Actualités Espagnoles

Rappel du premier message :

ATTAQUE TERRORISTE À BARCELONE ALERTE INFO UNE FOURGONNETTE PERCUTE LA FOULE LE 17AOUT 2017

exacte ! dans ce genre d'affaires qui se veulent être opaques le renseignement humain est primordial. une taupe ou un honorable correspondant bien introduit au sein des centres de décision politiques ou sécuritaires du pays- cible ennemi ou adversaire vaut tout l'or du monde et ça nos services savent y faire .

mdr

La malediction des chorfas

Parece un drogadicto

L'armée espagnole serait bouleversée par ce timbre commémoratif marocain ...

Eux qui défilent chaque année avec les reliquats de la dynastie marocaine des Almohads ….

Citation :

El gerente del hospital donde Ghali estuvo ingresado dice al juez que no sabe si pagó la factura

https://www.larazon.es/espana/20211105/tgbsezqmavd5df4mzsnlx2zs7e.html

Citation :

Estados Unidos traslada de la base de Morón a Italia su fuerza militar de respuesta rápida en África


Después de que años atrás Estados Unidos y España acordasen habilitar la base aérea de Morón de la Frontera (Sevilla), cuyo uso comparten ambos países, como base permanente de la fuerza militar norteamericana de despliegue rápido en África, incrementando así el número de tropas de dicho país en el recinto castrense, Estados Unidos ha decidido trasladar a Italia dicho contingente.

José Armando Rodríguez Ardila (UGT), presidente del comité de empresa de KBR,sociedad adjudicataria del contrato de las Fuerzas Aéreas de Estados Unidos en Europa y África correspondiente a los servicios de ingeniería civil, apoyo logístico, salud e higiene industrial de la base de Morón, ha explicado a Europa Press que los empleados españoles ligados a tal contrata conocían por comentarios informales de los militares estadounidenses la decisión de "mover a Italia" la citada fuerza de despliegue rápido en África.

En una reciente reunión, según ha explicado, los responsables de KBR habrían confirmado finalmente al comité de empresa la decisión de Estados Unidos de trasladar a Italia dicho contingente militar, un traslado que ya ha comenzado y que previsiblemente concluiría a finales de este mes, según la información transmitida por la empresa a la representación sindical de la plantilla española de los servicios civiles de la base.

A tal efecto, Rodríguez Ardila ha expuesto que este traslado "no tiene por qué tener impacto" en la plantilla española de la base de Morón, razonando que si la llegada de los efectivos de la fuerza de reacción rápida en África allá por 2013 no se tradujo en la contratación de más personal civil para hacer frente a la situación, ahora "no tiene por qué haber" consecuencias negativas en materia de empleo. "Estamos tranquilos", ha asegurado, detallando que los propios representantes de KBR habrían trasladado ese mensaje.
La presencia de EEUU en Morón

A tal efecto, recordemos que gracias a una enmienda al convenio de cooperación entre Estados Unidos y España que regula el uso de la base de Morón, EEUU puede desplegar en estas instalaciones hasta un total de 36 aeronaves, 2.200 militares y 500 profesionales civiles.

Y es que mediante dicho documento, el recinto castrense de Morón se convertía precisamente en base permanente de la fuerza militar norteamericana de despliegue rápido en África, toda vez que el incremento de la presencia estadounidense en esta base cuyos servicios civiles gestionan empresas seleccionadas por las Fuerzas Aéreas de Estados Unidos en Europa y África, ha ido acompañado de una reducción paulatina del personal español adscrito a tales servicios de ingeniería civil, apoyo logístico, salud, ambulancia, higiene industrial o servicios postales.
La plantilla española

El comité de empresa de los mencionados servicios civiles, en ese sentido, lleva años denunciando insistentemente una supuesta estrategia predeterminada de sustitución del personal español por profesionales estadounidenses o directamente militares de dicho país.

En ese sentido, Rodríguez Ardila ha avisado de que la plantilla española de la base de Morón ve con "decepción y preocupación" que el Gobierno español sopese la idea de prorrogar meramente el mencionado convenio bilateral de cooperación, recordando que los trabajadores españoles de este recinto y de la base aeronaval de Rota (Cádiz) llevan años y años reclamando un nuevo texto que recoja las "mejoras laborales" que reivindican.


https://www.diariodesevilla.es/andalucia/Unidos-Moron-Italia-respuesta-Africa_0_1625537949.html

https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2021/11/21/engaging-morocco-a-chess-game-spain-does-not-want-to-lose/

Citation :

Engaging Morocco: A Chess Game Spain Does Not Want to Lose

- Modern Diplomacy
Published 55 mins ago on November 21, 2021
16 - 21 minutes

In a game of chess, each player knows the type of game they are playing and takes turns moving the pieces. In addition to the relative advantage of making an opening consistent with your objectives, you must anticipate your opponent’s moves and plan accordingly.

