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Sujet: Actualités au Moyen Orient Lun 4 Juin 2018 - 13:51
Rappel du premier message :
Kursad2 a écrit:
La Turquie n'est pas un pays musulman en soit. C'est pas parce qu'Erdogan dit des choses par populisme que l'État Turc est un État musulman. Aucune loi, aucun article de la constitution parle de l'islam. Erdogan est au pouvoir depuis le début des années 2000 mais il n'a jamais introduit un seul mot d'Islam au sein de l'État (constitution et loi). Et puis Musulman ca veut dire quoi? Le petit-fils du Prophète sws est mort au bord de l'Euphratr avant d'atteindre l'Euphrate. La politique étrangère ne doit jamais faire l'objet de sentimentalisme et d'idéologie. C'est pour ça qu'on a de mauvaise relation avec Israël entre autres car même si les intérêts sont communs les idéologies divergent. Les Syriens et les Irakiens sont accueillit en Turquie mais ils devront regagner leur pays une fois la guerre finie. C'est déjà le cas de l'Irak.
Merci pour ta sincèrité et sa profondeur.
_________________ L'homme sage est celui qui vient toujours chercher des conseils dabord, des armes on en trouve partout.
feu Hassan II.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AbjNQ_5QvgQ
Auteur
Message
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Mer 2 Jan 2019 - 20:34
Une idée de combien coute cette mobilisation par jour?
Adam Modérateur
messages : 6300 Inscrit le : 25/03/2009 Localisation : Royaume pour tous les Marocains Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Jeu 3 Jan 2019 - 15:14
Foreign Policy a écrit:
The United States Can’t Rely on Turkey to Defeat ISIS
Erdogan wants to confront the Kurds, not the Islamic State. Outsourcing the battle to Ankara will endanger America.
President Donald Trump’s plan to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria means that the United States is relying on Turkey to shoulder the burden of countering the Islamic State. This move will provide the terrorist group with an opportunity to revive itself at a critical stage in the fight.
Trump claims exiting Syria has been his plan all along. Still, many U.S. policymakers, including those in Congress, were caught by surprise—especially given the September assertion by Trump’s national security advisor, John Bolton, that U.S. troops would remain in Syria until the Iranians left.
When Trump announced his surprising about-face on what had been the closest thing Washington had to a Syria policy—the presence of 2,000 or so U.S. troops and support for Kurdish militia forces—he did so after a conversation with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Shortly after the phone call, Trump tweeted, “Now ISIS is largely defeated and other local countries, including Turkey, should be able to easily take care of whatever remains.” He went on to add that the Turkish leader “has very strongly informed me that he will eradicate whatever is left of ISIS in Syria.”
Apart from taking Turkish talking points at face value, there is a fundamental problem with this calculation. Ankara has often demonstrated a reluctance to take on the Islamic State directly, preferring instead to focus its energy and resources on countering the Kurds and Erdogan’s opposition.
Ankara has often demonstrated a reluctance to take on the Islamic State directly, preferring instead to focus its energy and resources on countering the Kurds and Erdogan’s opposition.
For years, Turkey has been playing a double game. Erdogan’s main objective is to prevent Syrian Kurds from consolidating more territory and establishing a corridor parallel to the southern Turkish border. Eradicating the Islamic State’s presence in Syria—and its networks within Turkey—is a secondary priority that has often been ignored entirely.
Ankara has often demonstrated a reluctance to take on the Islamic State directly, preferring instead to focus its energy and resources on countering the Kurds and Erdogan’s opposition.
Yet, because the Islamic State has already established a nascent infrastructure in Turkey, the recent policy decision to withdraw from Syria could breathe new life into the group, endangering Turkish soldiers and civilians at home and allowing the group to make a comeback in Syria.
Turkey’s borders remain far from impenetrable, and the Islamic State’s leaders recognize the importance of a robust logistics capability. Syria is the conflict zone that provides the Islamic State with operational space, but Turkey—with modern communications, transportation, and links to the global economy—is close to an ideal country for a terrorist group to take advantage of, akin to a rear supply base or logistical hub. Its security and intelligence services possess finite resources, which remain primarily geared toward fighting the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a group Turkey knows well and has been combating for nearly four decades.
One of Erdogan’s main arguments, and a point of contention between Ankara and Washington since the beginning of U.S. involvement in Syria, is that the People’s Protection Units (YPG), a Kurdish militia and the most effective fighting force in the broader anti-Islamic State coalition, is an extension of the PKK. Since the United States was backing the YPG as the main element of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), the argument goes, it was essentially sponsoring terrorism. This message resonates with Erdogan’s supporters, but because the YPG was the most effective bulwark against the Islamic State, the United States is far less sympathetic to this characterization.
Relying heavily on Erdogan presents a problem regarding both capability and intent across two dimensions: fighting the Islamic State on the battlefield in Syria and stamping out Islamic State networks and small cells of militants already entrenched in Turkey. Following high-profile attacks in Ankara, Istanbul, and Gaziantep over the past several years, the Islamic State has demonstrated its reach and operational capability.
In terms of fighting the Islamic State in Syria, Turkey boasts a formidable military—on paper, at least. But even with the Islamic State cornered in small towns and villages along the central Euphrates River valley, the United States was unable to completely eradicate the remnants of the group. So why does Trump think the Turks will be able to achieve this objective? The U.S. withdrawal comes amid a flurry of reports that the Islamic State is hunkering down for a long fight and preparing to wage a guerilla insurgency in the Sunni heartland of eastern Syria.
It will be especially difficult to fight the Islamic State at a time when the leadership of the Turkish security forces has been gutted.
It will be especially difficult to fight the Islamic State at a time when the leadership of the Turkish security forces has been gutted.
In late 2013, Turkey launched an anti-corruption probe, which was accelerated following a coup attempt in July 2016. The instability has led to command-and-control issues and fissures among pockets of military and intelligence leadership. The Turkish government purged hundreds of thousands of public servants across the country, including police, military officers, prosecutors, and judges. As a result, the state was left with an inexperienced and poorly trained counterterrorism and intelligence staff that is often plagued by serious operational flaws and prone to human right abuses.
