Actualités au Moyen Orient

RecepIvedik a écrit:

C'est comme ça .. On est en 2020 ça va très vite .. c'est la fibre ..


Rappelle toi que pour les S400 tu m'a dis la même chose et aujourd'hui ils sont en Turquie prêt à l'emploi .

Bien entendu qu'avant de lâcher le moindre morceau du gateau l'oncle Donald, il a essayé de neutraliser la Turquie ..

Malgré tout ce que tu cites. La Turquie a-t-elle décidé de s'imposer en Libye  ? oui ...
Donc tout ça ça marche pas avec la Turquie . Elle est toujours là en 2020 et toujours puissante voire plus ..

Les sanctions CAATSA elles ont été votés . Ils ont menacés de les appliquer.. L'ont ils fait ? Non.

Ils ont dit on arrête la production des pieces du F35 ... Ils viennent d'annoncer qu'ils ont aucune solution et que les pièces seront produites en Turquie jusqu'au moins fin 2020 ...

Ce que tu dis c'est du sentimentalisme.

Moi je regarde les faits . Je les additionne je les soustraits et je sors mes conneries ...

Le Monde a écrit:

L’essor du tourisme sexuel à Dubaï

L’émirat de Dubaï est devenu, avec des dizaines de milliers de prostituées, la principale destination de tourisme sexuel dans le Golfe.

Si la fédération des Emirats arabes unis est dirigée depuis Abou Dhabi par Mohammed Ben Zayed, Dubaï en représente la capitale économique, avec à sa tête, depuis 2006, Mohammed Ben Rachid al-Maktoum, à la fois vice-président et Premier ministre de la fédération. L’émirat de Dubaï compte trois des quelque dix millions de résidents de la fédération, mais avec une proportion de nationaux de l’ordre de seulement 5%, encore plus faible que celle du reste des Emirats arabes unis. Dubaï accueille en effet une très forte population expatriée, du salaire le plus bas au plus élevé, et a attiré 19 millions de visiteurs en 2019, là encore depuis les séjours tout-compris, plutôt abordables, jusqu’au très haut de gamme. La prostitution, officiellement interdite aux Emirats, mais tolérée de fait à Dubaï, a transformé cette ville en destination privilégiée du tourisme sexuel dans le Golfe.

LA FACE CACHEE DE LA MONDIALISATION

Le pari de Dubaï sur son insertion spectaculaire dans la mondialisation a été particulièrement réussi, même après la crise financière de 2008 qui a contraint l’émirat à développer ses activités de service, au premier rang desquels le tourisme. La consommation d’alcool est autorisée dans les hôtels, les bars, les restaurants et les night-clubs disposant d’une licence spécifique, même si elle reste interdite dans l’espace public. C’est généralement dans de tels lieux que des travailleuses sexuelles racolent le client potentiel, s’accordant avec lui sur le montant, la durée et la nature de la prestation. Il est ainsi possible de s’attacher le service d’une escort girl durant tout ou partie de son séjour dans l’émirat. Une hiérarchie tacite considère les prostituées chinoises, philippines ou indiennes de moindre valeur que leurs homologues d’Asie centrale, elles-mêmes moins appréciées que les Européennes, qu’elles soient russes, ukrainiennes ou occidentales. Les partenaires arabes demeurent les plus rares, donc les plus recherchées, car opérant moins souvent dans l’espace public.

Le nombre de prostituées actives à Dubaï, estimé dès 2010 à 30.000, est parfois évalué à 45.000. Il est naturellement impossible de le connaître avec précision, car il repose sur un complexe système où des ressortissants émiratis, autorisés à « parrainer » l’entrée d’un certain nombre d’étrangers sur des visas de résidence, cèdent ces droits de parrainage à des intermédiaires, sans forcément connaître l’activité réelle des futures « immigrées ».

Le système des visas de résidence, malgré sa réforme de 2016, continue de permettre ce type de manipulations, tandis que les réseaux démantelés concernent plutôt le bas-de-gamme de la prostitution. La transaction souvent conclue sans intermédiaire accrédite l’illusion d’une absence de proxénétisme, même s’il est inconcevable d’offrir de tels services à Dubaï sans une solide protection. L’ONU a publié en 2017 le témoignage d’une « esclave sexuelle » (sic) originaire d’Ouzbékistan qui, après 18 mois de cauchemar à Dubaï, a préféré se laisser arrêter par la police émiratie pour être expulsée. Plus récemment, c’est au Bangladesh qu’ont été diffusées les accablantes révélations de victimes de ce type de trafic, attirées à Dubaï par de fausses promesses d’emploi domestique.