Morocco moved pieces on May 17 and 18, 2021, when it let in 8,000 immigrants in the city of Ceuta, a Spanish territory in Africa and external border of the European Union. It did so without warning, neglecting its functions as border guardian and allowing the entry of a mass of migrants amounting to 9.5% of Ceuta’s population.

This episode is of unprecedented character: it occurred in the context of a geopolitical change in the Maghreb, within an unparalleled worsening of Rabat-Madrid relations, and it was of an unmatched magnitude. The particularity of the event demands an assessment of the relations between both countries and of Spain’s strategy towards Morocco. Does Madrid know that it is playing chess with Rabat? Is it capable of reading the moves of Morocco in advance? Does it have an effective strategy?

Background

This act takes place during a period of dramatic change in the Maghreb area. Namely, hostilities over Western Sahara broke out again in 2019. Further, Morocco’s relations with Algiers have drastically deteriorated, while its relations with Europe have become more strained following the CJEU rulings in 2021 and conflicts with France and Berlin. Washington has increased its support for Morocco, recognizing its sovereignty over Western Sahara and providing arms supplies and military cooperation. In parallel, Rabat is making a pivot to Africa, strengthening ties with the Sahel and extending its diplomatic contacts with Nigeria, Senegal and other West African countries. These changes enhance the importance of Morocco’s movements and highlight the relevance of its interactions with its only European neighbor: Spain.

Relations between Spain and Morocco have always been conflictive and prosperous in equal parts. In addition to the positive aspects of trade relations, economic complementarity and cooperation in the fight against terrorism, there are also problematic aspects: territorial claims over Spanish possessions in Africa, maritime delimitation issues and immigration. Morocco’s rejection of the principle of Uti possidetis juris, seeking to change the borders inherited from colonialism, has brought conflict to its relations with its neighbors. With Spain, this is evident in events such as the Ifni War (Morocco-Spain), the Green March, the Perejil crisis and the events in Ceuta in May of this year.

In the media, relations between the kingdoms of Spain and Morocco are shaped by conflicts, such as the Perejil Crisis in 2002 and 2010-2011 without a Moroccan ambassador to Madrid. These confrontations, usually involving Spanish territories in Africa or issues of great public sensitivity such as migration or the Western Sahara, are short-lived and normally quickly resolved. As a result, relations between Madrid and Rabat are cyclical in nature and form part of Spanish domestic politics. This conditions that the high points in their relations never last long and that Spain’s responses in discussing the Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla publicly are avoidant rather than assertive. Within this framework, the events in Ceuta 2021 can be understood as a new setback in the development of complex relations.

These conflicts contrast with Spain’s deeply intertwined economic interaction with Morocco. Sectors such as automobiles, textiles and agriculture form part of the same value chain. Morocco is Spain’s second largest non-EU partner while Spain has overtaken France as the main supplier to Morocco. This responds to the concept of the “cushion of interests” put forward by Spain in the 1990s. The core idea of this strategy is that increased economic interdependence will reduce political tensions. According to this theory, since Morocco’s economy is more dependent on Spain than Spain is on Morocco, Rabat would be constrained in its political movements. However, given the frequency of conflicts between the two kingdoms, this liberal approach is of doubtful effectiveness.

The combination of frequent misunderstandings and growing economic interaction is not the only paradox to be noted in the relations of the two kingdoms. On the political level, the synchronization between the countries’ royal houses (mainly between Juan Carlos I and Hassan II in the past but also between Mohamed VI and Felipe VI at present) stands in contrast to the six years without the annual high-level meetings required by the Treaty of Friendship between the two countries. Moreover, Prime Minister Sanchez has broken with the Spanish tradition of paying the first foreign trip to Morocco, in place since the 1980s.

In short, the problems between Madrid and Rabat are cyclical and greatly affect Spanish domestic politics. Neither the strength of the commercial interaction nor the closeness between their kings are enough to smooth relations between the two countries.

The axes of the relationship between Spain and Morocco

The complexity of the relationship between Spain and Morocco revolves around six axes: migration, terrorism, energy, Sahara, Ceuta and Melilla, and the European Union. Each axis generates a series of opportunities and vulnerabilities for Spain, and it is the confluence of these axes that determines the ups and downs between the two countries.

