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Sujet: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Dim 2 Déc 2018 - 22:36
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BELLINGCAT a écrit:
Investigating The Kerch Strait Incident
On the 25th of November, Ukraine and Russia were involved in one of the most serious confrontations of the almost 5-year long conflict between the two countries. Russian Navy vessels first rammed and then later fired on and captured three Ukrainian Navy vessels, marking the first time Russian-flagged military units had officially attacked those of Ukraine.
Like many events in this conflict, both sides put out conflicting stories of what happened, as well as statements accusing the other of breaching international law. But what can we say for certain happened?
The First Confrontation
The opening act of the clash between the two navies began around 07:00 Russian time. Three Ukrainian Navy vessels – the Gyurza-M-class artillery boats ‘Berdyansk’ and ‘Nikopol’ and the tugboat ‘Yany Kapu’ – sailed towards the Kerch Strait, aiming to transit to the Ukrainian port of Mariupol. At around this time, they were intercepted by Russian Coast Guard vessels including the ‘Don’ and the ‘Izumrud’.
At this point, the clarity of the picture begins to break down. Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB) claims that Russian vessels attempted to hail the Ukrainian ships and ask them to turn back, as they were not allowed to transit the Kerch Strait without a Russian navigator on board. The Ukrainians, for their part, claim they were illegally intercepted and had the right to free navigation through the strait.
As to what happened next, we need to analyse several primary sources. The first of these is an alleged communications intercept released by the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU). In it, several groups of Russian naval officers discuss the events which took place. There is no specific timeframe given, and it appears that the intercept is a collection of several recordings between different people forming seven discrete conversations.
From this recording, several key pieces of information can be taken away. The first is that the Russian vessel ‘Don’ rammed the ‘Yany Kapu’ twice. Once at 07:35 at the location (44°56’00″N 36°30’08″E) and a second time at 7:44 at (44°56’06″N 36°30’05″E). The second takeaway is that Russian vessel ‘Izumrud’ was damaged in a collision with another Russian ship.
Another piece of evidence is a video showing the Russian ship ‘Don’ appearing to intentionally ram the Ukrainian tug ‘Yany Kapu’. This footage can be seen below.
From this footage, several things can be seen. First, the identity of the boat which the video was shot from can be determined from the distinctive off-set 30mm autocannon seen at 0’51” in the footage, which is also present on the preexisting photos of the ‘Don’. Second, the approximate time of day that the video was shot can also be determined. In the footage, it appears to be shortly after sunrise. According to SunCalc, sunrise on the 25th of November in this area was at 7:46. As such, the video must have been shot within around an hour after sunrise the given the relatively low position of the sun in the sky. As well, in the video, a voice (presumably that of the pilot of the ‘Don’) shouts “eight twenty-one (08:21)” immediately after the collision. It is likely this is the time of the collision and appears to converge with the timeframe suggested by the solar position.
This is further backed up by an apparently unnoticed detail in the video. In it, the tug ‘Yani Kapu’ has already sustained damage from at least two individual strikes. This would confirm that it happened after the 07:35 and 07:44 strikes mentioned in the SBU intercept video. Photos of these areas of damage, when compared to a photo of the undamaged ship taken just a day before can be seen below.
Notably, following this video, the Yani Kapu was struck at least one more time. Video released by Telekanal Zvezda shot an hour or two later in the morning, when the sun was higher in the sky, shows that the tug has sustained additional damage to its port stern, which was not present either in the ramming video or the image taken of the Yani Kapu on the 24th of November.
Further evidence also backs up information from the SBU intercept. Images released by Kerch.FM show damage sustained by the Russian Coast Guard ship ‘Izumrud’. The location of this damage (high on the starboard midship area) is consistent with a strike from a Russian vessel larger than the smaller Ukrainian boats. As well the long scar along the side of the ship is inconsistent with weapons damage. This fits in with the SBU tape wherein a collision between ‘Izumrud’ and another Russian vessel is discussed.
The Second Confrontation
As the day continued, Russian Coast Guard vessels continued blocking manoeuvres against the three Ukrainian ships. A large cargo vessel was used to physically block the narrow passage under the Kerch Bridge, and a separate group of three Ukrainian naval vessels in the Sea of Azovwas forced to return to their base in Berdyansk.
Little information exists for what transpired over this period, however, the SBU intercept recording suggests that one of the Russian Coast Guard vessels took on a complement of 10 special forces soldiers to assist in later actions.