It will be especially difficult to fight the Islamic State at a time when the leadership of the Turkish security forces has been gutted.
Instead of taking a more comprehensive approach, Erdogan’s security policy has been one of either/or, with respect to fighting the Kurds and the Islamic State. The political will on the part of the Turkish government to wholeheartedly confront the Islamic State has been conspicuously lacking, which is somewhat vexing given operations launched by the Islamic State on Turkish soil. These include major attacks like the June 2016 Ataturk Airport incident in Istanbul or the assault on the Reina nightclub in January 2017. Ostensibly, Turkey should have a vested interest in uprooting a terrorist group from its territory. But in the Middle East, the enemy of one’s enemy is still too often seen as a friend, so the Islamic State was viewed as a source of “strategic depth” against the Kurds, similar to the manner in which Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence and military rely on the Taliban, despite attacks that have been directed against Pakistani personnel. This is merely viewed as the cost of doing business in a dangerous region.
There may also be a sectarian angle at work, as the Islamic State was fighting the Bashar al-Assad regime, a symbol of Shiite Islam, while Erdogan has worked assiduously to bolster his image as the most prolific defender of Sunni Islam in the region. Alliances are already shifting, with the YPG recently asking the Assad regime to deploy troops to Manbij, near the Turkish border. Some U.S. policymakers recognize how detrimental a growing relationship between Assad and the Kurds would be and have scrambled to persuade Trump to slow or even walk back aspects of the planned withdrawal.
The consequences of fighting the Kurds and ignoring the Islamic State could be doubly damaging for Turks at home. If Erdogan follows through on attacking the Kurds in northern Syria, it will keep Turkey’s military occupied in that theater and could prompt retaliation by Kurdish militants in Turkey proper.
Throughout the years, Kurdish terrorist groups have demonstrated the ability to strike deep into the heart of Turkey—and with devastating effect. In the summer of 2015, Kurdish militants killed a Turkish soldier and wounded several others in Adiyaman, while two police officers were gunned down in Ceylanpinar. So, with forces deployed in conventional military combat in another country and ongoing counterterrorism investigations and operations against Kurdish terrorists internally, it is highly doubtful that Erdogan can deliver on his promise to Trump to wipe out what remains of the Islamic State in Syria.
If Islamic State militants are allowed to rebuild their networks in Turkey, the implications are dire.
If Islamic State militants are allowed to rebuild their networks in Turkey, the implications are dire.
The Islamic State will be able to use Turkey for logistical support, thus fueling its insurgency across the border in Syria. Rogue elements could also launch attacks in Turkey, while other cells might seek to plot attacks in Europe.
If Islamic State militants are allowed to rebuild their networks in Turkey, the implications are dire.
Turkey was never completely sincere in its fight against the Islamic State, often sending conflicting messages to friends and foes alike. Between 8,000 to 10,000 Turks have moved to Syria and Iraq as foreign terrorist fighters since the beginning of the conflict. According to Turkey’s Social Trends Survey carried out among 1,500 people across Turkey in 2015, about 9 percent of Turks said they believed the Islamic State was not a terrorist organization, and more than 5 percent said they supported its actions.
Turkey is scheduled to hold local elections March 31, 2019. Erdogan has expressed concern about the outcome of these elections amid the economic crisis Turkey has been suffering from. The fight against the PKK has often been a great domestic tool for Erdogan to mobilize the nationalist voter base in Turkey, and his Justice and Development Party has aligned itself with the Nationalist Movement Party for the March elections. Domestic politics were believed to be a major justification for Erdogan’s rationale when he announced in mid-December—two weeks before his phone call with Trump—that Turkey was going to start the operation against the SDF.
It is difficult to see how Turkey can fight the Islamic State effectively now. The majority of the remaining pockets of the Islamic State territory are over 300 miles away from Turkey’s border. Accordingly, it is almost impossible for the Turkish army and its local allies to reach these areas to effectively fight against the Islamic State and exert full control over this territory.
Erdogan relies on the Free Syrian Army (FSA)—a group of Syrian Arab military officers who formerly served under Syrian President Bashar al-Assad—in the territories he is holding. He may be planning to deploy the FSA during his promised offensive against the SDF, but there are a host of complicated issues to consider. First, it is an ill-disciplined force, and there are reports about the atrocities of these forces paid and backed by Turkey. Following an operation by Turkish-backed Syrian rebels in Afrin in March, there were widespread reports of looting and theft of locals’ property.
More worrying is the potential overlap between the Islamic State and the FSA. It is well known that some returning Islamic State fighters joined the FSA and ascended to leadership positions. For example, Seyf Ebu Bekir, a commander of the Hamza Division of the FSA, is a former Islamic State member from Bab. Many Islamic State fighters are now serving in the Turkish-backed militia as commanders.
Many Islamic State fighters are now serving in the Turkish-backed militia as commanders.
Many Islamic State fighters are now serving in the Turkish-backed militia as commanders.
Given all these factors, it’s clear that Erdogan is not entirely sincere in his promise to fight back against the Islamic State. Rather, with the Turkish president focused on helping his party gain more power in upcoming local elections, his promise to Trump to wipe out the Islamic State is merely a useful domestic tool to help him boost his popularity as a capable leader and military commander.
Trump’s gamble can pay off, but only if Erdogan follows through on his promise to destroy the Islamic State, a pledge that history indicates Turkey’s president would be unwilling to keep, no matter how much Washington wants to expedite its plans to extricate the United States from the quagmire of the Syrian civil war.
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
Samyadams Administrateur
messages : 7134 Inscrit le : 14/08/2008 Localisation : Rabat Maroc Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Jeu 3 Jan 2019 - 16:57
Kursad2 a écrit:
Samy: J'espère que le Maroc ne rentrera pas dans ce jeu, il a plus a perdre.je crois que votre Roi est sage et mène une politique équilibrée, c'est tout à son honneur.
