messages : 24818 Inscrit le : 14/02/2009 Localisation : 7Seas Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mar 17 Déc - 17:21
Rappel du premier message :
Ce Topic est dédié aux débats des membres de notre communauté autour de leurs visions pour un nouveau modèle de développement du Maroc.
La modération de ce topic incombe uniquement à l'administration du forum en la personne de PGM et moi-même.
Nous aspirons à avoir un échange de valeur pouvant aboutir à enrichir le travail qui se fait en Off avec le staff et des membres du forum en vue de présenter une vision FAR-MAROC au CSMD.
Le respect de la charte du forum et des institutions est primordial, ce topic sera aussi sous surveillance des gens ayant relation avec ce chantier national stratégique.
PS : la suppression des interventions sans aucune valeur ajoutée ou non soignée ne fera pas objet de justification de la part de l'administration...
_________________
Auteur
Message
PGM Administrateur
messages : 11677 Inscrit le : 12/12/2008 Localisation : paris Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 6 Mai - 20:02
Je suis tombé sur cet article ce matin. En effet, je le trouve pessimiste (même si pertinent sur certains points). Le fil de son argumentation, est en fait bien plus large que l'exemple marocain. Partout en ce moment, du fait de la pandémie, les autorités (y compris chez les démocrates scandinaves) tentent de tirer profit des possibilités qu'offre le GSM en matière de localisation et autres contrôles indirect des populations (localisation, repérage des personnes infectés, délimitation des périmètres de circulation, etc). Que se soit à bon ou mauvais escient. Il n'a pas noté que la première utilisation élargie qu'en ont fait les autorités marocaines, était totalement aux bénéfices de la population. Toute technologie est duale. Et il est dans l'ordre des choses que le recours au portable pour tout un tas de choses, deviennent la règle. Oui il faut encadrer strictement l'accès, l'usage et le stockage de ces données. Le confinement, a obliger des millions de personnes et étudiants a travailler depuis leur domicile. Quand je prend mon propre cas, c'est 4 PC qui tourne à plein (avec visio) avec un paquet de transfert de données. Et je rame pour avoir un débit correct (les performances ont été dégradées pour servir tout le monde), Bref tout le monde sait qu'il faut aller au plus vite vers la 5G si l'on veut généraliser le travail à distance . problème, seul les chinois dispose d'une technologie 5G éprouvée à prix compétitif. Il y a donc en occident tout un débat (initié par les USA) pour freiner la mainmise à venir des chinois sur une technologie hautement stratégique. Et bien évidemment, l'occident convoque "la démocratie" et les "droits de l'homme" (les droits à l'image, la confidentialités des données....), bref tout un tas de baratins qui ne nous aurait pas été servi si eux mêmes avait maîtrisé le truc. C'est des prétextes faux cul, surtout après Snowden ou wikileaks.... Ça n’empêche pas que l'usage que l'on fera de cette technologie et les limites qu'on s'impose, doivent être débattu démocratiquement à l'assemblée.
Le pouvoir marocain sait être opportuniste et je pense qu'on tient là une bonne opportunité pour changer les choses. Ce que nous disions ou dénoncions (sur l’hôpital, le privé, les écoles privés, la rente etc), apparaît dorénavant dans sa vérité crue. Plus personne ne peut nier le parasitage d'une partie des agents économiques, la cannibalisation de la santé...
_________________
rafi General de Division
messages : 9496 Inscrit le : 23/09/2007 Localisation : le monde Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 6 Mai - 21:42
Bonsoir,
Albert Einstein professait avec justesse que l'on ne résout pas les problèmes avec le mode de pensée qui les a engendrés. Coronavirus ou pas, le défi à relever est tellement à l'opposé de la mentalité des adeptes de la théorie de la main invisible du système que l'on se demande qui serait capable de se remettre en cause, si profondément, qu'il puisse le comprendre et changer de cap ? lorsque opportunisme et incompétence vont de pair, et c'est si souvent le cas, bonjour les dégâts !
Invité Invité
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 6 Mai - 23:49
Ce que vient d'ecrire Rafi devrait etre envoyé à la commission. Comment des gens qui ont grandi dans la rente, qui ont prosperé grâce à la rente pourrait se remettre suffisament en question pour comprendre qu'il est nécessaire de changer de cap et quel nouveau cap prendre.
Nous le voyons, la tendance de cette "élite" rentière est d'inciter l'executif à aller vers plus d'autoritarisme pour verrouiller toute contestation de leurs avantages.
rafi General de Division
messages : 9496 Inscrit le : 23/09/2007 Localisation : le monde Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 7 Mai - 13:11
Bonjour,
De même que nombre de tes commentaires, Alphatango.
Invité Invité
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Ven 8 Mai - 1:52
Interview de Seddiki. Il revient sur le problème de la rente mais ne donne pas de solution sur la manière dont on se débarrasse de cette économie de rente.
messages : 7470 Inscrit le : 12/09/2009 Localisation : Zone sud Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 15 Juil - 2:38
Citation :
Au niveau du contenu, le thème qui revient le plus souvent dans les échanges est celui de la nécessité de rétablir la confiance. La Commission a également observé que le sujet de la dualité et/ou la polarisation dans la société marocaine était présent dans ces débats. Dans cette perspective, les citoyens ont exprimé des attentes au niveau de 3 axes, à savoir : la justice sociale et territoriale, les libertés publiques et la participation politique, le développement économique. Cela va du sentiment d’inégalité à la nécessité de disposer d’un service public de qualité, en passant par la mise en place d’une économie au service de la société. https://fr.le360.ma/economie/nouveau-modele-de-developpement-benmoussa-fait-le-point-219254
_________________ "La stratégie est comme l'eau qui fuit les hauteurs et qui remplit les creux" SunTzu
Adam Modérateur
messages : 6300 Inscrit le : 25/03/2009 Localisation : Royaume pour tous les Marocains Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Sam 26 Sep - 15:51
Moroccan Institute for Policy Analysis a écrit:
Morocco’s water policies for irrigation have amplified water scarcity, it’s time to think differently
Introduction
In January 2020, King Mohammed VI chaired a work meeting in Marrakech[1] that resulted in a program adopted by the government of Morocco called “National priority programme to supply drinking water and irrigation 2020-2027” (programme national prioritaire d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation 2020-2027) with an investment of 115 billions of Dirhams (approximatively $ 12 billion). Among its objectives, it included (1) a rise in water supply by building new dams (2) a better management of water demand and water valuation particularly in agriculture, (3) enhancing the supply of drinking water in rural areas, (4) using recycled wastewater for greens spaces irrigation and (5) sensitizing and heightening awareness on the importance of preserving water resources and rationalizing its use.[2]Moreover, following the Royal guidelines as regards the program for water saving in agriculture, an overall budget of 14,7 billion of Dirhams (approximately $ 1,44 billion) was allocated to the supply of irrigation water, covering 510 000 hectares and benefiting 160 000 people.[3]
Such programs were set as a yet another response to the water scarcity problem Morocco is facing right now, which is likely to face a major water shortfall in the near future caused by “the expansion in demand of water”[4] and “the reduction in precipitation induced by climate change.”[5] However, water scarcity in Morocco is not linked to the increasing demand for water resources by households or the industrial sector (including the tourism industry), as both consume around 20% of the resources mobilized. In fact, Morocco’s water scarcity is deeply linked to the way water is used in irrigation, consuming around 80% of Morocco’s water annually.[6]
The agricultural strategy, that is based on a “store and save” water approach for irrigation, was implemented in a manner that makes farmers more dependent to rainfall and more vulnerable to drought. The increasing use of technology may have some benefits, but crucial issues persist. Notably, Morocco is prioritizing irrigation for exports and, for a water stressed country, exports of its agricultural products implies the export of a part of the much-needed water. Moreover, the current irrigation policy may have deepened social inequalities. On one hand, it mostly benefited big farmers, as the main beneficiaries of water policies are the entrepreneurs, the business farmers focusing on export-oriented production. On the other hand, the traditional Moroccan farmer that relies on rainfall and aquifers has not benefited that much from the modernization of the agricultural section and have sometimes created even more problem that it was initially, such as in Zagora watermelon cultivation projects.
This paper aims at to demonstrate that Morocco’s current irrigation policies make Moroccan society vulnerable to climate change. First, the paper argues that the country, through its hydraulic and agricultural strategy is actually more and more dependent on rainfall, which seems counterintuitive given the environmental context. Second, Morocco is actually exporting much needed water by favoring export-oriented agricultural strategies instead of national food security. Finally, this paper highlights how current water policies widen social inequalities, especially affecting traditional farmers, albeit invisible, as water access is complicated for family farmers thereby creating more social inequalities and poverty.
Spoiler:
Is Morocco really facing water scarcity?
Water scarcity is defined as “the lack of access to adequate quantities of water for human and environmental uses,”[7] the term being used globally to qualify the state of water resources on pressure. In order to measure its levels, the most common indicator is the “water stress index” conceived by Falkenmark et al. (1989) by calculating the total water resources available to the population of a country[8]: if the amount of fresh water in a country is below 1700 m3 per person per year, the country is said to be experiencing water stress ; below 1000 m3 per person per year it is said to be experiencing water scarcity and below 500 m3, absolute water scarcity. Henceforth, the Economic Social and Environmental Council (CESE) sounded the alarm, on September 26th 2019, by announcing that Morocco’s water resources were depleted severely as they are currently estimated at less than 650 m3 per person per year, compared to 2500 m3 in 1960 and should fall below 500 m3 by 2030. CESE also announced that climate change could cause the disappearance of 80% of the available water resources in Morocco within the next 25 years.[9]
Another ratio developed by the World Resources Institute through its Aqueduct project,[10] helps better understand the critical situation the country is in. The baseline water stress ratio estimates the degree to which freshwater is available as it calculates the total annual freshwater withdrawal for the year relative to expected annual renewable freshwater supply based on 1950 – 1990 climatic norms. It provides an assessment of the demand for freshwater from households, industry and irrigated agriculture relative to freshwater availability in a typical year[11]. In their latest publication[12], Morocco ranked 22d worldwide, suffering from a high baseline water stress. In other words, with a score of 3.89 out of 5, the demand for freshwater approaches up to 80% of the annual renewable supply, leading to greater socioeconomic competition for water and a higher risk of supply disruptions. Projections elaborated in 2015 by the same institute announced a baseline water stress score of 4,68 by 2040, making Morocco at the 18th place. All in all, it is Morocco’s water security that is questioned and presented as the main challenge: how to make sure that water is “effectively, sustainably and equitably managed”?[13]
Since Morocco’s independence, the political display of water and irrigation public policies has driven the image of a country working towards water and food security. However, one cannot ignore the succession of emergency plans that continue to be launched to mitigate the catastrophic consequences of droughts. Why then, as they seek to address the structural consequences of climate change, public authorities persist in calling for emergency short-term plans? Does the postponement of the design of new water policies taking into account structural drought represent a refusal to acknowledge the modest results of past and current policies with respect to water security?