The aforementioned Telekanal Zvezda video also contains another piece of useful information. In the first few seconds of the video, a bulk freight ship identified as the ‘Aviona’ can be seen within a few hundred meters from one of the Ukrainian armoured artillery boats. Using ship-tracking website MarineTraffic, we can determine that the ‘Aviona’ was at anchor in the Kerch Strait in effectively the same location for the entirety of November 25. This gives us a new data point for the location of the Ukrainian ships later in the day, much further north than previous positions.
Under the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) which Ukraine and the Russian Federation are parties to, territorial waters extend at most 12 nautical miles (22.2 km; 13.8 mi) from the baseline (usually the mean low-water mark) of a coastal state. Notably, this additional position near the ‘Aviona’ shows a Ukrainian vessel within not just the territorial waters of Crimea, but also mainland Russia.
It is also worth noting that Ukraine, as well as most Western countries, does not recognise Russia’s annexation of Crimea, and by extension its territorial sea. Moreover, Ukraine has cited a 2003 agreement with Russia that denotes the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait as a shared waterway, allowing free passage.
After 18:00 local time, however, the Ukrainian ships attempted to leave the area, and return to their home port of Odessa. They were, by all accounts pursued, intercepted, fired on, and boarded. Several Ukrainian soldiers were injured and the ships were later captured by Russian Naval forces.
Both sides made attempts to assert that this clash happened either outside of Russian-claimed territorial waters (in the case of Ukraine) and inside them (in the case of Russia).
The Russian FSB released a detailed timeline of the events of the day, including a number of geographical positions in which key events occurred. These events are plotted on the map seen below.
The Russian FSB makes that point that the initial interception, as well as the warning shots, and finally the shots which hit the ‘Berdyansk’ all took place within the ‘territorial waters of Russia’. This does not align with the location data they themselves released.
Specifically, the most serious incident – the shooting of the ‘Berdyansk’ – took place at 44°51.3’N, 36° 23.4 E (notated in the official release as Ш=44° 51’3 СШ, Д=36° 23’4 ВД). We know the FSB is using decimal arc-minutes in their notation, rather than arc-minutes and arc-seconds, due to the fact that an earlier location is given as (Ш=44° 53’47 СШ, Д=36° 25’76 ВД) something which would be impossible under a degrees and minutes notation style – specifically the final digits ‘76’.
As can be seen in the above image, the FSB data, if correct, shows that the ‘Berdyansk’ was 22.72km from the coast of Crimea, and more than 500m outside of Russian-claimed territorial waters when it came under fire.
Ukraine for its part provided less detailed information regarding key locations during this period.
Unfortunately, while Ukraine asserts that its ships were outside of the 12 nautical mile UNCLOS limit, even if their location data is taken at face value, it is inconclusive. This is due to the fact that they only provided 4-digit locations. Such locations do not pinpoint a single point but rather a rectangle approximately 1.8 km on the N-S axis and 1.3km on the E-W axis. Given this level of imprecision, the positions could be potentially within, or outside of the 12 nautical mile limit. Ukraine likely does have access to more precise location data, and could make this public if it wishes to add clarity.
Additionally, an alleged mayday call released by Ukrainian publication Liga Novosti from one of the three Ukrainian vessels includes the audio “How many wounded do you have? I need help! I need help! Mayday! Mayday!” followed by the coordinates N 44° 51’ 00’’, E 36° 23’ 04’’. This location is southwest of the position Russia claims it fired on the ‘Berdyansk’, and is also outside of the 12 nautical mile limit, and thus in international waters.
As for the details of the confrontation itself, we again fall back on statements by both Ukraine and Russia, in lieu of primary sources. Interestingly, neither country’s statements contradict the other aside from their positions relative to the territorial waters line. Both sides claim that Russian forces shot at and crippled the ‘Berdyansk’, capturing it and the tug Yani Kapu shortly after. Initially, the Ukrainian military claimed that both the ‘Berdyansk’ and the ‘Nikopol’ ships had been damaged, before clarifying at 23:20 (Russian time) that only the ‘Berdyansk’ was hit.
Photos of the Ukrainian ships in port in Kerch post-capture show many small calibre bullet holes in the ‘Berdyansk’ as well as at least one large calibre hole in its bridge. This larger hit especially confirms that Russian forces were not shooting to disable the vessel, but rather to harm the crew. The FSB release itself notes that the Russian Coast Guard vessel ‘Izumrud’ issued threats to the ‘Berdyansk’ that “weapons to kill” would be used if the vessel did not comply with its request to stop.
