TURQUIE : Economie, politique, diplomatie...

https://prochetmoyen-orient.ch/apres-ben-laden-baghdadi-nomine-a-hollywood/ a écrit:

Selon plusieurs sources militaires et diplomatiques, la rédaction de prochetmoyen-orient.ch peut confirmer que ce sont bien les services secrets turcs – à la demande expresse du président Recep Tayyip Erdogan – qui ont informé le Pentagone du lieu exact de la présence d’Abou Bakr al-Baghdadi – le chef de l’organisation « Etat islamique » (Dae’ch) – dans la localité de Baricha (gouvernorat d’Idlib) au nord-ouest de la Syrie. Durant la nuit du 26 au 27 octobre dernier, un commando des forces spéciales américaines a pu, ainsi tué le chef terroriste.

https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29412/F_35_Jet_Partner_Nations_Sign_New_Agreement_Minus_Turkey#.YIGViS27hsM a écrit:

Bruce Wayne a écrit:

La Turquie est définitivement exclue du programme F-35..

The Washington Post a écrit:

What it means for the U.S. to recognize massacre of Armenians as genocide

The massacre of as many as 1.5 million Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I is commemorated each year on April 24.

Armenians refer to the mass killings as the Armenian genocide — a term that Turkey rejects and which the United States had for decades refrained from using.

That changed Saturday, when President Biden recognized it as a “genocide” in an annual Remembrance Day declaration.

Why does Turkey oppose the term ‘genocide’?

The 1948 United Nations convention on genocide defines it as the crime of acting “to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group.”

Historians estimate that around 1.5 million Armenian Christians were killed during massacres and deportation campaigns carried out by the Ottoman Empire beginning in 1915. Many use the word genocide to describe the events.

But Turkey, the modern-day successor of the Ottoman Empire, rejects this allegation. Successive Turkish leaders have maintained that while some atrocities did occur, the deaths and persecution were nothing to the degree that Armenia and its supporters claim.

Instead, Turkey says that some 300,000 Armenians died during World War I as a result of the civil war and internal upheavals that consumed the Ottoman Empire as it splintered. In addition to Armenian Christians, Turkey says that many Muslim Turks died during this period.

Armenians today are considered among the world’s most dispersed peoples, according to the BBC. The mass killings more than a century ago are a defining moment for Armenia and its diaspora.

But for Turkey, the term genocide threatens the story it tells about the founding of its modern nation-state. Writers who use the term have been prosecuted under Article 301 of Turkey’s penal code, which criminalizes “insulting Turkishness.”

Why has the United States refrained from using the term?

Former presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, among others, did not use the word to avoid angering Turkey. Ankara is a longtime U.S. ally and a strategic NATO member, sharing a neighborhood with Russia and the Middle East. More recently, it was part of the fight against the Islamic State.

Ankara has repeatedly warned Washington that changing its stance would threaten U.S.-Turkish relations and shared interests such as an agreement that allows the United States access to a military base in the south of the country.

Turkey frequently complains when other countries use the term genocide. Some 20 countries do, including France and Canada, while other key U.S. allies, including Israel and Britain, do not.

In 2019, Congress passed a resolution calling the killings a genocide. The move infuriated Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Trump officially rejected it.

Obama had pledged to formally recognize the Armenian genocide when he first ran in 2008, but by the end of his eight years in office, he had not done so.

Samantha Powers, Obama’s ambassador to the United Nations and now Biden’s nominee to lead the U.S. Agency for International Development, said during a 2018 interview that she and others in the administration were “played a little bit” by Erdogan.

“Every year there was a reason not to,” Ben Rhodes, a deputy national security adviser in the Obama administration, said in the same interview in 2018. “Turkey was vital to some issue that we were dealing with, or there was some dialogue between Turkey and the Armenian government about the past.”

“Frankly, here’s the lesson, I think, going forward: Get it done the first year, you know, because if you don’t, it gets harder every year in a way,” he said.
What may be the impact of the change?

Biden, who as Obama’s vice president was presumably privy to these discussions, similarly promised to use the word while campaigning.

“If elected, I pledge to support a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide and will make universal human rights a top priority for my administration,” Biden said in a statement marking Armenia’s Remembrance Day last year.

Now as president, Biden’s follow-through comes after four tense years of relations between Trump and Erdogan. He might also have calculated that taking a stand on a historical event could be a relatively easy way to begin retooling his approach to foreign policy and human rights.