Policy of “Store and Save” water for irrigation: a questionable implementation
Water policies in Morocco follow the objective of increasing water supply through two levers of action: on one hand through the mobilization of more water, historically through dam building and more recently through desalination and treated wastewater reuse and on the other hand through saving water with the introduction of drip irrigation. This rationale of “store and save” water has however shown its limits in the way it was implemented.
Since its independence, Morocco prioritized the expansion of irrigated areas, which relied on a dams’ policy (Politique des barrages) which started officially in 1967 after a World Bank mission a few years before. The idea was to push for large-scale irrigation, in order to fight droughts, raise agricultural production and achieve national food security. Building one dam a year and working to reach a million hectares of irrigated perimeters by the year 2000 became the nation’s mantra.[14] Forty years later, the country counts 144 large-scale dams and 255 hill dams,[15] between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000 hectares[16] of irrigated perimeters and yet it still suffers from water scarcity. Moroccans’ daily life is still rhythmed by alarm bells of “water security elevated risks,” “State emergency in water management,” “anti-drought emergency plans,” “water stress” and lately of “water supply emergency plan.” Thus, it is clear that building an important number of hydraulic devices for water storage and irrigation does not automatically prevent Morocco from water shortage. The misunderstanding lies in the way we see dams as the unalterable solution to water scarcity.
In the context of climate change and structural drought, a dam cannot be the go-to solution anymore. Morocco’s circumstances have changed: gone are the predictable succession of rainy and dry seasons on which Morocco built its water and agricultural policies. Now drought is structural, spanning many years and rain comes often heavily in short bursts which provokes material and environmental destruction, thus difficult to store appropriately. As stated before, a dam allows to store water (mostly rainwater and melted snow) in order to use it all year long and not only during rainy season for irrigation and drinkability. The fundamental purpose of a dam is to stave off the effects of seasonality and passing droughts. However, when drought becomes structural, dams become practically useless due to the lack of rainfall. The filling level of dams provides important insights in evaluating water availability. For example, 40% of the main large dams surveyed on June 3rd, 2020 by the General Direction of Water attached to the Ministry of Equipment, Transports, Logistics and Water have a filling level below 50%.[17] Finally, building dams does not mean automatically fighting water scarcity: irrigated perimeters still need to be built, dams need to be maintained and preserved from sedimentation in order to keep their full volume capacity, hydraulic networks need to be built and maintained too. Unfortunately, it was often reported that many dams needed to be reelevated, that the establishment of irrigation projects were delayed or ill-equipped, or that hydraulic networks were leaking.[18] Such inefficiencies in policy implementation makes a conjunction of moments where water is wasted after storage despite the important investments allocated to such projects.
The issue of efficiency and water wastage constitutes one of the main concerns of water for irrigation policies on the international and national level. By integrating the National Irrigation Water Saving Program (Programme National d’Economie d’Eau en Irrigation)[19] as part of the Green Morocco Plan (Plan Maroc Vert) in 2008, public authorities have shown their willingness to promote drip irrigation, a technology presented as a water saving device that would help farmers “increase the value of water along the value chain i.e more production and more added value per cubic meter of water and in a sustainable way.”[20] To implement such a program, public authorities have allocated a budget of 37 billions of Dirhams[21] (around $ 3.5 millions) and have offered a subsidized financing package covering from 80% up to 100 % of the drip equipment costs.[22] According to the Ministry of Agriculture, the objective was to save up to 826 millions of cubic meters (m3) of water per year (514 millions of m3 from large scale public irrigation projects and 312 millions of m3 from private irrigated areas using groundwater) by converting 550 000 hectares of surface irrigated perimeters.[23] By 2017, 542 000 hectares were equipped with drip irrigation technology due to the heavy campaign led by local authorities.[24] Interestingly, as years passed, the saving water discourse has taken a back seat in favor of productivity and the famous “more crop per drop” injunction.
Between productivity and saving water, public authorities seem to favor productivity. Indeed, the Moroccan experience showed that in the end, the narrative of modernization and intensification of farming practices remains dominant. It’s been observed that farmers have mainly adopted the technology as it was a mean to attain a certain social status (image of a modern farmer) and economic gain.[25] As a matter of fact, drip irrigation was the occasion for farmers to convert their plot into higher valued plants such as onions or potatoes which demand more water, or extend their perimeter by investing into another plot where to install drip irrigation and dig consequently more wells. Moreover, practices of over-irrigation in order to achieve optimal yield were also often observed, putting more pressure on water demands. Interestingly, it is impossible to evaluate the “water saved” through this technology as there are few water meters installed in the perimeters and there are no official instructions given to farmers to limit their water consumption. As such, Morocco went from a policy that publicizes “saving water” into a policy that equips in drip irrigation and encourages intensification of agriculture.
In both the “store and save” water strategies, what stands out is the way technology takes over and diverts from the initial aim of the designed policy. It is important that Morocco centers its water policies on the practices (being farmers’ or public agents’) and on the evolution of the environmental context, and not exclusively on the technology, as technology is as effective as what we make of it depending on the context we use it. There are no automatic benefits by just installing a dam or drip irrigation. There are other factors that should be taken into consideration, such a climate change, and authorities should engage more with farmers’ practices through drawing contracts of limited water consumption and constantly monitoring water consumption for irrigation.
Irrigation for exportation: Exporting the much-needed water?
Since its independence Morocco’s water for irrigation policies were supposed to pave the way for food security and rural development. To do so, priority was given to agricultural intensification, through the implementation of irrigated perimeters. However, a large part of the production coming from such perimeters is dedicated to exportation and not to the national market. To better understand the issue at stake, 80% of the usable water resources (surface water and aquifers)[26] are used to irrigate 15% of Morocco’s “utilized agricultural land” (surface agricole utile)[27] which contributes up to 75% of the country’s agricultural exports.[28] Hence, the continuous emergency plans against drought and water shortage. The truth is that the country still relies heavily on rainfall for its food security, as observed with the impact of this year’s drought on cereals production[29] (mostly situated in rainfed areas), and is still heavily dependent on importation.[30] The prioritization of storing water for business development and the Green Morocco Plan (le Plan Maroc Vert) has only amplified this trend.
In 2008, the Green Morocco Plan came as a response to the country’s ambition to develop a modern, high-added value, high productivity agricultural sector. The policy, designed by a private foreign consultancy firm (McKinsey Company), has been showcased as the engine towards the transformation of Moroccan agriculture into a competitive sector “for economic growth and poverty reduction.”[31] To that end, the policy was divided in two pillars: Pillar 1, which focused on the capitalistic side of the agricultural sector and Pillar 2, targeting small farmers located in semi-arid and disadvantaged regions. However, the budget allocated to each pillar highlights the importance given to agricultural exportations as 75 billion dirhams ($7,5 billion) are to be invested for over 10 years on projects related to Pillar 1.[32] In comparison, investments for Pillar 2 were fixed at 20 billion dirhams ($2 billion). Apart from the inequality in allocation, the announced investments remain quite ambitious.
Water and agricultural policies are supposed to propose an encompassing model of both rural and economic development. However, it seems that public authorities gave more emphasis to the latter. It’s been observed that despite the announcement of an inclusive agricultural plan taking into consideration the duality of the sector, the focus stayed on the development of an exportation-oriented agriculture through the establishment of plant chains on high return (and for some, high water consumption) crops such as vegetables, fruits and olive oil necessitating permanent water for irrigation access.[33] Ten years later, agricultural growth is globally picking up.[34] Reports show that the average annual growth rate of olive trees production is 7,4%, vegetables 1,2% and citruses 6,3%. In terms of exportations, the average annual growth rate registered for fruits (dry, fresh or frozen) is of 13,5%, vegetables (fresh or frozen) is of 8,5% and fresh tomatoes is of 5,6%.[35] Meanwhile, the cereal sector – which Moroccans depend on for food security – remains unstable and highly dependent on rainfall.[36]
Morocco has built a paradoxically unequal agricultural water model: the water stored through multiple and expensive hydraulic systems is mostly exported in the form of citruses, other fruits and vegetables (business first) while small farmers have to deal with the consequences of lack of rainfall and depleted aquifers. Moreover, such irrigation policies do not even serve the objective of food security as 90% of the cereal cultivated areas are rainfed.
Current water policies for irrigation have deepened social inequalities
In fact, the promotional effects of past and present water and agricultural policies with its catching numbers (budget, dimensions etc.) not only failed to guarantee food security but also produced winners and losers. So far, the first beneficiaries of water policies are the big entrepreneurs, the business farmers focusing on export-oriented production. One category of farmers is absent in the design of policies, the family farmer,[37] the traditional Moroccan farmer that relies on rainfall and aquifers to care for his cattle and its plot of land.
By striving to modernize the agriculture sector, Moroccan policymakers designed public policies adapted only to those who have the means to follow them in their ambition, at the expense of family farmers. Experiences in Zagora[38] and El Guerdane[39] show how conflicts emerge because of the inequalities in water access that were caused by Green Morocco projects. For instance, in Zagora, watermelon cultivation projects approved by the Green Moroccan Plan and where drip equipment were subsided has dried up a region that already suffers from water scarcity[40]. Not only the production of high-water consuming crops in a region at the doors of the Sahara is questionable, but also the usual mishandling of drip irrigation and the lack of rain push entrepreneurs to dig deeper into aquifers to get more water. Generally, family farmers do not have the means to take up the costs of digging deeper wells when they dry up. Aquifers are shared by both categories of farmers, when some take more, it means that others have less; leaving a population thirsty for water.[41]Hence, the numerous “protests of thirst” that have taken place in the last few years in the Zagora region have shown that sentiments of anger, humiliation and injustice are palpable.[42]
Similarly, the mere fact of building a dam and transferring water for the project of El Guerdane in the Souss region disturbed or stopped the access of water for a certain population who used the water of the Oued (valley)[43]. Building a dam diverted the course of the water depriving some farmers from it. From there on, the dam allowed the creation of new irrigated perimeters but deprived some farmers of their water. To put it bluntly, entrepreneurial farming is depleting the aquifers all within the legal and procedural framework of the Green Moroccan Plan and leaving family farmers struggling. Such inequality in water access and its social consequences are not addressed in the structures of the policies implemented so far. And seeing public authorities approving projects that financially benefit one specific social category while endangering the safety of another, by cutting off their water, creates a legitimate social anger and a real distrust of public authorities. And that’s why, in times of dire crises, long drought for example causing cattle dying, drinking water cuts, social anger etc.., authorities resort to emergency plans.