ENTRE NORMALISATION ET VACCINATION

Le traité de paix signé entre Israël et les Emirats arabes uni, en septembre dernier, s’est très vite accompagné de l’ouverture de liaisons aériennes directes entre les deux pays. Plus de cent mille touristes israéliens ont d’ores et déjà visité Dubaï, où l’hospitalité démonstrative à leur égard contraste avec la « paix froide » réservée jusque là aux visiteurs israéliens en Jordanie et en Egypte. Mais la presse israélienne a aussi consacré plusieurs reportages à scandale à des formes de tourisme sexuel.

Le quotidien « Yedioth Aharonoth » a ainsi décrit de véritables catalogues de prostituées, avec les transactions qui peuvent en découler autour de la piscine d’un grand hôtel. Le site en ligne « Mako » s’est pour sa part intéressé à la reconversion de mafieux israéliens dans des « agences d’escorte » à Dubaï, tout en reproduisant, en captures d’écran, des échanges relevant du proxénétisme. Le quotidien « Haaretz » a même publié une tribune intitulée « Visiter Dubaï équivaut à se tenir au bord d’un viol collectif ». Les défenseurs de la normalisation israélo-émiratie ont protesté contre de telles outrances et relativisé l’importance des témoignages rapportés, sans représentativité à leurs yeux.

Il semble en tout cas que le tourisme sexuel soit, de manière générale, appelé à se développer encore à Dubaï. Cela fait plusieurs années que le rapport annuel du Département d’Etat américain sur les trafics d’êtres humains considère, malgré des remarques encourageantes, que « le gouvernement des Emirats arabes unis ne respecte pas pleinement les standards minimaux pour l’élimination des trafics ». La pandémie de coronavirus ne devrait pas affecter cette réalité, bien au contraire. En effet, la campagne menée de manière volontariste aux Emirats a déjà permis de vacciner plus d’un tiers de la population contre le Covid-19. Un argument supplémentaire pour les sites spécialisés qui vantent sur Internet les « sales petits secrets » de Dubaï et les charmes des « vacances sexuelles » dans cet émirat…

Citation :

https://mobile.twitter.com/SPAregions/status/1374006361969819657

Citation :

https://mobile.twitter.com/ELINTNews/status/1375101239076225031

Citation :

https://mobile.twitter.com/kdpfro/status/1375035894588178433

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NoK_ZyQEiso&t=1s a écrit:

https://news.cgtn.com/news/2021-03-27/China-Iran-sign-25-year-cooperation-agreement--YYwfPrZaVy/index.html a écrit:

https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/02/politics/iran-nuclear-deal-vienna/index.html a écrit:

Citation :

Jordanian royal detained in alleged plot against King Abdullah II

Joby Warrick
Jordanian authorities detained the kingdom’s former crown prince and arrested nearly 20 other people Saturday after what officials called a “threat to the country’s stability.”

Prince Hamzah bin Hussein, the oldest son of the late King Hussein and his American-born wife Queen Noor, was placed under restriction at his Amman palace, amid an ongoing investigation into an alleged plot to unseat his half brother, King Abdullah II, according to a senior Middle East intelligence official briefed on the events.

The move followed the discovery of what palace officials described as a complex and far-reaching plot that including at least one other Jordanian royal as well as tribal leaders and members of the country’s security establishment.

Additional arrests were expected, said the intelligence official, who like others interviewed, spoke on the condition of anonymity, citing security sensitivities surrounding the ongoing law-enforcement operation. A Jordanian adviser to the palace confirmed that arrests had been made related to a “threat to the country’s stability.”

Prince Hamzah served as Jordan’s crown prince for four years before the title was transferred to the current monarch’s eldest son, Hussein.

Hamzah was informed of his detention by senior Jordanian military officers who arrived at his house with an escort of guards, even as the other arrests were getting underway, the intelligence official said.

The sweeping arrests also have been reported on Jordanian social media.

It was unclear how close the alleged plotters were to carrying out the plan, or what, exactly, they planned to do. The intelligence official described the plan as “well-organized” and said the plotters appeared to have “foreign ties,” though he did not elaborate.

Among the others arrested was Sharif Hasan, who also is a member of the royal family; and Bassem Awadullah, a Saudi citizen, the official said.

