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Sujet: Renseignement & Espionnage Mar 3 Mai 2011 - 12:39
Rappel du premier message :
Le renseignement étant une activité d'une importance stratégique cruciale, un topic lui est désormais dédié;
Citation :
Un Néerlandais accusé d’espionnage pour le compte de la Biélorussie
Les services spéciaux néerlandais ont interpellé un pilote des forces aériennes nationales soupçonné d'espionnage pour le compte de la Biélorussie, rapporte vendredi la radio hollandaise Radio Netherlands Worldwide. Agé de 37 ans, le pilote de chasseur F-16 est accusé d'avoir transmis des secrets d'Etat aux services de renseignement biélorusses. Selon le quotidien néerlandais De Telegraaf, le détenu avait l'intention de mener des affaires avec un ressortissant biélorusse. Le porte-parole du parquet hollandais a refusé de commenter ces informations "pour ne pas nuire aux intérêts de l'enquête" et "en raison du caractère délicat de la question du point de vue diplomatique". MOSCOU, 29 avril - RIA Novosti
http://fr.rian.ru/world/20110429/189317111.html
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La Russie proteste contre l’espionnage de son attaché militaire en poste aux Pays-Bas
par Laurent Lagneau · 17 août 2020
Les relations entre les Pays-Bas et la Russie ont connu des jours meilleurs… En effet, elles se surtout dégradées depuis l’affaire du Boeing B-777 du vol MH-17, abattu en juillet 2014 avec 196 ressortissants néerlandais à son bord, alors qu’il survolait le sud-est de l’Ukraine. L’équipe d’enquête internationale [JIT] a en effet déterminé que l’appareil avait été détruit par un système de défense aérienne Buk M1, fournie aux séparatistes ukrainiens par la 53e brigade antiaérienne de l’armée russe.
Le 10 juillet, La Haye a fait connaître son intention de traduire Moscou devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme [CEDH] pour sa responsabilité dans ce drame. « Rendre justice aux 298 victimes de l’explosion du vol MH17 est et restera la plus haute priorité du gouvernement », a alors soutenu Stef Blok, le ministre néerlandais des Affaires étrangères. « En franchissant cette étape aujourd’hui […] nous nous rapprochons de cet objectif », a-t-il ajouté, soulignant que cette procédure allait donner un « soutien maximal » aux proches des victimes.
À cette affaire est venue s’ajouter, en octobre 2018, celle relative aux quatre agents du renseignement militaire russe [GRU], expulsés des Pays-Bas pour avoir tenté d’espionner l’Organisation pour l’interdiction des armes chimiques [OIAC], dont le siège est La Haye.
« Habituellement, nous ne divulguons pas ce type d’opération de contre-espionnage. Mais le gouvernement néerlandais juge extrêmement inquiétante l’implication de ces agents de renseignement », avait expliqué, à l’époque, Ank Bijleveld, la ministre néerlandaise de la Défense.
Mais, ce 17 août, une autre affaire d’espionnage est venu troubler davantage les relations entre les Pays-Bas et la Russie. Cette fois, c’est le renseignement néerlandais qui se retrouve accusé par Moscou.
En effet, le ministère russe des Affaires étrangères a convoqué Dominique Kuhling, la numéro deux de l’ambassade des Pays-Bas à Moscou pour lui faire part de sa ferme protestation après la découverte d’un dispositif d’espionnage dans le véhicule utilisé par l’attaché militaire russe en poste au Pays-Bas.
La Russie « a protesté fermement » auprès de la diplomate « en raison de la découverte d’équipement d’espionnage dans la voiture de service de l’attaché militaire russe aux Pays-Bas », a en effet indiqué la diplomatie russe. « Ces actes inamicaux compliquent davantage les relations déjà difficiles entre les deux pays », a-t-elle ajouté, appelant les autorités néerlandaises à « prendre immédiatement des mesures exhaustives visant à empêcher des incidents similaires » à l’avenir.
Le Premier ministre néerlandais, Mark Rutte, n’a pas souhaité faire de commentaire sur cette affaire.
Cela étant, les Pays-Bas semblent intéresser particulièrement le renseignement russe. Car ce n’est évidemment pas le premier « accrochage » du genre entre les deux pays. Ainsi, en 2012, un fonctionnaire du ministère néerlandais des Affaires étrangères avait été arrêté par le contre-espionnage pour avoir livré à la Russie, et pendant plusieurs années, des centaines de documents sensibles, ayant notamment trait à l’Otan. Et cela, en échange de plusieurs dizaines de milliers d’euros.
Un homme arrêté en Norvège pour espionnage au profit de la Russie
Oslo, 17 août 2020 (AFP) -
Les services de renseignement norvégiens (PST) ont annoncé lundi avoir arrêté un Norvégien suspecté d'avoir fourni des informations sensibles à la Russie.
"L'homme est formellement soupçonné d'avoir fourni à un Etat étranger des informations qui peuvent nuire aux intérêts fondamentaux de la nation", a indiqué PST sur Twitter.
Une responsable de PST a ensuite précisé que cette puissance étrangère était la Russie.
"La personne arrêtée a eu des rencontres avec un officier des services de renseignement russes", a déclaré Line Nyvoll Nygaard à la chaîne TV2 Nyhetskanalen.
De son côté, l'organisme de certification DNV GL, spécialisé notamment dans la vérification des installations industrielles et des moyens de transport, a confirmé qu'il s'agissait de l'un de ses employés.
"Le suspect (...) a via sa position eu accès à des informations qui, à nos yeux, peuvent être d'un grand intérêt (...) pour d'autres pays et d'autres acteurs", a précisé Mme Nyvoll Nygaard.
Selon son avocate, il nie les faits qui sont passibles d'une peine de 15 ans de prison dans le pays scandinave.
Arrêté samedi dans un restaurant d'Oslo après avoir, selon PST, rencontré l'officier russe, le suspect âgé de 50 ans a été placé lundi en détention provisoire pour quatre semaines, les deux premières à l'isolement total.
"Il est décisif que l'accusé ne puisse communiquer avec le monde extérieur par l'intermédiaire par exemple d'autres détenus et ainsi avoir la possibilité d'influencer des témoins et d'éliminer des preuves", a estimé le tribunal d'Oslo.
L'ambassade de Russie à Oslo n'a pas fait de commentaire.
Dans son rapport annuel d'évaluation des risques publié en février, le PST avait mis en garde contre les risques d'espionnage planant sur différents secteurs de la société norvégienne (pouvoir politique, milieux économiques, défense, recherche...), en désignant plus particulièrement la Russie, la Chine et l'Iran.
Plusieurs affaires d'espionnage ont au cours de ces dernières décennies émaillé les relations entre la Norvège, pays de l'Otan, et la Russie qui partagent une frontière commune dans le cercle arctique.
Un officier français mis en examen pour avoir transmis des documents sensibles au renseignement russe
par Laurent Lagneau · 30 août 2020
Un officier français, occupant des fonctions au sein de l’Otan en Italie [donc soit au Commandement de la Force interarmées interalliée basé à Naples, soit au Collège de défense de l’Otan à Rome] a été arrêté et mis en examen pour « livraison d’informations à une puissance étrangère », « collecte d’informations portant atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation en vue de les livrer à une puissance étrangère », « intelligence avec une puissance étrangère portant atteinte aux intérêts fondamentaux de la Nation » et « compromission du secret de la défense nationale par une personne dépositaire de ce secret ». Il a été placé en détention provisoire. L’information a été révélée ce 30 août par Europe 1.
