Iran vs Israel

Citation :

L’Iran et Israël prêts à en découdre

A la veille de la Conférence de l’ONU sur le racisme qui s’est tenue à Genève, où le président iranien Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a qualifié Israël de régime cruel et raciste, provoquant ainsi un scandale international, le Times britannique avait révélé que les forces aériennes israéliennes étaient prêtes à frapper l’Iran et que des avions israéliens étaient prêts à décoller à tout moment pour effectuer des bombardements massifs contre les sites nucléaires de la République Islamique. Ils attendent simplement que l’ordre leur en soit donné.
Il convient d’ajouter, à cette information du journal britannique, celles de sites israéliens, selon lesquelles le premier ministre Benjamin Nétanyahou a rencontré à trois reprises, la semaine dernière, le ministre de la Défense, le chef d’Etat-major général et d’autres responsables militaires israéliens. Le premier ministre, qui assume également les fonctions de commandant en chef, aurait reçu un rapport détaillé sur la préparation d’une frappe contre les ouvrages militaires de l’Iran. Il aurait été « agréablement étonné » d’apprendre que cette « préparation » était bien avancée.

Jusqu’où ces informations sont-elles fiables, et dans quelle mesure la décision d’Israël de bombarder prochainement le « programme nucléaire iranien » est-elle réaliste ?

Israël n’a jamais caché qu’il n’admettrait pas que l’Iran atteigne un niveau de technologie nucléaire lui permettant de créer sa bombe atomique. On peut comprendre Israël. Le développement par l’Iran de ses technologies nucléaires s’accompagne régulièrement, comme nous l’avons déjà entendu, de déclarations de Téhéran, selon lesquelles Israël n’a pas le droit d’exister sur la carte politique du monde en tant qu’Etat.

Pour Israël, le programme nucléaire iranien comporte toujours une « ligne rouge » au-delà de laquelle l’Iran devient pour lui, en tant qu’Etat, une menace directe. Selon les experts israéliens et européens, cette « ligne rouge » a toujours été évaluée, outre le niveau des technologies nucléaires, à l’aune du facteur temps. La date qui revient le plus souvent est 2010. C’est pourquoi il est permis de penser que ces informations des médias faisaient allusion à la vérification « planifiée », par le nouveau premier ministre israélien, de la préparation du système de défense du pays à l’élimination de sa menace principale.
Ce scénario est confirmé, entre autres, par le fait que les Etats-Unis et Israël prévoient d’effectuer cette année des manœuvres de défense antimissile sous le nom de code de « Juniper Cobra ». Ces manœuvres ont été organisées ces cinq dernières années par les forces antiaériennes israéliennes et l’Agence américaine de défense antimissile (MDA). Mais celles de cette année seront les plus complexes et les plus longues. Cela atteste probablement qu’Israël et les Etats-Unis se préparent sérieusement pour l’année 2010, ne serait-ce que sur le plan défensif.

Peut-on éviter un scénario militaire ? En ce qui concerne Israël, ce pays « vit sans avoir droit à la défaite ». Du moins, c’est ce qu’on pense en Israël. La moindre perte de position est considérée, quasiment, comme la destruction de l’Etat. L’Iran, dans le même temps, ne cache pas ses ambitions de devenir une puissance régionale. S’il réussit à prouver l’inconsistance d’Israël en tant qu’Etat, son objectif sera atteint. Pourquoi ne pas essayer de pousser l’adversaire à aller vers sa défaite ? Et a fortiori vers une défaite militaire, en le contraignant à lancer une opération militaire grosse de conséquences inconnues ?

Il faut rendre son dû à Téhéran. Les paroles et les actes des dirigeants iraniens actuels ne laissent à Israël aucune chance d’éviter de lancer des bombardements aériens contre le programme nucléaire iranien. Téhéran fait état, avec un esprit de suite enviable, de ses nouveaux succès précisément dans les domaines (nucléaire et balistique) qui suscitent l’inquiétude de l’opinion mondiale quant au « caractère civil » de son programme nucléaire.

En fin de compte, grâce à cet esprit de suite de Téhéran, l’inquiétude cède de plus en plus la place à la certitude que l’Iran crée sa bombe atomique. Ou, en tout cas, à la certitude que l’Iran agit précisément en ce sens. Il n’est que de prendre l’une des dernières déclarations de Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, selon laquelle l’« immoralité » des pays possédant des technologies nucléaires a contraint l’Iran à devenir un « Etat nucléaire ». Des « objectifs purement civils » ne s’inscrivent guère dans une telle logique.
Dans cette confrontation irano-israélienne, on connaît déjà le nom d’un des perdants. Quel que puisse être le scénario qui s’écrira, ce sera Moscou.

Si un conflit éclate, par exemple, aujourd’hui, la Russie sera visée de toutes parts. La communauté européenne et les Etats-Unis lui reprocheront de n’avoir pas su persuader Téhéran de renoncer à son programme d’enrichissement de l’uranium ; Israël lui reprochera d’avoir doté d’armes russes l’armée iranienne, et l’Iran lui reprochera de ne pas lui avoir livré les S-300 russes

armée.com-publié le jeudi 23 avril 2009

inanc a écrit:

Je mets une petite pièce sur Syrie-Irak-Iran pour l'itinéraire.

Citation :

Yuval Diskin, Israel Former Intel Chief, Slams Netanyahu's Iran Stance

JERUSALEM — The former head of Israel's Shin Bet security agency has accused the country's political leaders of exaggerating the effectiveness of a possible military strike against Iran, in a striking indication of Israel's turmoil over how to deal with the Iranian nuclear program.

Yuval Diskin said Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Ehud Barak – who have been saber-rattling for months – have their judgment clouded by "messianic feelings" and should not be trusted to lead policy on Iran. Diskin, who headed Shin Bet until last year, said a strike might actually accelerate the Iranian program.

Iran says its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes. Israel, like the West, believes that Tehran is developing weapons technology, but there is intense debate over whether international economic sanctions accompanying the current round of negotiations might prevent Iran from developing a bomb, or whether at some point a military strike should be launched.

Diskin's comments deepened the sense that a rift is growing between the hawkish Netanyahu government and the security establishment over the question of a strike.

In Israel, security figures carry clout well into retirement. Although they frequently pursue political careers, Diskin had been seen as relatively apolitical, perhaps lending his words even greater weight.

"I don't have faith in the current leadership of Israel to lead us to an event of this magnitude, of war with Iran," Diskin said at a public meeting Friday, video of which was posted on the Internet the next day and quickly became the lead news item in Israel.

"I do not believe in a leadership that makes decisions based on Messianic feelings," he continued. "I have seen them up close. They are not messiahs, these two, and they are not the people that I personally trust to lead Israel into an event."