Summary:
From this information, several things are made clear. Firstly, based on geolocated video footage, Ukrainian ships did enter Russian-claimed territorial waters, both that of Crimea and mainland Russia in the Kerch Strait. Ukraine nonetheless argues this was legally permissible due to the 2003 agreement between the two countries. Secondly, we can say that the Ukrainian tug ‘Yani Kapu’ was intentionally rammed at least four times over a period of at least an hour. Thirdly, based on information provided by the Russian FSB which appears to incriminate themselves, the shooting of the ‘Berdyansk’ most likely took place in international waters.
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 25 Jan 2022 - 23:23
''A disruption in the physical energy supplies transiting Ukraine would, clearly, most acutely affect natural gas markets in Europe. And so we’re engaging our European allies to coordinate our response planning, including talking to them how they deploy their existing energy stockpiles, which are, obviously, at significantly low levels this year due to the reduced Russian supplies over the last several months.
We’ve been working to identify additional volumes of non-Russian natural gas from various areas of the world — from North Africa and the Middle East to Asia and the United States.''
_________________ Le courage croît en osant et la peur en hésitant.
Fox-One General de Division
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Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 25 Jan 2022 - 23:55
et là c'est critique pour nous
romh General de Division
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Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mer 26 Jan 2022 - 0:22
Pas du tout, c"est justement l'occasion pour les USA d'accélérer le projet gazoduc Nigeria Maroc, et d'investir dans le pôle gazier du port Nador westmed, si ils prennent cette voix ces l'Allemagne qui sera très fâché car pour eux ils sont gagnant avec le monopole Russe via nord stream 2
Réponse Russe à la sortie de la WH...Pour rappel le système Russe équivalent au SWIFT est en place le SPFS,les Chinois se sont aussi engagés à connecté leur équivalent (CIPS) au système Russe et sortir eux aussi du SWIFT en cas de sanctions contre les Russes (c'était lors de l'entretien Poutine Xi Ji Ping)...La manière de gérer les conflits de la part des démocrates est pire qu'une guerre en Ukraine ceci m'inquiète à titre perso encore plus que tout le reste, car aucune sanction ne sera efficiente contre les Russes faut savoir être réaliste la Russie à un moment, Trump avait raison en cherchant à organisé un sommet (de bonne foi) avec Poutine, l'administration actuelle est partagée entre son idéal mondialiste et sa réalité plus ''républicaine'' (comme le disait Pat Buchanan) et mène des actions contradictoire tout en ''délaissant'' ses alliés..
_________________ Le courage croît en osant et la peur en hésitant.
Fox-One, Fahed64, romh et QuickShark aiment ce message
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mer 26 Jan 2022 - 18:02
Ukraine : Les étudiants marocains face au risque de guerre
Alors que les tensions continuent de monter en Europe de l’Est, notamment entre la Russie d’un côté, et la Grande-Bretagne et les Etats-Unis d’un autre, des étudiants marocains résidant en Ukraine font part de leur inquiétude. En cas de guerre, ils risquent de rester piégés dans le pays, au moment où le Maroc ferme toujours ses frontières extérieures.
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Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Lun 31 Jan 2022 - 20:36
FT a écrit:
The empire returns: Russia, Ukraine and the long shadow of the Soviet Union
As the Kremlin attempts to reassert control over its neighbours, Ukrainian historian Serhii Plokhy uncovers the deep roots of the crisis
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As Russian troops amass on the approaches to Ukraine, Ukrainian citizens are bracing themselves for war. “Emergency kit” is a phrase I hear used more and more among my friends and acquaintances all over the country; the question on everyone’s mind is whether there will be an attack. I have been asked this numerous times over the past few weeks and I cannot provide a satisfactory answer. The only thing I am sure about is that every bit of moral, political and military support that Ukraine gets from its friends and allies makes an invasion less likely.
The crisis erupted on December 17 when Russia presented the west with an unexpected ultimatum. Its list of demands included a commitment in writing to halt any further eastward expansion of Nato, the removal of multinational Nato troops from Poland and the Baltic states, and the possible withdrawal of US nuclear weapons from Europe. Most crucial was that Ukraine never be allowed to join the alliance.
The demands were considered non-starters in Washington and found unacceptable by all members of Nato. The result is that we now find ourselves locked in the most intense diplomatic confrontation between east and west since the end of the cold war.