Ainsi, cet officier, qui serait un lieutenant-colonel, a été interpellé par la Direction générale de la sécurité intérieure [DGSI] alors qu’il s’apprêtait à retourner en Italie à l’issue d’une permission. Selon Europe1, il lui est donc reproché d’avoir livré des « documents ultra-sensibles » au renseignement russe. Il a depuis été placé en détention provisoire à la prison de la Santé. On ignore quel rôle a pu jouer la Direction du Renseignement et de la Sécurité de la Défense [DRSD] dans cette affaire.
Lors de l’émission « Le Grand Rendez-vous » d’Europe1, réalisée en partenariat avec CNEWS et le quotidien « Les Échos », la ministre des Armées, Florence Parly, a confirmé cette information et précisé qu’une procédure judiciaire avait été lancée à l’initiative de ses services.
« Je peux confirmer qu’un officier supérieur est sous le coup d’une procédure judiciaire pour transmission ou atteinte à la sécurité. S’il est sous cette procédure, c’est parce que le ministère des armées a pris l’initiative de saisir le procureur de la République en enclenchant un article 40 », a expliqué Mme Parly.
« Nous avons pris toutes les mesures de sauvegarde qui étaient nécessaires et maintenant il faut que la justice puisse faire son travail dans le respect du secret de l’instruction », a continué la ministre, sans donner plus de précisions. Et de souligner que c’est désormais « à la justice de dire de quoi il est coupable et s’il est coupable. » Si tel est le cas, il risque une condamnation de 15 ans de prison devant une cour d’assises.
Plus tard, Europe1 a livré d’autres détails sur cet officier. Ainsi, âgé d’une cinquantaine d’années et père de cinq enfants, il aurait de « lointaines racines familiales » en Russie et parlerait couramment le russe. En Italie, il aurait été vu avec un agent du GRU, le renseignement militaire russe. « Dès que ces soupçons sont apparus, la France n’a pas voulu prendre le risque de continuer à le laisser agir », explique la radio.
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Sujet: Re: Renseignement & Espionnage Dim 4 Oct 2020 - 13:55
US House of Representatives Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence a écrit:
The China Deep Dive: A Report on the Intelligence - Community’s Capabilities and Competencies with Respect to the People’s Republic of China
Document
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Sujet: Re: Renseignement & Espionnage Mar 13 Oct 2020 - 19:04
Citation :
La Norvège accuse la Russie d'être derrière une cyberattaque contre son Parlement
Oslo, 13 oct 2020 (AFP) -
La Norvège a accusé mardi la Russie d'être derrière une attaque informatique qui avait visé cet été son Parlement et permis à ses auteurs de s'introduire dans le courrier informatique de certains députés.
Le 1er septembre, le Storting, le Parlement monocaméral norvégien, avait annoncé avoir été la cible quelques jours plus tôt d'une "vaste" attaque informatique, sans en préciser l'origine. Des données "d'un petit nombre de députés et d'employés" avaient été téléchargées, avait-il ajouté.
"Sur la base des informations en possession du gouvernement, nous estimons que la Russie est derrière cette activité", a déclaré mardi la ministre des Affaires étrangères, Ine Eriksen Søreide.
"C'est un épisode sérieux qui affecte notre institution démocratique la plus importante", a-t-elle dit dans un communiqué, sans fournir plus de détails.
Dans leur rapport annuel d'évaluation des menaces publié début février, les services norvégiens de renseignement intérieur (PST) mettaient en garde contre des opérations "sur le réseau informatique" qui constituent, selon eux, "une menace persistante et à long terme pour la Norvège".
En 2018, la Norvège, pays membre de l'Otan, avait arrêté un Russe soupçonné d'avoir collecté des informations sur le réseau de données du Parlement, mais l'avait relâché moins d'un mois plus tard faute de preuves.
Les deux pays, qui partagent une frontière commune dans l'Arctique, entretiennent généralement de bonnes relations mais leurs rapports se sont tendus depuis l'annexion de la Crimée par la Russie en 2014
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Sujet: Re: Renseignement & Espionnage Dim 1 Nov 2020 - 3:14
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Sujet: Re: Renseignement & Espionnage Mer 18 Nov 2020 - 13:48
Vice a écrit:
How the U.S. Military Buys Location Data from Ordinary Apps
A Muslim prayer app with over 98 million downloads is one of the apps connected to a wide-ranging supply chain that sends ordinary people's personal data to brokers, contractors, and the military.
The U.S. military is buying the granular movement data of people around the world, harvested from innocuous-seeming apps, Motherboard has learned. The most popular app among a group Motherboard analyzed connected to this sort of data sale is a Muslim prayer and Quran app that has more than 98 million downloads worldwide. Others include a Muslim dating app, a popular Craigslist app, an app for following storms, and a "level" app that can be used to help, for example, install shelves in a bedroom.
Through public records, interviews with developers, and technical analysis, Motherboard uncovered two separate, parallel data streams that the U.S. military uses, or has used, to obtain location data. One relies on a company called Babel Street, which creates a product called Locate X. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM), a branch of the military tasked with counterterrorism, counterinsurgency, and special reconnaissance, bought access to Locate X to assist on overseas special forces operations. The other stream is through a company called X-Mode, which obtains location data directly from apps, then sells that data to contractors, and by extension, the military.
The news highlights the opaque location data industry and the fact that the U.S. military, which has infamously used other location data to target drone strikes, is purchasing access to sensitive data. Many of the users of apps involved in the data supply chain are Muslim, which is notable considering that the United States has waged a decades-long war on predominantly Muslim terror groups in the Middle East, and has killed hundreds of thousands of civilians during its military operations in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Motherboard does not know of any specific operations in which this type of app-based location data has been used by the U.S. military.
The apps sending data to X-Mode include Muslim Pro, an app that reminds users when to pray and what direction Mecca is in relation to the user's current location. The app has been downloaded over 50 million times on Android, according to the Google Play Store, and over 98 million in total across other platforms including iOS, according to Muslim Pro's website.
"The Most Popular Muslim App!," Muslim Pro's website reads. The app also includes passages and audio readings from the Quran. (After publication of this piece, Muslim Pro said it will no longer share data with X-Mode).
Another app that sent data to X-Mode was Muslim Mingle, a dating app that has been downloaded more than 100,000 times.
...
Some app developers Motherboard spoke to were not aware who their users' location data ends up with, and even if a user examines an app's privacy policy, they may not ultimately realize how many different industries, companies, or government agencies are buying some of their most sensitive data. U.S. law enforcement purchase of such information has raised questions about authorities buying their way to location data that may ordinarily require a warrant to access. But the USSOCOM contract and additional reporting is the first evidence that U.S. location data purchases have extended from law enforcement to military agencies.
USSOCOM bought access to Locate X, a location data product from a company called Babel Street, according to procurement records uncovered by Motherboard. A former Babel Street employee described to Motherboard how users of the product can draw a shape on a map, see all devices Babel Street has data on in that location, and then follow a specific device around to see where else it has been.
