que ce traitement égal n’a pas pour but de bâtir une coopération militaire régionale. Donc, ce que les Etats-Unis soutiennent sur le plan économique, avec la réactivation de l’initiative Eizenstat qui défend le projet d’un marché maghrébin global, ne cadre pas forcément avec la coopération militaire et sécuritaire. Cependant, le général Ward a pris soin, et d’après le même câble, de souligner que l’Africom a également pour objectif la stimulation de la coopération économique.

Cela donne au commandement, qui est basé actuellement à Stuttggart en Allemagne, une autre dimension qui va, probablement, être plus claire plus tard. A Rabat, le général Ward, qui a eu des entretiens avec l’Inspecteur général des forces armées royales (FAR) marocaines, le général de corps d’armée Abdelaziz Bennani, a signé un accord pour la livraison au Maroc, à partir de juillet 2011, des avions de combat F16. Il a également paraphé un Protocole d’accord sur interopérabilité des communications et de la sécurité entre les Etats-Unis et le Maroc. Ce protocole permettra aux militaires marocains d’accéder à la dernière technologie en matière de cryptographie (traçage des mails par exemple) et de verrouillage de communication (isolement de systèmes téléphoniques mobiles). Rabat et Washington envisagent de signer un autre important accord, l’ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement).

Signé avec 76 pays, dont tous les Etats membres de l’OTAN, l’ACSA est principalement destiné aux nations alliées des Etats-Unis. Il permet un échange d’équipements, de carburants, de produits alimentaires et de munitions en toutes circonstances. «L’année prochaine (2011) verra la mise en place d’un programme complet de coopération dans le domaine sécuritaire entre les armées des deux pays», est-il relevé. Le général Abdelaziz Bennani a estimé que les FAR sont prêtes à participer dans le futur à des opérations combinées avec l’armée américaine. Par ailleurs, la Libye, selon un télégramme de l’ambassade US à Tripoli, daté du 11 février 2010, a accusé les Etats-Unis de l’avoir empêchée de continuer le programme de destruction de missile Scud. Le général Ahmed Azwaï, en charge de ce programme, a indiqué que son pays était à la recherche de systèmes alternatifs. Et, il a indiqué que la Libye était intéressée par l’achat de missiles russes Iskander.

«Azwai n’a fait aucune mention du missile français Scalp ou des autres alternatives proposées pendant la réunion», est-il indiqué. Mieux : il est relevé que le général Azwaï a suggéré que l’option Scalp, qui est un missile de croisière, soit une initiative personnelle de Seif Al Islam El Gueddafi, fils du leader libyen. Cela peut donc souligner que des divergences d’ordre stratégique existent entre Mouamar El Gueddafi et ses propres fils. Le général Azwaï a également affirmé que la Libye souhaite un appui des Etats-Unis pour adhérer au MTCR (régime de contrôle de la technologie des missiles). Le MTCR est un regroupement informel de trente-quatre pays qui veulent lutter contre la prolifération des missiles non pilotés d’armes de destruction massive (ADM) mais également qui œuvrent à contrôler «les transferts d’équipements, de matériels et de technologies relatifs aux missiles qui sont utilisables dans des systèmes capables de transporter des ADM». Aucun pays arabe n’est membre de ce système. La Turquie est le seul pays musulman à y siéger alors que l’Afrique du Sud est le seul Etat africain à en être membre.
Fayçal Métaoui

El watan

Citation :

ID: 58606
Date: 2006-03-29 14:46:00
Origin: 06RABAT557
Source: Embassy Rabat
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 06RABAT539
Destination: VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHRB #0557/01 0881446
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291446Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY RABAT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3222
INFO RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3852
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 2856
RUEHMD/AMEMBASSY MADRID PRIORITY 5422
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 3072
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 4097
RUEHTU/AMEMBASSY TUNIS PRIORITY 8736
RUEHCL/AMCONSUL CASABLANCA PRIORITY 1472
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0160
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L RABAT 000557