Jordan, a close ally to the United States, has been hard-hit economically by the covid-19 pandemic as well as the fallout from massive waves of refugees from Syria, its northern neighbor. King Abdullah has ruled the country since King Hussein’s death in 1999, and cultivated close ties with a succession of U.S. presidents. The resource-poor kingdom of 10 million is a major partner in the U.S.-led campaign against the Islamic State and has assisted U.S. forces in security operations around the globe.

مصدر مطلع لبترا: صاحب السمو الملكي الأمير حمزة بن الحسين ليس قيد الإقامة المنزلية ولا موقوفاً كما تتداول بعض وسائل الإعلامhttps://t.co/abPHqQ6tyY#بترا #الاردن pic.twitter.com/VzoBi71Y0g

— Jordan News Agency (@Petranews) April 3, 2021

Jordan News Agency a écrit:

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Maj. Gen. Yousef Huneiti on Saturday denied claims about the arrest of Prince Hamza bin Al-Hussein and said the Prince was asked to stop "movements and activities that are used to target" the security and stability of Jordan, adding that the move is part of joint comprehensive investigations undertaken by security agencies, and as a result of which Sharif Hassan bin Zaid, Basem Ibrahim Awadallah and others have been arrested.

The army chief indicated that the investigations are ongoing and their results will be announced with full transparency and clarity.

He stressed that all the measures taken were carried out according to the law and after extensive investigations that prompted them. He also emphasized that "no one is above the law and that Jordan’s security and stability take precedence over any consideration."

Cabinet Royal a écrit:

“Sa Majesté le Roi Mohammed VI, que Dieu L’Assiste, a eu dimanche tôt le matin un entretien téléphonique avec Son frère Sa Majesté le Roi Abdallah II Ibn Al Hussein, Souverain du Royaume Hachémite de Jordanie.

Cet entretien téléphonique a été l’occasion de rassurer Sa Majesté le Roi de la situation sur la base des données que le Souverain jordanien a partagées avec Sa Majesté le Roi.

A cette occasion, le Souverain a réitéré Sa solidarité entière et naturelle avec la Jordanie sœur et le soutien total de Sa Majesté à toutes les décisions prises par Sa Majesté le Roi Abdallah II pour consolider la sécurité et la stabilité.

Cet entretien téléphonique intervient en concrétisation des forts liens historiques et familiaux unissant les deux Souverains et les deux Familles royales, et des liens entre les deux pays et les deux peuples frères”.

https://www.reuters.com/article/us-jordan-security/jordans-former-queen-says-allegations-against-prince-hamza-are-wicked-slander-idUSKBN2BR0DM a écrit:

Yasmina Abouzzohour - Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis - Brookings a écrit:

Heavy lies the crown: The survival of Arab monarchies, 10 years after the Arab Spring

These monarchies’ unfulfilled promises of reform and development will catch up with them, and they will have to adapt the ways in which they interact with opposition actors and their wider populations, especially as further and greater contestation is imminent.

Ten years ago, the Arab uprisings unseated four “presidents for life” in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, and Yemen. The Middle East and North Africa’s (MENA) eight monarchs were spared, although many of their countries experienced moderate or significant unrest, including Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, Jordan, and Morocco. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Qatar faced the least contestation of the monarchies.

Since then, scholars have asked what it means that no monarch was overthrown and whether Arab monarchy matters to the outcome of regime survival. Various experts have linked the latter to monarchs’ legitimacy, external support, and resource wealth. Though there is no consensus, it is clear that monarchs have repeatedly and successfully contained different types of opposition threats for decades prior to the Arab Spring and continue to do so 10 years later.

Today the question of Arab monarchical survival remains highly relevant. Since the 2011 uprisings, protests erupted across Jordan, Morocco, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Kuwait. They were usually triggered, at least in part, by economic hardship, which suggests that protests will continue, especially given the economic consequences of the coronavirus pandemic. Worryingly, across the board, Arab monarchs have increasingly repressed critics and opposition actors. In extreme cases, regimes have resorted to assassination and torture; in others, they have used judicial proceedings and long prison sentences to constrain dissidents.

As popular discontent grows due to heightened repression and persistent economic woes, further contestation will likely take place in many of these cases. However, Arab monarchs may find that their usual containment strategies will prove less effective as populations and opposition movements transform, and that the time has come for them to adapt their behavior.