The Locate X data itself is anonymized, but the source said "we could absolutely deanonymize a person." Babel Street employees would "play with it, to be honest," the former employee added.
USSOCOM purchased the "additional software licenses" for Locate X and another product focused on text analysis called Babel X in April, according to the public records. The bundle of additional licenses cost around $90,600, the records show.
In a statement, Navy Cmdr. Tim Hawkins, a U.S. Special Operations Command spokesperson, confirmed the Locate X purchase, and added "Our access to the software is used to support Special Operations Forces mission requirements overseas. We strictly adhere to established procedures and policies for protecting the privacy, civil liberties, constitutional and legal rights of American citizens."
A Babel Street document available online says that "Within the technical specifications of the Locate X Data, Customer’s use of the Locate X Data is not limited by the number of search queries." The document says the location data may not always be accurate.
Babel Street did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
In March, tech publication Protocol first reported that U.S. law enforcement agencies such as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) were using Locate X. Motherboard then obtained an internal Secret Service document confirming the agency's use of the technology. Some government agencies, including CBP and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), have also purchased access to location data from another vendor called Venntel.
"In my opinion, it is practically certain that foreign entities will try to leverage (and are almost certainly actively exploiting) similar sources of private platform user data. I think it would be naïve to assume otherwise," Mark Tallman, assistant professor at the Department of Emergency Management and Homeland Security at the Massachusetts Maritime Academy, told Motherboard in an email.
THE SUPPLY CHAIN
Some companies obtain app location data through bidstream data, which is information gathered from the real-time bidding that occurs when advertisers pay to insert their adverts into peoples' browsing sessions. Firms also often acquire the data from software development kits (SDKs).
Location data firm X-Mode, which is different than Babel Street, encourages app developers to incorporate its SDK, essentially a bundle of code, into their own apps. The SDK then collects the app users' location data and sends it to X-Mode; in return, X-Mode pays the app developers a fee based on how many users each app has. An app with 50,000 daily active users in the U.S., for example, will earn the developer $1,500 a month, according to X-Mode's website.
In a recent interview with CNN, X-Mode CEO Joshua Anton said the company tracks 25 million devices inside the United States every month, and 40 million elsewhere, including in the European Union, Latin America, and the Asia-Pacific region. X-Mode previously told Motherboard that its SDK is embedded in around 400 apps.
In October the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission published a report about data transfers by smartphone apps. A section of that report included the endpoint—the URL some apps use—to send location data back to X-Mode. Developers of the Guardian app, which is designed to protect users from the transfer of location data, also published the endpoint. Motherboard then used that endpoint to discover which specific apps were sending location data to the broker.
Motherboard used network analysis software to observe both the Android and iOS versions of the Muslim Pro app sending granular location data to the X-Mode endpoint multiple times. Will Strafach, an iOS researcher and founder of Guardian, said he also saw the iOS version of Muslim Pro sending location data to X-Mode.
The data transfer also included the name of the wifi network the phone was currently collected to, a timestamp, and information about the phone such as its model, according to Motherboard's tests.
Muslim Pro did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
Other apps sending data to X-Mode included the "Accupedo" step counter app, which has been downloaded more than 5 million times according to the app's page on the Google Play Store; the "CPlus for Craigslist" app which lets users more easily search Craigslist, and has more than one million downloads; and "Global Storms," an app for following hurricanes, typhoons, and tropical storms. The app has been downloaded more than a million times.
As well as the prayer app, Motherboard also installed the Muslim Mingle dating app onto an Android phone and observed the app sending precise geolocation coordinates of the phone's current location and wifi network name to X-Mode multiple times. Vietnam-based Mingle, the developer behind the app as well as other dating apps such as Black Mingle which is marketed specifically towards Black people, did not respond to multiple requests for comment.
"It is safe to say from this context that the reasonable consumer—who is not a tech person—would not have military uses of their data in mind, even if they read the disclosures."
Motherboard found another network of dating apps that look and operate nearly identically to Mingle, including sending location data to X-Mode. Motherboard installed another dating app, called Iran Social, on a test device and observed GPS coordinates being sent to the company. The network of apps also includes Turkey Social, Egypt Social, Colombia Social, and others focused on particular countries.
X-Mode then sells access to this sort of data to a wide range of different clients. Motherboard has previously shown that one of those clients includes a private intelligence firm whose goal is to use location data to track people down to their "doorstep." X-Mode has also demonstrated how its data can be used to follow where people in COVID-19 hotspots travelled to after potentially exposing one another to the coronavirus.
Those clients have also included U.S. military contractors, Motherboard found. Included in archived versions of the "Trusted Partners" section on its website, X-Mode lists Sierra Nevada Corporation and Systems & Technology Research as customers. Sierra Nevada Corporation builds combat aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, and supports contractor Northrop Grumman in the development of cyber and electronic warfare capabilities for the U.S. Army. Systems & Technology Research works with the Army, Navy, and Air Force according to procurement records, and offers "data analytics" support to intelligence analysts, according to its website.
Senator Ron Wyden told Motherboard in a statement that X-Mode said it is selling location data harvested from U.S. phones to U.S. military customers.
"In a September call with my office, lawyers for the data broker X-Mode Social confirmed that the company is selling data collected from phones in the United States to U.S. military customers, via defense contractors. Citing non-disclosure agreements, the company refused to identify the specific defense contractors or the specific government agencies buying the data," the statement read.
X-Mode told Motherboard in an email that the company "does not work with Sierra Nevada or STR" but did not deny they were once customers. (As Motherboard has continued to report on the company and the office of Senator Ron Wyden has carried out its own investigation into the location data industry, X-Mode has removed multiple company names from the Trusted Partners page, including Sierra Nevada Corporation).
"X-Mode licenses its data panel to a small number of technology companies that may work with government military services, but our work with such contractors is international and primarily focused on three use cases: counter-terrorism, cybersecurity and predicting future COVID-19 hotspots," X-Mode added in its email to Motherboard.
Several app developers who work with X-Mode told Motherboard they did not know their users' location data was being sent to defense contractors.
"I was not aware that X-Mode was selling those data to some military contractors," Nicolas Dedouche, CEO at app development firm Mobzapp, told Motherboard in an email. Mobzapp made a screen sharing app for Android that sends location data to X-Mode and has been downloaded more than a million times. "I cannot be aware X-Mode is working with military contractors if they do not clearly mention it somewhere," he added.
"As an app developer I do care with whom I'm contracting with," Antoine Vianey, the developer behind the app "Bubble level" that has been downloaded more than ten million times, said. But they added "to be totally clear I missed the two you sent me!" referring to Sierra Nevada Corporation or Systems & Technology Research.
YanFlex, the developer behind the CPlus for Craigslist app, also did not appear to know that X-Mode works with military contractors. "I don't think what you described is true," they incorrectly wrote in an email when asked for comment.
Accupedo, the step tracking app, told Motherboard in an email that "We do not speak publicly about the relationships we have with our partners. If you are interested in our relationship with X-Mode, you can contact them directly."