Diskin said it was possible that "one of the results of an Israel attack on Iran could be a dramatic acceleration of the Iran program ... They will have legitimacy to do it more quickly and in a shorter timeframe."

Spokesmen for Netanyahu and Barak both refused comment on the issue.

Further complicating the picture is the widely held belief that Israel's threats are actually a bluff of historic proportion and that indeed they have been effective in compelling the world to boycott Iranian oil and isolate its central bank.

From that perspective, criticism such as Diskin's, based on a literal approach, could be presented as simplistic and damaging.

Israeli security officials have taken issue with the political leadership on several issues: whether sanctions will make a strike unnecessary, whether a strike will be militarily effective, and whether Israel should strike unilaterally if it cannot gain American approval.

Diskin's speech came days after the country's current top military commander, Lt. Gen. Benny Gantz, also seemed to disagree with the country's leadership on the likelihood that Iran will pursue a nuclear weapon.

Gantz told The Associated Press this week that Iran is seeking to develop its "military nuclear capability," but that the Islamic Republic would ultimately bow to international pressure and decide against building a weapon. The key to that pressure, he said, were sanctions and the threat of a military strike.

One of the first criticisms voiced by a security figure came last summer from Israel's recently retired spy chief Meir Dagan. He called a military strike against Iran's nuclear program "stupid." Dagan, who headed the Mossad spy agency, said an effective attack on Iran would be difficult because Iranian nuclear facilities are scattered and mobile, and warned it could trigger war.

Other senior figures with security backgrounds have questioned whether Israel should act alone, as Netanyahu insists the country has a right to do.

Last month Shaul Mofaz – a former military chief and defense minister who has since been elected head of the opposition Kadima Party – said the threats of an imminent military strike are actually weakening Israel. Mofaz, who was born in Iran and moved to Israel as a child, said Israel "is not a ghetto" and that despite its military might must fully coordinate with the U.S. on any plan to strike Iran.

Dan Halutz, who led the military from 2005 to 2007, also criticized Netanyahu last month for invoking Holocaust imagery in describing the threat posed by a nuclear-armed Iran. "We are not kings of the world," Halutz said. "We should remember who we are."

A recent poll suggested the public agrees. The survey, conducted by the Israeli Dahaf agency for the University of Maryland, said 81 percent of Israelis oppose a solo attack on Iran. At the same time, it said two-thirds of Israelis would support military action if coordinated with Washington. The poll, released last week, questioned 500 Israelis and had a margin of error of 4.3 percentage points.

In a recent report the U.N. nuclear agency found Iran continues to enrich uranium – a key step toward developing a bomb. Although few in Israel would dispute that a nuclear-armed Iran is an existential threat, debate has revolved around the cost-benefit analysis of an attack.

On the cost side is the possible retaliation, in the form of Iranian missiles as well as rocket attacks by Iranian proxies Hezbollah and Hamas on its northern and southern borders. Especially daunting is the prospect of sustained missile strikes on Tel Aviv, a bustling business and entertainment capital whose populous is psychologically ill-prepared for a homefront war.

It also would likely cause oil prices to skyrocket at a time when the global economy is already struggling – risking a new recession for which Israel would absorb much if not most of the blame. Some also fear that Iran might attack American targets in response to any Israeli strike – a scenario that could directly influence the outcome of this fall's U.S. presidential election.

Citation :

Israël très sceptique sur un accord entre l'Iran et l'AIEA


JERUSALEM - Israël est très sceptique sur l'accord que doivent conclure prochainement l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA) et l'Iran pour résoudre les questions en suspens sur le programme nucléaire controversé de Téhéran, a indiqué mardi un haut responsable à l'AFP.

Nous sommes très sceptiques sur cet accord apparent entre l'AIEA et l'Iran. Nous avons vu comment des accords passés entre l'AIEA et l'Iran étaient violés de manière flagrante par l'Iran, a-t-il affirmé sous le couvert de l'anonymat.

Cet accord apparent avec l'Iran ne traite que de la supervision de l'AIEA mais pas de la question la plus importante: empêcher l'Iran de développer une arme nucléaire, a-t-il souligné, réitérant les exigences du Premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu: que l'Iran arrête tout enrichissement (d'uranium, NDLR), livre tout le matériau enrichi et démantèle le site près de Qom.

Le directeur général de l'AIEA, Yukiya Amano, a fait part mardi d'un accord qui serait prochainement signé entre l'agence et l'Iran sur une approche structurée concernant le programme nucléaire de Téhéran, au retour de sa première visite en Iran.

Le négociateur iranien sur le nucléaire Saïd Jalili a précisé que les différences existantes ne seraient pas un obstacle à l'accord, a ajouté M. Amano, qui ne s'est pas étendu sur ces différences.

La chose importante est que j'ai pu parler directement aux dirigeants en Iran et nous comprenons mieux nos positions mutuelles, a-t-il souligné.

Cette annonce intervient à la veille d'une importante réunion sur la question à Bagdad entre les représentants iraniens et le groupe dit 5+1 (Etats-Unis, Russie, Chine, France et Grande-Bretagne, plus l'Allemagne).

Une grande partie de la communauté internationale soupçonne l'Iran de vouloir, sous couvert de programme nucléaire civil, se doter de la bombe atomique, ce que dément Téhéran.

Israël, considéré comme l'unique puissance nucléaire de la région, un statut sur lequel il maintient l'ambiguïté, présente le programme nucléaire iranien comme une menace pour son existence, se référant aux déclarations répétées des dirigeants de la République islamique souhaitant ou prédisant sa disparition.

Les principaux responsables israéliens, M. Netanyahu en tête, agitent périodiquement la menace d'une opération militaire, exprimant leurs doutes sur l'efficacité des sanctions contre Téhéran, a contrario de l'administration américaine.


(©AFP / 22 mai 2012 15h03)

Citation :

  Israël : prendre l’Iran à revers  



Les dirigeants israéliens préparent un plan pour nouer une alliance avec plusieurs pays situés à proximité de l’Iran en vue de créer un «environnement régional hostile» contre Téhéran et son programme nucléaire.

Parmi les Etats qui pourraient prendre part à cette opération figurent la Géorgie, l’Ouzbékistan, le Kazakhstan, l’Azerbaïdjan, le Turkménistan, qui entretiennent de bonnes relations avec l’Etat hébreu.

Les responsables israéliens comptent, notamment, utiliser les promesses non-tenues d’assistance économique de l’Iran à ces pays pour les convaincre tout en leur proposant une coopération «élargie». Ces cinq pays pourraient ainsi recevoir des informations des services de renseignements israéliens sur les cellules implantées par les Gardiens de la Révolution et le Hezbollah sur leur territoire.