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There are significant differences between this crisis and previous ones. Most important is the emergence of China as the leading partner in what began as the Sino-Soviet alliance, accompanied by the reduction of the former Soviet Union to the territory of Russia — a state whose economy is not in the world’s top 10. Putin’s essay suggesting there had been no such thing as a separate Ukrainian nation was perceived as a denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood
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These changes are crucial for understanding Russia’s foreign policy today. Its aggression towards Ukraine can be seen as part of an attempt to turn the clock back to Soviet times and reinstate Russian control over the former Soviet space — or at least limit western influence over what used to be Moscow’s east European empire.
So does Vladimir Putin want to re-establish the Soviet Union, as is occasionally suggested today? Not really. His goal is rather to reinstate or maintain the Kremlin’s control over the former Soviet space more efficiently by creating dependencies, preferably ruled by autocrats, in place of the former Soviet republics — an imperial power structure with him as the ruler of rulers at the top.
History cannot tell us what might or might not happen tomorrow. But what it can do is provide a better understanding of how we got to the situation we are in today and what is at stake — especially as in this case the discipline of history, or at least a version of it, is right at the heart of the dispute.
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The current crisis is a reminder that the dissolution of the Soviet Union — closely associated in the public mind with Mikhail Gorbachev’s resignation as president of an already non-existent country on Christmas Day 1991 — was not a one-act play. It is, rather, a continuing saga with numerous sequels; a process rather than an event.
Last July, Putin published a long essay specifically dealing with the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations. The key argument of the article, “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”, was formulated in its very first paragraph. Referring to a recent press conference, Putin stated that “when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people — a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context.”
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What the essay suggested was that there had been no such thing as a separate Ukrainian nation. The argument, which swept aside differences in language, history and culture — especially political culture — between Russians and Ukrainians, was perceived by many as a denial of Ukraine’s right to statehood. But the claim that the Russians and Ukrainians constitute one people is not new, either in Putin’s pronouncements or in the history of Russian political thought.
The origins of that claim go back at least to the mid-19th century when, in order to accommodate the rising Ukrainian national movement, Russian imperial thinkers formulated a concept of the tripartite Russian nation consisting of the Great Russians (or Russians in today’s understanding of the word), Little Russians, or Ukrainians, and the White Russians, or Belarusians. It was also around this time that the imperial authorities prohibited Ukrainian-language publications in the empire, all but arresting the development of the Ukrainian political and cultural movement.
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That policy had its limits. It slowed down the development of a modern Ukrainian national project but did not stop it altogether. As the empire fell in the flames of the Russian Revolution, the Ukrainian activists created a state of their own and in January 1918 declared independence. In neighbouring Austria-Hungary, Ukrainians declared independence as the Western Ukrainian republic. This independence turned out to be shortlived, but it set the agenda for generations of Ukrainian leaders.
By the time the Bolsheviks had taken control over most of what used to be the Russian Ukraine in 1920, the idea of independence had gained popularity among the Ukrainian masses and could not be simply dismissed by the new authorities — the Bolsheviks were forced to recognise Ukraine as a separate nation and even grant a pro forma independence to the Ukrainian Soviet republic. Indeed, the Soviet Union was created in 1922-23 as a pseudo-federal rather than a unitary state precisely in order to accommodate Ukraine and Georgia, the two most independent-minded republics, whose communist leaders simply refused to join the Russian Federation.
Ukraine, as the most populous republic after the Russian Federation, played the key role not only in the creation of the USSR but also in its dissolution. It was the Ukrainian referendum of December 1 1991, in which over 90 per cent of participants voted to leave the USSR, that spelt the end of the cold war superpower.
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The Ukrainians had answered the question of whether they wanted their country to be independent — not whether they wanted to dissolve the USSR. But the USSR fell apart within a week, when Russia’s parliament approved an agreement negotiated by Boris Yeltsin and his Ukrainian and Belarusian counterparts, Leonid Kravchuk and Stanislav Shushkevich, in the hunting lodge of Viskuli in western Belarus. That agreement dissolved the Soviet Union, recognised the independence of the former Soviet republics, and established the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) in place of the now defunct USSR.
The CIS, a compromise forced on Yeltsin by Ukraine, became central to Russia’s bid to re-establish its control over the post-Soviet space
The explanation for this was given more than once by President Yeltsin in conversations with President George HW Bush: without Ukraine, Russia would have been outnumbered in Gorbachev’s Union by the Muslim Central Asian republics. Demographic and cultural factors certainly figured in that calculation, but so did economics. Russia was not prepared to bear the burden of the Union without the Union’s second-largest economy, that of Ukraine. So the old Union had to go.