"We are comfortable with how X-Mode uses location data," Neil Kelly, president and chief developer of Kelly Technology, which makes the Global Storms app, told Motherboard in an email.
"I cannot be aware X-Mode is working with military contractors if they do not clearly mention it somewhere."
On its website, X-Mode describes its "best practices" in how it obtains consent from app users to gather their location data. As well as the operating system level permission to access location data, and a privacy policy, X-Mode says it also "provide[s] our publisher partners with recommended language both to ease their privacy navigation and to have brand consistency with the way we present our data collection and sharing to users across our panel."
The Bubble level terms of service pop-up that appears when a user first opens the app says the software may collect anonymous location data "to power tailored ads, location-based analytics, attribution and other civic, market and scientific research about traffic and crowds." The Global Storms app provided a similar dialogue in Motherboard's tests. The disclaimers themselves do not explicitly say the data will be sent to military contractors or a private intelligence firm. Some app privacy policies as well as X-Mode's own policy says the company may use location data "for disease prevention and research, security, anti-crime and law enforcement."
"I don’t know how many provide consent," Kelly said of the Global Storms app's users.
But some apps that are harvesting location data on behalf of X-Mode are essentially hiding the data transfer. Muslim Pro does not mention X-Mode in its privacy policy, and did not provide any sort of pop-up when installing or opening the app that explained the transfer of location data in detail. The privacy policy does say Muslim Pro works with Tutela and Quadrant, two other location data companies, however. Motherboard did observe data transfer to Tutela.
The Muslim Mingle app provided no pop-up disclosure in Motherboard's tests, nor does the app's privacy policy mention X-Mode at all. Iran Social, one of the apps in the second network of dating apps that used much of the same code, also had the same lack of disclosures around the sale of location data.
After Motherboard's tests and being approached for comment, Mingle added a new opt-in dialogue box that does say the Muslim Mingle app collects location data. Innovate Dating, the company behind Iran Social, did the same.
X-Mode clarified in an email to Motherboard that its partner apps are contractually obligated to follow relevant data protection laws and obtain consent, rather than there being a technical mechanism in place that stops collection without informed consent.
"We require all apps on our platform to follow all applicable privacy and data protection laws and platform guidelines (e.g., Google/Android and Apple/OS). Our app partners are contractually obligated to comply with these requirements. These requirements include obtaining all required consents and permissions (including applicable opt-ins and providing means to opt-out) from end-users for any data collection and use," X-Mode wrote in an email. "We provide our app partners with consent management tools to help them comply with these requirements, and we audit our publisher’s apps for conformance. When we learn of any alleged issue of nonconformance by an app on our platform, we take this seriously, and we investigate thoroughly and remediate as necessary," it added.
When shown some of the apps’ lackluster privacy disclosures, Chris Hoofnagle, faculty director at the Berkeley Center for Law & Technology, told Motherboard in an email "The question to ask is whether a reasonable consumer of these services would foresee of these uses and agree to them if explicitly asked. It is safe to say from this context that the reasonable consumer—who is not a tech person—would not have military uses of their data in mind, even if they read the disclosures."
Sierra Nevada Corporation was behind a widely discredited report that used location data to conclude that a disruptive event happened at the Wuhan Institute of Virology in October 2019.
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Sujet: Re: Renseignement & Espionnage Sam 21 Nov 2020 - 16:58
Citation :
Russie: un homme condamné à 13 ans de prison pour espionnage au profit des USA
Moscou, 20 nov 2020 (AFP) -
Les services spéciaux russes (FSB) ont annoncé vendredi la condamnation à 13 ans de prison pour "haute trahison" et espionnage au profit des Etats-Unis d'un citoyen russe, chargé de la maintenance de navires de guerre.
"Le 17 novembre, le tribunal régional de Briansk (ouest) a déclaré Iouri Alexandrovitch Echtchenko coupable de haute trahison", a indiqué le FSB dans un communiqué, ajoutant qu'il avait été condamné à 13 ans d'emprisonnement "à régime sévère".
Selon le FSB, M. Echtchenko travaillait à Severomorsk (nord), où est basée la flotte russe de la mer du Nord. Il était chargé "de la maintenance des systèmes radioélectroniques des navires de la flotte du Nord" et a "décidé pour des raisons financières de transmettre des informations aux Etats-Unis".
Les services spéciaux russes ajoutent que l'homme aurait fait des copies de documents confidentiels sur les armes utilisées par la flotte russe entre 2015 et 2017 et, début 2019, "a pris contact avec la CIA".
Il a été arrêté en juillet de la même année dans la région de Briansk, alors qu'il tentait de transmettre ces documents, ajoute le FSB.
Les condamnations pour espionnage se sont multipliées ces dernières années en Russie. En juin, un Américano-Britannique possédant aussi les nationalités irlandaise et canadienne a été condamné à 16 ans de prison pour espionnage en Russie, l'homme affirmant que l'affaire a été montée de toute pièce et qu'il a été piégé.
U.S. Diplomats and Spies Likely Targeted by Radio Frequency Energy, Long-Withheld Report Determines
A scientific study that was long kept under wraps by the State Department finally provides some—though not all—of the answers to mysterious health problems of American officials.
Mysterious brain injuries sustained by U.S. diplomats and CIA officers serving overseas in Cuba, China, and Russia were likely caused by directed, pulsed radio frequency energy, according to a study conducted by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
“[A]fter considering the information available to it and a set of possible mechanisms, the committee felt that many of the distinctive and acute signs, symptoms, and observations reported by DOS [Department of State] employees are consistent with the effects of directed, pulsed radio frequency (RF) energy,” the report said, noting that further studies were required.
The confidential government study, released to Congress after four months of being kept under wraps and obtained by Foreign Policy, presents the most comprehensive account to date of what could be causing mysterious health problems of American diplomats and intelligence officials. The U.S. government has not publicly disclosed the cause of the possible attacks—or even if it knows from where the radio frequency energy could have originated.
U.S. officials have long suspected the Russian government of being behind the attacks, which have strained Washington’s relations with Havana and Beijing, but they do not have conclusive intelligence implicating the Kremlin. The Russian and Cuban governments have denied any knowledge of or involvement in the purported attacks.
The 66-page report does not attempt to answer who may have been behind the attacks, if that is indeed the cause of the diplomats’ health issues, or the mechanisms used to train radio frequencies on U.S. diplomats. But the report authors note that their findings present a vexing problem for the U.S. government and its ability—or lack thereof—to protect government personnel against potential future attacks.
“The mere consideration of such a scenario raises grave concerns about a world with disinhibited malevolent actors and new tools for causing harm to others,” David Relman, a Stanford University professor and microbiologist who led the committee that conducted the study, wrote in the preface to the report, which was first reported by NBC News.
Beginning in 2016, State Department and CIA officials in Cuba and China began reporting mysterious ailments including sharp headaches, dizziness, vertigo, and memory loss. While senior Trump administration officials vowed to identify the cause and perpetrators, the issue has stumped top investigators and scientists from across the U.S. government. The set of symptoms, dubbed “Havana syndrome,” impacted at least several dozen U.S. officials.
In the years since the health problems first began, State Department and CIA officials afflicted by them have voiced anger and frustration about the U.S. response, saying they aren’t receiving adequate medical support or information on the investigations from the government. Relman previously told Foreign Policy he was frustrated by the government’s refusal to release the report.