THE MONARCHS’ SPRING

Arab Spring-related protests across the monarchies were broadly triggered by a combination of economic, social, and political factors. For example, in Saudi Arabia, where unrest was catalyzed by the self-immolation of an elderly man due to poor living conditions, people protested economic hardship, anti-Shia discrimination, and the constrained political scene. The most significant unrest occurred in the oil-producing, Shia-populated Eastern Province whose residents repeatedly took to the streets because of marginalization, inequality, and repression.

In oil-rich Kuwait, citizens sought a more representative political system and reforms that would reduce the emir’s powers, notably through the legalization of political parties. In economically vulnerable monarchies like Jordan, Morocco, and Oman, unrest was triggered by high unemployment rates, planned subsidy reforms, and soaring food and fuel prices. Protesters also sought constitutional reforms, better electoral laws, transparent elections, and stronger legislative branches. The UAE and Qatar experienced very limited unrest. Around 150 Emiratis organized a petition asking for greater political opening through universal suffrage and a more powerful Federal National Council. In Qatar, there were no petitions nor protests; however, shortly after the Kuwaiti regime announced it would provide citizens with a total of $4 billion in handouts, Qatari nationals demanded a similar package, according to local sources.

At the other end of the spectrum, Bahrain experienced the most unrest, as protests that initially sought political opening and equality for the Shia majority escalated due to the regime’s use of excessive force. In fact, Bahrain was the only monarchy where the protest movement called for the abdication of the ruling family. Brutal violence triggered more protests, which led to further repression. This loop eventually intensified, and the Bahraini monarchy requested and obtained military aid from its neighbors to contain the situation.

SURVIVING THE ARAB SPRING

Most Arab monarchs attempted to contain the 2011 uprisings in a broadly similar manner: They granted monetary incentives and limited political concessions, which they combined with repressive tactics that constrained persistent protesters and deterred further contestation. Of course, depending on regime wealth and type, some offered more concessions or repressed protesters more harshly than others.

Indeed, Arab monarchies can be categorized according to their political systems and economic conditions. Broadly, there are the poorest kingdoms — Morocco and Jordan — and the relatively wealthier Gulf monarchies. The latter group can be further divided into three categories: super-rentier states with small populations and high reserves of natural resources (Kuwait, Qatar, and the UAE), an oil-wealthy kingdom with a significantly larger population (Saudi Arabia), and the economically vulnerable Gulf monarchies (Oman and Bahrain).

Their political systems range from absolute monarchy to soft dictatorships. Morocco and Jordan fit the latter description; they have both a minimum component of democracy and mechanisms that ensure the ruler remains the most powerful actor. Although Kuwait and Bahrain have minor openings and developing civil society groups, Gulf monarchies overall have more restrictive political systems compared to Morocco and Jordan.

These categorizations help explain how regimes interact with populations and opposition movements. Wealthier monarchies can provide citizens with material perks in a way that poorer monarchies cannot. During the uprisings, while poorer monarchies like Morocco and Jordan offered modest monetary concessions like delayed austerity measures and increased subsidies, super-rentier states such as the United Arab Emirates could afford multi-billion-dollar development projects. Furthermore, monarchies with strong civil society and political groups face greater or more frequent opposition than absolute monarchies and are less likely to harshly repress them. This partly explains why security forces in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia killed a massive number of protesters compared to in Morocco and Jordan.

Yet, most Arab monarchs contained the 2011 uprisings by granting monetary and political concessions as well as repression. Notably, the Saudi regime promised to spend $130 billion to increase salaries, build housing, and undertake other projects. The UAE pledged $1.6 billion for infrastructure projects in the poorer northern emirates. The Bahraini regime pre-emptively granted every Bahraini family $2,600 in cash handouts, while the Kuwaiti regime provided all citizens with $3,500. Qatar increased public sector wages for nationals by 60%. Austerity measures were delayed in Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Oman, and Jordan promised to create tens of thousands of public sector jobs. Subsidies were increased or introduced in Morocco, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait.

In terms of political concessions, Arab monarchs granted limited reforms that minimally constrained them while addressing some of the opposition’s demands. In Qatar, the regime pre-emptively announced elections for the legislative body (thus far postponed) and laws in favor of separation of powers. Deeper constitutional reforms were carried out in Jordan, Morocco, and Oman. New elections were announced in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan. Rulers reshuffled cabinets, dissolved parliaments, or dismissed government officials targeted by protesters in Kuwait, Jordan, and Oman. New electoral laws were created in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Jordan, and Morocco. The reforms sought to appease protesters and contain the threat of the uprisings, not to democratize or genuinely open the political sphere. In most cases, the disingenuity of these reforms triggered further protests later, which were immediately repressed.