De sources sûres, il n'est pas du tout question que le Maroc envoie des troupes en Syrie, sous quelque motif que ce soit. Les Marocains, qui n'ont aucune raison objective d'entrer en confrontation avec les Turcs, n'ont, par ailleurs, pas du tout confiance en les Syriens, encore moins en les Kurdes, qui sont, comme chacun le sait, motivés par le séparatisme. Qu'Arabes, Kurdes et Trucs s’entre-tuent comme bon leur semble, ce n'est pas du tout notre affaire.
_________________
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Jeu 3 Jan 2019 - 17:09
Kursad2 a écrit:
YASSINE a écrit:
Bonjour Kursad, ton amour pour ta patrie est respectable, la vérité sur le terrain est autre..... relis toi et compte combien de fois tu as dit le mot Turquie!! la turqui est une puissance émergente oui je te l'accord, mais face à la chine ou Russie ou l'alliance arabe ne fera jamais le poids et risque de faire un bon de 50 ans en arrière, votre économie est volatile ce qui la rend très fragile( samy l'a bien détaillé) et crois moi je ne pense pas que dans la région vous aillez que des amis (même le Qatar risque de changer de camps) des petits lien pour toi: Syrie: le retrait US reporté? (en attendant vos troupes dans la région s’épuisent et votre logistique aussi) https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201901011039504217-trump-report-retrait-us-syrie/
Ankara veut l’aval de Moscou pour « en finir » avec les Kurdes de Syri https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/12/31/ankara-veut-l-aval-de-moscou-pour-en-finir-avec-les-kurdes-de-syrie_5403869_3210.html en même temps les vrais puissance ne se soucient de personnes exemple des USA ou Russe!!
Le retrait US n'est pas reporté, Trump a bien démenti les médias qui ont affirmé que le retrait était reporté, donc fake news.
La Turquie fera le nécessaire, sur ça j'ai pas de doute, concernant l'économie turque, elle est volatile? La baisse de la livre turque n'était que spéculative, l'économie turque reste puissante, d'ailleurs, pour la première fois, les exportations dépassent les importations. Le paiement des comptes courants est au vert, l'inflation est maitrisée et la livre turque a gagnée de la valeur depuis.
On a trop attendu à être passif, et on doit faire payer le prix fort à ceux qui voudront s'en prendre à nous.
Bonjour, voilà un exemple concernant le volet économique, quand je dis que la situation économique reste très volatile.... En Turquie, l'inflation atteint des records et le peuple s'impatiente https://fr.news.yahoo.com/turquie-linflation-atteint-records-peuple-simpatiente-151929214.html?guccounter=1
La crise financière de la Turquie: Les symptômes du déclin http://www.alterinfo.net/La-crise-financiere-de-la-Turquie-Les-symptomes-du-declin_a140934.html
Samyadams Administrateur
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Jeu 3 Jan 2019 - 17:48
Kursad2 a écrit:
concernant l'économie turque, elle est volatile? La baisse de la livre turque n'était que spéculative, l'économie turque reste puissante, d'ailleurs, pour la première fois, les exportations dépassent les importations. Le paiement des comptes courants est au vert, l'inflation est maitrisée et la livre turque a gagnée de la valeur depuis.
La baisse de la livre turque n'était pas spéculative, vos entreprises se sont trop endettées en dollars et ce en raison d'une politique de taux d'intérêts trop laxiste de la part de votre banque centrale, pressée dans ce sens par Erdogan. A chaque fois que la FED étasunienne va relever ses taux d'intérêts et contracter son bilan, la Turquie aura des soucis à se faire. Moins il y a de dollars en circulation, plus vos entreprises auront de la peine à rembourser leurs dettes contractées dans cette monnaie. Il faut dire merci au Qatar de vous avoir sauvé la mise, mais ce n'est pas une solution durable. S'il est indéniable que l'économie turque est puissante, il ne faut pas oublier que le crédit bon marché encourage le surendettement, ce qui est en soi porteur de graves menaces.
_________________
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Jeu 3 Jan 2019 - 18:33
Comprendra qui peut le retrait annoncé des Américains de Syrie
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Jeu 3 Jan 2019 - 23:23
Washington veut s'assurer que "les Turcs ne massacrent pas les Kurdes je pense que les troupes turque attendront encore un bon moment avant toute incursion... courage aux soldats dans ce temps pourri....
messages : 7134 Inscrit le : 14/08/2008 Localisation : Rabat Maroc Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Ven 4 Jan 2019 - 0:09
Malgré toute leur puissance militaire, les Turcs n'auront pas les mains libres dans le nord-est de la Syrie, car aucun de leurs alliés ou leurs ennemis ne veut les voir tailler les Kurdes en pièces, chacun pour ses propres raisons. Le plus probable, c'est que tout le monde va finir par se mettre d'accord pour que ce soit l'armée syrienne qui reprend le contrôle sur les zones ou sont actuellement déployés les combattants kurdes, qui seront également désarmés, comme solution de moindre mal. En fin de compte, Assad ira danser devant les frontières turques et narguer Erdogan, sans que celui-ci ne puisse faire quoi que ce soit. Il ne restera à ce dernier qu'à pleurer ses ambitions évaporées de néo-sultan ottoman. Face à la légitimité de la présence de l'armée syrienne au nord-est de la Syrie, la puissance de l'armée turque est sans effet. Quand à l'argument turc de non-reconnaissance de la légitimité d'Assad, il vaut zéro sur le plan du droit international. La foi aveugle en la force brutale est une chimère.
_________________
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Ven 4 Jan 2019 - 18:43
https://fr.Un avion US mène une mission de reconnaissance près de la base russe en Syriesputniknews.com/international/201901041039531951-syrie-base-russe-avion-espion-us/
Deux citoyens russes auraient trouvé la mort dans une frappe de la coalition US en Syrie https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201901041039528608-syrie-frappe-coalition-victimes/
Turquie: nouvelle vague d'arrestations liées au putsch manqué de 2016 https://www.bfmtv.com/international/turquie-nouvelle-vague-d-arrestations-liees-au-putsch-manque-de-2016-1604339.html
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Ven 4 Jan 2019 - 21:24
je pense que les troupes turque resteront un bon moment à la frontière avec ce que cela engendre comme désagréments et coup faramineux sans compter le morale des troupes....ça se confirme!! pas de date de retrait précise et aucune volonté de laisser la place au turque
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Ven 4 Jan 2019 - 21:25
The Atlantic a écrit:
The True Origins of ISIS
A secret biography suggests that Abu Ali al-Anbari defined the group’s radical approach more than any other person.