“While I’m encouraged by the progress we’re seeing, much more must be done to uncover the source of these incidents and ensure that no other public servant suffers in this way,” Democratic Sen. Jeanne Shaheen said in a statement on Saturday. Shaheen included a provision in the new defense authorization bill to provide long-term emergency care benefits to the government employees affected by “Havana syndrome.”
The study, commissioned by the State Department, convened leading neurologists, experts in electrical engineering, toxicologists, and epidemiologists to examine four possible explanations for the symptoms experienced by U.S. officials. Possible causes included exposure to directed radio frequency energy, exposure to insecticides, infectious diseases, and psychological factors.
Ultimately, the study concluded that the symptoms experienced by U.S. officials across a number of locations was consistent with the use of directed, pulsed radio frequency energy. The report doesn’t rule out the possibility that some variation in the symptoms experienced by officials may have had other causes “including psychological and social factors.”
A State Department spokesperson said the department was “pleased” that the report was released and it “is still working to determine what happened to our staff and their families.”
“The investigation is ongoing, and each possible cause remains speculative,” the spokesperson said. “Among a number of conclusions, the report notes that the ‘constellation of signs and symptoms’ is consistent with the effects of pulsed radiofrequency energy. We would note that ‘consistent with’ is a term of art in medicine and science that allows plausibility but does not assign cause.”
The spokesperson did not directly respond to questions on why the department kept the study under wraps up to this point, nor questions on whether its investigations into the health problems have made any progress in recent months
In October, the New York Times and GQ reported that American officials suspected the health incidents were part of a coordinated attack from a U.S. adversary. While the CIA has not commented on whether the Kremlin is behind the attacks, an agency investigation using cellphone location data found that individuals linked with Russian security services were in the vicinity of U.S. officials before they began experiencing symptoms, GQ reported.
The Russian foreign ministry did not immediately respond to a request for comment.
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Reported Russian hack of US systems has implications for DoD network security plans
Andrew Eversden, Mark Pomerleau This story was updated with a statement from the U.S. Department of Defense.
WASHINGTON — The reported cyber breach through an IT contractor’s software used by the military highlights the risks the Department of Defense takes when it increasingly must rely on third-party vendors for digital services.
As civilian agencies disconnected Monday from the SolarWinds’ Orion platform under government orders, the Department of Defense declined to comment on whether its systems are among those across several government agencies reportedly accessed by hackers affiliated with Russia’s foreign intelligence agency. SolarWinds counts all five military services, the Pentagon and the National Security Agency among its clientele for the network management platform, and said Monday in a Securities and Exchange Commission filing that the hack between March and June affected “fewer than” 18,000 customers — both government agencies and businesses.
“The DoD is aware of the reports and is currently assessing the impact. The NSA and JFHQ-DoDIN has issued guidance and directives to protect DoD networks and IT systems,” said Russ Goemaere, a spokesperson for the Department of Defense. “For operational security reasons the DoD will not comment on specific mitigation measures or specify systems that may have been impacted.”
With agencies just now unplugging from the platform, the extended time that hackers potentially had access to government emails and other information particularly alarmed experts.
“This is just the price that the Department of Defense, the intelligence community and the U.S. government, writ large, are going to pay over and over for their continued and increasing reliance on, at its core, code that someone else wrote and tested on their network” (as opposed to code that they wrote and they tested), said Philip Reiner, CEO of the Institute for Security and Technology, who also formerly served at DoD and on the National Security Council.
“As the Department of Defense continues to expand its trust in third-party products and services, because it has no choice, really, this will only get worse. Trust is a transitive property, and threat actors know this, which is why they take advantage of it.”
The Navy and Army referred questions to the Department of Defense, which declined to comment. A spokesperson for the chief information officer of the Air Force did not respond right away to a request for comment.
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A U.S. Cyber Command spokesperson said the command is assessing the issue. “U.S. Cyber Command is postured for swift action should any defense networks be compromised. We are in close coordination with our interagency, coalition, industry and academic partners to assess and mitigate this issue.”
Reuters, which first reported the breach, identified the departments of Commerce, Treasury and Homeland Security as agencies that hackers infiltrated. The Washington Post reported that the group behind the intrusions was APT29, which is associated with the SVR, Russia’s foreign intelligence agency. Reuters reported that the breach was severe enough for the National Security Council to call an emergency meeting. The Wall Street Journal reported Monday that “national security agencies and defense contractors” were among the breached organizations. FireEye, a cybersecurity company with significant federal contracts, announced last week that hackers broke into its servers, which the Washington Post attributed to the same Russian outfit.
What this could mean for the Defense Department
Greg Touhill, who served as the federal government’s first chief information security officer and helped oversee response to the 2015 breach of the Office of Personnel Management, told C4ISRNET that the DoD needs to be on “red alert.”
“I’m in the DoD, I’m thinking, ‘They’re inside, and they’ve been snooping around and laying low,’” said Touhill, a retired Air Force brigadier general and president of Appgate Federal. “So I’m very concerned to find them in the DoD and across the whole federal government; they should be very concerned. And you know what? Those of us in the industry, we ought to be very concerned as well. So this is a five-alarm fire.”
Hackers gained initial access through SolarWinds software updates, allowing them to move within networks beyond the contractor-supported systems.
“This is just an unprecedented breach of commonly used network management tools,” said Trey Herr, director of the Cyber Statecraft Initiative under the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security at the Atlantic Council. “If you’re DoD, you’re looking at a significant impingement on your ability to do every basic office function in a way that you can be assured is not subject to significant compromise.”
The hack through the supply chain comes as the Defense Department works to ramp up contractor cybersecurity requirements through the Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification, which evaluates contractors’ cybersecurity strength.
“It certainly highlights the criticality of improving the security posture of the supply chain,” said Jacob Olcott, vice president of government affairs at BitSight Technologies. “However, one of the significant gaps in CMMC today is the real-time, timeliness issue … You could imagine a situation where an organization would have answered positively to a lot security checkboxes and then something like this happens.”
Across the military services, components are turning to managed service providers for many “as a service” functions, particularly IT as a service. In a recent webinar, a top official at the Army program office task with managing the service’s enterprise network said that there’s “probably nothing that we’re not looking at as ‘as a service.’”
Jon Bateman, a fellow in the Cyber Policy Initiative at the Carnegie Institute for International Peace, told C4ISRNET that the situation highlighted the limits of cybersecurity.
“You’ve got the leading entities in the world, the U.S government or ... FireEye, and then you’ve got the leading hackers in the world, some of them are in Russia. And just given enough time and persistence and effort, the offense can win in huge ways,” said Bateman, who served as special assistant to former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford. “I think that shows us something about the limits of cybersecurity.”
While initially, the goal of the intrusion was purely espionage, the access could have been used for disruption, Herr said. In a hypothetical example, he noted it could have been strategically timed with a significant event crippling DoD’s ability to send emails or other functions, which would be a significant handicap.
The access provided by the intrusion to a foreign actor would be a goldmine from an espionage perspective, Herr added. Being able to read interdepartmental communications and exchanges affords the hackers the opportunity to learn about more about the decisions made within the U.S. government and what is important to leaders.