“The American people honor all those Armenians who perished in the genocide that began 106 years ago today,” Biden said in a statement Saturday. “Let us renew our shared resolve to prevent future atrocities from occurring anywhere in the world. And let us pursue healing and reconciliation for all the people of the world.”
How have Turkey and Armenia’s supporters responded?

Erdogan briefly weighed in Thursday, before Biden’s announcement, saying that Turkey will continue to defend its history of what Turkish media called “the events of 1915.”

On Saturday, Turkey’s foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, swiftly condemned Biden’s remarks.

“We entirely reject this statement,” he wrote on Twitter. “We have nothing to learn from anybody on our own past. Political opportunism is the greatest betrayal to peace and justice.”

Many Armenian American activists had been pushing Biden to fulfill his campaign promise. On Wednesday, over 100 members of Congress sent a letter to Biden urging him to do so.

“We join with the proud Armenian American community and all of those who support truth and justice in asking that you clearly and directly recognize the Armenian Genocide,” they wrote.

Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan praised the move Saturday in a letter to Biden. He said it was welcomed by “Armenians all over the world” and called it important for Armenia’s security, Reuters reported.

Carnegie MEC a écrit:

Ankara’s Maghreb Moment

Turkey is advancing economic, energy, and military objectives in North Africa, particularly in Algeria.

Recently, some Algerian media outlets reported on tensions between Algeria and Turkey over alleged Turkish support for Rashad, an Algerian Islamist group. Rashad is made up of former members of the banned Islamist party, the Islamic Salvation Front. The Turkish Embassy released a statement explaining that these were “allegations” and “false rumors.” While the Algerian authorities have issued no official statement on the matter to date, unofficially diplomatic sources in both Algiers and Ankara sought to discredit such reports.

Whatever the truth, a confrontation is unlikely between the two sides because for the last decade and a half Turkey has gained considerable leverage in North Africa in general, and Algeria in particular. Located at the crossroads of Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East, southern Europe, and the Mediterranean, the Maghreb countries are becoming part of Turkey’s zone of influence. Turkey has focused on expanding its reach to advance its economic, energy, and military objectives, as cornerstones of a larger role in Africa and the Mediterranean.

When it comes to its economic agenda, Turkey views the Maghreb as an entry point into new African markets, beginning with the Sahel countries. Turkish investments have steadily increased in Africa, where Turkey’s trade with the continent was estimated at $25.3 billion in 2020. The Turkey-Africa Economic and Business Forum has helped to boost such links. Turkish products have proven successful in the Maghreb countries, after over a decade and a half of improved economic ties. In 2005 Turkey signed an Association Agreement with Tunisia, and followed this up a year later with a trade agreement with Morocco and a Friendship and Cooperation Agreement with Algeria.

Trade with Algeria has been the most significant among the three countries. Algeria is Turkey’s second largest trading partner in Africa after Egypt, with exchanges amounting to $4.2 billion in 2020. Both sides would like to expand trade to $5 billion in 2021, surpassing Egypt. Turkey, which has invested $3.5 billion in Algeria, has also become the leading foreign investor outside the hydrocarbons sector, which is more than France. It is also present in the construction, textiles, steel, food, and energy sectors. More than 1,200 Turkish companies operate in Algeria, employing over 10,000 people. Last January, for example, three Turkish construction groups—Atlas Grup, Ozgur San, and Doruk Construction—won a $1.2 billion contract to construct 4,400 social housing units in different regions of Algeria.

Turkey’s prominent position in Algeria is expected to last as the relationship has been strengthened by the recent signing of seven cooperation agreements on energy, agriculture, and tourism.

When it comes to the energy sector, Turkey has also had significant interests in Algeria, which is Ankara’s fourth largest gas supplier. The Algerian state-owned Sonatrach and the Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporation have extended until 2024 a natural gas agreement in which Algiers will supply 5.4 billion cubic meters of gas annually to Turkey. Sonatrach is also working with Rönesans Holding on building a petrochemical complex in Ceyhan, in southern Turkey’s province of Adana. The investment is worth $1.2 billion.

In neighboring Libya, home to Africa’s largest oil reserves, Turkey and the Tripoli-based Government of National Accord (GNA) have been discussing exploration in onshore and offshore energy blocs. Last September, Turkish officials held talks with Libya’s National Oil Corporation about power generation and pipeline operations. More recently, on April 12, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan received Libya’s prime minister, Abdul Hamid Dbeibah, and the two sides vowed to strengthen their cooperation in the oil and gas sectors, especially as Turkey and the GNA signed a maritime agreement demarcating their maritime boundaries. The agreement would, in theory, allow them to establish a corridor from southwest Turkey to northeast Libya and claim drilling rights in an exclusive economic zone (EEZ). However, this has led to tensions with Greece and Cyprus over violations of their internationally-recognized EEZs.