The first of these axes is migration. Due to its sustained omnipresence in the media, it is the one that most concerns Spanish domestic policy. Sub-Saharan and Moroccan immigrants arrive to Spain through two different routes: by sea (to the peninsula and the Canary Islands) and by land (through the Spanish cities in Africa of Ceuta and Melilla). Since 1992, Madrid has increased cooperation with Rabat in this area.

Currently, the border externalization system is present in the repatriation of immigrants, the joint maritime police patrols, the joint police stations, the raids against massive assaults on border fences, and the construction and control of the Nador fence in Morocco. These projects are financed by European funds, which Morocco would like to see increase. This collaboration is asymmetrical: Morocco has sole control of the border, and Spain depends on its goodwill. Rabat, aware of this, does not hesitate to instrumentalize the issue.

The second axis is anti-terrorism and security cooperation. Collaboration in this area originated with the terrorist attacks in Madrid on March 11, 2004. Cooperation now extends to police, judicial and intelligence cooperation. In addition, with the aim of controlling radicalization, Rabat appoints part of the imams in Spain. Here again, the asymmetry is in favor of Morocco. The Moroccan imams could position themselves in favor of the interests of their country of origin. Moreover, anti-terrorist cooperation is essential for Spain’s national security, and its potential loss would put Spain at risk.

The third axis is energy. The Spanish presence in this field is extensive, with participation in Morocco’s solar and wind power development and in its combined cycle power plants. In addition, Spain exports electricity to Morocco through two interconnections with the Iberian Peninsula, which accounts for 20% of the Moroccan demand. Spain used to be dependent on the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline, which passed through Morocco. Its closure in November 2021 has reduced this dependence but has posed a problem to guaranteeing gas supplies to Spain. In this field, Spain has the upper hand: it has vetoed the Mediterranean Solar Plan in Morocco (to avoid competition with Spanish renewable production) and has rejected a 3rd electricity interconnection requested by Morocco.

The fourth axis is that of Western Sahara. This former Spanish colony is of visceral importance to Morocco. In the heart of its territorial claims, the conflict remains ongoing since it began in the 1970s, and Rabat lacks international support on its position. Moreover, it is a topical issue, around which Morocco has recently won American support, French and German rejection, and on which it has declared that it will not sign trade agreements that do not include Western Sahara.

Spain faces a dilemma since it must choose between its public opinion (sensitive to the Saharawi cause) and its trade relations with Morocco. As a result, it maintains a dual position. Officially, Spain supports a solution through the UN, sends humanitarian aid to the Saharawi refugee camps in Tindouf, recognizes the Polisario Front as representative of the Saharawi people and rejects Moroccan claims to Canary Islands waters on the grounds that Rabat has no sovereignty over Western Sahara.

Nevertheless, it applauds the autonomy project proposed in 2007 by Morocco (which does not envisage independence), rejected the US initiative to extend MINURSO’s mandate to human rights monitoring in 2013, and defends Morocco’s interests (and its own) before the judgments of the CJEU on trade agreements involving Western Sahara. The complexity of this axis, which forces Spain to walk in two directions at the same time, is a threat to any constructive relationship with Morocco.

The fifth axis is Morocco’s claims over the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla and the Spanish islands off the Moroccan coast. Rabat’s endeavor to re-establish its “authentic” borders does not end in the Sahara, further extending into these Spanish territories, over which it has a permanent claim.

These territories have four problems.

Economically, they are dependent on Moroccan trade and on Spanish subsidies,
demographically, the growth of the population of Moroccan origin causes changes in the social structure that can be a source of conflict,
international protection is relative, since the Spanish territories are not explicitly protected by NATO, and although they are part of the EU and the Schengen Area, they are not within the Customs Union,
the islands do not appear in the Spanish Constitution nor in the Spanish territorial organization.

Taking advantage of these weaknesses, Morocco has used different strategies to strengthen its claims: economic blockades, vetoes against further integration into the EU, a rhetoric of colonialism, and comparisons to Gibraltar, and even the Perejil crisis in 2002, in which a small group from the Moroccan navy occupied one of the Spanish islands. This axis has a latent presence in the relations between both countries: although Madrid avoids its public mention, Rabat’s claims may end up in direct confrontation Spanish national interests.