“I could, for example, from an espionage standpoint, get a much clearer sense of where my redline might be and run significantly closer to that, or see where there’s less interest in or focus on certain geographic or topical areas and policies and push my activity in that direction away from the adversary’s focus, which in this case, be the United States’ focus as a way to avoid penalties,” he said.
Moreover, the duration of the access means that the actor has a good snapshot of the U.S. decision making process rather than just a small snapshot in time.
On Sunday, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency at the Department of Homeland Security, which is tasked with securing federal networks, directed federal civilian agencies to unplug all SolarWinds Orion products. In the directive, CISA categorized the breach as grave. Across the government, an effort to assess the damage from the breach is underway.
“The NSC is working closely with @CISAgov, @FBI, the intelligence community, and affected departments and agencies to coordinate a swift and effective whole-of-government recovery and response to the recent compromise,” NSC spokesman John Ullyot wrote in a tweet Monday morning.
Reaction from the Hill
On Capitol Hill, lawmakers expressed great concern about the supply chain tactics to reach into federal agencies.
“Software supply chain attacks of this nature can have devastating and wide-ranging effects — whether it’s via niche Ukrainian tax software or, as here, network management tools relied upon by some of the world’s largest companies,” said Sen. Mark Warner, D-Va., vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. “As we gather more information on the impact and goals of these malign efforts, we should make clear that there will be consequences for any broader impact on private networks, critical infrastructure or other sensitive sectors.”
California Democrat Adam Schiff, chairman of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, called cybersecurity breaches like this a persistent problem.
“These intrusions reinforce the need to secure our unclassified government networks and those in the private sector that partner with the government,” Schiff said.
Sen. Angus King, I-Maine, who chaired the bipartisan Cyber Solarium Commission, pointed to the risks posed by the sheer magnitude of the federal government’s supply chain.
“I hesitate to even imagine how many vendors there are to the United States government,” King said. “So that underlines that danger.”
Companies doing business with the Pentagon total around 300,000.
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Exclusive-Suspected Chinese hackers stole camera footage from African Union - memo
Raphael Satter WASHINGTON (Reuters) - As diplomats gathered at the African Union’s headquarters earlier this year to prepare for its annual leaders’ summit, employees of the international organization made a disturbing discovery.
Someone was stealing footage from their own security cameras.
Acting on a tip from Japanese cyber researchers, the African Union’s (AU) technology staffers discovered that a group of suspected Chinese hackers had rigged a cluster of servers in the basement of an administrative annex to quietly siphon surveillance videos from across the AU’s sprawling campus in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital.
The security breach was carried out by a Chinese hacking group nicknamed “Bronze President,” according to a five-page internal memo reviewed by Reuters. It said the affected cameras covered “AU offices, parking areas, corridors, and meeting rooms.”
“We cannot estimate the quantity and value of the data which have been stolen,” the memo continued, adding that while AU technicians had managed to interrupt the flow of data, the hackers could easily regain the upper hand.
“We are still weak to prevent another attack,” the memo said.
The alert, drafted in late January and circulated to senior officials, provides a glimpse of how world powers are jockeying for influence and visibility at the continent’s paramount pan-African organization. Some American and European officials have voiced concern as Beijing has stepped in to meet the AU’s needs - part of an Africa-wide shift that has seen China become the continent’s top creditor. Chinese workers built the AU’s showpiece new conference center in 2012 and Chinese technicians still help maintain the organization’s digital infrastructure.
The Chinese mission to the AU said in an email that “the AU side has not mentioned being hacked on any occasion” and that Africa and China are “good friends, partners and brothers.”
“We never interfere in Africa’s internal affairs and wouldn’t do anything that harms the interests of the African side,” the email said.
Repeated messages sent to AU spokesperson Ebba Kalondo asking about the January breach were marked as “read” but went unanswered.
Longstanding doubts over Beijing's role at the AU spilled into the open in 2018, when French newspaper Le Monde reported here that AU employees had found that the servers at the new conference center were sending copies of their contents to Shanghai every night and that the building itself had been honeycombed with listening devices.
Both the AU and the Chinese government vehemently denied the report at the time, but a former AU official told Reuters the article in Le Monde was accurate and had put officials there on high alert over cyberespionage.
The former official said the latest breach was discovered following a tip from Japan’s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), which in a Jan. 17 email alerted AU officials to unusual traffic between the international organization’s network and a domain associated with Bronze President.
Koichiro Komiyama, who directs the global coordination division of Japan’s CERT, confirmed to Reuters that he sent the warning after a fellow researcher discovered the malicious traffic while picking through the hacking group’s old infrastructure.
The AU memo said that, within days of Komiyama’s email, the AU’s information technology team had traced the suspicious traffic to a set of servers in the basement of the organization’s Building C - part of an older complex across the road from the new conference center.
The memo said the hackers were able to siphon off “a huge volume of traffic” from the servers by hiding it in the regular flow of data leaving the AU’s network during business hours, even pausing their data theft during lunch.
Secureworks, an arm of Dell Technologies Inc which has been tracking Bronze President since 2018, confirmed that the malicious domain identified by Japan’s CERT was linked to the hackers.
Secureworks researcher Mark Osborn said his company had seen strong evidence that Bronze President operated from China, adding that it had been detected in several espionage campaigns targeting China’s neighbors, including Mongolia and India.
Any official protest over the spying is unlikely, according to the former AU official. He said China plays a critical role in keeping the organization running, including during an incident in June when part of the AU’s network was knocked out by a power failure and Chinese technicians swiftly repaired the damage.
For that reason, the former official expects that the surveillance camera incident - like the listening devices reported in 2018 - would be swept under the rug.
“Attacking the Chinese, for us, it’s a very bad idea,” he said.
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« Si l’avion n’avait pas atterri en urgence… » : un présumé officier du FSB piégé par Alexeï Navalny
Se faisant passer pour un officier d’une autre agence, l’opposant a recueilli les confessions d’un membre du commando responsable de son empoisonnement.
Les récentes enquêtes de presse sur l’empoisonnement d’Alexeï Navalny, au mois d’août en Russie, ne se contentent pas d’accumuler les éléments incriminant le FSB : elles s’accompagnent d’une série d’humiliations pour l’agence de renseignement russe.
Le 14 décembre, l’un de ses officiers supérieurs avait vu débarquer à l’aube, à son domicile, les caméras de CNN, se voyant obligé de claquer la porte à une journaliste américaine prête à mener un véritable interrogatoire : « Est-ce votre équipe qui a empoisonné Alexeï Navalny ? »
L’homme était cité le même jour, dans une enquête minutieuse menée par plusieurs médias, dont Bellingcat et The Insider, comme le coordinateur d’un commando du FSB composé de médecins et de chimistes lancés sur la trace de l’opposant dès 2017 et présents en même temps que lui dans la ville sibérienne de Tomsk, lieu de son empoisonnement au mois d’août.