Israël propose également une assistance pour repérer les islamistes radicaux de certains de ces pays enrôlés dans les rangs des rebelles syriens liés à la mouvance Al-Qaïda, qui retournent ensuite chez eux après avoir suivi un entraînement militaire et une formation idéologique intense, susceptibles de constituer une menace de déstabilisation pour les autorités en place.

Les diplomates israéliens ne manquent pas de souligner auprès de leurs interlocuteurs les dangers que représente un possible retour en force de la Russie en Asie centrale et dans le Caucase, au moment où les Etats-Unis semblent décidés à réduire leurs activités dans ces régions. Pour compléter le tout, Israël a l’intention de promouvoir une plus étroite coopération dans les secteurs de la santé, de l’énergie et de l’agriculture.

http://www.ttu.fr/israel-prendre-liran-a-revers/  

http://www.chaos-controle.com/archives/2013/10/16/28215293.html a écrit:

Il y a quelques années nous avons parlé de la Libye,aujourd'hui le monde s'inquiète pour la Syrie.De plus en plus sont les massacres de civils innocents, des scènes d'enfants empoisonnés longtemps en proie aux intérêts stratégiques internationaux. La phase de la guerre froide semblait être surmontée, et pourtant ce sont précisément ces deux blocs qui risquent de s'affronter dans une guerre terrible dont la Syrie serait l'étincelle de cette horrible guerre mondiale dont tout le monde parle.

D'une part, la plus grande puissance occidentale, celle des États-Unis jointe à Israël , prêt à financer et soutenir par tous les moyens les "rebelles syriens", dans un même jour qui sont capables de crimes atroces faisant des massacres parmi la population et de publier des photos avec des têtes coupées et des coeurs arrachés, des victimes qui refusent de se battre à leurs côtés.

L'autre bloc est une Russie de plus en plus déterminé à défendre la position du président syrien Bachar Al-Assad. Dès le début, il y a eu plusieurs opinions sur ce qu'on appelle "la crise syrienne" nous avions vu quand elle a divisée le sommet du G8 à Enniskillen en Irlande du Nord. A cette occasion, en effet, la question de l'approvisionnement militaire a laissé sceptique même en Europe, tandis que les Américains, préoccupés par la présence de la milice du Hezbollah aux côtés Assad, a insisté pour faire porter le chapeau des armes chimiques à l'armée syrienne.

S'il est vrai que la Russie a ses propres intérêts en Syrie mais ne veut pas voir une deuxième Libye, voyant le complot du "nouvel ordre mondial" arrivé prés de chez eux,une fois de plus Vladimir Poutine a vu juste en prouvant que les «rebelles» par l'envoi d'images et de vidéos satellites russes à l'ONU où il est démontré que les armes chimiques lancées en Syrie responsable de la mort d'environ 1.300 personnes, appartenant aux groupes terroristes et rebelles manipulés par la CIA et financés d'une part par le duo Qatari-Saoudite.

L'objectif serait la création d'un Nouvel Ordre Mondial, un monde fait d'une énorme masse d'individus tout de même (sous le prétexte de «droits civils» si chère à ceux qui refuse de regarder au-delà des apparences) et prêt de se soumettre à la volonté de quelques-uns, de la finance et de la logique de marché.Un projet, pour la Syrie, qui aurait eu ses origines peu après les attaques contre les «Twin Towers» à New York, comme l'a déclaré le général américain Wesley Clark.

Aujourd'hui, cependant, la Syrie n'est pas seul.D'une part, elle peut se vanter de l'aide d'une Russie qui permettra de renforcer sa présence dans le bassin méditerranéen, comme annoncé par le colonel Leonid Ivashov, président de l'Académie russe des problèmes géopolitiques, après que la décision du Pentagone d'envoyer le navire de guerre USS Mahan dans le même secteur.

D'autre part, en plus du Hezbollah chiite libanais, il y a aussi le soutien de l'Iran qui enverra au moins 4.000 gardiens de la révolution en Syrie pour soutenir l'armée d'Assad."Nous sommes très préoccupés - a dit Abbas Araghchi, porte-parole du ministère iranien des Affaires étrangères sur l'utilisation d'armes chimiques en Syrie et nous condamnons fermement l'utilisation de ces armes. Il ya des preuves qui condamnent les groupes terroristes pour commettre de tels actes ".

"Nous rejetons et condamnons les menaces américaines de lancer une agression contre la Syrie" Nicolas Maduro, président du Venezuela , a déclaré aussi que Barack Obama se prépare à une guerre au Moyen-Orient, un conflit qui va affecter le monde entier.

Source : Terrarealtime(italien)

http://fr.ria.ru/presse_russe/20130808/198961047.html a écrit:

Le nouveau président iranien Hassan Rohani a dit être prêt à s'entendre sur son programme nucléaire avec les six médiateurs internationaux, écrit jeudi 8 août le quotidien Kommersant.

Néanmoins, Israël ne partage pas l'enthousiasme de l'Occident concernant les changements à Téhéran. Tel-Aviv est persuadé que la politique nucléaire de l'Iran restera inchangée avec le nouveau président. Dans ce sens, les experts estiment que la décision d'engager une opération militaire contre l'Iran pourrait être prise dans les prochains mois, car Téhéran s'approche rapidement de la "ligne rouge" fixée par Israël.

"L'Iran a suffisamment de volonté politique pour chercher une solution au conflit en sauvegardant les intérêts nationaux et les droits du peuple iranien", a déclaré Rohani lors de la première conférence de presse après son investiture concernant l'avenir des négociations avec les six médiateurs internationaux (les cinq membres permanents du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies et l'Allemagne). Selon lui, le dialogue reprendrait immédiatement après l'approbation de la nouvelle composition du gouvernement iranien, mais à condition de voir la "bonne foi des interlocuteurs".

De cette manière, Téhéran fait allusion à l'assouplissement des sanctions internationales, notamment celles qui ont été adoptées par le congrès américain à la veille de l'investiture de Rohani. Les Etats-Unis disent que la balle est dans le camp iranien et exigent de Téhéran de tenir ses engagements internationaux, en donnant avant tout l'accès de ses sites nucléaires aux inspecteurs de l'Agence internationale de l'énergie atomique (AIEA).

Ainsi, la situation autour du programme nucléaire iranien continue à rappeler le tir à la corde, mais le changement de rhétorique avec l'arrivée de Rohani inspire un certain optimisme aux médiateurs. La haute représentante de l'Union pour les Affaires étrangères Catherine Ashton compte sur un règlement rapide du problème iranien, et Moscou perçoit dans la position de Téhéran un "véritable intérêt pour le progrès".

Cependant, Israël ne partage pas cet enthousiasme. D'autant que dans son discours d'investiture, Rohani a attaqué Israël en le qualifiant de " blessure infligée au corps du monde musulman".