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

STATE FOR NEA/MAG, EUR; PARIS FOR DEA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2010
TAGS: MO, PGOV, PREL, SNAR
SUBJECT: SPANISH AMBASSADOR ON WESTERN SAHARA, MIGRATION,
ISLAMISTS

REF: A. RABAT 539

B. RABAT 308
C. RABAT 484

Classified By: Ambassador Thomas T. Riley for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) Summary: Over lunch March 20, Spanish Ambassador
Planas Puchades told Ambassador Riley that Spain continued to
encourage Morocco to produce a credible autonomy plan for the
Western Sahara. He dismissed alleged splits within the
Polisario, suggesting the recently emerged faction "Line of
Martyrs" seemed to be made up of disgruntled or former
Polisario members living in the Canary Islands, and "it is
not significant." Planas pointedly did not reiterate Spanish
concern about Van Walsum's remarks on pulling the Security
Council back from the Sahara dispute or US interest in
downsizing MINURSO. On migration, Planas expressed
disappointment with Algeria's apparent decision not to
participate in the July regional conference in Rabat, which
Planas said enjoyed EU buy-in. Planas was interested in a
recent International Republican Institute (IRI) poll that
appeared in the March 18 issue of Moroccan weekly Le Journal,
which indicated strong support for Morocco's Islamist party.
The conversation touched briefly on the upcoming NATO
High-level event in Rabat, Spanish investment in Morocco, and
narcotics. End Summary.

Western Sahara
--------------

2. (C) Continuing a series of reciprocal lunches, Spanish
Ambassador Planas Puchades hosted Ambassador Riley and
Polcouns to lunch at the Spanish residence on March 20.
Planas was accompanied by his new DCM and previously Spanish
Ambassador in Nigeria, Alfonso Portabales, who had arrived in
Morocco the previous week.

3. (C) Planas said the GOS was following with great interest
the King's much-anticipated visit to Western Sahara (March
20-25; see ref A). Ambassador Riley noted we were also
following the visit with interest. Planas said Spain's
primary message to Morocco at this point was one he believed
we shared: Morocco should present a credible autonomy plan.
Planas said Spain would need to review the plan before taking
a position on it, but in the meantime the GOS was providing
"comfort and support" to the GOM to produce a serious plan.
Planas was somewhat dismissive of the consultation process
with Moroccan political parties, saying he understood the
parties' meetings with Palace advisor Mohamed Moatassim were
"not really an exchange." He said, nevertheless, that
conferences such as that held by the PJD and FC several weeks
ago (Ref B) "were okay." Planas said the Spanish have been
clear with Morocco that the autonomy plan must be concrete
and not conservative. Ambassador Riley said this was a key
US message as well.

4. (C) Planas said the reported split within the Polisario
(the so-called Ligne de Martyrs, or Line of Martyrs) was not
significant. These were mostly individuals based in the
Canary Islands. While the split itself was not significant,
Planas believed there was growing frustration in Tindouf, but
it might not be related solely to pressure for negotiation.
Planas noted that the Polisario cause continued to resonate
with Spaniards, who visited Tindouf in large numbers every
year as families back in Spain opened their doors to
5000-10,000 Sahrawis for home stays.

5. (C) Planas did not echo GOS concern about the possible
backing off of the Western Sahara conflict by the Security
Council as advocated by UN Envoy Van Walsum; nor he did
express concern about a possible MINURSO drawdown.

Migration
---------

6. (C) Planas said there continued to be good cooperation
between Morocco and Spain on migration issues, especially
after the unfortunate deaths on the frontiers of the Spanish
enclaves last fall. Planas said the GOS was pleased Morocco

had announced it was holding a regional conference on
migration in Rabat in July, but he regretted that Algeria had
apparently decided not to participate (he actually said
Algeria's non-participation was "dangerous.") on the ground
that the AU was already organizing migration conferences.
The Rabat conference, Planas said, enjoyed solid support from
France and the EU, as well as Spain. He was concerned about
the growth of trafficking networks in the region, noting that
some migrants bought "travel packs" (a package of movements
-- by road, car, ship, with a series of handlers at each
phase -- to get one to the desired destination), which from
his information cost thousands of dollars, with no certainty
that one would ever reach the destination.