Conclusion
Morocco’s water management is still rhythmed by water emergency plans for two main reasons. First, its “store and save” policies seem to be more focused on technical features than on water management and changes in farmers practices. Second, its water for irrigation policies seem to overlook family farmers whose livelihood still relies on rainfed land and cattle. This category of population invisible in ordinary times, becomes apparent in times of crisis, leading to social unrest, which eventually pushes public authorities to action.
The past and current water for irrigation policies have been unbalanced. Rural and economic development should go hand in hand through an inclusive approach, but so far, in a structural drought and climate change context, public authorities have favored water exportation at the detriment of family farmers. The policies implemented only accentuate the state of water scarcity which strikes the vulnerable first.
More importantly, a situation of scarcity is not set. Climate change results in less rainfall which limits Morocco’s water storage capacity. But it is important to also understand that water scarcity is constructed on water demand, the way it is managed and the political, social and economic choices that are made. Hence, Morocco needs a new water for irrigation policy that gets back to basics. Aside from being a driver for economic growth, agriculture should also be a driver for social development. The focus should be on improving food and water security and introducing a more equal access to water, leaving no one behind. To do so, the following recommendations can be made:
To move towards sustainable inclusive policies that cater also to family farmers by securing their livelihood (in rainfed areas) from threats of droughts and lack of rainfall. In particular, the following measures could move towards a concrete solution of this issue: To set up and enforce key water consumption metrics and quota (being for surface water or aquifers) in order to contain water demands and prevent water grabbing and unequal access; To support financially and technically rainwaters collection projects launched by farmers; To support farmers into adapting their practices (seeding date, etc.) to climate change; To generalize the inclusion of farmers in the production chains; To raise awareness for the importance of short distribution channels; To offer training and support to the young generation of farmers in rainfed areas. To invest on crops adapted to semi-arid and arid climates rather than the water intensive ones; To continue on investing on alternative water resources such as treated wastewater reuse and desalination in order to limit Morocco’s dependence on rainfall; Finally, policymakers have also to focus on the way such technical solutions are implemented and their social implications, in order to avoid the inefficient use of the resources invested in these policies.
Footnotes
[1] “Le Roi Mohammed VI: 115 MMDH pour le programme d’eau potable et d’irrigation”, Médias24, January 7th, 2020
[2] See for reference the following articles: “Lancement du Programme prioritaire national d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation », Libération, January 15th, 2020 ; « Le Roi Mohammed VI: 115 MMDH pour le programme d’eau potable et d’irrigation”, Médias24, January 7th, 2020 ; “Mohammed VI lance un programme à 115 milliards de dirhams pour l’eau potable et l’irrigation”, Telquel, January 7th, 2020
[3] “Lancement du Programme prioritaire national d’approvisionnement en eau potable et d’irrigation », Libération, January 15th, 2020 ; Momar Diao, « Economie d’eau dans l’agriculture : Les composantes du plan septennal dévoilées », Finances News Hebdo, January 20th, 2020
[4] Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. “Water Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key Water Challenges.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
[5] Ibid
[6] See Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. “Water Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key Water Challenges.” World Bank, Washington, DC. Citing FAO (2018), it states that Morocco allocates between 75% and 87% of its water resources to irrigation. For simplification, we will use the estimate of 80% in our argumentation.
[7] Chris White, “Understanding water scarcity: Definitions and measurements », Global Water Forum, May 7th, 2012
[8] Falkenmark, M., J. Lundquist and C. Widstrand (1989), “Macro-scale Water Scarcity Requires Micro-scale Approaches: Aspects of Vulnerability in Semi-arid Development”, Natural Resources Forum, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 258-267 cited in Chris White, “Understanding water scarcity: Definitions and measurements », Global Water Forum, May 7th, 2012
[9] Maïne Alloui, “Le CESE alerte sur la menace de stress hydrique”, Telquel, January 9th, 2020 ; The Economic, Social and Environmental Council : “Le droit à l’eau et la sécurité hydrique, gravement menacés par un usage intensif : Le CESE tire la sonnette d’alarme et appelle à entreprendre des mesures urgentes » (Translation : « The right to water and water security under serious threat from intensive use: The EESC sounds the alarm and calls for urgent measures to be taken ») ; « Document/ Sécurité hydrique: Le CESE tire encore la sonnette d’alarme », L’Economiste, September 26th, 2019
[10] The new aqueduct water risk atlas: what’s new & why does it matter to you? Technical Note, World Resources Institute, August 2019
[11] Ibid
[12] Rutger Willem Hofste, Paul Reig and Leah Schleifer, “17 Countries, Home to One-Quarter of the World’s Population, Face Extremely High Water Stress » World Resources Institute, August 6th, 2019
; Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas, World Resources institute, August 2019
[13] Beyond scarcity. Water Security in the Middle East and North Africa. MENA development report. World Bank Group. 2018. Washington, DC
[14] King Hassan II’s speeches in Tangiers, September 18th, 1967 and in Oued El Makhazine, March 14th, 1974 as reported by Yassine Benargane. « Le 18 septembre 1967, le roi Hassan II lançait le grand projet d’irrigation d’1 million d’hectares », Yabiladi, January 18th, 2017 and Jean-Jacques Perrenès. 1993. L’eau et les hommes au Maghreb. Contribution à une politique de l’eau en Méditerranée. Editions Karthala. Paris.
[15] « Amara: le Maroc compte 144 grands barrages et 13 autres en cours de construction », H24, November 6th, 2018 ; ALM. « Barrages : 40 ouvrages construits et 35 en cours ». Aujourd’hui le Maroc. July 31st, 2019.
[16] Taheripour, Farzad, Wallace E. Tyner, Iman Haqiqi, and Ehsanreza Sajedinia. 2020. “Water Scarcity in Morocco: Analysis of Key Water Challenges.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
[17] Daily situation of the main large dams
[18] « Un milliard d’eau perdu par an » L’Economiste. April 28th, 2004
[19] The program is actually the revamped version of « le Programme National de Subvention à l’Irrigation Localisée » launched in 2002 in the objective to implement drip irrigation in 114 000 ha. See Tanouti & Molle, 2017
[20] Mhamed Belghiti. 2008. « Programme National d’Economie et de Valorisation de l’eau en irrigation ». Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la pêche maritime
[21] Ibid.
[22] For details on the conditions see : Ministère de l’Agriculture et de la pêche maritime. 2019. Fonds de Dévelopement Agricole.Les aides financières de l’État pour la promotion des investissements agricoles.
[23] See François Molle, Oumaima Tanouti. 2017. La micro-irrigation et les ressources en eau au Maroc : un coûteux malentendu. Alternatives rurales. Maroc ; François Molle. 2017. Conflicting policies: agricultural intensification vs. water conservation in Morocco. G-EAU Working Paper/Rapport de RechercheNo.1. Montpellier, France ; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Mener le goutte à goutte à l’économie d’eau : ambition réaliste ou poursuite d’une chimère ? Alternatives rurales. Maroc. ; Saskia van der Kooij, Marcel Kuper et al. 2017. Re-allocating yet-to be saved water in irrigation modernisation projects : the case of the Bittit irrigation system, Morocco. In Drip irrigation for agriculture. Untold stories of efficiency, innovation and development. Eds. Jean Vénot et al. Chapter 4. Routledge. New York, London.
[24] Agence pour le Développpement Agricole. Principales réalisations du Plan Maroc Vert
Jean-Modeste Kouame. Irrigation : Magriser à la conquête du marché subsaharien. L’économiste. January 28th, 2019.
[25] See Maya Benouniche’s work on the topic : Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Mener le goutte à goutte à l’économie d’eau : ambition réaliste ou poursuite d’une chimère ? Alternatives rurales. Maroc ; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Making the user visible: analysing irrigation practices and farmers’ logic to explain actual drip irrigation performance. Irrigation Science. ; Maya Benouniche et al. 2014. Bricolage as innovation: opening the black box of drip irrigation systems. Irrigation and Drainage. 63: 651–658. See also the work of François Molle and Oumaima Tanouti referred previously.
[26] For further details see : Abou Bekr Seddik EL Gueddari. Economie d’eau d’irrigation au Maroc. Ministry of Agriculture. Rural Engineering administration ; Abou Bekr Seddik El Gueddari. 2004. Economie d’eau en irrigation au Maroc : acquis et perspectives d’avenir. Revue Hommes, Terre et Eaux. N° 130. Septembre 2004
[27] Ministry of agriculture irrigation webpage : http://www.agriculture.gov.ma/pages/lirrigation-au-maroc
[28] Ibid.
[29] Abdelaziz Ghouibi. “Campagne céréalière : 30 millions e quintaux à récolter”. L’Economiste. April 24th, 2020.
[30] “La part du blé dans les importations se maintiendrait à une Moyenne de 63% à l’horizon 2025”. EcoActu. December 29th, 2019 ; “Les retombées de la dépendance alimentaire du Maroc sur son secteur agricole”. AgriMaroc. December 28th, 2019
[31] Présentation Générale du Plan Maroc vert. 2009. Ministère de l’Agriculture et des Pêches Maritimes
[32] Ibid.
[33] Akesbi, Najib. 2012. Une nouvelle stratégie pour l’agriculture marocaine:Le «Plan Maroc Vert». New Medit n°2/2012 ; Nicolas Faysse (2015) The rationale of the Green Morocco Plan: missing links between goals and implementation, The Journal of North African Studies, 20:4, 622-634
[34] The purpose of the paper is not to analyze the Green Morocco Plan results and its efficiency. The objective is to focus on the water allocation and its consequences on Moroccan citizens
[35] For more details on the evaluation of Green Morocco Plan see : Aziz Louali, Le secteur agricole marocain : tendances structurelles, enjeux et perspectives de développement. DEPF – Ministère de l’économie et des finances – Juillet 2019
[36] For more details see page 14 of Aziz Louali, Le secteur agricole marocain : tendances structurelles, enjeux et perspectives de développement. DEPF – Ministère de l’économie et des finances – Juillet 2019
[37] Nicolas Faysse (2015) The rationale of the Green Morocco Plan: missing links between goals and implementation, The Journal of North African Studies, 20:4, 622-634 ; Mostafa Errahj et al. 2017. Etude sur l’agriculture familiale à petite échelle au Proche-Orient et Afrique du Nord. Pays focus: Maroc. FAO, CIRAD, CIHEAM-IAMM ; see also Najib Akesbi analysis of the Green Morocco Plan
[39] Houdret, A. 2012. The water connection: Irrigationand politics in southern Morocco.Water Alternatives 5(2): 284-303
[40] “Les pastèques seraient la cause de la pénurie d’eau à Zagora”. AgriMaroc. November 11th, 2017 ; “La culture de la pastèque interdite à Zagora?”. AgriMaroc. February 17th, 2016 ; “Crise de l’eau : Zagora, victim du succès de ses pastèques”. L’Economiste. Decembrer 4th, 2015
[41] Sabrina Belhouari. “Pénurie d’eau : Zagora réclame son eau à boire”. L’Economiste. February 28th, 2018
[42] “Dans le sud marocain, des manifestations de la soif contre les pénuries d’eau”. Le Monde et l’AFP. October 13th, 2017.