Overall, repression was used not excessively like in Bahrain, but rather as a supplementary tool aiming to ensure that protesters accepted concessions and to deter further protests. Protesters were arrested across the board, and freedoms were constrained thereafter. In Kuwait, stateless Bidoon protesters were either ignored or threatened with deportation. In Saudi Arabia, where the regime increased the presence of security forces at the onset of the protests, Shia protesters in the Eastern Province were targeted more than Sunni protesters. In many of these monarchies, activists who criticized the regime following the uprisings were imprisoned.

AFTER THE SPRING

Despite hopes that the uprisings would bring greater political opening to these kingdoms, Arab monarchs have not fulfilled most promises of liberalization. The ensuing popular disillusionment with these regimes — combined with economic hardship, inequality, and corruption — led to repeated episodes of contestation since 2011.

In Bahrain, protests re-erupted, ranging from large demonstrations — such as in March 2012, attended by around 100,000 people — to smaller-scale rallies like on February 14 of this year. Security forces and protesters clashed repeatedly between 2011 and 2020. Most of these protests were peaceful, but all were met with brutal repression, including torture, beatings, arrests, tear gas, live ammunition, and intimidation. Authorities also blocked access to the internet, raided schools, and arrested and charged medical workers who had treated protesters.

In the other less extreme cases, freedoms and the space for contestation were greatly restricted after 2011. Monarchies such as Kuwait and Oman adopted new, more restrictive laws. Activists and protest organizers were imprisoned in Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Morocco. There have been reports of torture in Saudi Arabia. Police forces used beatings, tear gas, or water cannons against protesters in Jordan. The Saudi regime repressed repeated dissent in the Qatif region between 2017 and 2020. It also implemented a two-year purge of prominent business and political figures, carried out a crackdown against feminists between 2018 and 2019, and is widely believed to have orchestrated the murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi.

Jordan saw major protests between 2016 and 2020. Most were triggered by economic issues — namely unemployment, austerity measures, and reduced spending — though in a few instances, protesters did call for political reform like rallies in 2018. That same year, a new tax law and International Monetary Fund-imposed austerity measures sparked several general strikes, which escalated to a series of country-wide protests. Though smaller in scale, similar protests followed in 2019 and 2020. Most were peaceful, yet were met with a harsh security response, including pre-trial detentions, home raids, the dissolution of unions, arrests, and harsher internet laws.

In Oman, youth groups took to the streets in 2018 and 2019 to demand jobs and were arrested, beaten, or dispersed. Authorities cracked down on Bidoon protesters seeking Kuwaiti citizenship rights in 2019. Morocco saw an unprecedented boycott in 2019 as well as a series of protests in Jrada, Errachidia, and Rif, with unrest in the latter escalating to country-wide demonstrations against economic marginalization, corruption, and repression. Along with some concessions, protests were met with a strong security response. More widely, freedom of expression has been more restricted in recent years.

OUTLOOK: A TIME FOR CHANGE

Lessons of monarchical survival during and since the Arab uprisings show that monarchs, like all rulers, are opportunistic. To avoid overthrow and maintain power, they use containment and deterrence strategies involving some combination of repression, public spending, and conciliatory steps. Importantly, they have strategically adapted over the years; today, most monarchs know that they are constrained by historical context. They face pressure to use brutal force more sparingly than their predecessors to avoid domestic and international backlash. Instead, they resort to political maneuvring, smear campaigns, and judicial repression.

Opposition actors and populations also learn from regime behavior, modify their actions to promote their interests, and adapt to changing contexts. In Jordan, this meant threatening a possible escalation to a mass revolution to obtain concessions from the regime. In Morocco, new forms of contestation, such as a country-wide boycott, were adopted that avoided traditional repressive tactics. In Oman, silent protests were carried out to express discontent in a country that traditionally has little space for contestation. Importantly, the more regimes repress and the more they renege on promises of liberalization, the more disillusioned populations grow and the less likely they are to accept such promises in the future.

In other words, while they have been successful in the past, these tried-and-true strategies of threat containment will likely become gradually less effective as opposition movements evolve and populations transform. Furthermore, regimes’ heightened use of repression is not sustainable and can lead to backlash. In time, these regimes’ unfulfilled promises of reform and development will catch up with them, and they will have to adapt the ways in which they interact with opposition actors and their wider populations, especially as further and greater contestation is imminent.