"Le président Rohani a montré son véritable visage plus tôt qu'on ne s'y attendait", a déclaré à ce sujet le premier ministre israélien Benjamin Netanyahu. Toutefois, il s'abstient pour l'instant d'employer une rhétorique belliqueuse en cédant à la pression des USA qui continuent à préférer la tactique des sanctions.

Selon les experts, les autorités israéliennes sont toujours face au même dilemme : agir seules contre l'Iran ou attendre des garanties de la part des USA. "Les chances du soutien américain, vu les manœuvres diplomatiques de Rohani, deviennent de plus en plus faibles, et la probabilité d'être condamné par la communauté internationale en cas d'opération unilatérale devient plus grande pour la même raison", a expliqué l'expert israélien de l'Iran David Menashri.

"Rohani est un homme souriant et intelligent, et il n'y aura pas de scandales comme à l'époque d'Ahmadinejad, estime Evgueni Satanovski, président de l'Institut du Proche-Orient. L'Occident pourra parler de succès diplomatiques, et l'Iran pourra continuer à fabriquer sa bombe nucléaire."

Selon une source du ministère israélien des Affaires étrangères, il existe actuellement dans l'establishment politique du pays un "solide consensus concernant la "ligne rouge" pour l'Iran, au-delà de laquelle Israël lancera une opération militaire quoi qu'il en soit". Selon les experts, l'Iran pourrait franchir cette "ligne rouge" d'ici quelques mois – pour cela il lui suffirait d'enrichir jusqu'à 20% 60 kg d'uranium.

Netanyahou au congrès américain "la plus longue fellation jamais faite à un juif..."

Citation :

Ehud Barak révèle trois attaques avortées contre l’Iran

L’ex-ministre israélien de la Défense Ehud Barak a affirmé que trois projets d’attaques contre l’Iran soutenus par lui-même et le chef du gouvernement Benjamin Netanyahu avaient été bloqués par l’armée.

Ministre de la Défense de 2009 à 2013, Barak a déclaré à la Deuxième chaîne de télévision privée que des plans d’attaque avaient été mis au point entre 2009 et 2010 et approuvés par lui-même et Netanyahu mais que la réponse du chef d’état-major de l’époque, le général Gabi Ashkenazi, « n’avait pas été positive ».

L’année suivante, le nouveau chef d’état-major, le général Benny Gantz, a expliqué aux dirigeants politiques que les possibilités d’une attaque existaient mais a mis en garde contre « les risques », a poursuivi Barak dans cet entretien dans la nuit de vendredi à samedi.

Les réserves des militaires ont convaincu Moshe Yaalon, actuel ministre de la Défense et ministre des Affaires stratégiques de l’époque, et Yuval Steinitz, alors ministre des Finances et actuel ministre des Infrastructures, a-t-il ajouté.

Le refus de Yaalon et de Steinitz, qui faisaient partie des huit membres du cabinet de sécurité restreint, a privé Netanyahu de la majorité nécessaire pour aller de l’avant, a ajouté Ehud Barak.

En 2012, Israël a eu une nouvelle occasion d’attaquer l’Iran, mais elle n’a pas été exploitée car elle devait « avoir lieu au même moment que d’importantes manœuvres militaires avec les Etats-Unis, ce qui risquait d’embarrasser Washington et de donner l’impression que les Américains étaient directement impliqués dans l’attaque », a-t-il poursuivi.

L’ancien Premier ministre Ehud Olmert a accusé en 2013 son successeur Benjamin Netanyahu d’avoir dépensé près de 3 milliards de dollars pour les préparatifs d’une attaque contre l’Iran qui n’a finalement pas eu lieu.

Depuis des années, Benjamin Netanyahu agite la menace de recourir à « l’option militaire » pour empêcher l’Iran de se doter de l’arme nucléaire. Il s’oppose, comme une grande majorité de la classe politique israélienne, à l’accord conclu en juillet entre l’Iran et les grandes puissances.

Pour Netanyahu, les clauses de l’accord ne sont pas suffisamment strictes pour empêcher l’Iran de se doter de l’arme nucléaire et de s’en servir contre Israël, dont les dirigeants iraniens appellent à la destruction.

L’ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères Avigdor Lieberman a accusé dimanche le ministre de la défense d’autrefois, Ehud Barak, d’avoir exposé ces secrets d’État.

Liberman a déclaré à la radio militaire qu’il était « plus que surpris » de la diffusion des secrets d’Etat par Barak, et affirme que de telles déclarations finiraient par renforcer l’Iran.

« Je pense que quand des mesures et des discussions qui auraient dû résolument rester des secrets d’Etat sont débattues dans la presse, cela laisse entendre que vous êtes un beau parleur, que vous n’êtes pas sérieux, que vous n’êtes pas fiable, » a-t-il dit.

« Voilà pourquoi, entre autres raisons, l’Iran est choyé par la communauté internationale, tandis que nous avons été acculés dans un coin… Ces sujets auraient dû être débattus uniquement dans des forums fermés. »

A la question de savoir s’il croyait que Barak était coupable de la divulgation des secrets d’Etat, Liberman a répondu qu’il n’y avait « aucun doute » que c’était le cas.

Selon la Deuxième chaîne samedi, « la colère » envers l’ancien ministre de la Défense est très répandue au sein des dirigeants israéliens, et de nombreux hauts-responsables politiques et sécuritaires suggèrent que la version des événements de Barak n’est pas entièrement exacte. Le bureau du Premier ministre n’a pas donné de réponse officielle à la diffusion.

Suite à ces révélations, la Deuxième chaîne a déclaré samedi que selon diverses personnalités israéliennes clés, Ashkenazi n’a pas exclu une opération aussi catégoriquement que Barak l’a laissé entendre.

En outre, d’après le rapport télévisé de samedi, Ashkenazi n’était nullement la seule personnalité de haut rang n’ayant pas soutenu une attaque à ce moment-là. D’autres l’ont imité, comme l’ancien chef du Mossad, Meir Dagan, qui a plus tard diffusé son opposition, et des principaux ministres, y compris Dan Meridor et Eli Yishai.

La Deuxième chaîne a également suggéré que Barak jouait peut-être la politique du parti avec ses commentaires.

Ashkenazi envisagerait d’entrer en politique, et Barak, qui s’est retiré de la vie politique, pourrait vouloir le contrecarrer. Les deux sont devenus rivaux au fil des ans, et la relation de Barak avec l’actuel ministre de la Défense Yaalon est tout aussi orageuse.

Le matériau des bandes provient de conversations liées à une nouvelle biographie de Barak écrite par Danny Dor et Ilan Kfir. L’ancien ministre de la Défense, qui était aussi précédemment Premier ministre et chef d’état-major, a tenté d’empêcher la diffusion des enregistrements, mais la censure militaire israélienne a permis à la Deuxième chaîne de les révéler.