A third priority of Turkey is to advance its military influence throughout North Africa. Libya is a case in point. In January 2020, it deployed military personnel and used its TB2 armed drones to halt the advance of General Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army against GNA areas, before forcing him to retreat. Turkey seeks to protect its geostrategic interests, including the maritime agreement with the GNA, as well as its economic interests.

Algeria, which has a nearly 1,000-kilometer border with Libya, remains cautious about Turkey’s approach to Libya, though it doesn’t openly oppose it. The Algerian authorities want to preserve a façade of neutrality in the conflict, even if they too favor the GNA. This has made them effective allies of Turkey in Libya. Algeria cannot do without Turkey there, otherwise it would be marginalized in the conflict. But nor can Turkey do without Algeria and Tunisia, which share borders with Libya, providing Ankara with land access to the country if that is required. Meanwhile, Algiers continues working on the diplomatic front to find a political settlement to the Libyan conflict that would involve all actors and avoid foreign interference.

Beyond Algeria and Libya, developments in other parts of the Maghreb show how Ankara’s military policy is tied in to its broader aim of expanding its regional reach. Turkey’s long-term strategy is to dominate the African arms market. In December 2020, for example, Tunisia and Turkey signed a military agreement in which Turkey offered Tunisia $150 million in interest-free loans to purchase Turkish military equipment. The agreement also included cooperation in the military industrial sector, creating common platforms for research, development, the production of spare parts, and the joint export of military material.

This cooperation should allow Ankara to establish a solid industrial base in Tunisia to export its military material throughout the Maghreb and Africa. Indeed, having opened 37 military offices in Africa, Turkey is the country with the most such offices on the continent. In the past three years it has also entered into military agreements with Chad (2019), Niger (2020), and Somalia (2021), and is now eyeing other African markets for further military cooperation.

Turkey is seeking to build up political support in the African continent. Erdoğan, disappointed by the European Union’s reluctance to integrate Turkey into its ranks, has redirected his country’s diplomacy toward the Maghreb and Africa to expand Turkey’s sway in the Mediterranean. The Turkish footprint will continue to grow. While European countries, particularly France, may not be happy with this involvement in an area traditionally under French influence, they will have to adapt. Ankara’s desire to present itself as an alternative to France, confront the Europeans, and portray itself as a defender of the Muslim world, has been welcomed in a region fed up with the long relationship with a former colonial power.

Yörük Işık - Middle East Institute a écrit:

CAATSA sanctions are hurting Turkey’s military readiness at a time when NATO can’t afford it

On Dec. 14, 2020, the Trump administration sanctioned Turkey’s Presidency of Defense Industries (SSB), along with key individuals involved in the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system. The sanctions were issued under the 2017 Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), a law intended to punish Russia for a wide range of malign activities. While Turkey’s decision to purchase the S-400 — one of several decisions that have expanded Russia’s presence in Turkey in recent years[1] — presents serious risks to NATO defenses and the F-35 in particular, responding with CAATSA sanctions undermines both the military capabilities and combat readiness of a key member of the transatlantic alliance.

The CAATSA sanctions are the third part of a trio of U.S. actions. The first was to remove Turkey from the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter consortium and block the delivery of the jets to Turkey — effectively ending billions of dollars’ worth of contracts as well as Ankara’s opportunity to add the world’s only fifth-generation fighter jet to its air force before any other European nation. In parallel, Congress imposed a de facto arms embargo on Turkey. This was largely in response to Ankara’s invasion of Syria in October 2019, but hostile feelings began to emerge during the Turkish president’s visit to Washington in 2017, when two Diplomatic Security special agents, six Secret Service officers, and one Metropolitan Police Department officer sustained multiple injuries in a fight with Turkish security personnel.

The CAATSA financial sanctions now coming into effect include a prohibition on loans or credits from U.S. financial institutions totaling more than $10 million in any 12-month period, a ban on U.S. Export-Import Bank assistance, and a requirement that the U.S. oppose loans by international financial institutions benefitting the SSB. The latter threatens the ability of future Europe-Turkey partnerships to develop advanced weapons platforms. Of particular concern is whether Americans will follow up on implementation such that other countries fear being caught up in CAATSA sanctions as well.