Une semaine plus tard, c’est un autre membre de ce groupe qui apparaît dans une séquence dérangeante, publiée lundi 21 décembre par Alexeï Navalny, et dans une version traduite par Bellingcat. Konstantin Koudriavtsev, spécialiste en chimie formé au ministère de la défense, croit parler à un adjoint du chef du conseil de sécurité nationale, Nikolaï Patrouchev, enquêtant sur le « raté » de l’opération Navalny. Sauf qu’à l’autre bout du fil, celui qui pose les questions n’est autre que M. Navalny lui-même, avec à ses côtés, à Berlin, le principal enquêteur de Bellingcat, Christo Grozev.
Des traces de poison sur le slip de Navalny
Les deux hommes utilisent un faux numéro d’appel, prétendument du FSB, mais ils ont surtout l’avantage du moment : le coup de fil est passé juste avant la publication des enquêtes du 14 décembre. Le FSB n’est alors pas encore sur ses gardes, mais le faux enquêteur dispose d’une masse d’informations précises qui le rendent particulièrement crédible. D’autres membres du groupe contactés ne sont toutefois pas tombés dans le piège.
D’abord méfiant, choisissant ses mots avec soin, s’étonnant d’être contacté sur une ligne non sécurisée, M. Koudriavtsev finit par baisser la garde, au cours d’une conversation de près de cinquante minutes. Lui-même n’a pas participé à l’empoisonnement ; il a été envoyé, plus tard, pour récupérer et « nettoyer » les habits de l’opposant à l’hôpital d’Omsk, où l’avion transportant Alexeï Navalny s’était posé et où il sera gardé durant deux jours avant son envoi en Allemagne.
Ce récit est conforme aux informations issues des données téléphoniques et de vols qui seront publiées quelques heures plus tard. L’agent va même jusqu’à mentionner l’habit le plus contaminé, sur lequel il a fallu particulièrement « travailler à faire disparaître les traces » : le slip de M. Navalny, et précisément « l’entrejambe ». Il pourrait s’agir là de la première information solide sur le mode d’administration du poison. La partie russe a toujours refusé de rendre à sa famille les habits portés par Alexeï Navalny le 20 août.
De façon générale, note Bellingcat dans une analyse détaillée du coup de téléphone, les réponses de M. Koudriavtsev sont cohérentes avec les résultats de ses propres enquêtes. Lorsque M. Navalny se trompe sur l’identité d’un membre du commando, l’agent le corrige. Il ne cesse également de renvoyer à un certain Stanislav Makchakov, lui aussi expert en chimie du FSB et désigné comme le chef du groupe.
La ligne de défense russe fragilisée
Alexeï Navalny met par ailleurs au défi le FSB de soumettre la voix de l’agent Koudriavtsev à expertise, pour confirmer ou infirmer son identité. Lundi soir, des agents de police étaient visibles devant son domicile, tandis que les réseaux sociaux se repaissaient de blagues sur le FSB « laveur de slips ». L’agence, elle, a qualifié la vidéo de « provocation », qui « n’aurait pas été possible sans le soutien de services étrangers ».
Konstantin Koudriavtsev laisse aussi peu de place au doute quant à la volonté du FSB de tuer Navalny. « Si l’avion avait volé un peu plus longtemps et n’avait pas atterri en urgence, peut-être que le résultat aurait été différent, dit-il. C’est-à-dire, le travail des médecins, des ambulanciers, sur la piste d’atterrissage… »
Peu après que M. Navalny est tombé dans le coma, des médecins d’Omsk ont révélé avoir utilisé, par défaut, de l’atropine, un antidote. Les responsables de l’empoisonnement avaient pourtant « calculé avec de la marge », s’étonne l’agent du FSB. Il suppose également que si les traces de poison sont censées disparaître dans l’organisme, la partie allemande a pu utiliser d’autres « méthodes de détection » pour identifier l’agent innervant de type Novitchok.
Ce dernier développement spectaculaire, en plus de constituer une nouvelle offense pour le FSB, fragilise encore un peu plus la ligne de défense russe. Moscou, qui se refuse toujours à ouvrir la moindre enquête, n’a cessé d’avancer des versions différentes de l’affaire Navalny. Lors d’une conversation téléphonique avec Emmanuel Macron, Vladimir Poutine avait même été jusqu’à évoquer un auto-empoisonnement.
Mais le 17 décembre, lors de sa conférence de presse annuelle, le président russe n’a pas remis en cause les informations apportées quelques jours plus tôt par Bellingcat et ses partenaires. S’il a tenté de disqualifier ces révélations comme relevant de la « légitimation de contenus venus des services spéciaux américains », il n’a pas nié que des agents du FSB suivaient Alexeï Navalny. Selon M. Poutine, l’objectif de cette surveillance était une réponse au fait que l’opposant « a le soutien des services spéciaux américains ». Des titres de la presse ont ensuite fait part de projets des services secrets occidentaux visant à assassiner un Navalny devenu inutile.
Le renseignement militaire russe serait à l’origine de l’explosion de deux dépôts de munitons en République tchèque
PAR LAURENT LAGNEAU · 19 AVRIL 2021
Le 16 octobre 2014, une explosion dévasta un dépôt de munitions de Vrbětice, loué par le groupe Imex à l’Institut technique militaire [VTU], une société d’État tchèque. Deux employés y laissèrent la vie. Puis, le 3 décembre de la même année, un second entrepôt, où 100 tonnes de munitions étaient stockées, connut le même sort, si ce n’est qu’il n’y eut aucune victime.
Les causes de ces deux explosions demeuraient inconnues quand, le 17 avril, le Premier ministre tchèque, Andrej Babis, et son ministre de l’Intérieur, Jan Hamacek, ont accusé le GRU, c’est à dire le renseignement militaire russe, d’en avoir été à l’origine. Preuves « irréfutables » à l’appui.
Ainsi, selon les services tchèques, deux membres du GRU, Alexander Michkine et Anatoli Tchepiga, sont suspectés d’avoir tenu un rôle de premier plan dans cette affaire. Ces deux-là ne sont pas des inconnus ; en septembre 2018, Londres diffusa deux mandats d’arrêt les concernant en raison de leur implication dans la tentative d’assassinat du colonel Sergueï Skripal [un ancien du GRU] et de sa fille avec des Novitchok, un puissant neuroparalytique mis au point par l’Union soviétique, à l’époque de la Guerre Froide.
Selon Prague, les deux espions du GRU seraient donc arrivés en République tchèque le 11 octobre 2014, dans le but affiché de visiter les entrepôts de munitions situés à Vrbětice en se faisant passer pour des clients travaillant pour le compte de la Garde nationale du Tadjikistan. Pour cela, ils auraient présenté des passeports moldave et tadjik, aux noms de « Rouslan Bochirov » et d' »Alexander Petrov ». Soit les mêmes identités qu’ils utiliseront en 2018 pour entrer au Royaume-Uni afin d’éliminer le colonel Skripal.
Quant au mobile, il aurait un lien avec une autre affaire, celle de l’industriel bulgare Emilian Gebrev, victime, lui aussi, d’une tentative d’assassinat en avril 2015. Tentative aussi mise sur le compte du GRU… et plus précisement sur celui de l’Unité 29155 de son 161e centre de formation spéciale. Unité qui laisse décidément beaucoup de traces derrière elle…
En effet, d’après la presse tchèque, l’entrepôt visé abritait des équipements militaires que l’homme d’affaires bulgare s’apprêtait à revendre à l’Ukraine. A priori, la première explosion n’aurait pas dû avoir lieu sur le territoire tchèque mais lors du transfert de la cargaison. Même chose pour la seconde.