Finally, the sixth and last axis is the European Union. Spain´s relationship with Morocco is based on the European Neighborhood Policy and on the Union for the Mediterranean. Besides, this relationship currently revolves around the provision of funds to Morocco for the externalization of borders, the agriculture and fisheries trade agreements, and the rulings of the CJEU on these, which since 2015 have complicated Brussels’ relations with Rabat. Indeed, Morocco has changed its attitude towards the EU since 2008, reducing its concessions, increasing its demands and adopting a more pragmatic discourse. In the framework of Madrid-Rabat relations, the EU has acted as an appeaser, reducing bilateral conflicts. However, Spain is limited within the multilateral structure, since it cannot impose its preferences and its power is confined to blocking initiatives (as it did with agricultural liberalization for example). Moreover, the judgments of the CJEU have poisoned the bilateral relations between Spain and Morocco.

What nowadays is cooperation in migration, security and energy, due to conflicts around the Sahara or Ceuta and Melilla may one day become an undesirable dependency. Too many issues related to Spanish national security are subject to Rabat’s goodwill. That is why the disagreements between the two countries cause so much commotion in Spain, even if they do not always revolve around each of the 6 axes described above.

Ceuta 2021 — Another crisis or a point of no return?

This article begins with the events of May 18, 2021, when Morocco loosened its border controls and allowed more than 8,000 undocumented migrants, mostly young Moroccans, to enter the city of Ceuta. The figure is unprecedented, around 10 times higher than what used to be received until then. It is worth asking whether this event is a simple downturn in the cyclical relations between Morocco and Spain, or whether it implies something different.

When the Ceuta crisis in 2021 is put into context, an extraordinary deterioration of relations between Morocco and Spain is observed, enhanced by unilateral actions by Rabat. In 2018, Morocco closed the commercial border with Melilla. In 2019, it toughened the fight against smuggling in Ceuta, hindering the border crossing and prohibited its officials from entering Ceuta or Melilla. To this day, this has subjected both cities to an unprecedented economic asphyxiation. In 2020, Morocco vetoed the entry of Moroccan fish into Ceuta and revived the dispute over the delimitation of maritime borders in Canary waters. In 2021, it installed a fish farm in Spanish waters near the Chafarinas Islands without permission. In recent years relations between the two countries have worsened gradually, camouflaged behind the Covid-19 pandemic and around issues of relative relevance, which only indirectly affect the 6 axes above mentioned.

In contrast, the Ceuta crisis is relevant in almost every aspect.

Morocco is instrumentalizing immigration, leaving aside its obligations as border guardian.
The Western Sahara conflict lingers in the background: the crisis was a form of protest by Rabat against the hospitalization in Spain of the Polisario Front leader Brahim Ghali, organized in an opaque manner by Madrid.
Despite Rabat’s attempts to keep the crisis within the bilateral framework, it escalated to the European Union, where Spain received the support of the European Commission, the European Parliament (which issued a condemnation for violation of children’s rights against Morocco), and even of France.
The crisis was followed by the reactivation of territorial claims over Ceuta and Melilla: The Moroccan Prime Minister compared the situation to Western Sahara.

Faced with the numerous and unusual vectors of this crisis, Spain must identify what objective Morocco is pursuing, and what its next steps will be. Rabat is obviously trying to capitalize on the momentum provided by the U.S. recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara and its vigorous relations with some of its African neighbors.

Moreover, the deterioration of relations has coincided with a deterioration of Spanish domestic politics, while Morocco is taking advantage of independence, government instability, COVID-19, etc. Is Morocco pursuing a strategy against Spain? That is what the Spanish intelligence presumes, without knowing very well what strategy it is. In fact, the CNI considers the Ceuta crisis not to be an immigration problem, but an invasion that can be repeated again. Rabat could have taken the conflict into a gray zone, in which case it would be establishing the environment, waiting for opportunities.

The current situation is not part of the cyclical pattern that characterizes its relations with Morocco. Ceuta and Melilla are suffocating, Spanish intelligence fears losing anti-terrorist collaboration with Morocco, Rabat is in a strong position, and Madrid is unable to recognize what Morocco’s next step will be, limiting itself to trying to put an increasingly entrenched relationship back on track. The impetus with which Rabat is pushing for the recognition of its sovereignty over the Sahara, and its extrapolation of this to Ceuta and Melilla, suggests that the disagreements with Spain are not over.

In all this, Spain’s strategy towards Morocco is ineffective. The liberalism of the cushion of interests has failed. It was based on elements that were of national interest for Spain (migration, terrorism, etc.) but not for Morocco. The only sphere where Madrid has an advantageous position is energy: Spain exports electricity to Morocco, continues to refuse to establish a third electricity interconnection, and is receiving Moroccan requests for Spain to re-export Algerian gas. Moreover, Spain has learned that Morocco fears losing its reputation with the European Union and is trying to prevent the EU from getting involved in its bilateral relations. Thanks to the EU intervention, Morocco made a misstep during the Ceuta crisis this year.