Most historians of the Islamic State agree that the group emerged out of al-Qaeda in Iraq as a response to the U.S. invasion in 2003. They also agree that it was shaped primarily by a Jordanian jihadist and the eventual head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Jordanian had a dark vision: He wished to fuel a civil war between Sunnis and Shiites and establish a caliphate. Although he was killed in 2006, his vision was realized in 2014—the year isis overran northern Iraq and eastern Syria.
Narratives about the origins of Islamic State ideology often focus on the fact that Zarqawi and Osama bin Laden, both Sunni extremists, diverged on the idea of fighting Shiites and on questions of takfir, or excommunication. Such differences, the story goes, were reinforced in Iraq and eventually led to the split between isis and al-Qaeda. Based on this set of assumptions, many conclude that Zarqawi must have provided the intellectual framework for isis.
Recently, I came to question the conventional wisdom. The groundwork for isis was arguably laid long before the invasion, and if there was one person responsible for the group’s modus operandi, it was Abdulrahman al-Qaduli, an Iraqi from Nineveh better known by his nom de guerre, Abu Ali al-Anbari—not Zarqawi. It was Anbari, Zarqawi’s No. 2 in his al-Qaeda years, who defined the Islamic State’s radical approach more than any other person; his influence was more systematic, longer lasting, and deeper than that of Zarqawi.
A month ago, I obtained a 93-page document that chronicles Anbari’s life, as well as the extremist landscape around him in 1990s Iraq. Anbari’s son, Abdullah, wrote the biography for the internal use of the Islamic State, which published parts of it in its weekly Arabic magazine, Al-Naba, in 2016, shortly after Anbari’s killing. Dissidents within isis recently spread the full document on social media, which is how I came across it. Abdullah has stated that the biography was based on 16 years of working closely with his father, a diary that Anbari kept, and firsthand accounts of Anbari from fellow isis members.
In addition to Abdullah’s biography, I’m relying here on a series of lectures that Anbari delivered in 2014 and 2015, and on my notes from interviews with members of the organization and Syrian rebels. All in all, it’s become clear to me that Zarqawi was likely influenced by Anbari, not the other way around.
Anbari was born in northern Iraq in 1959 into a Turkified family of Arab and Armenian descent. The household was devout. Abdullah tells the story of when a young Anbari wanted to buy pigeons. His father told him he had to ask the local imam if keeping pigeons was sound from an Islamic-law standpoint. The imam told him it was a “devilish” habit, so he dropped the idea. (In some Arab countries, testimony from pigeon keepers is inadmissible in court; Arabs associate them with dishonesty, as their profession is thought to involve stealing pigeons owned by others and then lying about it.)
Anbari studied Sharia after he completed elementary school, at an institute in the northern Iraqi city of Tal Afar. He graduated from the University of Baghdad in 1982 with a degree in Islamic studies. (He shares an alma mater with the Islamic State’s current leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.) After graduation, he joined the Iraqi army, served for seven years, and fought in the Iran-Iraq war. “He obtained military and religious training, a rare combination,” his son wrote.
After Anbari’s military service, according to the biography, he was assigned to teach a Sharia class in a small, diverse town called Mujama Barzan. One day, a rich citizen of the town invited ghajars—an ethnic group similar to the Roma—to pitch a tent and throw a party with music and dancing. Anbari was enraged by the news; the party seemed to him profoundly sacrilegious. He offered 10 extra marks to any student who did not attend, but that wasn’t enough of a statement. Anbari considered killing the ghajars, but he had no gun. He then asked one of his students to bring him gasoline, with the idea that he would burn the ghajars alive inside their tent. Ultimately, he simply delivered a sermon against the ghajars and the planned, profane celebration. Under intense pressure, the rich sponsor sent the ghajars away. But the incident left Anbari thinking: There is something wrong with a government that would even consider allowing such an event to take place.
In the mid-1990s, Anbari moved back to Tal Afar, a mixed city of Shiites and Sunnis. He was assigned to a local school in one of the city’s largest Shiite neighborhoods, Khadraa, and later also became an imam at a nearby mosque. He used the pulpit to attack Shiites and Sufis as deviant sects.
Later that decade, he associated himself with Kurdish jihadist organizations in the north. The biography explains that he was influenced by jihadist materials, including audio sermons, coming out of Afghanistan and Chechnya. He developed relationships with three men who later became notable jihadists. One was killed by the Kurdish Peshmerga in Mosul in the early days of the Iraq War, and two became senior leaders of the Islamic State of Iraq, as isis was known from late 2006 until it expanded into Syria in 2013.
Around the time of 9/11, support for jihad spiked in Iraq. The success of the attacks was, of course, one factor behind the preinvasion spike—but it was not the only one. In the wake of the Gulf War in 1991, Saddam Hussein’s government inaugurated the so-called Islamic Faith Campaign, which promoted Islamization of the public sphere. Seven months before the attacks, the government mobilized Iraqis to join the volunteer-based Jerusalem Army, which had a stated mission of expelling Jews from the holy city. Abu Maria al-Qahtani, one of the founders of al-Qaeda in Syria, once told me that Hussein’s persistent anti-American rhetoric galvanized many to fight against U.S. influence before and after the invasion. Al-Qahtani himself was trained by Hussein’s regime for a possible suicide mission in Israel.
Anbari was swept along by these trends. After 9/11, he and some of his former students created a “nucleus of an emirate”—a sort of proto–Islamic state—in northern Iraq. The students were trained on the hillsides surrounding Tal Afar by a close associate of Anbari named Iyad Abu Bakr.