[43] Houdret, A. 2012. The water connection: Irrigation and politics in southern Morocco.Water Alternatives 5(2): 284-303
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
Adam Modérateur
messages : 6300 Inscrit le : 25/03/2009 Localisation : Royaume pour tous les Marocains Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Ven 4 Déc - 20:17
The Brookings Institution - Yasmina Abouzzohour / Doha Qatar a écrit:
Progress and missed opportunities: Morocco enters its third decade under King Mohammed VI
In the midst of the coronavirus pandemic, Morocco’s King Mohammed VI will celebrate 21 years on the throne in July 2020. Over the last two decades, the king has spearheaded positive civil and political reforms, as well as formidable foreign policy and infrastructural changes. Most recently, the regime took swift and effective measures to control the initial spread of the COVID-19 outbreak. Yet, deeply rooted socioeconomic and political challenges have fueled growing popular disillusionment with the regime and triggered numerous strikes and protests in recent years. Two decades on, regret and missed opportunities are multiplying, as Moroccans look back on the reign of a monarch many had hoped would bring about deep political reform and eradicate social inequality.
This policy briefing closely evaluates the major achievements and challenges that came out of Morocco’s first two decades under King Mohammed VI. First, it overviews the noteworthy foreign policy achievements, large-scale infrastructural developments, important civil reforms, and limited political transformation undertaken by the monarch. Second, it examines the lack of deep political reform and socioeconomic growth that continues to plague the kingdom. Finally, it contends that the regime should preemptively introduce genuine and targeted reforms in order to improve political and socioeconomic conditions and prevent popular discontent from boiling over into violence.
Key Recommendations:
Promote genuine political change: The Moroccan regime should bring about concrete political opening by minimizing interference in government affairs and by effectively dividing tasks between the monarchy and the government.
Reduce social inequality for vulnerable groups: The regime should raise funds (by reforming the taxation system) to improve the living conditions of rural populations and to enhance education and welfare for vulnerable groups.
INTRODUCTION
In 2019, the Arab Barometer found that 70 percent of Moroccans between the ages of 18 and 29 had thought about emigrating,[1] while 49 percent supported rapid political change on the domestic front — the latter percentage being the highest of all Arab countries polled.[2] Such figures — along with chronic protests, a countrywide boycott, critical chants and rap songs, and expressions of discontent on social media — point to an increasing sense of popular disillusionment with the regime. The growing frustration of a wide group of Moroccans comes at an interesting time in the country’s political history. King Mohammed VI will celebrate 21 years on the throne on July 30, 2020 — in the midst of a pandemic that has pushed the country into mandatory lockdown, left many without wages, and led to a reported rise in police violence.[3]
Under Mohammed VI, Morocco has undergone important political and economic reforms while facing considerable challenges. During the first five years of the king’s reign, the regime allowed fairer elections, decreased media censure, acknowledged the human rights violations committed during the reign of the late King Hassan II (1961-1999), and pursued economic development programs. Other achievements include strengthening the country’s foreign policy by diversifying its alliance base and upgrading its infrastructure through large-scale projects. In response to the 2011 uprisings, the regime introduced reforms that marginally limited its powers (i.e., requiring that the prime minister come from the party with the largest share of votes, and reducing the number of diplomatic and high administrative posts that could be nominated directly by the monarch).[4] Furthermore, an Islamist party — the Justice and Development Party (PJD) — entered the government for the first time in the country’s history.
However, despite these achievements, Morocco remains plagued by socioeconomic challenges. The country suffers from high unemployment rates, poverty, social inequality, mediocre healthcare and education, a persistent urban-rural divide, and towering public debt. Furthermore, the economy relies on oil imports and unstable agricultural and tourism sectors. In the last decade, protests triggered by economic hardship have faced increased repression from the regime, which fears rising instability. In fact, since the 2011 uprisings, the regime has faced great security concerns due to the emergence of the Islamic State (IS) in neighboring countries and the Hirak movement in the historically rebellious Rif region. Two decades on, the reform process seems to have collapsed altogether.
Overall, continuous economic hardship and political restrictions will increase popular frustration and fuel further protests. Yet, the king — who remains the most powerful political actor in the country — can still deescalate this volatile situation, as the regime has not yet resorted to brutal violence. To avoid chaos, the regime should focus on: (1) bringing about concrete political opening by limiting interference in government affairs and by effectively dividing tasks between the monarchy and the government; and (2) reducing social inequality by reforming the taxation system, thereby raising funds to improve the living conditions of rural populations and to enhance education and welfare.
ACHIEVEMENTS AND CHALLENGES
Since Mohammed VI succeeded to the throne in 1999, Morocco has undergone noteworthy changes in terms of foreign policy, infrastructural development, and civil reform. However, concrete political reform continues to lag behind past promises, and socioeconomic challenges persist despite minor advances.
Foreign policy re-direction
Morocco has taken significant strides in foreign policy by diversifying its alliance base to pursue economic and diplomatic interests.[5] Under the current king, the country has rejoined the African Union (AU), developed stronger ties with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), improved relations with Europe, and strengthened its position as an international ally in fighting terrorism and irregular migration.[6]
To maintain trade relations and continue to receive bilateral aid from Europe — Morocco’s largest trading partner and donor — the regime has often had to accept trade restrictions and human rights criticism from the European Union (EU). Indeed, the EU accounted for 59.4 percent of Morocco’s trade in 2017 (i.e., 64.6 percent of its exports and 56.5 percent of its imports).[7]At least 73 percent of Morocco’s inward foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks in 2019 came from European countries.[8]
Under Mohammed VI, there has been a conscious effort to reduce this influence, and Moroccan decision-makers have striven to diversify the country’s support base by strengthening ties with GCC countries and developing new relationships with non-traditional partners, such as China and Russia.[9] Most striking has been the kingdom’s re-direction toward sub-Saharan Africa.
Indeed, Mohammed VI has championed greater presence within the African continent, a move that positions the kingdom as the West’s gateway to Africa, thereby allowing it to enhance its international standing, shore up regional support, and improve its economy. Morocco rejoined the AU in 2017, more than three decades after leaving it.[10] Since then, the regime has demonstrated its interest in joining the Economic Community of West African States,[11] which invited Morocco to a recent summit.[12] The king has personally worked to build ties with sub-Saharan countries; he has made numerous visits to various states and signed nearly 1,000 agreements for economic, political, and security deals.[13]
Through the king’s efforts, Moroccan companies have increased cooperation with sub-Saharan Africa in banking, telecommunications, insurance, and manufacturing. In fact, according to the African Development Bank, 85 percent of the kingdom’s FDI went to sub-Saharan states in 2018.[14] Moroccan-African trade is also growing — it increased by 68 percent between 2008 and 2018 (see Figure 1),[15] while Moroccan exports to western Africa tripled during the same period.[16] Beyond boosting the kingdom’s economy and diversifying its alliance base, Morocco’s ties to sub-Saharan countries will further benefit its relationship with the EU by promoting Morocco-EU-African trade.
Security player
In terms of regional security, instability has grown in North Africa and the Sahel over the last decade, allowing Morocco to rise as a key counterterrorism player. Recent protests in Algeria, Sudan, and Egypt have highlighted Morocco as a zone of stability in an otherwise struggling region and as a safe ally for Western actors. Meanwhile, the kingdom’s willingness to contain terrorist activity in Libya and Mali has strengthened its position as an actor that can help with counterterrorism efforts in the region.
Furthermore, Morocco has faced fewer terrorist attacks than neighboring Tunisia, Algeria, Spain, Italy, and France, a fact that may be attributed to its effective cybersecurity and counterterrorism forces (see Figure 2).[17 ]Indeed, Moroccan authorities maintain a network of close to 50,000 auxiliary agents that are placed in neighborhoods to inform on residents.[18] Counter-terrorist forces are usually able to dismantle cells before terrorist activity or planning takes place. According to the authorities, they foiled 352 attacks and dismantled over 170 cells between 2002 and 2017; [19] many of these were reportedly linked to ISIS.[20] Morocco’s control of terrorist activity within its own borders and in other countries has made the regime an indispensable ally to the EU and United States, thereby balancing out its dependence on their financial support.
[21]
In addition to providing the United States and EU with intelligence on terrorist cells, Moroccan counter-terrorist forces have stopped plots before they unfurled on European soil — notably in France in 2015 and Spain in 2017.[22] They also foiled attacks on U.S. and British ships in the Strait of Gibraltar in 2002.[23] The regime has also allowed the United States to carry out military training in Morocco through the annual African Lion exercise.[24] In return, Morocco has received support from both the EU and United States (notably through the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership) to train its forces and target radicalization at the population level.[25] Furthermore, there has been much U.S. and EU support for Morocco’s soft power approach to countering radicalization through programs that train local, African, and European imams.[26] The success of such programs has strengthened Morocco’s international position.
Infrastructural developments and needs
The regime’s infrastructural development plan over the past two decades started with a push for mass electrification [27] before improving the country’s motorway infrastructure. The regime then focused on launching a renewable energy megaproject. These costly developments will attract greater investment and tourism inflow and will eventually reduce Morocco’s reliance on energy imports.
A groundbreaking achievement during Mohammed VI’s reign was the construction of the country’s first mega solar power complex, Noor, which saw investments of around $9 billion.[28] Once complete, the complex will be the world’s largest concentrated solar power plant, [29] able to power a city twice the size of Marrakech at peak capacity.[30] Most of Noor’s phases are already on stream, and construction is underway for the final phase.[31 ] The aim is for 42 percent of Morocco’s electrical power to come from renewable sources by 2020, and 52 percent by 2030.[32] This is feasible given that 35 percent of the country’s electricity came from renewable sources in 2018.[33]
There has also been significant improvement to the country’s motorway network under the current king, with the network’s length having increased from around 400 kilometers in 1999 to 1,831 kilometers in 2016.[34] As a result, 60 percent of the population (mostly in urban areas) now has direct access to the highway network,[35] which connects 18 airports and 37 commercial ports (13 of which are dedicated to foreign trade).[36]
Furthermore, after close to 16 years of planning and construction,[37] Morocco inaugurated Al Boraq, its first high-speed rail service, in November 2018. In its first phase, Al Boraq currently spans close to 350 kilometers, connecting Casablanca and Tangiers and reducing the travel time between them from five hours to two hours. Eventually, the high-speed rail service will extend to 1,500 kilometers throughout the country.[38] The project received significant criticism domestically, with major objections concerning its cost of more than $2 billion.[ 39] Such a budget was deemed exorbitant by certain associations and political figures, given that Morocco has yet to tackle issues of weak welfare provision, healthcare, and education.