Full blocking sanctions, including an asset freeze and visa restrictions, have been imposed on the SSB’s president, Dr. Ismail Demir, and three other SSB officers. Here, the biggest risk is that other European or Asian suppliers might hesitate to do business with the SSB because of the sanctions on its staff.

Export licensing

Likely the most damaging sanction is a prohibition on granting specific U.S. export licenses and authorizations for any goods or technology. This may directly impact billions of dollars’ worth of potential business, as the United States historically has been the largest exporter of weapons to Turkey. Existing U.S.-Turkey defense contracts are not canceled, but new licenses will not be granted for the export of defense products or technology transfer to the SSB, which includes the re-export from Turkey to third countries.

Export licenses are obtained from the U.S. government by the respective U.S. company with end-user information. Previously, the end user was the specific force, but now most, if not all, agreements designate it as the SSB. Existing licenses under current contracts are insufficient to guarantee the supply of spare parts for U.S.-made weapons systems, since some current contracts specify the quantities involved.

The ban on licenses for re-export from Turkey to third countries will affect the 35% of Turkish defense industry exports that contain American subsystems, per SSB figures. Turkey’s re-export problems occurred even before CAATSA, however. In 2018, Turkish Aerospace Industries signed a $1.5 billion contract with Pakistan for 30 T129 helicopters, but Honeywell could not obtain an export license for the engines. The contract is still in limbo. Similarly, Boeing CH-47 Chinook helicopters were delivered without airborne electronic warfare self-protection because BAE Systems could not obtain an export license for its Echidna Phase 2A Project system. Furthermore, any piece of equipment or part that returns to the United States for an upgrade requires a new export permit.

Substitutions for some parts can be found from alternative sources, but parts may not be substituted in products produced under license. Where Turkish industries lack capacity, sanctions will undermine readiness, obstruct planned upgrades to the Turkish Armed Forces, and hamper the export-driven growth of the Turkish defense industry. For example, engine building has been one of the weaker elements of Turkish industries, especially for defense, but also for general aviation, as was vividly displayed in the Altay tank project, now delayed for years for lack of appropriate engines and transmissions.

Any deals done through foreign military sales might survive, but sanctions threaten equipment and systems that rely on parts usually obtained via commercial channels, such as the crucial early warning and control aircraft E-7T AEW&C Peace Eagle. This type of plane, in addition to the KC-135 Stratotanker aerial refueling aircraft, has been the sine qua non of Turkey’s Libya campaign. Without it, operational capacity will be significantly hampered. Similar problems might arise with the P-235 Meltem II, which is a CASA CN-235 with several key Honeywell upgrades, such as ground proximity warning, weather radar, and satellite communications; GE Aviation’s F110 afterburning turbofan jet engine, which is license-built in Eskişehir by TUSAŞ Engine Industries for F-16 fighter aircraft; and with Lockheed's service life extension program for the F-16s, which are the backbone of the Turkish Air Force. Turkey’s order of Korea Aerospace Industries’ KT-1T trainer aircraft, developed in cooperation with Lockheed, is also under threat.

Procurement and substitution

Procurement issues have already arisen with the Phalanx MK-15 Block 1B Close-In Weapons System, Raytheon's Rolling Airframe Missile MK-49 mod-3 guided missile launching system, and Lockheed's MK-41 vertical launching system with 16 cells, which was to be installed on the brand-new Turkish frigate TCG Istanbul. As a result, at the launch ceremony, only alternative Turkish systems were mentioned. Another potentially serious problem is that GE Marine is the contractor for the gas turbines to power all ships for the Turkish Navy’s new DIMDEG fleet replenishment ship.

Impairing Turkey’s capacity also affects America and NATO. For example, when the B-1s from the 28th Bomb Wing at Ellsworth Air Force Base in South Dakota patrol the Black Sea, it’s Turkish KC-135 planes that conduct in-flight refueling.

If sanctions continue, Turkey will be forced to make purchases from other countries to maintain defense readiness — not necessarily from Russia, but perhaps South Korea or other European countries willing to engage. The Turkish government amplifies the view that every Western product has an alternative. While there is some truth to this claim, not every alternative offers the same quality, and substitutes pose a threat to NATO interoperability.