Islamists
---------

7. (C) Planas had read with interest recent coverage in
Moroccan weekly Le Journal of an "American poll" on Moroccan
political attitudes (the poll was conducted by the
International Republican Institute but was not intended to be
shared with the press; according to IRI, one of political
parties that had helped with the poll likely leaked it. Full
details and embassy analysis of the results can be found in
Ref C). Planas said the results, purporting to forecast a
likely PJD victory in the 2007 parliamentary elections, were
very interesting. Planas said even if it won many seats the
PJD probably would not be able to govern without a
coalition. Other political parties are being slow to
democratize, Planas said; their leaders are old and there is
little dynamism in the ranks. The PJD seems to be following
the Erdogan path, he added (see Ref C).

NATO High-Level Event
---------------------

8. (C) Planas raised Morocco's hosting of the upcoming NATO
High-Level Event (April 6-7 in Rabat) and said it was an
important event for Morocco, especially as it followed the
meeting of NATO and Med Dialogue Defense Ministers in
Taormina in February. Planas added that the upcoming 50th
anniversary of the Moroccan Armed Forces was also a showcase
event for Morocco, and he hoped the US would participate
robustly. (Comment: we are firming up a robust US
participation in the 50th Anniversary of the FAR celebrations
and have tentatively secured a DV embarkation onboard a U.S.
aircraft carrier as part of the event. End Comment).
Ambassador Riley thanked Planas for Spanish support for the
recent planning conference for an upcoming exercise, Phoenix
Express, which brought together Moroccan, Algerian, and
Spanish naval officers for a week in Rabat.

Spanish Investment
------------------

9. (C) Ambassador Riley noted Spain's announcement in
February of a 200 million Euro plan to facilitate small and
medium-sized enterprises in Morocco. (Spain is Morocco,s
second largest investor). Planas said he hoped the plan
would assist Spanish enterprises but said Morocco remained a
challenging place to do business given lack of transparency.
In terms of providing aid to Morocco Ambassador Riley said
there ought to be better coordination among donors and
suggested small meetings for donors for specific regions in
Morocco, not for all programs in the whole country,
especially given the MCA activities. Planas agreed and
pointed out that two thirds of Spanish aid to Morocco went to
the northern part of the country.

Narcotics
---------

10. (SBU) Planas noted that Spain was developing plans to
promote tobacco production in Larache province (between Rabat
and Tangiers) as a way of promoting alternatives to narcotics
cultivation in northern Morocco.
******************************************
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat

******************************************

Riley

Citation :

ID: 84104
Date: 2006-11-02 16:23:00
Origin: 06MADRID2809
Source: Embassy Madrid
Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Dunno: 06STATE150118
Destination: VZCZCXRO7785
PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHMD #2809/01 3061623
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021623Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY MADRID
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1229
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAS/AMEMBASSY ALGIERS PRIORITY 3902
RUEHNK/AMEMBASSY NOUAKCHOTT PRIORITY 1121
RUEHRB/AMEMBASSY RABAT PRIORITY 5978
RUEHLA/AMCONSUL BARCELONA PRIORITY 2206
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0246

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 MADRID 002809

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/02/2016
TAGS: PREL, SP
SUBJECT: SPANISH SEEK INCLUSION IN WESTERN SAHARA STRATEGY

REF: A. STATE 150118

B. NEA READ OUT: A/S WELCH-SPANISH DG IRANZO MEETING

MADRID 00002809 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: A/DCM Josie Shumake for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: One month after the UNGA meeting between
Assistant Secretary Welch and MFA DG for Middle East/Africa
Alvaro Iranzo, Iranzo paid a call on the Ambassador October
26, saying he had sought the meeting at FM Moratinos'
request, to reiterate that Spain wishes to play a role in
U.S. strategic planning on Western Sahara. Iranzo asked
whether the GOS could anticipate a response to the non-paper
which he presented to A/S Welch at their UNGA meeting.
Foreign Minister Moratinos stuck to boilerplate language on
Western Sahara in recent testimony before the Spanish
Congress, and he denied a media report that Spain is
assisting Morocco in crafting their autonomy plan. Post
requests guidance on how to respond to MFA's non-paper. END
SUMMARY.