Beyond spurring jihadism, the 9/11 attacks seem to have polarized the religious scene in Iraq. Anbari and like-minded jihadists began to see rival Islamists, including the Muslim Brotherhood, as enemies—a position that would become a notable aspect of the Islamic State’s ideology. Anbari viewed the Muslim Brotherhood’s embrace of political norms and its rejection of al-Qaeda as a betrayal. His fixation with the Muslim Brotherhood is also evident in his audio lectures, in which he refers to its members as “the devil’s brothers.”
Anbari took great stock in a new set of jihadist books that were circulating in post-9/11 Iraq, primarily ones by Zarqawi’s prison mentor, Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, and Abdulqadir bin Abdulaziz, an Egyptian jihadist ideologue. These materials, his son wrote, “polished the sheikh’s concepts” and “corrected his creed” on matters such as apostasy and the adoption of man-made laws. Thus, a man who had never embraced moderation rejected the concept as totally anathema to Islam.
What I hope is now clear to readers is that Anbari’s extremist views, which were later mirrored by isis, were forged before the American invasion of Iraq—and before he met Zarqawi.
According to Abdullah’s biography, Zarqawi arrived in northern Iraq from Afghanistan in the spring of 2002. Anbari met him a month later in Baghdad, where Zarqawi was hosted by an envoy of the Kurdish jihadist group Ansar al-Islam and a friend of Anbari’s. (This is the first time an isis publication has acknowledged that Zarqawi was present in Baghdad before the invasion. Previously, some claimed this chronology was false or politicized—part of the Bush administration’s attempts to justify the war by linking Zarqawi to the Hussein regime.) During this period, Anbari moved back and forth from central to northern Iraq to facilitate jihadist activities. “Preparations for jihad were maturing, in terms of finance, men and arms,” Abdullah’s biography reads. “All this was happening under the rule of the Baath.”
“All this” included the preinvasion professionalization of the Islamist movement, as former Baathists, who “repented” before the war, set about organizing new recruits. Abu Muslim al-Turkmani, once a colonel in Hussein’s army and the eventual No. 3 in the Islamic State of Iraq’s hierarchy, trained an anti-Saddam jihadist group that was then put under Anbari’s command. Anbari and Turkmani’s men made gun silencers and improvised bombs for Zarqawi.
When the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, Anbari and Zarqawi led separate groups that were not yet part of al-Qaeda in Iraq. (Both pledged allegiance in 2004, Anbari as Zarqawi’s deputy.) There’s a great deal of evidence that Anbari, not Zarqawi, set the extremist pace, advancing the policies that would characterize isis.
Soon after the invasion, Anbari’s group in Tal Afar targeted anyone regarded as heretical or obstructive; it attacked Shiites, members of the Muslim Brotherhood, and local informants regardless of what tribe they belonged to.
By contrast, it would take another year for Zarqawi to embrace such extreme sectarianism. After Zarqawi formally pledged allegiance to bin Laden and became the head of al-Qaeda in Iraq, he wrote a letter to al-Qaeda’s central leadership articulating a plan to attack Shiite civilians and places of worship. The idea for targeting the Shiites probably came from native Iraqis like Anbari—possibly even Anbari himself. Prior to 2004, Zarqawi’s fixation was largely with secular Arab regimes, exemplified by his bombing of the Jordanian embassy in Baghdad in the summer of 2003. Laith Alkhouri, a close watcher of the group and a co-founder of the intelligence company Flashpoint in New York, said Zarqawi found anti-Shiite views instrumental to mobilizing Sunnis in Iraq in 2005, which led him to declare an all-out war against Shiites “wherever they are.”
Murad Batal Shishani, a prominent jihadism expert from Zarqawi’s hometown, told me that Zarqawi’s trials in Jordan in the mid-1990s—for his involvement in a secret Islamist organization—produced no evidence that he held the extremist views associated with isis after 2003. In Jordan, “Zarqawi did not deviate from his jihadi peers, only through his character,” Shishani said. “He was more radical, he was a thug, and so on, but ideologically he was a lightweight. He was influenced by what was happening around him in Iraq.”
Anbari also had a direct role in the transformation of al-Qaeda in Iraq from a foreign-dominated force into one run by Iraqis. Abdullah’s biography reveals that Anbari was dispatched by Zarqawi to Pakistan in late 2005, passing through Iran with fake documents, to brief leaders of al-Qaeda there about rumors that the Iraqi branch was alienating fellow jihadists. (The detail about Anbari’s journey is a rare admission of the fact that Iran is used as a transit corridor in the region.) When Anbari returned, he presented a plan to merge al-Qaeda in Iraq with other, local forces to establish the Mujahideen Shura Council in January 2006. Anbari headed the council, using his new nom de guerre, Abdullah Rasheed al-Baghdadi.
One year later, the newly “Iraqized” local operation rebranded itself as the Islamic State of Iraq, and the group’s attacks against Shiites and Americans rose exponentially.
Anbari was arrested by U.S. troops in Baghdad in 2006, and Zarqawi was killed two months later, at which point, of course, his influence came to an end. Although Anbari remained in custody until March 2012, he stayed involved in the jihadist story by recruiting and indoctrinating fellow inmates. After Anbari’s release—which the Islamic State of Iraq apparently arranged by bribing Iraqi officials—Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi summoned him to Baghdad and assigned him to a critical mission.
Anbari’s new task was to investigate whether the group’s branch in Syria, then known as Jabhat al-Nusra, was still loyal to Baghdadi. He found that Abu Muhammad al-Julani, the Syrian branch’s leader, was a “cunning person” and “double-faced”—according to an account published by isis—so Anbari and Baghdadi plotted against him. The two formed independent relationships with key members of Jabhat al-Nusra, and then Baghdadi unilaterally announced a merger between the two branches. Although the merger didn’t last, many of Jabhat al-Nusra’s leaders went over to Baghdadi’s group. Anbari was also tasked with communicating with al-Qaeda, under the nom de guerre Abu Suhayb al-Iraqi, to resolve the jihadist infighting. The reconciliation effort failed and al-Qaeda formally disavowed isis in February 2014.