Persistent socioeconomic woes
Many macroeconomic and social indicators point to an improved socioeconomic landscape in Morocco. Since Mohammed VI’s ascension to the throne, the country’s per capita income (constant dollars over time) has increased from $1,963 in 1999 to $3,361 in 2018,[40] and exports have tripled.[41] At the social level, the primary school enrollment rate increased by over 27 points between 1999 and 2018,[42] the poverty headcount ratio at the national poverty line decreased from 15.3 percent in 2000 to 4.8 percent in 2013,[43] life expectancy increased by over eight years between 1999 and 2018, [44] and unemployment decreased from 13.9 percent in 1999 to 9 percent in 2019.[45] The economy was boosted by a strong revival of the tourism sector — indeed, the number of tourists visiting the kingdom has tripled over the past 20 years[46]— and it has greatly benefited from the growth of specific industries (such as automotive and aerospace).[47]
However, according to the World Bank, nearly a quarter of Moroccans are poor or at risk of poverty,[48 ]and the gap between the highest and lowest socioeconomic classes is wide, pointing to great inequality. Morocco’s Gini index is 40.9 percent, meaning it has barely improved since 1998.[49] This is the highest number in North Africa (excluding Libya, which is in the throes of civil war), followed by Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt.[50]
Indeed, while poverty has decreased countrywide, it is still prevalent in rural areas. Poverty rates among the rural population were twice as high as at the national level in 2018; in fact, the rural population accounted for 79.4 percent of poor people in the country.[51] In 2014, close to 1.2 million rural inhabitants lived under the poverty line, compared to 225,000 urban inhabitants, while 19.4 percent of the rural population was considered vulnerable compared to 7.9 percent of the urban population, according to official sources.[52] These numbers show a wide center-periphery wealth divide and indicate the state’s failure to close the gap.
Furthermore, Morocco’s economy remains largely dependent on agricultural activity, which makes it vulnerable to poor harvests and environmental shocks. The agricultural sector, which accounted for approximately 39 percent of total employment in 2018,[53] is highly volatile compared to the rest of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region.[54] It remains dependent on weather conditions, meaning that any rainfall deficit or excess impacts production. Moreover, Morocco’s reliance on oil imports hurts its economy every time oil prices peak. The country also has a high level of public debt, which reached $76.8 billion in June 2019.[55] While Morocco’s GDP has improved, its annual growth has been too small to enhance standards of living or meet society’s expectations; at an average annual rate of 4 percent, it is considered low for emerging markets.[56]
Youth unemployment also remains a pressing problem in Morocco, where around 16.6 percent of the population is made up of young people (ages 15 to 24).[57] In 2019, the country had a youth unemployment rate of 22 percent nationally and 40.3 percent in urban areas.[58] Lower unemployment rates in rural areas (in 2018, 178,000 people in rural areas versus 990,000 people in urban areas were unemployed)[59] do not indicate better economic conditions. Rather, they can be attributed to the educated urban population’s reticence to accept undesired positions. Indeed, evidence gathered from field research shows that educated youths in urban areas queue for desired jobs, with many preferring public sector jobs that meet their expectations as university graduates.[60] Within the urban middle class, even those who are employed face difficulties, as public sector workers struggle to cover basic expenses due to low wages. Overall, Morocco’s lower middle class continues to face significant economic hardship. This is exacerbated by mediocre public healthcare and education, which lead some people to pay high prices in private clinics and schools.
Freedoms and rights
Undeniable progress was made in terms of women’s rights during the first five years of Mohammed VI’s reign. In 2004, the king reformed the family code to raise the minimum marriage age to 18 years and to grant women the right to self-guardianship, child custody, and divorce;[61] these were significant changes, despite some caveats.[62] In addition, polygamy laws were modified to require the approval of the existing wife (or wives).[63] However, further reforms have yet to take place, namely relating to inheritance laws, the legalization of abortion, and the abolishment of the death penalty.
On the political front, the current king’s reign has been marked by far less brutal repression than his predecessor’s. The electoral process is also more transparent than it was 20 years ago, with less evidence of rigged elections and regime interference. The 2011 uprisings resulted in granting some political freedoms, including partial empowerment of the legislative branch and free and fair parliamentary elections. The latter were won by the PJD, allowing them to enter government after having been kept out for decades.
In relative terms, when comparing a non-absolute authoritarian monarchy like Morocco to an absolute monarchy like Saudi Arabia, it is clear that the former is faring better in terms of human rights and political freedoms. However, when comparing Morocco to a constitutional monarchy like Spain, the former does not fare as well (see Figures 3 and 4). The structures and institutions that facilitate political opening exist in Morocco, but the transition remains restricted from the top.
Indeed, over 20 years, the current regime has favored limited liberalization over deep change. Mohammed VI has avoided the very reforms many had hoped he would introduce relating to freedom of expression, censure of the press, and regime interference in government affairs and formation.[64]
Over the past 20 years, the kingdom’s Freedom House rating of “Partly Free” has not changed.[65] In fact, the last episode of significant political opening took place under Hassan II, shortly before his death.[66] Moreover, repression seems to have increased following the 2011 uprisings, including heightened judicial harassment of dissidents.[67] In 2012, one year after the constitutional referendum, the authorities repressed protests organized by the February 20 movement, which had emphasized the wider opposition’s dissatisfaction with what they deemed to be cosmetic reforms.[68]
The 2016-2018 protests, which took place in the historically marginalized Rif region,[69] were also met with repression. These protests, triggered by the death of a fishmonger crushed by a garbage truck, gained countrywide traction.[70] Organizers spoke out against government corruption, economic hardship, and tough living conditions. Around 150 protesters were arrested, and movement organizers were given long prison terms.[71] Following the Rif protests, demonstrations triggered by economic hardship in Errachidia and Jrada were also repressed.[72] In 2019, police forces used water cannons and batons to disperse smaller-scale demonstrations organized by specific groups (teachers, students, etc.).[73]
The period following the 2011 uprisings has also been marked by greater regime interference in government affairs, despite promises to ensure a more robust and independent legislative branch.[74] While the legislative branch is partially more empowered, elected officials do not possess the power to govern the country or implement deep reform without the regime’s permission and cooperation; effective power rests with the monarchy. Indeed, the monarch is the highest political, military, security, and religious authority, appointing key ministers (such as defense and interior), secretaries of state, and governors, among others.
Furthermore, palace-aligned parties — such as the National Rally for Independents (RNI), the Constitutional Union (UC), and the Popular Movement (MP) — interfere in government affairs and formation, as demonstrated in the aftermath of the 2016 legislative elections. The PJD — which had won a historic 125 out of 395 parliamentary seats[75] — needed to enter into a coalition with other parties.[76] However, the RNI (which won 37 seats)[77] formed a bloc with the Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USFP), the UC, and the MP (all parties with minor results) to increase its influence in government.[78] While the RNI refused to join the coalition without these parties, then-Prime Minister Abdelilah Benkirane rejected the USFP’s participation (as it had won only 20 seats).[79] This resulted in a five-month deadlock that led the monarch to ask Benkirane to step down in March 2017 and to appoint current Prime Minister Saâdeddine El Othmani in his place.[80] El Othmani formed a coalition with the palace-aligned parties within a week,[81] thereby diminishing the PJD’s influence in government and creating divisions within the party.
Other promises made during the 2011 uprisings for greater political freedoms (of press, speech, and organization)[82] did not come through. In fact, the regime has refined its tactics of controlling the media and its image. For example, business figures close to the palace control various media outlets, which spread pro-regime propaganda.[83] The regime rewards loyal outlets while taking to court journalists who have been critical (in these cases, courts often rule in the regime’s favor).[84]
Individuals criticizing the regime via social media have also faced repression. Two famous YouTubers were arrested toward the end of 2019 for criticizing the king.[85] That same year, three Moroccan rappers released “Long Live the People,” a viral track criticizing the state and the king, which included the lyrics: “Bullets will not suffice … I’m the hurt one … the Moroccan citizen … who fought for independence but never felt it … Who took our money? … Who was it that took the phosphates?”[86] As the song gained popularity within the country and internationally, one of the rappers, Gnawi, was sentenced to a year in jail for insulting the police on social media.[87]
OUTLOOK AND RECOMMENDATIONS
As economic hardship persists for marginalized communities and popular frustration grows due to persistent social inequality, discontent will increase and protests will multiply. The revolution in neighboring Algeria,[88] no matter its outcome, will only embolden Moroccans to express dissent. While this piece does not aim to predict the timeline for a tipping point, tensions are bound to boil over if the kingdom’s socioeconomic and political conditions do not improve.
Recommendations
The regime can still deescalate this volatile situation, despite growing expressions of popular discontent and increased protests. Indeed, it has not yet crossed over to brutal repression, and the opposition is too fragmented to mobilize the population. The regime still has time and space to rebuild its social contract with the people. o do so, it must introduce genuine reforms that would: (1) bring about concrete political opening by empowering the legislative branch, and (2) reduce social inequality by improving the living conditions of rural populations and prioritizing education and welfare.
Opening the political sphere
Authoritarian learning [89] goes both ways; as regimes modify their behavior based on what they have learned from opposition events at home and abroad, so do opposition actors. Just as the Moroccan regime has developed a successful pattern of containing opposition through a combination of promised and cosmetic reforms and repression, so have opposition actors and the wider population learned from regime behavior and grown disillusioned with its failure to deliver on a number of promises. These span from as far back as 1956, when King Mohammed V promised various political groups [90] a constitution that he never passed, to as recently as the 2011 uprisings, when the current king promised a new era of reform but implemented little change.
If current grievances were to boil over and fragmented opposition actors were to unify, further pledges from the regime may not suffice to contain an eventual uprising. It is therefore in the best interest of the monarchy to act preemptively, before the tipping point, by introducing genuine reforms and change. A good start would be for the regime to strengthen the legislative branch and grant the prime minister greater powers, thereby paving the way for more individual freedoms. This recommendation would not require the monarchy to step away from power, but rather to be involved in the political sphere in such a way that allows the legislative branch to fulfill its constitutional role.
First, the monarchy should stop palace-aligned parties from interfering in government formation and affairs. Although the RNI-led initiative that resulted in a deadlock in forming the new government in 2016 and the subsequent ousting of Benkirane did not violate the text of any constitutional articles,[91] these actions did not respect the spirit of the constitution.
Second, the monarchy and the government need to agree on an effective division of tasks. There are fields in which the monarchy has been extraordinarily successful and which it should continue to oversee — most notably foreign policy, international business initiatives, and the development of business-oriented infrastructure. However, the legislative branch should take charge of affairs related to domestic politics and the economy and be given more control over public funds, in order to carry out successful socioeconomic and political reforms.