2. (C) MFA DG for Middle East/Africa Alvaro Iranzo called
on the Ambassador on October 26 to discuss Western Sahara.
He said his visit to the Embassy was at the request of
Foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos, and he repeated the
plea made to NEA A/S Welch at their September meeting in New
York for greater US-Spain coordination on Western Sahara.
Iranzo suggested that Spain and the U.S. coordinate prior to
bringing in other interested parties including the UK and
France. Iranzo said Spain welcomed the plan for a "technical
rollover" of the MINURSO mandate at the end of October but
wished it had some reference to a broader political framework
or negotiating strategy. In that respect, he mentioned the
non-paper he presented to A/S Welch in New York and asked
whether Spain would receive a response, as A/S Welch had
indicated. The Ambassador told Iranzo he would relay the
request to Washington. Iranzo asked for Ambassador
Aguirre,s support in pressing Washington for greater
coordination with Spain on this issue and said he had
appreciated the meeting with A/S Welch.

3. (C) Apart from this meeting, Iranzo called in PolCouns on
October 16 to convey the same message. PolCouns noted that
the U.S. had put forward a framework that included pressure
on Morocco to produce a credible autonomy plan and negotiate
directly with the Polisario as soon as possible - with the
continued threat that MINURSO rollovers would no longer be a
matter of course.

4. (U) On October 24, Foreign Minister Miguel Angel
Moratinos told the Congress of Deputies that the relevant
parties in the Western Sahara dispute must continue
negotiating and bring solution to the conflict. He said that
the Zapatero government "has tried, continues to try, and
will continue trying to find a definitive solution to the
Sahara problem that is just, politically and mutually
acceptable, and that permits the exercise of free
self-determination for the Sahrawi people." Moratinos said
he was sure that a consensus could be reached in New York if
the parties could agree on a plan. "What is missing is that
the parties need to find the will to negotiate a solution
within the structure of the United Nations and its principles
and resolutions." At a joint press conference on October 31,
Moratinos denied a report published in Moroccan magazine "Le
Journal Hebdomadaire" which claimed that Spanish jurists are
assisting Morocco in drafting its autonomy plan for Western
Sahara.

5. (U) Spanish interest in Western Sahara starts at the
top. The King and Queen will visit Algeria in early 2007,
and the King recently met with Morocco's King Mohamed VI.
The Polisario Front sent a letter to King Juan Carlos on
October 12 asking him to intervene on their behalf with the
Moroccan monarch. Mauritanian President Ely Ould Mohamed
Vall just made his first visit to Spain, along with a host of
ministers. His visit coincided with that of Algerian Foreign
Minister Mohamed Bedjaoui, though post is unaware of any
connection.

6. (C) COMMENT: The Spanish non-paper declares the
"unfeasibility" of any regionally acceptable solution while
Algeria and Morocco remain at each other's throats. It is
also clearly colored by and suggests a solution similar to
the approach which Spain has taken with its own region of
Catalonia. That is, abandoning "decolonization" vocabulary
such as sovereignty and independence in favor of
"globalization" vocabulary such as regionalization, autonomy,
and self-rule (page 9). Spain's reliance on Algerian natural

MADRID 00002809 002.2 OF 002


gas and on Moroccan labor, trade and CT cooperation puts it
in the awkward position of having to maintain good relations
with both nations. Spain's national interest clearly lies
with resolving this dispute, opening the Morocco-Algeria
border, and engaging a regionally integrated North African
economy. END COMMENT.

------------------------------------------
Visit Embassy Madrid's Classified Website;
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/eur/madrid/
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AGUIRRE