For Syrian rebels, Anbari was the face of isis as he met and negotiated with them from late 2012 through the summer of 2014. After the takeover of Mosul, he turned his full attention to sharpening the organization’s ideology. Indeed, he became the ideologue in chief, in which capacity he trained senior clerics, instructed members to draft religious texts, and issued fatwas about major issues affecting the caliphate. Under his supervision, a Jordanian pilot was condemned to immolation, a dark realization of the younger Anbari’s desire to burn the ghajars who’d come to Mujama Barzan; Yazidis who came in contact with the group were massacred or enslaved; and two tribes in Syria and Iraq were massacred as a warning against rebellion in the wake of the group’s capture of one-third of Iraq and nearly half of Syria. Anbari also labeled Syria’s moderate rebels as apostates in 2013, and authored a detailed fatwa against them.
Later on, Baghdadi appointed Anbari to serve as the group’s chief of finance, a task that involved regular travels between Syria and Iraq. In March 2016, on one of those frequent trips, Anbari was killed near the Syrian city of Shaddadi, along the Syrian-Iraqi border. According to the biography, American soldiers attempted to capture him in a raid but he blew himself up using a suicide belt. Anbari outlived Zarqawi by 10 years, and out-influenced him.
Perhaps scholars have ignored Anbari’s contributions because he was so elusive. He had, for example, around a dozen noms de guerre. For many years the U.S. thought he was at least two different people. Officials had only two pictures of him. When he was captured briefly in Mosul in 2005, his U.S. captors did not know his true identity, because he used fake documents. The second time he was captured, in 2006, they recognized him but only as the local terrorist cleric from Tal Afar, rather than as the leader of the al-Qaeda–dominated Mujahideen Shura Council.
Zarqawi led a jihadist group that later evolved into the Islamic State of Iraq and later still into the Islamic State proper—but it is too simplistic to say that isis was Zarqawi’s brainchild. Experts who closely tracked Zarqawi’s early activism agree that the Jordanian had no clear sectarian vision before he arrived in Iraq, and his ideas before that did not depart from mainstream jihadist worldviews. Nada Bakos, a former CIA analyst and the author of the forthcoming The Targeter: My Life in the CIA, on the Hunt for the Godfather of isis, told me that Zarqawi “was a good tactician, not a strategic thinker, and he was responding to the circumstances around him. People near him built the strategy of what he wanted to achieve.”
Husham Alhashimi, an Iraqi historian of jihadist groups who advises the Iraqi government on isis, studied the insurgency against the United States up close from the outset. He pointed to three Iraqi ideologues who directly shaped Zarqawi’s thinking and approach. They had similar profiles to Anbari in terms of religious training and were all wanted by the former regime for their extremist ideas and activities: Abu Abdulrahman al-Iraqi, a former aide to Zarqawi who currently in jail; Nidham Addin Rifaai, who was imprisoned several times, starting in 1978, for involvement in the Salafi Monotheists Movement and who is also currently in jail; and Abdullah Abdelsamad al-Mufti, who has been wanted since 1991 and who is a highly regarded Salafi ideologue in Iraq.
Alhashimi said these Iraqi jihadist clerics advanced ideas eventually rejected by al-Qaeda but embraced by isis, including extreme sectarianism and the concept of establishing an Islamic state. “These clerics had a complete school of jurisprudence and methodology, as well as foundational religious texts,” Alhashimi said. “Zarqawi was merely a commander who worked according to their approach, which was why his approach diverged from al-Maqdisi and bin Laden after he mingled with the people of Iraq.”
What sets Anbari apart from these clerics is that in addition to holding extreme sectarian views at least a decade before Zarqawi’s appearance, he had a high-level organizational role within al-Qaeda in Iraq and later within isis. He was the longest-serving and highest-ranking cleric within the organization since its inception until his death.
Recognizing the central role of Anbari in the formation of isis, and of the events that cultivated leaders like him before the 2003 invasion, establishes that the group was not merely the creation of one cunning Jordanian jihadist. It seems that Zarqawi landed in a country where the ideological contours of the group he would one day lead had already been defined. He was influenced by the existing environment and by the native ideologues who shaped it before him.
The distinction matters. If isis grew organically for at least a decade before the U.S. invasion, and before Zarqawi’s arrival, that helps explain how it was able to rise in and then dominate a country as demographically diverse as Iraq. The group has deeper roots than has previously been acknowledged.
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
Samyadams Administrateur
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Ven 4 Jan 2019 - 23:03
Merci pour la partage, Adam, un article très instructif sur le cancer jihadiste. Les idéologues créent un terreau fertile ou les combattants poussent comme des champignons. Le dénominateur commun est la haine de l'autre, beaucoup plus que la foi en Dieu, qui ne semble servir que de paravent.