Les frappes aériennes sur les installations nucléaires iraniennes devaient avoir lieu en raison du fait que Netanyahu et Barak avaient prévu que l’Iran entrerait dans une « zone d’immunité », dans laquelle ses installations étaient si bien protégées ou développées qu’une future attaque serait inutile.

Barak a exprimé vendredi soir son indignation devant la diffusion des enregistrements.

Steinitz a déclaré qu’il était grave que ce matériel ait été diffusé et n’a fait aucun commentaire sur les détails, tandis que Yaalon a affirmé n’avoir aucun commentaire sur ce qu’il qualifie de matériau partial et biaisé.

Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies a écrit:

Israel’s Possible Paths to Nuclear War

North Korea’s nuclearization has implications for Israel’s nuclear deterrence posture. There are several plausible means by which a nuclear conflict could arise in the Middle East. It may be time to consider a phase-out of Israel’s “deliberate nuclear ambiguity” and to focus Israeli planning around evaluations of enemy rationality.

In the end, we still depend upon creatures of our own making.

Goethe, Faust

For the moment, at least, global concern about nuclear war is focused on North Korea. The Middle East nevertheless remains a possible site for future nuclear conflict, and Israel’s strategy for dealing with this prospect warrants close examination. Worth pointing out, too, is that these two seemingly discrete theaters of potential nuclear belligerency are not mutually exclusive.

Quite the contrary. Nuclear warfare events in these two distant places could become mutually reinforcing.

Any conceivable resort to nuclear weapons on the Korean peninsula would almost certainly affect nuclear incentives elsewhere. At a minimum, any breaking of the longstanding nuclear taboo in Asia (southwest as well as northeast Asia, if coup-vulnerable Pakistan is factored in) could enhance the presumed usability of nuclear weapons in the Middle East.

There are overarching questions to be asked. How, precisely, might Israel find itself in some form or other of a nuclear war? Under what circumstances might it use nuclear weapons?

For the moment, at least, any such concerns might appear baseless. After all, Israel remains the only presumptive nuclear state in the region.

But Tehran, like Pyongyang, will not desist from its nuclear ambitions. Iranian membership in the Nuclear Club is more than likely to occur within the next several years, the Vienna 2015 Iran Agreement notwithstanding. Moreover, even in the absence of a single regional nuclear adversary, the Jewish State could still find itself having to rely upon nuclear deterrence against certain biological and/or massive conventional threats.

To answer its most basic nuclear questions, Jerusalem’s strategic planners will need to adhere closely to well-established canons of systematic inquiry, logical analysis, and dialectical reasoning. There are four plausible, intersecting narratives that “cover the bases” of Israel’s nuclear preparedness: 1) nuclear retaliation; 2) nuclear counter-retaliation; 3) nuclear preemption; and 4) the fighting of a nuclear war.

1)     Nuclear retaliation                          

Should an enemy state or alliance of enemy states ever launch a nuclear first strike against Israel, Jerusalem would respond, to whatever extent possible and cost-effective, with a retaliatory nuclear strike. If an enemy first strike were to involve some other form of unconventional weapon, such as high-lethality biological weapons of mass destruction, Israel might still launch a nuclear reprisal. This response would depend in large measure on Jerusalem’s calculated expectations of follow-on aggression, and also on its assessments of comparative damage limitation.

If Israel were to absorb “only” a massive conventional attack, a nuclear retaliation could not be ruled out, especially if: (a) the state aggressor(s) were perceived to hold nuclear and/or other unconventional weapons in reserve; and/or (b) Israel’s leaders were to believe that exclusively non-nuclear retaliations could not prevent annihilation of the Jewish State. A nuclear retaliation by Israel could be ruled out entirely only in those circumstances in which enemy state aggressions were conventional, “typical” (that is, sub-existential, or consistent with previous historical instances of enemy attack in both degree and intent), and directed solely at hard targets (i.e., Israeli weapons and military infrastructures and not at “soft” civilian populations).

2)     Nuclear counter-retaliation

Should Israel feel compelled to preempt enemy state aggression with conventional weapons, the response of the target state(s) would largely determine Jerusalem’s next moves. If the response were in any way nuclear, Israel could plausibly turn to nuclear counter-retaliation. If the enemy retaliation were to involve other weapons of mass destruction, Israel might feel pressed to escalate.

Any such initiative would necessarily reflect the need for what is more formally described in orthodox strategic parlance as “escalation dominance.”

All pertinent decisions would depend upon Jerusalem’s early judgments of enemy intent, and on accompanying calculations of essential damage limitation. Should the enemy state’s response to Israel’s preemption be limited to hard-target conventional strikes, it is unlikely that the Jewish State would move on to nuclear counter-retaliation. If, however, the enemy’s conventional retaliation were “all-out” and directed against Israeli civilian populations, not just Israeli military targets, an Israeli nuclear counter-retaliation could not be excluded.

It would appear, then, that such a counter-retaliation could be ruled out only if the enemy state’s conventional retaliation were proportionate to Israel’s preemption, confined exclusively to Israeli military targets, circumscribed by the legal limits of “military necessity” (a limit codified in the law of armed conflict), and accompanied by explicit and verifiable assurances of non-escalatory intent.

3)     Nuclear preemption

It is exceedingly implausible that Israel would ever decide to launch a preemptive nuclear strike. Although circumstances could arise wherein such a strike would still be rational, it is unlikely that Israel would ever allow itself to reach such dire circumstances. Unless the nuclear weapons involved were somehow used in a fashion consistent with the laws of war, this all-out form of preemption would represent an especially serious violation of international law.

Even if such consistency were possible, the psychological/political impact on the world community would be fiercely negative and far-reaching. This means an Israeli nuclear preemption could be expected only when (a) Israel’s state enemies have acquired nuclear and/or other weapons of mass destruction judged capable of annihilating the Jewish State; (b) these enemies have made clear that their military intentions parallel their capabilities; (c) these enemies are believed ready to begin an active “countdown to launch;” and (d) Jerusalem believes Israeli non-nuclear preemptions cannot possibly achieve minimum levels of damage limitation – that is, levels consistent with physical preservation of the state and nation.

4)     Fighting a nuclear war

Should nuclear weapons ever be introduced into an actual conflict between Israel and its enemies, either by the Jewish State or by an Arab/Islamic foe, the fighting of a nuclear war could ensue at one level or another. This would be true so long as: (a) enemy first strikes against Israel do not destroy Jerusalem’s second-strike nuclear capability; (b) enemy retaliations for an Israeli conventional preemption do not destroy Jerusalem’s nuclear counter-retaliatory capability; (c) Israeli preemptive strikes involving nuclear weapons do not destroy adversarial second-strike nuclear capabilities; and (d) Israeli retaliation for enemy conventional first strikes does not destroy enemy nuclear counter-retaliatory capability.