Like many of its domestic industries, Turkey’s defense industry relies on imported parts to manufacture high-quality products for export. These companies already sell as much domestically as is provided for in the defense budget, and their growth is powered by foreign sales, based on the quality of their products. If parts can’t be imported from America, companies will find alternatives — perhaps not as good as their Western counterparts, but significantly cheaper. Off-the-shelf products are always cheaper than your own R&D, and they provide an opportunity for reverse engineering. By using such substitutes, Turkey might produce lower quality products and damage its brand, but it might also make cheaper products and open new markets. Such is the case with armored combat vehicles. The Turkish defense industry began with licensed production of amphibious armored combat vehicles, but after facing procurement problems, developed its own vehicles and systems, such as armored amphibious rigs and anti-tank vehicles, with a wide range of turret options.

The broader impact

Washington is increasingly disregarding Turkey’s strategic geographical position as a matter of importance. Yet the reality is that Turkey remains the only country to have successfully blocked unchecked Russian military expansionism in the past 16 months. In 2020, in Idlib, Syria, the Turkish military single-handedly halted a Russian-Iranian offensive. Shortly thereafter, Turkish-led forces in Libya delivered another blow to Russia, and in the last year, Turkey successfully maneuvered itself into Nagorno-Karabakh, preventing a full Russian takeover. It would be indeed tragic if Russia grabbed another part of Ukraine or Georgia because a new generation of analysts has not grasped this. Russian expansionism won't wait while Congress reviews sanctions on Turkey.

Ukraine, Georgia, and NATO’s entire eastern membership are currently under threat from Russia’s massive troop movements and “combat readiness” exercises. If Russia escalates further, the first unit to respond would be NATO’s Very High Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF). As of 2021, Turkey took over command of the VJTF from Poland. Built around Turkey’s 66th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of around 4,200 troops, the VJTF includes a total of around 6,400 soldiers in units from Albania, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Montenegro, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. Turkey has made substantial investments in the VJTF — among the most mobile in NATO — particularly in its logistics and ammunition requirements planning. The latest models of Turkish armed vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and howitzers have been allocated to the force.

If viewed from a short-term perspective, CAATSA sanctions provide a tool to punish Turkey for its S-400 purchase. But the long-term damage to the transatlantic security structure outweighs any short-term gain. Sanctions are a blunt instrument that will cause significant collateral damage to American business as well as the military capabilities and combat readiness of a key member of the transatlantic alliance and the relationship between these long-time allies.

To protect transatlantic security and the alliance itself, the United States must engage at the highest level to bring Turkey back in from the cold. Aside from the S-400s and F-35s, other problems have emerged in recent years that must be addressed, starting with the countries’ respective policies in Syria. Without such high-level dialogue, opportunities will be missed and Russia will keep exploiting the void.


Endnotes

[1] Turkey also contracted with Rosatom to build the country’s first nuclear power plant and granted it rights to operate a commercial port on the Mediterranean, adjoining the plant. In addition, Russia’s construction of the TurkStream natural gas pipeline via Turkey achieving a longstanding goal of ending Moscow's dependence on Ukraine to transport natural gas to Europe, giving Gazprom a dominant position in the Balkan market. In recent years the International Investment Bank, a Russian-controlled development bank that critics have dubbed Putin's Trojan horse, has started to occupy a prominent place in Ankara as well.

Fahed64 a écrit:

Sympa le style Grèco-Byzantin

Si ça concerne le monde entier . Vous avez trouvé du pétrole ?

The EurAsian Times a écrit:

Turkey Negotiating With Three Nations To Build A Spacecraft

Turkey is negotiating with three countries on the construction of a spacecraft on the territory of one of them, Turkish Space Agency President Serdar Huseyin Yildirim said.

“We hold meetings with countries … There are only three of them,” he said at the Global Space Exploration Conference (GLEX) in the Russian city of St. Petersburg.

Even though Yildirim did not name the countries, but specified that the spaceport should be on the seashore and be close to the equator.

He also explained that the spaceport would be used for commercial launches, so Turkey plans to cooperate with other countries, including Russia, to jointly develop a launch rocket for low-Earth orbit with a payload capacity from two to four tonnes.



“We are not yet at the level [to build such spacecraft independently]. Of course, we are working on this, but for now, we will need international cooperation. In this regard, Russia could become a good partner. In the course of our negotiations, we also discuss this,” Yildirim said.

However, according to him, by 2029, when the Turkish spacecraft is expected to depart for the Moon, the country will already have had the technology to independently produce such a rocket.

In early 2021, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan presented the national space program. He proposed sending the country’s first citizen into space, building its own spaceport, and sending a lander to the Moon at the end of 2023.