Quoi qu’il en soit, le rôle prêté au GRU dans cette affaire a donc motivé la décision du gouvernement tchèque d’expulser 18 « diplomates » russes du pays. En retour, Moscou a annoncé l’expulsion de 20 diplomates tchèques, voyant dans les accusations de M. Babis une « provocation » et un « acte d’hostilité ».
Ces dernières années, le service de contre-espionnage tchèque, le BIS, a régulièrement dénoncé les agissements du renseignement russe en République tchèque, les accusant de mener une « guerre de l’information » afin de « déstabiliser le pays ». Le tout en ne manquant pas de souligner qu’environ un tiers des 150 « diplomates » de l’ambassade de Russie à Prague seraient des « officiers de renseignement travaillant sous couverture ». Ce qui paraît disproportionné au regard de la taille de la République tchèque…
Cela étant, il y encore quelques jours, Jan Hamacek avait proposé que se tienne à Prague une rencontre entre le président américain, Joe Biden, et son homologue russe, Vladimir Poutine. Et il était même question que la République tchèque se procurât de vaccin russe anti-covid Sputnik V. Il faut dire que la situation politique du pays est compliquée, avec un président, Miloš Zeman, ouvertement pro-Kremlin, et un Premier ministre plutôt pro-européen [ce qui ne l’empêche pas d’être critique à l’égard de l’UE], qui a condamné l’annexion de la Crimée en 2014.
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NSA Spying Row: Four Reasons Why The US & Europe May Continue To Snoop On Each Other & Still Remain Friends
The US National Security Agency (NSA) spying on the German Chancellor Angela Markel with the help of the Danish Defence Intelligence Service (FE) may occupy the global headlines for few days, but it is unlikely to have any major impact on the relationship between the United States and Europe.
A controversy broke out after Danish public service broadcaster DR revealed on June 1 that FE had helped NSA spy on European politicians including German Chancellor Angela Merkel from 2012 to 2014.
The US spying on the European allies is old news; it was out way back in 2013 and had created a global outcry, thanks to the leaks by former but disgruntled NSA contractor Edward Snowden.
It was disclosed that the NSA had tapped the mobile phone of not only Merkel but also of about 35 world leaders. It also had accessed vast amounts of information about European citizens’ communications.
Phone-Tapping Allegations
What is new in the news this time is the help that the FE provided to the NSA in bugging the phones of Markel and other leaders in Sweden, Norway, and France.
This news will generate interest in Europe as not much was known so far about non-English speaking allies collaborating so closely with a US intelligence agency. Otherwise, it is very well-known that British and the US agencies illicitly monitor communications among European governments and businesses, and share that information between themselves.
There is also the “five eyes”, a comprehensive spying agreement that links together the signals-intelligence agencies of five major English-speaking countries — the USA, Australia, the UK, Canada, and New Zealand.
However, substantially speaking, the present uproars will be allowed to subside sooner rather than later because “spying in the allies” has been a well-accepted norm in international politics for ages. It is not that America spies on allies, including even Great Britain, its closest ally. Major European powers also spy on America.
The Snowden Saga
All told, when the incidents of the NSA spying were leaked in 2013 by Snowden, the most powerful leader whose phone was monitored was of Merkel. Naturally, it created a lot of hue and cry in Germany where the anti-American sentiment rose very high.
Accordingly, the Bundestag, Germany’s Parliament, created an investigative committee to study the NSA’s activities. However, its probe reached an anti-climax when it was found out that the BND, Germany’s own foreign intelligence agency, had eavesdropped on various US government agencies and diplomatic missions, on fellow European Union members, on humanitarian nongovernmental organizations, and even on the Vatican’s mission in Berlin!
This anti-climax made Germany very defensive and the US-German relations were back on rails.
France had also had protested against the US a lot after the 2013 leaks and the-then French President François Holland had demanded the then US President Barak Obama to express his “profound disapproval” of the snooping.
But the French had to be embarrassed later to hear that their own external-intelligence agency, the DGSE, was collaborating with the NSA in gathering “metadata” on the phone calls (such as their direction and duration), e-mails and web-browsing of French citizens.
So much so that Bernard Squarcini, formerly France’s counter-intelligence chief, told the French newspaper Le Figaro that he was “amazed by such disconcerting naïveté. You would almost think our politicians don’t bother to read the reports they get from the intelligence services.” He added: “All countries, even when they co-operate on counter-terrorism, spy on their allies.”
Spying On Allies
According to experts, there are plenty of good reasons why allies spy on each other.
One, by spying, one ally protects against a good “friend” simply getting things wrong. For example, the then US President Woodrow Wilson decided to support the allies in World War I, only when the MI6, the British intelligence, thanks to its secret surveillance of a US transatlantic cable, learned of a German plot to win Mexico’s allegiance by promising the country a chunk of US territory.
After receiving this alarming news, Wilson nudged the United States towards a declaration of war.
Similarly, it is argued that unless you know vital information about your friend’s strength and weakness (political cohesion or lack of it, religious and national groups, terrorist vulnerabilities) you cannot be in real position to make good choices about it.
This is vitally important to guard against double-dealing or betrayal, to protect against allies’ vulnerabilities, and to guard against surprise stemming from diverging interests from your friend.
For example, it was because both Britain and the United States spied on one another that the world came to know through the counterintelligence “Venona project”, which entailed the decryption of Soviet message traffic during the war, that sensitive documents were being sent to Moscow from the British embassy in Washington.
It may be noted here that before both London and Washington could react, two British double-agents — Donald MacLean and Guy Burgess had fled to the Soviet Union.
Two, US analysts often argue that since American soldiers fight the international wars with forces or states equipped with highly advanced weapons sold to them by third parties, including allies, it is absolutely vital to know how these weapons systems work to defend themselves.
But such information will not come normally from the allies selling these weapons for the understandable reasons of maintaining their competitive advantage and other intellectual properties and data.
The allies will not divulge such intelligence to each other because, although politically friendly, they are still economic competitors (this is equally true in trade issues). In that situation, counterintelligence services are unavoidable.
Three, given the rising phenomena of terrorism, ecological abuse, and drug trafficking, every major power has to collect a diversity of information that can be gathered openly or transparently.
There are also good reasons why the intelligence gathering in these areas has to be performed with great discretion as regular diplomatic channels will not suffice. And this is good for the allies too as they get warned in time by one another.
And four, it is the rising sequence of jihadist attacks in the last two decades all over Europe that has led to closer collaborations among intelligence agencies of the European countries and that of the United States. In that sense, they need each other more, not otherwise.
Viewed thus, notwithstanding the public outcry in the wake of the latest Danish leaks, the solidarity of the western intelligence community will remain strong.
There may be little more control, here and there, of the American agencies on monitoring the foreign leaders that may be imposed by President Biden (he was the Vice President when President Obama did impose some restrictions on the agencies following the leaks by Snowden in 2013), but Europeans are unlikely to press their case too hard. Doing that will undermine the intelligence cooperation that they depend on.
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