It follows that in order to satisfy its most essential survival requirements, Israel must take immediate and reliable steps to ensure the likelihood of (a) and (b) and the unlikelihood of (c) and (d).

In all cases, Israel’s nuclear strategy and forces must remain fully oriented towards deterrence and never towards the actual fighting of a war. With this in mind, Jerusalem has likely already taken steps to reject tactical or (relatively) low-yield “battlefield” nuclear weapons and, as corollary, any corresponding plans for counter-force targeting. For Israel, nuclear weapons can make sense solely for deterrence ex ante, not for revenge ex post.

These four core scenarios should remind Israel of the overriding need for coherent nuclear strategy and doctrine. Among other things, this need stipulates a counter-value targeted nuclear retaliatory force that is secure from enemy first strikes, and simultaneously capable of penetrating any enemy state’s active defenses. To best meet this imperative security expectation, the IDF would be well advised to continue with sea-basing designated portions of its nuclear deterrent force (that is, placing them on submarines). Naturally, to best satisfy the equally important requirements of penetration capability, Tel Aviv will have to stay well ahead of all enemy state air defense refinements.

Sooner rather than later, Jerusalem will need to consider a partial end to its historical policy of “deliberate nuclear ambiguity.” By incrementally removing the “bomb” from the “basement,” Israel’s planners would be better able to enhance the credibility of their very small country’s nuclear deterrence posture. However counterintuitive, the mere possession of nuclear forces does not automatically bestow credible nuclear deterrence.

Always, in strategic nuclear planning, reason must hold pride of place. Would-be aggressors, whether nuclear or non-nuclear, must be encouraged to believe that Israel has the willingness to launch measured nuclear forces in retaliation, and that these forces are invulnerable to first-strike attacks. Additionally, these enemies must be made to expect that Israel’s designated nuclear forces would penetrate their already deployed ballistic missile and related air defenses.

It follows that Israel could benefit substantially from releasing certain broad outlines of relevant strategic information. Without a prior and well-fashioned strategic doctrine, no such release would make any sense.

All such information could support the perceived utility and security of Israel’s nuclear retaliatory forces. Released solely to maximize Israeli nuclear deterrence, it would center purposefully upon the targeting, hardening, dispersion, multiplication, basing, and yield of selected ordnance. Under certain conditions, it must be understood, the credibility of Israeli nuclear deterrence could vary inversely with the perceived destructiveness of its relevant weapons.

In the end, Israel, heeding Goethe, must depend upon policies and calculations of its own making. Accordingly, what is currently happening on the Korean peninsula could have serious implications for what eventually happens in the Middle East. One especially crucial and common focus in both theaters of potential nuclear conflict is the presumed rationality or irrationality of the adversarial state leaderships. The same questions that now surround Kim Jong un could soon pertain to Iran’s decision-making elite.

Israel, like the US vis-à-vis North Korea, will need to prepare very differently for a rational nuclear adversary than for an irrational one. In such bewildering circumstances, Jerusalem decision-makers would need to distinguish between genuine enemy irrationality and pretended enemy irrationality. In actual practice, operationalizing such a subtle distinction will not be easy.

The Jerusalem Post a écrit:

IDF submarine crosses Suez Canal as direct message to Iran

According to Arab intelligence that confirmed the reports, the submarine passed the Red Sea and was making its way towards the Persian Gulf.

The Dolphin-class submarine first entered service in 2000

An IDF Navy submarine crossed the Suez Canal last week as a direct message to Iran, Kan News reported Monday evening.

Arab intelligence officials reportedly confirmed to Kan News that the Israeli submarine crossed the canal toward Iran visibly above water, in an act meant as a message to Iran's supreme leader Ali Khamenei.

The move was made during a more than usually tense time between Jerusalem and Tehran. It was made possible after receiving an approval from Egyptian authorities.

According to Arab intelligence that confirmed the reports, the submarine passed the Red Sea and was making its way toward the Persian Gulf, in what they believe was meant as a direct threat to Iran.

הצוללת הישראלית בדרך לאיראן - חשיפת כאן חדשות | גורמי מודיעין ערביים: צוללת של חיל הים חצתה את תעלת סואץ באופן גלוי ובאישור מצרי, לכיוון המפרץ הפרסי. הגורמים העריכו שישראל ניסתה להעביר מסר לטהראן. מצה"ל נמסר שהם לא מתייחסים לפרסומים מסוג זה @kaisos1987 #חדשותהערב pic.twitter.com/T67OG9QrMw

— כאן חדשות (@kann_news) December 21, 2020

The tension between Israel and Iran has increased dramatically following the assassination of Iran's top nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh on November 27. Shortly after the assassination, Iran vowed revenge on Israel, which it believes is behind the assassination.

Israel, in turn, responded by raising the level of alertness in its diplomatic delegations abroad.
IDF Chief of Staff Lt.-Gen. Aviv Kochavi addressed the tension with Iran earlier on Monday, assuring a harsh response to any attempt to hurt Israel or its citizens.

"If Iran and its partners from the radical axis... carry out an attack against the State of Israel, they will find the price extremely high," Kochavi said. "The IDF will attack anyone who chooses to participate in – partially or fully, closely or remotely – any action against the State of Israel or Israeli targets."

Anzarane a écrit:

Je ne crois pas a aucun escalade militaire entre ces deux là. Plusieurs giflent humiliantes de la part du Mossad sans aucune réaction notable de la part des iraniens. Juste un jeu de chat et la souris.

New information indicates that Israel attacks Iranian #oil tankers, raising major red flags. In particular over environmental pollution caused in international waters. This includes the SABITI tanker, causing a 100k barrel large oil spill in 2019 1/x https://t.co/u5jplBg1QL pic.twitter.com/8KtrDYLEz6

— Wim Zwijnenburg (@wammezz) March 11, 2021

Unconfirmed reports circulating of an "event" aboard the #Iran|ian SHAHR E KORD Vessel in the Eastern Med. AIS data via @MarineTraffic updated ~5 hours ago had her off the coast of Baniyas, #Syria. Photos circulating appear to confirm the vessel? it looks like a cargo fire. pic.twitter.com/kSlyWgMHH2

— Aurora Intel (@AuroraIntel) March 11, 2021

#ISRAEL : Reports that the Iran-flagged container ship SHAHR E KORD suffered an incident yesterday morning in the Eastern Mediterranean remain unconfirmed. The vessel did slow and deviate while underway from Suez to Syria, 72nm WNW of Haifa at around 06:11 LT. pic.twitter.com/F4m5C4eQOO

— Ambrey Intelligence (@Ambrey_Intel) March 11, 2021

Haaretz a écrit:

Much more than 12: Israel attacked dozens of tankers, Iran lost billions

A deep dive into Israeli-Iranian naval war

The report in the Wall Street Journal a week ago apparently uncovered only the tip of the iceberg of the economic warfare that Israel has been waging against Iran for the past two and a half years. According to the Journal, Israel has systematically scuttled maritime oil smuggling from Iran to Syria by striking at least 12 ships. That effort, according to American sources, is intended to disrupt the use of the funds paid for the oil smuggled to Hezbollah in order to purchase combat materiel.