GLEX is an annual event that gathers representatives of scientific circles, governments, and industries since 2012. This year’s edition started on Monday in St. Petersburg and will end on Friday.

This day in 1941, Nazi Germany and Turkey signed the German–Turkish Treaty of Friendship in Ankara.

Turkey severed its diplomatic and commercial relations with Germany, and on February 23, 1945, declared war on Germany. #WW2 pic.twitter.com/xV0CyiPZod

— WWII Pictures (@WWIIpix) June 18, 2021

Citation :

A Tale of Two Corridors: Two Competing Architectures of Europe– West Africa Commercial Connectivity via the Maghreb

In the West African context, the fundamental architecture of trans-Mediterranean
connectivity consists currently of two potential Europe-to-Africa, multi-modal corridors: a
Morocco-based corridor whose overland component runs along Africa's Atlantic coast and
an Algeria-based corridor whose overland component runs through the central Maghreb.
Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, Morocco's West Africa-to-Western Europe corridor was
the more advanced in its development while the Algeria-based, central corridor in which
Turkey is playing a prominent role was, and remains, in a formative state. Both corridors
illustrate that the requirements for a successful Africa-to-Europe corridor reflect two
fundamental needs in Africa's current growth phase more generally: increased
commercial connectivity to consumer markets and a larger industrial manufacturing base.
As the Moroccan example shows, corridors emerge only where the requisite large
investments in port and rail infrastructure are coupled with an industrial base anchored
in international manufacturing value chains.10

The Moroccan Model of Euro-Africa Connectivity: The Value of Value
Chains

Prior to the pandemic, Morocco's 2018 inauguration of its al-Boraq high-speed rail line –
Africa's first high-speed rail transportation connecting Tangier to Casablanca –
consolidated Morocco's unrivalled position as an Africa-to-Europe commercial corridor.
The first segment of the $2.3 billion, 362 km rail link was built as a Franco-Moroccan joint
venture. The Boraq line is linked to Morocco's new state-of-the-art Tanger Med port on
the country's Mediterranean coast 40 km east of Tangier. In June 2019, Tanger Med became the Mediterranean's largest port with a total container capacity of 9 million
twenty-foot equivalent units (TEU), surpassing Spain's Algeciras and Valencia ports. The
$1.5 billion capacity expansion was supported by substantial Chinese investment,11 but
China has failed to capitalise on the investment as Beijing so far has been unsuccessful in
establishing an independent, Chinese-led manufacturing value chain in Morocco.12
The importance of integrating infrastructure investment with industrial manufacturing
chains is illustrated by Morocco's successful automotive industry, producing over 700,000
vehicles annually and serving as the western corridor's centrepiece. In 2012, Groupe
Renault established a second Moroccan manufacturing plant in Tangier to benefit from the
expanded Tanger Med Port and rail link. In 2019, Europe's third largest automaker sent
six trainloads of Renault vehicles daily from its Tangier factory to the Tanger Med port for
shipment.13 In June 2019, France's Groupe PSA, Europe's second largest automaker,
opened a manufacturing plant in Kénitra, north of Rabat, because of the Boraq high-speed
rail link to the Tanger Med port.14 In early 2019, automotive sectors sales accounted for
27.6% of Morocco's exports.15 Morocco's present vehicle production led by Groupe
Renault and Groupe PSA is supported by approximately 200 international suppliers
operating their own manufacturing plants in the country, including major firms
headquartered in Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Belgium, the United States and Japan.
Some Chinese manufacturers are using the opportunity of Groupe PSA's new plant in
Kénitra to integrate into the French-led European value chain, such as CITIC Dicastal,
whose $400 million Kénitra plant can produce 6 million pieces annually to supply Groupe
PSA.16 The recent history of the Morocco-based West Africa-to-Western Europe corridor
illustrates the necessity for Turkey to lay the groundwork for an industrial base
development that leads to value chain integration in partnership Africa nations and other
international actors.

Turkey's Potential Europe-to-Africa Corridor via the Central Maghreb
Turkey's central Maghreb Europe-to-Africa corridor presently centres on Algeria's road
connectivity from its Mediterranean coast to West Africa via the Trans-African Highway
system. The recently formed Turkey-Italy-Tunisia transportation network (Figure 3) that
slices across the centre of the Mediterranean, creating an arc of commercial connectivity
from the Maghreb to the wider Black Sea, forms the primary link in the embryonic central
Maghreb Europe-to-Africa corridor that utilises Algeria's connectivity.