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YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Sam 5 Jan 2019 - 0:13
Echange de tirs entre Kurdes et soldats Turcs près de la frontière arméno-turque
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Sam 5 Jan 2019 - 13:40
Citation :
L’un des « cerveaux » présumés de l’attentat contre l’USS Cole visé par une frappe américaine au Yémen
Le 12 octobre 2000, alors qu’il se trouvait au mouillage dans le port d’Aden [Yémen], le destroyer américain USS Cole fut la cible d’un attentat suicide mené au moyen d’une embarcation pleine d’explosifs et revendiqué, plus tard, par al-Qaïda. Le bilan fut de 17 marins tués et de 39 autres blessés. Depuis, plusieurs cadres d’al-Qaïda, impliqués de près ou de loin dans la préparation de cette attaque, ont été tués ou capturés. Ainsi, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, fut éliminé par une frappe réalisée par un drone Predator de la CIA en novembre 2002 au Yémen. Même chose pour Fahd al-Quso, en 2012. En revanche, Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri fut fait prisonnier et envoyé en détention à Guantanamo. Mais sans doute faudra-t-il bientôt ajouter à cette liste le nom de Jamel Ali al-Badawi. Soupçonné d’avoir été l’un des « cerveaux » de l’attaque contre l’USS Cole, ce dernier a été visé par la première frappe américaine de l’année au Yémen. « Une frappe de précision a été menée le 1er janvier dans le gouvernorat de Marib, au Yémen, dont la cible était Jamel al-Badawi, un ancien agent d’Al-Qaïda au Yémen impliqué dans l’attentat contre l’USS Cole », a en effet indiqué, le 4 janvier, le commandant Bill Urban, un porte-parole du commandement militaire américain pour l’Asie centrale et le Moyen-Orient [US CENTCOM]. « Les forces américaines évaluent toujours les résultats de la frappe, selon un processus approfondi visant à confirmer sa mort », a-t-il ajouté. Les États-Unis accusaient al-Badawi d’avoir fourni le bateau et les explosifs ayant été utilisés contre l’USS Cole. La justice américaine avait retenu pas moins de 50 chefs d’inculpation contre lui et le plaça sur sa liste des personnes les plus recherchées, sa tête ayant été mise à prix pour 5 millions de dollars. Àgé d’une cinquantaine d’année, al-Badawi avait été capturé une première fois par les autorités yéménites en 2003. Évadé, il fut de nouveau repris en mars 2004, puis condamné à mort pour son implication dans l’attaque contre l’USS Cole. Mais il parvint à s’évader de nouveau, en 2006. À l’époque, il fut raconté que lui et ses complices avaient utilisé des balais et des morceaux d’un ventilateur cassé pour creuser un tunnel menant de la prison à une mosquée voisine. http://www.opex360.com/2019/01/05/lun-des-cerveaux-presumes-de-lattentat-contre-luss-cole-vise-par-une-frappe-americaine-au-yemen/
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Invité Invité
Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Sam 5 Jan 2019 - 16:13
YASSINE a écrit:
Kursad2 a écrit:
YASSINE a écrit:
Bonjour Kursad, ton amour pour ta patrie est respectable, la vérité sur le terrain est autre..... relis toi et compte combien de fois tu as dit le mot Turquie!! la turqui est une puissance émergente oui je te l'accord, mais face à la chine ou Russie ou l'alliance arabe ne fera jamais le poids et risque de faire un bon de 50 ans en arrière, votre économie est volatile ce qui la rend très fragile( samy l'a bien détaillé) et crois moi je ne pense pas que dans la région vous aillez que des amis (même le Qatar risque de changer de camps) des petits lien pour toi: Syrie: le retrait US reporté? (en attendant vos troupes dans la région s’épuisent et votre logistique aussi) https://fr.sputniknews.com/international/201901011039504217-trump-report-retrait-us-syrie/
Ankara veut l’aval de Moscou pour « en finir » avec les Kurdes de Syri https://www.lemonde.fr/international/article/2018/12/31/ankara-veut-l-aval-de-moscou-pour-en-finir-avec-les-kurdes-de-syrie_5403869_3210.html en même temps les vrais puissance ne se soucient de personnes exemple des USA ou Russe!!
Le retrait US n'est pas reporté, Trump a bien démenti les médias qui ont affirmé que le retrait était reporté, donc fake news.
La Turquie fera le nécessaire, sur ça j'ai pas de doute, concernant l'économie turque, elle est volatile? La baisse de la livre turque n'était que spéculative, l'économie turque reste puissante, d'ailleurs, pour la première fois, les exportations dépassent les importations. Le paiement des comptes courants est au vert, l'inflation est maitrisée et la livre turque a gagnée de la valeur depuis.
On a trop attendu à être passif, et on doit faire payer le prix fort à ceux qui voudront s'en prendre à nous.
Bonjour, voilà un exemple concernant le volet économique, quand je dis que la situation économique reste très volatile.... En Turquie, l'inflation atteint des records et le peuple s'impatiente https://fr.news.yahoo.com/turquie-linflation-atteint-records-peuple-simpatiente-151929214.html?guccounter=1
La crise financière de la Turquie: Les symptômes du déclin http://www.alterinfo.net/La-crise-financiere-de-la-Turquie-Les-symptomes-du-declin_a140934.html
Vous vivez sur place? Les médias d'Occident parle de crise tout le temps, je ne vois pas crise. Donc à la poubelle. La Turquie a réalisé sa plus grande taux d'exportation depuis la proclamation de la République avec une croissance de 4.5%. Donc oui, la réforme économique continue, passer d'une économie de consommation à une économie de production, c'est le plus grand défit.
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Sam 5 Jan 2019 - 19:24
on est bien d'accord qu'il n'y a pas de fumer sans feu!! La Turquie en route vers une crise économique majeure
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Dim 6 Jan 2019 - 10:38
Les Forces armées turques continuent d’envoyer des renforts militaires à la frontière syrienne en amont de l’éventuelle opération à l’est de l’Euphrate en Syrie
Il y a même pas de feu. Concernant la Syrie, les troupes turcs toujours en mouvement vers la Syrie. Il y a toujours des préparatifs..
Samyadams Administrateur
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Dim 6 Jan 2019 - 13:06
Une opération turque dans le nord-est de la Syrie est fort peu probable, le mouvement de troupes, c'est juste la manière d'Erdogan de négocier avec les Américains et les Russes une compensation, sachant que les Russes maintiennent la pression sur la Turquie pour qu'elle règle le problème des jihadistes massés à Idlib.
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YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Dim 6 Jan 2019 - 14:58
Samyadams a écrit:
Une opération turque dans le nord-est de la Syrie est fort peu probable, le mouvement de troupes, c'est juste la manière d'Erdogan de négocier avec les Américains et les Russes une compensation, sachant que les Russes maintiennent la pression sur la Turquie pour qu'elle règle le problème des jihadistes massés à Idlib.
je suis d'accord avec toi Samy, mais à quel cout!!!
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Dim 6 Jan 2019 - 15:01
l'info vient de se confirmer... circulez y a rien à voir!! La Turquie doit s'engager à ne pas attaquer les Kurdes, dit Bolton https://fr.news.yahoo.com/la-turquie-doit-sengager-%C3%A0-ne-pas-attaquer-121605337.html?guccounter=1
Fahed64 Administrateur
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Dim 6 Jan 2019 - 15:17
Population civil ou terroriste ?
Il est évident que les turcs vont pas tirer sciemment sur des civils ...