Targeting social inequality
To tackle social inequality, the regime should focus on three key aspects: (1) reducing the gap between rural and urban populations; (2) increasing the literacy rate for affected groups; and (3) raising more funds to make these changes possible.
To address the urban-rural divide in the short term, more funds should be allocated to rural areas that lack infrastructure and electricity, and which have not benefited from the same massive improvements as urban areas. The regime should focus on upgrading and adding to roads in rural areas, as well as building schools and health clinics in remote villages.
For a long-term solution, the regime must work toward reducing illiteracy, especially among the segments of the population most affected (in this case, women and rural inhabitants). To address this issue successfully, the regime must allocate funds to: (1) encourage and enable families to send their children to school and prevent dropout, and (2) allow illiterate adults to access literacy courses. Major obstacles to childhood education include poverty and distance. The regime must reinforce the public school system with more financial and human resources, give poor families cash incentives to keep their children in school, and set up more schools in remote villages. To reduce adult illiteracy, the regime must allocate funding to literacy courses, provide more courses across the kingdom, and encourage private employers to allow illiterate employees to attend such trainings.
To make these costly changes, the regime must raise more funds, especially as high public debt and dependency on oil imports have limited available state funding. There are several ways to do this, including: improving the tax collection system; spending less on megaprojects; reducing subsidies; and reforming the country’s taxation policy. Although the last option may generate significant political pushback from the higher income groups, it is the most straightforward option, given the regime’s propensity to develop large-scale projects, the cuts already made to the subsidy system following the 2011 uprisings, and the economic implications of the ongoing coronavirus crisis. The country’s income taxation policy is currently progressive to 38 percent for six different income groups.[92] People in the highest income group (the sixth one) earn over 180,000 dirhams per month, or close to $18,500. This policy can be reformed to include a seventh income group that would be taxed at a higher percentage. For example, people who earn more than 500,000 dirhams per month (around $55,000) could be taxed at a rate of 44 percent. Higher taxes should also be collected on property and wealth.
CONCLUSION
King Mohammed VI’s twenty-first year on the throne marks around a decade since the 2011 uprisings reached Morocco, and a decade since the king promised political opening and change that would meet the demands of the protest movement.[93] This symbolic date may explain the growing dissatisfaction with the regime among the media, the opposition, and the population. However, it has not all been bad — far from it. The king has introduced important changes in terms of foreign policy, infrastructure, and women’s rights. In the beginning of the king’s reign, the regime allowed some political opening and committed to increasing economic development. Following the 2011 uprisings, the regime introduced reforms that marginally limited its powers and allowed an Islamist party to lead the government for the first time in the country’s history.
Yet, so much more could and should be done to open the political sphere and address massive inequality. With protests rocking neighboring Algeria, as well as Lebanon and Iraq, and with persistent economic hardship and political restrictions fueling popular frustrations, protests are bound to increase. The economic fallout from the coronavirus pandemic (due to disrupted trade flows, reduced tourism, a potential European crisis, and increased public spending) will only exacerbate Morocco’s economic hardship.
To keep tensions from boiling over, the regime should focus on: (1) bringing about concrete political opening by minimizing interference in government affairs and by effectively dividing tasks between the monarchy and the government; and (2) reducing social inequality by reforming the taxation system, thereby raising funds to improve the living conditions of rural populations and to enhance education and welfare. Such changes would improve the country’s political and socioeconomic landscapes and would make it, in the monarch’s own words, “a country that accommodates all its sons and daughters; a country in which all citizens — without exception — enjoy the same rights and have the same obligations, in an environment where freedom and human dignity prevail.”[94]
FOOTNOTES
Spoiler:
1 Arab Barometer, “Arab Barometer V: Morocco Country Report,” June 2019, https://www.arabbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/ABV_Morocco_Report_Public-Opinion_Arab-Barometer_2019.pdf.
2 “Could Morocco see the next uprising, after Sudan and Algeria?,” BBC News Africa, June 27, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-48771758.
3 Yasmina Abouzzohour, “ COVID in the Maghreb: Responses and Impacts,” Project on Middle East Political Science (POMEPS), POMEPS Studies 39, April 2020, 51-55, https://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/POMEPS_Studies_39_Web.pdf.
4 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco 2011, art. 47, 49, and 91.
5 Mohamed Karim Boukhssass, “Yasmina Abouzzohour: al-Maghrib ‘abbara biwuduh ’anahu la yumkin ’an yakuna tahta wisayati ’ahadin wa la yumkin ’ibtizazuhu limawaqifihi,” [Morocco has clearly stated that it cannot be under the guardianship of anyone and cannot be blackmailed for its positions], Al Ayam no. 840 (February 14–20, 2019), https://mipa.institute/6525.
6 Yasmina Abouzzohour and Beatriz Tomé-Alonso, “Moroccan foreign policy after the Arab Spring: a turn for the Islamists or persistence of royal leadership?,” The Journal of North African Studies 24, no. 3 (2019): 444–67, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13629387.2018.1454652.
7 “Morocco Trade Picture,” European Commission, accessed May 21, 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/morocco/index_en.htm.
8 Author’s calculations based on data from “Recettes des investissements directs étrangers au Maroc: Repartition par pays et organisme financier” [Receipts from foreign direct investments in Morocco: Breakdown by country and financial institution], Office des Changes, accessed June 26, 2020, https://www.oc.gov.ma/fr/etudes-et-statistiques/series-statistiques. The countries included in the author’s calculations are the following: Ireland, France, Denmark, Spain, Luxembourg, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium, Cyprus, Germany, Malta, Italy, Greece, Portugal, Poland, Austria, Norway, and Sweden.
9 Ibid; “Full Text of Royal Speech on Throne Day,” Maroc.ma, accessed May 20, 2020, http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-activities/full-text-royal-speech-throne-day.
10 Nizar Manek, “Morocco Rejoins African Union Three Decades After Withdrawal,” Bloomberg, January 31, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-01-31/morocco-rejoins-african-union-three-decades-after-withdrawal.
11 The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) is a political and economic bloc made up of 15 West African states.
12 “Morocco Participates in ECOWAS Counterterrorism Summit,” Morocco World News, September 14, 2019, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/09/282593/morocco-ecowas-counterterrorism-summit/.
13 “HM the King Delivers Speech to Nation on 44th Anniversary of Green March,” Agence Marocaine de Presse, accessed May 20, 2020, http://www.mapnews.ma/en/discours-messages-sm-le-roi/hm-king-delivers-speech-nation-44th-anniversary-green-march.
14 “Banking on ECOWAS: Why Morocco is cosying up to sub-Saharan Africa,” The Economist, July 19, 2018, https://www.economist.com/middle-east-and-africa/2018/07/19/why-morocco-is-cosying-up-to-sub-Saharan-africa.
15 “Moroccan-Sub-Saharan Trade Increased by 9.1% in 2016: Foreign Exchange Office,” Morocco World News, July 15, 2017, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/07/223214/moroccan-sub-Saharan-trade-increased-by-9-1-in-2016-foreign-exchange-office/.
16 “Banking on ECOWAS.”
17 Morocco has faced three major terrorist events during the reign of the current king: the 2003 Casablanca bombings, which resulted in 45 deaths; the 2011 Marrakech Argana bombing, which resulted in the death of 17 people, many of whom were tourists; and the 2018 murders of Louisa Vesterager Jespersen and Maren Ueland, two tourists decapitated by terrorists near Imlil.
18 Thomas Renard, ed., “Returnees in the Maghreb: Comparing Policies on Returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters in Egypt, Morocco, and Tunisia,” Egmont Institute, Egmont Paper no. 107, April 2019, 30, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/content/uploads/2019/04/EP107-returnees-in-the-Maghreb.pdf?type=pdf.
19 Note that it is unclear how Moroccan authorities defined “cell,” and how structured these broken-up cells were.
20 “Plus de 170 cellules terroristes démantelées et plus de 352 projets “destructeurs” déjoués depuis 2002 au Maroc” [More than 170 terrorist cells dismantled and more than 352 “destructive” projects foiled since 2002 in Morocco], Maroc Diplomatique, October 20, 2017, https://maroc-diplomatique.net/plus-de-170-cellules-terroristes-demantelees-plus-de-352-projets-destructeurs-dejoues-2002-maroc/; Mohammed Amine Benabou, “US Embassy in Morocco Upgrades Security Alert for Terror Risk,” Morocco World News, April 3, 2019, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/04/269615/us-embassy-in-morocco-upgrades-security-alert-for-terror-risk/.
21 The Global Terrorism Index systematically ranks 163 countries based on the impact of terrorism. Specifically, it measures data linked to terrorist activities since 2000. The index scores countries yearly, based on four factors: the total number of terrorist incidents in a given year; the total number of fatalities caused by terrorism in a given year; the total number of injuries caused by terrorism in a given year; and the approximate level of total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year. See: “Global Terrorism Index 2019: Measuring the impact of terrorism,” Institute for Economics & Peace, 2019, http://visionofhumanity.org/app/uploads/2019/11/GTI-2019web.pdf.
22 Thierry Oberlé, “Le Maroc a aidé la France à dépister les terroristes de Saint-Denis” [Morocco helped France track terrorists in Saint-Denis], Le Figaro, November 21, 2015, https://www.lefigaro.fr/international/2015/11/20/01003-20151120ARTFIG00341-le-maroc-a-aide-la-france-a-depister-les-terroristes-de-saint-denis.php; Victor Fortunato, “Espagne/Maroc : démantèlement d’une «cellule djihadiste» qui préparait des attaques” [Spain/Morocco: The dismantling of a ‘jihadist cell’ that was preparing attacks], Le Parisien, September 6, 2017, http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/espagne-maroc-demantelement-d-une-cellule-djihadiste-qui-preparait-des-attaques-06-09-2017-7238658.php.
23 Douglas Frantz, “U.S. Enlists Morocco’s Help To Counter Terrorist Plots,” The New York Times, June 24, 2002, https://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/24/world/us-enlists-morocco-s-help-to-counter-terrorist-plots.html.
24 “African Lion,” United States Africa Command, accessed January 20, 2020, https://www.africom.mil/what-we-do/exercises/african-lion.
25 Clive Williams, “Counterterrorism cooperation in the Maghreb: Morocco looks beyond Marrakech,” The Strategist, December 12, 2018, https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/counterterrorism-cooperation-in-the-maghreb-morocco-looks-beyond-marrakech/; Silvia Colombo and Benedetta Voltolini, “‘Business as Usual’ in EU Democracy Promotion Towards Morocco? Assessing the Limits of the EU’s Approach towards the Mediterranean after the Arab Uprisings,” L’Europe en Formation 1, no. 371 (2014): 41–57, https://doi.org/10.3917/eufor.371.0041; “U.S. Relations with Morocco,” U.S. Department of State Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, October 4, 2019, https://www.state.gov/u-s-relations-with-morocco/.