However, everything suggests that Madrid is confident that the ups and downs will continue to prevail in its relations with Rabat and it accepts Mohamed VI’s invitation to inaugurate an unprecedented stage in the relations between the two countries. It is foreseeable, therefore, that Spain will keep Morocco as one of the two pilot countries of its Focus Africa 2023 plan, giving it and Senegal unparalleled attention in the development of constructive relations, and will export this experience to other African countries. In a game of chess, each player knows the type of game he is playing and takes turns moving the pieces. Spain knows that it is playing, but it has not realized that the game has changed, and that the chessboard is different. It has skipped several turns and, for too long now, its pieces have been sitting immobile.

From our partner RIAC

Très intéressant comme information sachant que les algériens demandent un lien entre eux et l'Espagne.

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The third axis is energy. The Spanish presence in this field is extensive, with participation in Morocco’s solar and wind power development and in its combined cycle power plants. In addition, Spain exports electricity to Morocco through two interconnections with the Iberian Peninsula, which accounts for 20% of the Moroccan demand. Spain used to be dependent on the Maghreb-Europe gas pipeline, which passed through Morocco. Its closure in November 2021 has reduced this dependence but has posed a problem to guaranteeing gas supplies to Spain. In this field, Spain has the upper hand: it has vetoed the Mediterranean Solar Plan in Morocco (to avoid competition with Spanish renewable production) and has rejected a 3rd electricity interconnection requested by Morocco.

L'article est vraiment très bon... merci Shugan, la conclusion est très pertinante:

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In all this, Spain’s strategy towards Morocco is ineffective. The liberalism of the cushion of interests has failed. It was based on elements that were of national interest for Spain (migration, terrorism, etc.) but not for Morocco. The only sphere where Madrid has an advantageous position is energy: Spain exports electricity to Morocco, continues to refuse to establish a third electricity interconnection, and is receiving Moroccan requests for Spain to re-export Algerian gas. Moreover, Spain has learned that Morocco fears losing its reputation with the European Union and is trying to prevent the EU from getting involved in its bilateral relations. Thanks to the EU intervention, Morocco made a misstep during the Ceuta crisis this year.

However, everything suggests that Madrid is confident that the ups and downs will continue to prevail in its relations with Rabat and it accepts Mohamed VI’s invitation to inaugurate an unprecedented stage in the relations between the two countries. It is foreseeable, therefore, that Spain will keep Morocco as one of the two pilot countries of its Focus Africa 2023 plan, giving it and Senegal unparalleled attention in the development of constructive relations, and will export this experience to other African countries.

In a game of chess, each player knows the type of game he is playing and takes turns moving the pieces. Spain knows that it is playing, but it has not realized that the game has changed, and that the chessboard is different. It has skipped several turns and, for too long now, its pieces have been sitting immobile.

Pour information l origine de cet analyse est un think tank Russe créée par le MAE Russe
https://russiancouncil.ru/en/about/founders/

https://www.yabiladi.com/articles/details/121462/gouvernement-espagnol-exige-classement-l-affaire.html

Citation :

Le gouvernement espagnol exige le classement de l’affaire de l’entrée de Ghali

Yabiladi.com

2 - 3 minutes

L’enquête du juge d’instruction, Rafael Lasala, sur les conditions d’entrée de Brahim Ghali, le 18 avril, embarrasse au plus haut niveau du gouvernement espagnol. Une nouvelle fois, l’exécutif a activé la Direction des services juridiques de l’Etat, relevant du ministère de la Justice, pour exiger du juge de mettre un terme à ses investigations, sous prétexte que l’affaire Ghali est frappée du sceau de la confidentialité, rapporte La Razon.

La Direction a remis au juge une note du ministère de la Présidence, que dirige Félix Bolaños, lui rappelant que le conseil des ministres du 15 octobre 2010, présidé alors par José Luis Zapatero, avait qualifié certains dossiers relevant de la sécurité de «réservés», et ce pour éviter «que les questions de politique étrangère de l'Espagne ne soient pas protégée». Le texte précise en effet que les dossiers se rapportant «à la sécurité extérieure de l'État et ses relations diplomatiques, nécessitent une protection pour la meilleure défense des intérêts de l'Espagne».

Sur un ton menaçant le ministère de la Présidence affirme que la «divulgation non autorisée» de dossiers peut entrainer «des risques ou nuire à la sécurité de l'État» ou «compromettre les intérêts fondamentaux de la nation en matière de défense nationale, de paix ou d'ordre constitutionnel».