Addressing the Russian parliament on December 12 1991, Yeltsin stated that the formation of the CIS was the only way to “ensure the preservation of the political, legal and economic space built up over centuries but now almost lost”. Yeltsin did not want Gorbachev’s reformed Union: his preferred political model was confederation, not full independence for the republics. The Commonwealth, whose creation was a compromise forced on Yeltsin by Ukraine, became central to Russia’s bid to re-establish its control over the post-Soviet space and its status as a global power.
It seemed that the leaders of the Soviet republics, the Russians in particular, had managed to avoid the usual violent disintegration of empires, preventing not only a widely feared nuclear war between the newly minted nuclear powers of Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, but also a conventional war between the main post-Soviet successor states. But the subsequent years found Russia involved in conflicts with post-Soviet states, offering support to separatist movements and eventually using its military forces outside its own borders. That was hardly a scenario imagined in the euphoria of the early post-cold war years, given the victory of democratic forces in Russia and some other former Soviet republics.
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The Soviet Union ceased its existence in a manner reminiscent of other continental empires, including its neighbours, the Ottoman Empire and Austria-Hungary, disintegrating along ethnic lines.
But the end of the competition between Moscow and Washington never included a political settlement concerning the post-Soviet space. The US, having sought to prevent the disintegration of the USSR as long as possible, ultimately decided to recognise and support the independence of the former Soviet republics. Russia, for its part, never accepted anything but the conditional independence of the former republics, predicated on an alliance with Moscow and belonging to Russia’s sphere of influence.
1991 Year of the break-up of the Soviet Union, formalised in the Belovezh Accords in December that year Although the CIS was devised for the specific purpose of accommodating Ukraine, the Ukrainian leadership was not interested in any form of joint statehood with Russia. It even formally refused to join the Commonwealth that it had helped to create.
Kyiv’s stubborn reluctance to give up the nuclear weapons it had inherited from the USSR — the third-largest arsenal after those of the US and Russia — was based on its concern about possible Russian aggression. When the Ukrainians finally agreed to give up nuclear weapons in 1994, they insisted on guarantees of their territorial integrity and sovereignty. The Budapest Memorandum, which provided Ukraine with assurances instead of guarantees, was the result. One of the “assurers”, apart from the US and the UK, was Russia.
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Yeltsin’s Russia attempted to keep Ukraine within its sphere of influence by means of economic ties, especially Ukraine’s dependence on Russian gas. Putin’s Russia tried to follow suit, but as Ukraine continued its drift away from Russia towards the European Union, Russia tried to bribe President Viktor Yanukovich with a $15bn loan to prevent him from signing an association agreement with Brussels. A popular uprising drove Yanukovich out of the country when he ultimately refused to sign such an agreement with the EU, although he had promised Ukrainian voters that he would do so.
Russia accepted the fugitive, blamed the US and Europe for provoking and supporting the popular revolt and annexed Crimea. Moscow then began its destabilisation of the Donets Basin (Donbas), the easternmost part of Ukraine, bordering on Russia. The resulting war is still going on, and many expect the Donbas to be the flashpoint of a new conflagration if a Russian invasion takes place. Some are concerned that the conflict could engulf other European countries and go global.
How does Nato fit into this story? As the second world war drew to a close, Soviet armies conquered eastern Europe and occupied it for two generations. Nato was established in 1949 as a defensive alliance to prevent further Soviet westward penetration.
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Russia’s annexation of Crimea drove a majority of Ukrainians into the pro-Nato camp. If less than 20 per cent of those polled supported joining Nato in 2013, almost 60 per cent favour it today
Not surprisingly, after the disintegration of the USSR, east European nations joined the alliance in order to prevent a recurrence of their long political and economic subjection — a process that Russia now deliberately misrepresents as an aggressive “eastward expansion” of Nato led by Washington and Brussels. Poland offers a particularly striking illustration of east European insistence on joining Nato: the Poles threatened Washington with the development of their own nuclear capabilities if they were not offered membership.
Russia’s invasion of 2014 became the driving force behind Ukraine’s insistence on joining the alliance. Immediately after the fall of Viktor Yanukovich’s government in February of that year, the new Ukrainian leadership declared that it had no plans to join Nato. But the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas brought the majority of Ukrainians into the pro-Nato camp. If less than 20 per cent of those polled supported joining Nato in 2013, almost 60 per cent favour it today. Despite this change in attitude, Nato continues to deny Ukraine a Membership Action Plan. But Russia’s current demand to bar Ukraine from Nato forever may very well backfire, leading ultimately to the opposite result.