_________________ Sois généreux avec nous, Ô toi Dieu et donne nous la Victoire
Adam Modérateur
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Lun 7 Jan 2019 - 20:48
Times Of Israel a écrit:
Israel said set to seek $250b compensation for Jews forced out of Arab countries
After 18 months of research, first claims being finalized for reported $35b from Tunisia, $15b from Libya, for assets Jews left behind when kicked out after establishment of Israel
Israel is preparing to demand compensation totaling a reported $250 billion from seven Arab countries and Iran for property and assets left behind by Jews who were forced to flee those countries following the establishment of the State of Israel.
“The time has come to correct the historic injustice of the pogroms (against Jews) in seven Arab countries and Iran, and to restore, to hundreds of thousands of Jews who lost their property, what is rightfully theirs,” Israel’s Minister for Social Equality, Gila Gamliel, who is coordinating the Israeli government’s handling of the issue, said Saturday.
According to figures cited Saturday night by Israel’s Hadashot TV news, compensation demands are now being finalized with regards to the first two of the eight countries involved, with Israel set to seek $35 billion dollars in compensation for lost Jewish assets from Tunisia, and $15 billion dollars from Libya.
In total, the TV report said Israel will seek over $250 billion from those two countries plus Morocco, Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Yemen and Iran.
Justice for Jews from Arab Countries (JJAC), an international umbrella group of Jewish community organizations, has estimated that some 856,000 Jews from 10 Arab countries — the other two were Algeria and Lebanon — fled or were expelled in 1948 and after, while violent Arab riots left many Jews dead or injured.
For the past 18 months, utilizing the services of an international accountancy firm, the Israeli government has quietly been researching the value of property and assets that these Jews were forced to leave behind, the TV report said.
It is now moving toward finalizing claims as the Trump Administration prepares for the possible unveiling of its much-anticipated Israeli-Palestinian peace proposal. A 2010 Israeli law provides that any peace deal must provide for compensation for assets of Jewish communities and individual Jews forced out of Arab countries and Iran.
“One cannot talk about the Middle East without taking into consideration the rights of the Jews who were forced to leave their thriving communities amid violence,” said Gamliel, a member of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud party.
“All the crimes that were carried out against those Jewish communities must be recognized.”
The Palestinian Authority has sought over $100 billion in compensation from Israel for assets left behind by Arab residents of what is today Israel who fled or were forced to leave at the time of the establishment of the Jewish state, and presented documentation to that effect to the United States a decade ago, the TV report said.
The Palestinians have also always demanded a “right of return” to what is today’s Israel for the few tens of thousands of surviving refugees and for their millions of descendants. This demand would spell the end of Israel as a Jewish state and has been dismissed by successive Israeli governments. Israel argues that Palestinian refugees would become citizens of a Palestinian state under a permanent peace accord, just as Jewish refugees from Arab lands became citizens of Israel. It also argues that by extending refugee status to Palestinian descendants, the relevant UN agencies artificially inflate the issue, complicating peace efforts. The latter view is shared by the Trump administration, which last year announced it was halting funding for the UN’s Palestinian refugee agency, UNRWA.
Israel has never formally demanded compensation for Jews forced out of Arab lands and Iran, and although many of those Jews arrived in Israel with next to nothing, they did not seek formal refugee status from the international community.
At the time, the newly established Jewish state was struggling to attract migration from the world’s Jews and to project its legitimacy as a sovereign state, able to care for its own people. Its first prime minister, David Ben Gurion, would not have wanted Jews returning to their “historic homeland” classed as refugees, according to Meir Kahlon, chairman of the Central Organization for Jews from Arab Countries and Iran.
Monies obtained from the eight countries would not be allocated to individual families, the TV report said, but would rather be distributed by the state via a special fund. Gamliel is coordinating the process, together with Israel’s National Security Council, which works out of the Prime Minister’s Office.
In 2014, Israel passed a law making each November 30 a day commemorating the exit and deportation of Jews from Arab and Iranian lands, which involves educational programming and diplomatic events aimed to increase international awareness of the issue of Jewish refugees from Arab lands and Iran, and of their right to compensation.
That year, at the first such events, Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin issued calls for financial reparations.
“It is not for nothing that this day is marked on the day after the 29th of November,” Netanyahu said on November 30, 2014, in reference to the anniversary of the UN adoption of the Palestine partition plan in 1947. “The Arab countries, which never accepted the UN declaration on the establishment of a Jewish state, compelled the Jews living in their territories to leave their homes while leaving their assets behind… We have acted – and will continue to act – so that they and their claims are not forgotten.”
In his address at that first ceremony, Rivlin appealed for greater Sephardic representation in Israeli society, as well as for compensation for their suffering. He acknowledged that the troubles of Middle Eastern Jews were not mitigated upon their arrival in Israel, where European Jews were firmly entrenched in power.
“Their voices were muted, but the words were in their mouths all along, even if they were said in Hebrew with a Persian or Arabic accent, which in Israel were thought of as enemy languages and viewed as a source of shame,” he said.
“The voice of Jews from Arab countries and Iran must be heard within the education system, in the media, in the arts, and in the country’s official institutions, as it needs to be heard in the international arena as well, in order to mend the historical injustice, and to ensure financial reparations,” Rivlin said.
Kahlon said that “nearly 800,000 came here (in the years after the establishment of the state) and the rest (around 56,000) went to the United States, France, Italy and elsewhere.”
Kahlon himself came to Israel as a child from Libya and spent his first years in the Jewish state in one of the tent camps set up to shelter the flood of newcomers.
In March 2014, Canada formally recognized the refugee status of the Jewish emigres who fled or were expelled from Arab countries after Israel’s founding.
Some of the migrants to Israel say privately that the issue is being promoted to give Israel a bargaining card in negotiations with the Palestinians, to set against Palestinian compensation claims for property and assets left behind in what is now Israel.
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
YASSINE Capitaine
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Sujet: Re: Actualités au Moyen Orient Mar 8 Jan 2019 - 19:10
après le retrait kurde, la police militaire russe patrouille dans les environs de Manbij
Lun 4 Juin 2018 - 13:51
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