Justement l’ancienne ministre des Affaires étrangères, Arancha Gonzalez, avait brandi cette décision remontant à 2010, pour refuser, lors de sa comparution devant le juge Lasala le 4 octobre, de révéler l’identité du responsable ayant donné l’ordre d’accueillir en catimini et sous une fausse identité le chef du Polisario à la base militaire de Saragosse.

Pour rappel, en octobre, le juge d’instruction, Rafael Lasala, a déjà rejeté une injonction de la Direction des services juridiques de l’Etat, visant à classer l’affaire. Le juge a justifié par écrit son refus de suspendre l’instruction en s'appuyant sur «l’existence de preuves de la participation pénale d’autres personnes» dans «les circonstances particulières de l’entrée» du chef du Polisario en Espagne.

Très intéressant.

C'est 48 dernière heures on se rend compte que avec bousba3 rien n'est encore "acté"

Un passage que j'ai adoré :

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« Nous avons contacté à ce sujet nos homologues européens mais ces derniers n’ont pas interagi face aux agissements marocains; tout le monde a peur de la réaction des autorités marocaines », déplore la même source.

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« UN NUAGE ROUGE DANS LE CIEL DE MADRID ». LE RAPPORT SECRET REMIS À PEDRO SANCHEZ SUR LE RAPPROCHEMENT MAROCO-ISRAÉLIEN. RÉVÉLATIONS.

Un rapport alarmant a été remis fraîchement par les services de renseignement militaire  au président du gouvernement espagnol, Pedro Sanchez, sous l’intitulé « Un nuage rouge dans le ciel de Madrid ». Le rapport en question, « Document de recherche 19/2021 », porte le cachet du Centre Supérieur d’Études de la Défense Nationale (CESEDEN) et de l’Institut espagnol d’études stratégiques (IEEE), tous deux étant des centres d’analyse dépendant du ministère de la défense.

Dans ce rapport, remis au chef de l’Exécutif espagnol avant la visite le 22 novembre à Rabat du ministre israélien de la Défense, Benny Gantz, le renseignement militaire espagnol met en garde contre la « danger » que représenterait le rapprochement maroco-israélien pour « la nation espagnole ». « Nous savons tous que la nation espagnole est en danger; le lobby juif est le plus puissant et le plus influent au monde et, de ce fait, le rapprochement entre Rabat et Tel-Aviv met le Maroc en position de force et accroît substantiellement son influence dans la région », indique le rapport.

Ce document confidentiel fait état d' »enthousiasme sans précédent de la part des Marocains d’Israël notamment ceux qui occupent des postes sensibles en Israël ». « Le Maroc occupe une place privilégiée en Israël en raison de la présence d’1 million de Marocains en Israël », rappelle-il.

« Le niveau de dangerosité a été requalifié de la zone jaune à la zone rouge avec la visite au Maroc du ministre israélien de la défense (Benny Gantz, Ndlr) », s’alarme le renseignement militaire espagnol, relevant qu’un accord militaire, le premier du genre dans le monde arabe, sera scellé à l’occasion du déplacement marocain du chef de l’armée israélienne. « L’accord attendu, selon nos sources, permettra au Maroc d’acquérir facilement des équipements sécuritaires de haute technologie; il prévoit également une coopération en matière de planification opérationnelle, la recherche et le développement de la technologie militaire », rapporte le renseignement militaire espagnol.

« La coopération maroco-israélienne comprend également la construction d’une base militaire à proximité de nos frontière nationales. Ce projet dépasse le cadre les accords d’Abraham dont le Maroc est partie prenante », croit savoir la même source, faisant état d’ »informations » selon lesquelles « la coopération entre Rabat et Tel-Aviv pourrait dépasser le cadre sécuritaire et militaire pour englober une collaboration en matière de renseignement ».

« Israël ouvrera à doter le Maroc d’une antenne locale pour la fabrication de drones, ce qui permettra de renforcer les capacités de l’armée de l’air marocaine, et permettra à Israël de fabriquer des drones en grandes quantités et à bas prix, ce qui lui donnera la possibilité de mieux se positionner sur le marché international de l’armement », relève le même rapport.

Explorations pétrolières dans le sud marocain

Le Maroc a donné son feu vert à la société Qatar Petroleum International Upstream L.L.C pour démarrer l’exploration pétrolière dans « le Sahara occidental, près des Canaries », indique encore le rapport, relevant que « le gouvernement local » (îles Canaries) est « inquiet quant aux répercussions catastrophiques (de l’exploration) sur l’environnement ».