Russia now gives the impression of moving faster than ever before to re-establish its control over the post-Soviet space. The Kremlin’s support for Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus has helped him to quash peaceful protests against his corrupt rule. Russian military intervention in Kazakhstan this month helped President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev put an end to the violent protests in that country.
_________________ “Le monde ne sera pas détruit par ceux qui font le mal, mais par ceux qui les regardent sans rien faire.” Albert Einstein.
Fox-One General de Division
messages : 8023 Inscrit le : 20/09/2007 Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 8 Fév 2022 - 20:46
https://youtu.be/HIIiKOdvs-U
À votre avis, les connaisseurs en protocole et diplomatie, pourquoi une table aussi longue entre poutine et macron, qu'elle est le message transmis mais non dit ?
Arbalo Commandant
messages : 1001 Inscrit le : 05/08/2012 Localisation : Ontario Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 8 Fév 2022 - 21:31
Restez loin de cette affaire !!
cheribi aime ce message
Fox-One General de Division
messages : 8023 Inscrit le : 20/09/2007 Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 8 Fév 2022 - 22:03
Si ils veulent faire beaucoup de mal à la Russie, la solution est simple, le gazoduc Maroc Nigeria et assechage des caisses de leurs plus importants clients dans la région...
Stinger aime ce message
Shugan188 Modérateur
messages : 5662 Inscrit le : 12/05/2015 Localisation : Maroc Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Jeu 10 Fév 2022 - 0:34
FAMAS Modérateur
messages : 7470 Inscrit le : 12/09/2009 Localisation : Zone sud Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Jeu 10 Fév 2022 - 17:11
_________________ "La stratégie est comme l'eau qui fuit les hauteurs et qui remplit les creux" SunTzu
Voldenuit aime ce message
Fox-One General de Division
messages : 8023 Inscrit le : 20/09/2007 Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Jeu 10 Fév 2022 - 20:14
https://youtu.be/KpPSlVDB6G4
Shugan188 Modérateur
messages : 5662 Inscrit le : 12/05/2015 Localisation : Maroc Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Ven 11 Fév 2022 - 19:46
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 15 Fév 2022 - 14:18
Je pensais la même chose aussi Ssi Red..Le ''conflit'' que les US ont vu venir (dans leur imaginaire) était pour la consommation interne cette administration est l'une des plus détestée (celle qui était censée prendre la relève K.Harris a le charisme d'une huitre et on peut élargir sa à beaucoup de monde) ils se sont surement dit qu'ils allaient imaginé une invasion imminente (auquel même Zelensky n'y croyait pas) pour dire regardez notre bilan à l'international est bon on a stoppé une invasion Russe grâce à notre ''Mutual discussion'' ''engaged diplomacy'',dans cette affaire le type le ''plus raisonnable'' était Poutine (ce qui veut en dire long sur le degré d'incompétence de cette administration) qui a juste rappelé aux US l'accord passé entre Bush père et Gorbatchev sur le non-élargissement de l'OTAN au-delà de la ligne Oder-Neisse vu que les US ont la fâcheuse habitude rarement respecté leur accords (je conseille d'ailleurs la chaine de Xavier Moreau qui est uexcellente sur les analyses géopolitique surtout quand ça touche la Russie ou la Chine).. Par contre ce qui sera intéressant à suivre c'est les répercussions sur les négociation Iranienne car le but des dems c'est de diminuer la dépendance énérgetique Européenne au gaz Russe, l'Iran pourrait être un fournisseur tout comme le Qatar voire ceux d'a côté
_________________ Le courage croît en osant et la peur en hésitant.
Fahed64 Administrateur
messages : 25537 Inscrit le : 31/03/2008 Localisation : Pau-Marrakech Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 15 Fév 2022 - 14:19
Poutine se dégonfle, l’OTAN et surtout les américains n’ont pas cédé…
Poutine a l’air aussi fatigué et la situation en interne est extrêmement tendu.
Les américains vont donc continuer leur politique dans la région.
_________________ Sois généreux avec nous, Ô toi Dieu et donne nous la Victoire
lunatik2x aime ce message
atlas General de Division
messages : 7363 Inscrit le : 15/06/2008 Localisation : vitrolles Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: Tensions russo-ukrainiens Mar 15 Fév 2022 - 15:09
Pas évident .ça a peut être été entendu, manipulé .pour des raisons qu'on ignore
Dim 2 Déc 2018 - 22:36