26 Salim Hmimnat, “Morocco’s Religious ‘Soft Power’ in Africa As a Strategy Supporting Morocco’s Expansion in Africa,” MIPA, June 2018, https://mipa.institute/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/Hmimnat-Morocco%E2%80%99s-Religious-%E2%80%9CSoft-Power%E2%80%9D-in-Africa.pdf; Benjamin Bruce, “Morocco on the Road to European Islam,” Oasis 28, March 27, 2019, https://www.oasiscenter.eu/en/morocco-on-the-road-to-european-islam; Mohammed El-Katiri, “The institutionalisation of religious affairs: religious reform in Morocco,” The Journal of North African Studies 18, no. 1 (August 14, 2012): 53–69, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2012.712886.
27 World Bank Statistical Database, “Access to electricity, rural (% of rural population), Access to electricity, urban (% of urban population),” accessed September 30, 2019, https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=#.
28 Hamza Hamouchene, “The Ouarzazate solar plant in Morocco: Triumphal ‘Green’ capitalism and the privatization of nature,” Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt, March 25, 2016, https://www.cadtm.org/The-Ouarzazate-solar-plant-in; Reuters, “Vast Moroccan Solar Power Plant is Hard Act for Africa to Follow,” Fortune, November 5, 2016, https://fortune.com/2016/11/05/moroccan-solar-plant-africa/.
29 Tarik Bouhal et al., “Technical feasibility of a sustainable Concentrated Solar Power in Morocco through an energy analysis,” Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 81, no. 1 (January 2018): 1087–95, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rser.2017.08.056.
30 “Morocco Reaps Benefits of King’s Energy Farsightedness,” The North Africa Post, July 16, 2019, https://northafricapost.com/32543-morocco-reaps-benefits-of-kings-energy-farsightedness.html.
31 “Noor Ouarzazate Solar Complex,” Power Technology, accessed April 28, 2020, https://www.power-technology.com/projects/noor-ouarzazate-solar-complex/.
32 The World Bank, “Implementation Completion and Results Report on a Loan in the Amount of US$200 Million, Loan Number 80880-MA, and a Clean Technology Fund Loan in the Amount of US$97 Million, Loan Number TF010916, to the Moroccan Agency for Sustainable Energy for the Ouarzazate Concentrated Solar Power Project ( P122028 ),” Report No. ICR00004271, March 31, 2018, http://documents.banquemondiale.org/curated/fr/503371525382384008/pdf/ICR4271-PUBLIC-3-29-18.pdf.
33 Tarek Bazza, “35% of Moroccan Electricity Came from Renewable Sources in 2018,” Morocco World News, January 10, 2019, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/01/262953/morocco-electricity-renewable-sources/.
34 “Chiffres clés: Dates clés” [Key figures: Key dates], Autoroutes du Maroc, accessed May 20, 2020, https://www.adm.co.ma/adm/Chiffres-cles/Pages/dates-cles.aspx.
35 Agence France-Presse, “20 ans de règne. L’analyse de 2 conseillers du roi et de 2 anciens ministres” [20 years of reign. Analysis of two king’s advisers and two former ministers], Les Inspirations Éco, July 31, 2019, https://leseco.ma/20-ans-de-regne-l-analyse-de-2-conseillers-du-roi-et-de-2-anciens-ministres/.
36 Ibid; Agence Ecofin, “Maroc : 20 ans de règne de Mohammed VI en 10 chiffres clés” [Morocco: 20 years of Mohammed VI’s reign in 10 key figures], July 28, 2019, https://www.agenceecofin.com/gouvernance/2807-68234-maroc-20-ans-de-regne-de-mohammed-vi-en-10-chiffres-cles.
37 The feasibility studies for the high-speed rail began in 2003 and the Tangier-Kenitra route was identified the following year as one of the first that would be constructed. In 2007, the Moroccan National Railways Office (ONCF) signed preliminary agreements to manage the project. Financing was finalized in 2010, and construction began in 2011. The first trainset arrived to Tangier in 2015. Testing of the trains at revenue speeds began in 2017, the same year that track construction was completed. In January 2018, the electrical system was energized, and the control facility came online the following month. Construction of the stations was completed in mid-2018, and the service was inaugurated in November 2018.
38 “La LGV en chiffres” [The high-speed rail in numbers], Libération, November 16, 2018, https://www.libe.ma/La-LGV-en-chiffres_a103324.html.
39 Ahlam Ben Saga, “Politician Omar Balafrej Says LGV Train is Not a Priority for Morocco,” Morocco World News, November 15, 2018, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/11/257768/omar-balafrej-lgv-train-not-priority-morocco/; David W. Smith, “Morocco’s €1.8 billion TGV project splits opinion,” Construction Shows, October 31, 2011, https://www.constructionshows.com/moroccos-e1-8-billion-tgv-project-splits-opinion/.
40 World Bank Statistical Database, “GDP per capita (constant 2010 US$) - Morocco,” accessed January 4, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD?locations=MA.
41 World Bank Statistical Database, “Exports of goods and services (constant 2010 US$) - Morocco,” accessed January 4, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NE.EXP.GNFS.KD?locations=MA.
42 World Bank Statistical Database, “Adjusted net enrolment rate, primary (% of primary school age children) - Morocco,” accessed September 25, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.TENR?locations=MA.
43 World Bank Statistical Database, “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) - Morocco,” accessed September 25, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.NAHC?locations=MA.
44 World Bank Statistical Database, “Life expectancy at birth, total (years) - Morocco,” accessed September 25, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN?locations=MA.
45 World Bank Statistical Database, “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate) - Morocco,” accessed September 25, 2019, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SL.UEM.TOTL.ZS?locations=MA.
46 United Nations Data, “Arrivals of non resident tourists/visitors, departures and tourism expenditure in the country and in other countries,” accessed May 4, 2020, http://data.un.org/DocumentData.aspx?id=409.
47 Safaa Kasraoui, “Morocco’s Aeronautics Industry: 10 Years of Growth,” Morocco World News, October 26, 2019, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2018/10/256115/morocco-aeronautics-industry-growth/; Said Temsamani, “Morocco Among Top Most Promising Markets For Automotive Industry,” Eurasia Review, October 26, 2018, https://www.eurasiareview.com/26102018-morocco-among-top-most-promising-markets-for-automotive-industry-oped/.
48 Marie Anne Chambonnier, “Macro Poverty Outlook: Morocco,” The World Bank, 2019, http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/234641554825526725/mpo-mar.
49 The Gini index measures the distribution of income across income percentiles in a population. A higher score indicates greater inequality. “Gini Coefficient by Country 2020,” World Population Review, accessed May 20, 2020, http://worldpopulationreview.com/countries/gini-coefficient-by-country/; World Bank Statistical Database, “GINI index (World Bank estimate) - Morocco,” accessed May 21, 2020, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI?locations=MA.
50 “Gini Coefficient by Country 2020.”
51 The World Bank, “Morocco Digital and Climate Smart Agriculture Program (P170419): Program Information Document (PID),” Report No. PIDC190843, July 28, 2019, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/648291567624827368/pdf/Concept-Stage-Program-Information-Document-PID-Morocco-Digital-and-Climate-Smart-Agriculture-Program-P170419.pdf.
52 According to the High Commission for Planning, a vulnerable household is one whose expenditure per capita is between the national threshold of relative poverty and 1.5 times this threshold. See Safae El Badi, “Tableau De Bord Social,” Ministry of Economy and Finance, July 2019, 48, https://www.finances.gov.ma/Publication/depf/2019/TBS_12_07_2019.pdf.
53 Danish Trade Union Development Agency, “Labour Market Profile 2018: Morocco,” Labour Market Profile, January 2018, https://www.ulandssekretariatet.dk/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/Marocco_lmp_2018.pdf; “The World Factbook - Morocco,” Central Intelligence Agency, accessed May 5, 2020, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/mo.html.
54 “Challenges remain for Morocco's agribusiness despite positive developments,” Bizcommunity, September 28, 2016, https://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/741/151506.html.
55 “Morocco Government Debt: % of GDP,” CEIC Data, accessed December 16, 2019, https://www.ceicdata.com/en/indicator/morocco/government-debt--of-nominal-gdp.
56 World Bank Statistical Database, “GDP Growth (annual %) - Morocco,” accessed September 19, 2019, https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG&country=.
57 “The World Factbook - Morocco.”
58 World Bank Statistical Database, “Unemployment, youth total (% of total labor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate) - Morocco,” accessed September 25, 2019, https://databank.worldbank.org/reports.aspx?source=2&series=SL.UEM.1524.ZS&country=MAR; Katya Schwenk, “Despite Accelerated Growth, Unemployment Persists in Morocco,” Morocco World News, June 5, 2019, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2019/06/275140/acceleration-growth-unemployment-morocco-industries/.
59 El Badi, “Tableau De Bord Social,” 30.
60 The International Labour Office and International Fund for Agricultural Development, “Morocco: Young women’s employment and empowerment in the rural economy,” Country Brief, April 6, 2018, 3, https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_emp/documents/publication/wcms_622767.pdf.
61 Family Code (Moudawana) of the Kingdom of Morocco 2004, pmbl. 2, 3, and 6 and art. 171 and 218.
62 There are some caveats to consider. The official age for marriage was set to 18 years, unless a judge decides a minor is mature enough to be married (Family Code 2004, pmbl. 3). Women, in compliance with Islamic law, can retain custody of their children after divorce if they remain unmarried; if they remarry, the children only remain with their mothers until they are seven years old (Family Code 2004, art. 175).
63 Family Code 2004, pmbl. 4.
64 Craig R. Whitney, “Popular New King Has a Goal: A Modern Morocco,” The New York Times, November 12, 1999, https://www.nytimes.com/1999/11/12/world/popular-new-king-has-a-goal-a-modern-morocco.html.
65 “Freedom in the World 2018: Morocco,” Freedom House, accessed September 4, 2019, https://freedomhouse.org/country/morocco/freedom-world/2018; “Freedom in the World Comparative and Historical Data: Country and Territory Ratings and Statuses, 1973–2020,” Freedom House, accessed May 21, 2020, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/2020-02/2020_Country_and_Territory_Ratings_and_Statuses_FIW1973-2020.xlsx.
66 This was when King Hassan II invited the long-time socialist opposition actor and human rights lawyer Abderrahmane Youssoufi to form a government — the “Gouvernement d’Alternance,” or Government of Alternance — in which Youssoufi had enough power as prime minister to introduce some reforms.
68 Mounia Bennani-Chraïbi and Mohamed Jeghllaly, “The Protest Dynamics of Casablanca’s February 20th Movement,” Revue française de science politique 62, no. 5 (2012): 867–94, https://www.cairn-int.info/article-E_RFSP_625_867--.htm.