Le même rapport indique que Rabat avait également « autorisé une société israélienne à démarrer l’exploration de gaz et de pétrole dans les eaux du Sahara occidental, à Dakhla ».

L’installation par une société marocaine d’une ferme piscicole au large des îles Jaaffarines s’est également « invitée » dans le rapport des services secrets espagnols, qualifiant la décision marocaine souveraine de « développement dangereux » sur laquelle « il ne faut pas se taire quelles que soient les défis ».

« Nous avons contacté à ce sujet nos homologues européens mais ces derniers n’ont pas interagi face aux agissements marocains; tout le monde a peur de la réaction des autorités marocaines », déplore la même source.

« À Washington, le lobby juif marocain a fermé devant nous plusieurs portes; les États-Unis ne sont pas prêts à donner des leçons d’orientation à Rabat; le Maroc est devenu leur enfant gâté en Afrique du Nord », s’inquiète la même source. « Rabat commence à nous agacer par ses conditions, elle n’est pas enthousiaste pour rouvrir les frontières avec Ceuta et Melilla; pire encore, elle commence à s’ingérer dans nos affaires intérieures », s’alarme la même source, citant parmi lesdites conditions qui auraient été dictées aux autorités espagnoles « la régularisation de la situation des travailleurs dans les présides de Ceuta et Melilla ».

Et d’ajouter: « L’activité du renseignement marocain dans les deux villes a gagné en intensité et les espagnols d’origine marocaine constituent une bombe à retardement pour nous; ils peuvent être mobilisés à tout moment par Rabat ».

Autre « inquiétude » manifestée par le renseignement espagnol, elle concerne la question de la délimitation par le Maroc de ses frontières maritimes. À ce sujet, la même source évoque le refus des autorités marocaines de « s’asseoir à la table des négociations » pour régler cette question, attribuant ce refus à « la position géo-politique qu’occupe désormais le Royaume du Maroc ».

Avec ce rapport, il est clair que l’establishment espagnol peine encore à prendre la mesure  de la nouvelle donne géo-politique qui se dessine dans la région. Otage d’une vision colonialiste archaïque, il peine à s’adapter à la nouvelle réalité d’un Maroc souverain, puissant et maître de ses décisions.

Un nuage rouge dans le ciel de Madrid

Cet article rassemble tous le vomit et la propagande de la droite espagnole et sa presse.Vous pensez vraiment que les rapports des services secrets espagnols à leur premier ministre se balade dans les territoires des journalistes qui plus est marocains .

Shugan tôt ou tard on va avoir une explication droit dans les yeux avec eux …. Ce n’est qu’une question de « temps »

Rendez vous mid 2030 ….

Eh ben, les espagnols sont loin d'être serein

Plusieurs fois j'avais dit attention, quand on va monter en gamme, les espagnols vont commencer à perdre leur sérénité, on me disait "Mais non c'est des partenaires économiques, pas de souci"  
Ils parlent déjà de la prospection au Sahara et de la menace sur les Canaries, et pire, menace sur "la Nation Espagnole", c'est très grave et lourd comme affirmation venant des services secrets d'un pays... c'est clairement une tentative d'intimidation, si aujourd'hui ils parlent de menaces sur la nation espagnole, ça va être quoi demain ? Demain, ils te menace militairement. Parler également des espagnols d'origine marocaine, a tout moment mobilisable par Rabat soit disant, c'est du langage guerrier ni plus ni moins.

Et que dire de leur antisémitisme et complotisme chrétien qui ressort de l'ombre "lobby juif" "plus puissant du monde" . Ça aussi je l'avait dit, même récemment, les espagnols ont une sorte de cauchemar et complexe de Al Andalus, la réunion des musulmans et juifs du Maroc pour l'évolution du Maroc moderne, ils craignent ça comme la peste ces petits pingouins

Ils ne veulent clairement pas que le Maroc dépasse une certaine taille critique, bientôt ils ne vont même plus se cacher, ils veulent un partenaire mais docile, mais putain ils sont tombés sur un os, personne nous arrêtera. Sbanioul l7aze9.

Citation :

The "false" report sent to President Sanchez on Israeli-Moroccan relations seeks to increase tension in the region

Some Moroccan media (Le Collimateur and Hespress), published a "journalistic scoop" on Saturday 27 November, in which they reported "an alarming report sent by the military intelligence services to the President of the Spanish Government, Pedro Sanchez, under the title 'Red cloud over the sky of Madrid', warning of "the danger that the recent rapprochement between Morocco and Israel represents for Spain".  