The Journal noted that it also drew on additional sources, including intelligence sources in the Middle East. The first leak may have come from the Biden administration, aimed at neutralizing background noise which the Americans think might soon hamper the renewal of negotiations with Iran about the United States’ return to the nuclear agreement.

An investigation by Haaretz reveals that the report last week reflects only part of the broad picture. In practice, it appears that several dozen attacks were carried out, which caused the Iranians cumulative damage of billions of dollars, amid a high rate of success in disrupting its shipping.

Each shipment could include a million or more barrels of oil, worth up to about $50 million, according to fluctuations in the market price. The ships set out from ports in southern Iran and cross the Red Sea, navigating the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean. There were also cases in which a longer route was used, which involves circumnavigating Africa and passing through the Straits of Gibraltar into the Mediterranean, in order to evade attacks in the Red Sea. The port of destination is usually Banias, in northern Syria, which lies between the two largest ports on the Syrian coast, Tartus and Latakia.

The smuggling route was detected by Western intelligence organizations back in 2018. The trade in oil is intended to bypass the restrictions on international trade which were imposed on both Iran, against the background of its nuclear project, and on Syria, in response to the atrocities perpetrated by the Bashar Assad regime during the country’s civil war. The Israeli intelligence community, along with intelligence organizations in the West, realized that the Iranians had found a way to go on financing arms for Hezbollah. The money was transferred to the Lebanese organization mostly through the mediation of Syrian businesspeople, in return for the delivery of the Iranian oil to the Damascus regime.

The ships were apparently struck at many different points along their whole route, from the Red Sea in the south to the Syrian coast in the north. In one case, the Iranians alternately accused Israel, the United States and Saudi Arabia when a ship carrying an oil shipment was damaged by an explosion in the Red Sea, opposite the coast of Yemen, in October 2019. It’s likely that in a large number of the other incidents, quiet acts of sabotage were carried out that damaged critical functions of the ships without this entailing the detonation of a bomb or the firing of a missile. In some cases ships were destroyed beyond repair, and the Iranians had to tow them back to the home port.

What arises from the reports is that the attacks did not include harm to those who were on the ships, or the sinking of ships, and did not cause environmental damage.

Because those behind the operations seem to have wanted very much to act below the radar and not publicize the strikes, no overt takeovers were carried out, as in past commando operations by the Israel Navy. Takeover operations were mounted against weapons ships that were on the way from Iran to unload cargos opposite the coast of the Gaza Strip or Lebanon (Karine A in 2001, Francop in 2009, Klos C in 2014), or in the course of preventing solidarity operations by international left-wing organizations with the Palestinians, notably the botched, fatal episode of the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara in 2010.

The legal justification behind the scuttling of the oil smuggling could rest on the argument that Iran is using the profits to underwrite weapons purchases by terrorist organizations. To date, Israel has not been required to present such proof. In July 2018, Britain stopped an Iranian oil tanker on its way to Syria when it sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar. A week later, Iran responded with a threatening operation against a British tanker in the Persian Gulf – and the British quickly released the Iranian vessel they had detained.

At the end of February this year, a cargo ship was damaged in the Gulf of Oman, apparently by the detonation of mines. The ship was partially owned by a company belonging to the Israeli businessman Rami Unger. That looks like a first Iranian signal of its ability to respond to operations attributed to Israel. Still, the damage caused was minor: there were no Israeli citizens aboard, and the ship was carrying a cargo of cars between Saudi Arabia and the Far East.

Naval blazing

Besides comprehensive and precise intelligence gathering, such an extensive operation of striking at oil ships as is attributed to Israel naturally requires an all-out effort by the navy, with its fleet of submarines, missile boats and naval commandos. The number of certificates of merit and excellence handed out in recent years by the Israel Defense Forces to navy units might attest to the scope of the operations.

All these actions, as well as reports of Israeli maritime activity against arms smuggling to Hezbollah and to the Gaza Strip within the framework of the “campaign between wars” appear to reflect a considerable increase in offensive activity in the past few years. However, in contrast to air attacks, the Syrian government and Arab media rarely report the maritime incidents – and it’s quite possible that for Israel, too, it’s more convenient for such events to take place mostly below the radar.

The extensive offensive activity completes a gradual conceptual revolution undergone by the navy under its present commander, Vice Admiral Eli Sharvit, who this year will conclude a five-year stint in the post. The new insights began to take shape back in the summer of 2006, following the attack on the missile boat Hanit on the third day of the Second Lebanon War. But it took too many years before the conclusions led to the fomenting of a revolution in building Israel’s maritime force.

The Hanit was hit opposite the coast of Beirut by a shore-to-sea missile fired by Hezbollah while Israel was enforcing a showboat maritime siege that was pretty much superfluous. Four IDF soldiers were killed by the Chinese-made C-802 missile. The attack showed that the Israeli effort to achieve maritime superiority by means of detection capabilities and advanced sea-to-sea munitions was largely irrelevant in the face of Hamas and Hezbollah. Neither adversary has a naval fleet: Their main threat derives from shore-fired weapons. The Hanit was hit because the navy was unable to identify the threat facing it from the shore and strike first to destroy it. The navy, despite its might and sophistication, was vulnerable to its direct enemies, whereas their firing systems were almost immune to strikes.

The change that was needed, which was implemented in recent years, included the establishment of a maritime fire system capable of hitting shore-based targets, and diverting part of the intelligence resources to collect far more information about targets on the shore. Concurrently, Israel became occupied with protecting its economic waters, entailing the defense of natural gas assets against attacks from the shores of the Gaza Strip and Lebanon.

These changes will also have implications in the event of war: The navy will have to scuttle the enemy’s offensive capability from the shore as one of its first goals in a conflict. In the meantime, in the period of the campaign between wars, it is apparently gaining experience in more comprehensive operations in the past few years, as part of an overall campaign – against Iranian oil smuggling to Syria, weapons smuggling to Lebanon and Hamas’s efforts to upgrade its naval commando capabilities in the Gaza Strip.

Accident occurred in the electricity distribution network at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility less than a month after the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported that Iran had restarted enrichment at the Facility which Israel targeted previously https://t.co/eqjoajaxoE

— Adam Milstein (@AdamMilstein) April 11, 2021

There are reports of a ship having been attacked near the UAE port of Fujairah. Possibly Israeli-owned. The Belgian frigate BNS Leopold I is nearby. It operates in the framework of a European navy mission near the Strait of Hormuz, EMASOH https://t.co/TxsxSsh4xR pic.twitter.com/6SWW3cNXuU

— Hans de Vreij (@hdevreij) April 13, 2021

The Jerusalem Post a écrit:

How Israel and the US are taking Iran’s drone threat seriously

The decision to try to counter UAVs or drones has been in the works for years. Back in 2018 Congress first authorized a cooperative US-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) Program

A drone is pictured during a large-scale drone combat exercise of Army of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in Semnan, Iran January 4, 2021. Picture taken January 4, 2021

It’s not a coincidence that the head of US Central Command has been warning about drone threats

and that the US and Israel are increasingly working on efforts to confront drones.

A readout of US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan’s bilateral meeting with Israeli National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat on April 27 revealed that the “United States and Israel agreed to establish an interagency working group to focus particular attention on the growing threat of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs] and precision-guided missiles produced by Iran and provided to its proxies in the Middle East region.”

The decision to try to counter UAVs or drones has been in the works for years. Back in 2018, Congress first authorized a cooperative US-Israeli Counter Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) program. This was done by “expanding the scope of the anti-tunnel cooperation program, [and] then, in the FY2020 NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act],” the Congressional Research Service notes.

“Congress created a separate authority (Section 1278), which authorized the secretary of defense to ‘carry out research, development, test, and evaluation activities, on a joint basis with Israel, to establish capabilities for countering unmanned aerial systems that threaten the United States or Israel.”

Section 1278 requires a matching contribution from the government of Israel and caps the annual US contribution at $25 million. Congress authorized the program through 2024,” it said.
CENTCOM

HEAD Gen. Kenneth McKenzie has become a kind of prophet of counter-drone discussions because he keeps warning about the growing threat. In March, he spoke to the Senate Armed Services Committee.

Sen. Tom Cotton noted that while the US had spent “billions” on counter-drone technology, there was still a threat. McKenzie had in fact already warned in writing that drones are “the most concerning tactical development in the CENTCOM area of operations since the rise of the improvised explosive device.”

Responding to Cotton, the general said, “I think the key thing is [that] right now we’re simply at a stage in the development of systems, and you see it in the back-and-forth of warfare, where the advantage is with the operator and with the offense. We will catch up; it’s going to take us a little time to do that.

“And, really, it’s what we would call the Group 1 and Group 2s that concern me the most; the small ones that you can go and buy at Costco – you know, duct-tape a grenade or a mortar bomb to it and fly it into an objective,” he said. “The larger ones, we have ways to deal with them because they’re like aircraft in a traditional way – although they’re still very concerning.”

McKenzie doubled down in more testimony to the House in April.

“These small- and medium-sized UAVs proliferating across the [area of operations] present a new and complex threat to our forces and those of our partners and allies,” he told the House Armed Services Committee on April 20. “For the first time since the Korean War, we are operating without complete air superiority.”

The work between the US and Israel on this issue is important because the rise of Iranian drone threats is increasingly bedeviling US partners in the region. Tehran knows this and keeps unveiling more and more drones.

Iran has a seemingly endless amount of drones these days; it used them against Saudi Arabia in 2019 and also sent a drone from Syria’s T-4 base into Israeli airspace in February 2018. On April 28, the IDF said that it had “downed a drone and located an additional drone belonging to the Hezbollah terrorist organization that crossed from Lebanon into Israeli airspace.”

The threat is clear. In January a report at Newsweek indicated Iran may have exported a new type of drone to Yemen, one capable of reaching Israel.

MCKENZIE HAS warned about various types of drones, including those purchased off the shelf and then modified by terrorists.

The Iran threat is more complex, consisting of larger drones. Iran has been building them for years, going back to the 1980s when it first developed its Ababil and Mohajer programs. The Islamic Republic also has advanced drones dubbed part of its Shahed line, including the Shahed 171, which is a copy of America’s secretive RQ-170, and the Shahed 129, which is a copy of the Predator.

Iran sent so much drone technology to Yemen that the Houthis became one of the region’s leaders in using kamikaze drones. Furthermore, there was so much evidence of the Iranian link, including gyroscopes, that some of the wreckage of these Iranian drones was carted off to Washington, put on display in the Iran Materials Display at Joint Base Anacostia-Bolling – or what some affectionately call the “petting zoo.”

According to the Department of Defense, there are remains of a Shahed-123 unmanned aerial vehicle, shown in a 218 photo. “The Department of Defense established the Iranian Materiel Display in December 2017 to present evidence that Iran is arming dangerous groups with advanced weapons, spreading instability and conflict in the region. The IMD contains materiel associated with Iranian proliferation into Yemen, Afghanistan and Bahrain.”

There are other drones as well, including a Qasef-1, a drone the Houthis use that is derived from an Ababil. The Foreign Policy Research Institute called the Iran drone technology proliferation “low tech, high reward.”

Last week, Iran’s IRGC released new images it says were taken by a drone of a US aircraft carrier. The same thing was done back in September 2020. Now Iran is upping harassment of US ships again in the Gulf. Drones may play a greater role in that harassment.

WHAT WE know is that Iran’s drone arm is large, expanding and proficient. The drones have a long-range capability, and they have successfully evaded Saudi radar to strike at Abqaiq in 2019. They can be used in swarms and with cruise missiles. They fly to their target with a warhead on board, so they are essentially kamikaze drones that behave more like a cruise missile. They don’t have to communicate with their base, meaning that jamming them may not work. They have to be shot down.

The recent case of a Syrian S-200 missile flying deep into Israel illustrates the problem. Drones are slower than an S-200. Patriot missiles and Israel’s other air defense systems have been used against drone threats and Israel increasingly practices using air defense systems against drones.

Israel has a wide variety of counter-drone technology. This includes not only the missile defenses, like Iron Dome, but also systems designed to counter smaller drones, such as IAI’s Drone Guard, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems’ Drone Dome, Elbit Systems ReDrone, the innovated Smart Shooter system for rifles, the Xtend company’s Skylord system, and others. Israel usually distinguishes between smaller “drones” such as quadcopters and larger UAVs, a category under which Iran’s drones would likely fall.

The technology needed to stop a large, fixed-wing drone that may be flying fast is different than what is needed against a slow-moving but highly maneuverable quadcopter with a grenade on it. Nevertheless, with a crowded airspace, and small birds that sometimes can be mistaken for drones, the challenge is growing. You can shoot drones down, jam them, use lasers, missiles, guns, nets, and even other drones to kill drones. The question for the US and Israel may be whether and how to settle on several technologies that mesh well.

That Washington and Jerusalem are looking increasingly at how to bring all this together makes sense since Israeli defense companies already supply counter-drone technology to the US, and America has likewise supported Israeli air defense systems.