Needless to say, under the conditions of a deep crisis between Algeria and Morocco with the rupture of diplomatic relations and the swords raised between the two geopolitical rivals in the Maghreb, the official Algerian press agency APS echoed it a few hours later, stating that 'not only Algeria is concerned about the Moroccan-Zionist alliance, but also Spain'. A bad move by Abdelmadjid Tebboune's government in line with its visceral anti-Zionism.

According to information gathered by this newspaper, the scoop was not invented by the Moroccan media, but originated in Spain. Indeed, several Iberian online media have established a deal with some Moroccan counterparts, according to which they exchange scoops and leaks of interested press. The Spaniards are eager for news that calls into question the government of Pedro Sánchez, that seeks out its weak points, or highlights its contradictions, and they buy any scandalous information from the Moroccan media or from "absolutely reliable sources, they say, close to the Royal Palace". In return, they pass on their own scoops to their neighbours, such as the extravagant Spanish secret service report sent to President Sánchez.

It is worthwhile to dwell a little on the "alarming Report", and to break it down. First of all, even if it had existed, it would not be "a report by the Spanish secret services", but an ad-hoc document from CESEDEN (Centro Superior de Estudios para la Defensa) whose mission is to produce analyses for the Defence Staff, and not for the Prime Minister. For geopolitical and strategic analysis documents, the Prime Minister's Office has the National Security Department headed by General Miguel Ángel Ballesteros, who has extensive experience and knowledge of the Maghreb and Spanish-Moroccan relations, and who does not need any support from CESEDEN to do so, as he has his own team

Neither CESEDEN nor the Institute of Strategic Studies, which amounts to the same thing, are "intelligence services", neither civilian, as the Algerian agency claims, nor military, as the Moroccan press writes. The only civilian Spanish intelligence service is the CNI (National Intelligence Centre), and the only military intelligence service is the Armed Forces Intelligence Centre (CIFAS), which reports to the Defence General Staff and is responsible for military intelligence. The other organisations, institutes, analysis and documentation centres, etc., in Spain, of which there are many, are "intelligence services".

Third error, of form. In addition to the title of the report, 'A red cloud in the sky over Madrid', which reads like a mystery novel, the authors of the aforementioned articles claim that it is 214 pages long. In other words, a White Paper, rather than an intelligence report. Any journalist who has had knowledge of any confidential report prepared by the services of any country for their respective government knows that when it reaches 20 pages, it is already too long. A report should be concise, precise and clear, and not a novelised account.

Fourth mistake, political. The Report asserts that 'we all know that the Spanish nation is in great danger', and points to Israel as a more real than potential 'enemy', since the process of rapprochement between Morocco and Israel will allow the former to acquire 'high-tech security equipment easily', which will make 'any negotiation with Morocco impossible for Spain'. Read another way, the friend of my enemy has gone from being my friend to being my enemy.

Considering Israel as Spain's enemy, which is like considering the United States as Spain's enemy, is not only a total break with the policy pursued by Spain since the beginning of the democratic transition in 1976, but also calls into question all the agreements signed by Spain with the West, with NATO and with the European Union. To confuse the current problems that arise between Spain and Morocco, which in some cases are serious and must be dealt with as such, with a congenital state of enmity and aggressive warfare, is to stoke the fire, to feed it with new fuel, if not with sticks of dynamite varnished with ecological paint.

Fifth mistake, fakes news. The report includes false information from the online newspaper El Español, claiming that "Israeli-Moroccan cooperation also includes the construction of a joint military base near our national borders". This information was provided by the newspaper headed by Pedro J. Ramírez, without presenting any evidence or documents, and is unthinkable given the modern history of Morocco and Israel.

It is worrying, however, that the Spanish economic-financial lobbies, which manipulate a significant number of influential media and communications, adopt the motto "anything goes" when it comes to making profits, in arms sales and in the defence of energy groups. The "collateral damage" that may result, such as crises and armed conflicts, is of no importance to them.

https://atalayar.com/index.php/en/blog/false-report-sent-president-sanchez-israeli-moroccan-relations-seeks-increase-tension-region

Déjà des problèmes d'approvisionnement de l'Espagne en gaz, par gazoduc comme par méthaniers.

L'hiver va être long...
https://okdiario.com/espana/riesgo-cortes-sistema-gas-espanol-quedo-24-noviembre-minimos-durante-13-horas-8195145

Opinion d'un espingouin : L'Espagne est-elle toujours la Gardienne du Détroit ?
https://atalayar.com/fr/blog/lespagne-est-elle-toujours-la-gardienne-du-d%C3%A9troit