69 The Rif region experienced a tribal rebellion (1958–59) against the regime’s economic and political marginalization, which later developed separatist goals. The rebellion was repressed by the military, as per the orders of then-Crown Prince Hassan II. The region was also home to the 1984 Rif riots, which were triggered by economic hardship and escalated in reaction to the regime’s immediate repression.
70 El Maarouf Moulay Driss and Taieb Belghazi, “The event of death: Reflections on the dynamics of emotions and embodied resistance in the Moroccan contexts of hirak (movement) and la hirak ((non)movement),” Cultural Studies 33, no. 4 (2019): 632–56, https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09502386.2018.1543335.
71 “Morocco arrests 150 during Rif protests,” Middle East Monitor, June 29, 2017, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170629-morocco-arrests-150-during-rif-protests/; Ahmed Eljechtimi, “Moroccan court upholds prison sentences against Rif protesters,” Reuters, April 6, 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-protests/moroccan-court-upholds-prison-sentences-against-rif-protesters-idUSKCN1RI013.
72 Abdelillah Essatte, “Protests of Morocco’s Margins: The Credibility Gap,” MIPA, August 2018, https://mipa.institute/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Essatte-English.pdf; “Maroc : de violents affrontements à Errachidia, des policiers blessés (vidéo)” [Morocco: Violent clashes in Errachidia, injured policemen (video)], bladi.net, March 8, 2019, https://www.bladi.net/maroc-affrontements-errachida-policiers,54708.html; Ilhem Rachidi, “In Morocco, Hotbeds of Protest Are Not Being Extinguished,” Orient XXI, April 17, 2018, https://orientxxi.info/magazine/in-morocco-hotbeds-of-protest-are-not-being-extinguished,2408.
73 “Morocco: Hundreds of teachers protest in demand for higher wages,” Middle East Monitor, October 7, 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20191007-morocco-hundreds-of-teachers-protest-in-demand-for-higher-wages/; Reuters, “Thousands of Moroccan teachers protest over pay,” France 24, March 24, 2019, https://www.france24.com/en/20190324-thousands-moroccan-teachers-protest-over-pay-rabat-education; “Moroccan police crack down on protesting teachers,” Al Jazeera, February 20, 2019, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/02/moroccan-police-crack-protesting-teachers-190220173941088.html.
74 “Texte intégral du discours adressé par SM le Roi à la Nation,” [Full text of the speech addressed by His Majesty the King to the Nation], Maroc.ma, accessed May 20, 2020, http://www.maroc.ma/fr/discours-royaux/texte-intégral-du-discours-adressé-par-sm-le-roi-la-nation.
75 Yasmina Abouzzohour, “The Persistent Rural Failure of Morocco’s Justice and Development Party,” POMEPS, POMEPS Studies 27, September 2017, 12, http://pomeps.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/POMEPS_Studies_27_Web.pdf.
76 The PJD had to enter into a coalition with other parties because it needed a majority in parliament to form a government.
77 Abouzzohour, “The Persistent Rural Failure,” 14; Association TAFRA, “Résultats des élections législatives marocaines de 2016, listes locales et nationales" [Results of the 2016 Moroccan legislative elections, local and national lists], 2019, https://server.rferrali.net/media/parlement-elections-2016-1-1.xlsx.
78 Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, “Moroccan foreign policy after the Arab Spring,” 446–50.
79 Samia Errazzouki, “Months without government puts Moroccan public spending at risk: lawmakers,” Reuters, March 8, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-morocco-politics-idUSKBN16F2DW.
80 Abouzzohour and Tomé-Alonso, “Moroccan foreign policy after the Arab Spring,” 446–50.
81 Youssef Igrouane, “Saad Eddine Othmani Announces end of Deadlock, Formation of Government,” Morocco World News, March 25, 2017, https://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2017/03/212124/saad-eddine-othmani-announces-end-deadlock-formation-government/.
82 “Texte intégral du discours adressé par SM le Roi à la Nation.”
83 Abdelfettah Benchenna, Driss Ksikes, and Dominique Marchetti, “The media in Morocco: a highly political economy, the case of the paper and on-line press since the early 1990s,” The Journal of North African Studies 22, no. 3 (2017): 386–410, https://doi.org/10.1080/13629387.2017.1307906.
84 Reporters Sans Frontières, “Monarchy’s red lines gag Morocco’s independent media,” September 17, 2015, https://rsf.org/fr/node/27783.
85 “Le youtubeur « Moul Hanout » écope de trois ans de prison ferme” [YouTuber “Moul Hanout” receives a three-year prison sentence], le Desk, January 9, 2020, https://ledesk.ma/encontinu/le-youtubeur-moul-hanout-ecope-de-trois-ans-de-prison/; Amine Saadani, “« Vous n’êtes qu’un roi symbolique » : un youtubeur marocain poursuivi pour avoir critiqué Mohammed VI” [‘You are only a symbolic king’: Moroccan YouTuber prosecuted for having criticized Mohammed VI], Middle East Eye, December 5, 2019, https://www.middleeasteye.net/fr/en-bref/vous-netes-quun-roi-symbolique-un-youtubeur-marocain-poursuivi-pour-avoir-critique-mohammed.
86 “Weld l'Griya 09 ft. LZ3ER , GNAWI – ‘Ash al-sh’ab [Long live the people] (Prod by 88.YounG),” posted by Weld L’Griya 09, October 29, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hiW7ByHWJhg. The referenced lyrics were translated by the author from the original Moroccan Arabic: “Magha yakfikkum m‘ana qartas … Ana al-maqasah … Ana al-muwatin al-Maghribi … Ana li jibt al-’Istiqlal ’u ‘amri bih ma hesit … Shkoum li kla fina al-mal … Shkoun tahen al-fosfat …”
87 Kaothar Oudrhiri, “Condamnation du rappeur Gnawi : la scène rap préfère regarder ailleurs” [Rapper Gnawi condemned: rap scene prefers to look elsewhere], TelQuel, November 27, 2019, https://telquel.ma/2019/11/27/condamnation-du-rappeur-gnawi-la-scene-rap-prefere-regarder-ailleurs_1658810/?utm_source=tq&utm_medium=paid_post. See also Michael Safi, “Moroccan rapper jailed for one year over track about corruption,” The Guardian, November 25, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/nov/25/moroccan-rapper-gnawi-court-track-corruption-viral.
88 As of the writing of this piece, Algeria’s Hirak movement had paused the protests due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The protests will likely continue once the outbreak is under control.
89 Steven Heydemann and Reinoud Leenders, “Authoritarian Learning and Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the ‘Arab Awakening,’” Globalizations 8, no. 5 (2011): 647–53, https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2011.621274.
90 Most notably, the groups that demanded a constitution were the National Union of Popular Forces, the Istiqlal Party, and the Union of Moroccan Workers.
91 Constitution of the Kingdom of Morocco 2011, art. 47.
92 “Taxes: Income Tax,” Moroccan Investment Development Agency, accessed May 21, 2020 www.invest.gov.ma/?lang=en&Id=18.
93 “Full text of the speech addressed by His Majesty the King to the Nation.”
94 “HM the King Delivers a Speech to the Nation on Occasion of Throne Day (Full Text),” Maroc.ma, accessed May 20, 2020, http://www.maroc.ma/en/royal-speeches/hm-king-delivers-speech-nation-occasion-throne-day-full-text.
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
mauro future, simplet, QuickShark, sraboutibada et Socket-error aiment ce message
Fahed64 Administrateur
messages : 25537 Inscrit le : 31/03/2008 Localisation : Pau-Marrakech Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Ven 4 Déc - 20:45
Très intéressant Adam vraiment merci. On voit bien la stratégie des petits pas du Maroc
_________________ Sois généreux avec nous, Ô toi Dieu et donne nous la Victoire
Adam et QuickShark aiment ce message
Adam Modérateur
messages : 6300 Inscrit le : 25/03/2009 Localisation : Royaume pour tous les Marocains Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Dim 7 Fév - 16:32
Anthony H. Cordesman - CSIS a écrit:
The Greater Middle East: From the “Arab Spring” to the “Axis of Failed States”
.................
1. Morocco
Ranking: Uncertain Success
Summary: A poor state in economic terms, but it has made real progress towards reform after 2011, especially in terms of low repression rates by regional standards. Changes to the government, efforts to create a new economic model, and efforts to deal with youth unemployment have helped. There is real progress in building a diverse, open, market-oriented economy, but “major economic and population challenges” – coupled with loss of tourism income from the Coronavirus crisis – make success uncertain.
Problems remain in the southern region – or Western Sahara – and with the Polisario Front and Algeria. Morocco also experiences high unemployment, low labor force participation, poverty, and illiteracy, particularly in rural areas. Key economic challenges for Morocco include reforming the education system and the “judiciary.” Significant youth unemployment problem remains.
“After King Mohammed VI’s July 2019 call for a government reshuffle—adapted to meet his country’s pressing development challenges—in the second half of 2019, Saad Dine El Othmani, the head of Morocco’s government, presented a new cabinet line-up composed of 23 portfolios, streamlined from the 39 in the previous government. In it, the Party for Justice and Development (PJD) leading the coalition has seven cabinet posts, while the liberal National Rally for Independents (RNI) led by Aziz Akhannouch has four, strategic portfolios, including Agriculture, Economy/Finance, and Industry. The Party for Progress and Socialism (PPS) withdrew from the coalition the week before the government was formed in October 2019 and most of other government members have a technocratic background.”
“Members of the Commission for the New Development Model led by former Interior Minister, Chakib Benmoussa, were appointed by the King in December 2019. The Commission has been conducting extensive consultations across Morocco to gather feedback and recommendations on development bottlenecks and suggested pathways to reform. Its task is to develop a comprehensive roadmap to deliver to the King by June 2020, with a new vision for Morocco’s future.”
“To tackle youth unemployment, King Mohammed VI has urged the Moroccan banking and financial sectors to develop solutions to facilitate youth entrepreneurship and open up access to finance. The Intelaka initiative was launched in February 2020, offering a new generation of guarantees and financing products for young entrepreneurs and very small enterprises. A $625 million Trust Fund has been set up to finance the initiative, spanning three years and financed equally by the government and the banking sector.”
“The Covid-19 epidemic has triggered a number of radical, preemptive measures to counter its progress. In March 2020, Morocco closed its land and maritime borders and suspended all international passenger flights to and from its airports. Other measures were taken to limit social interactions. An economic watch committee, chaired by the Minister of Economy, was set up to evaluate the impact of Covid-19 on the economy and adopt mitigating measures to support the segments of the economy affected. King Mohammed VI ordered the creation of a fund of 10 billion dirham ($1 billion) to upgrade health infrastructure, support vulnerable households and help crisis-hit economic sectors.”
“To help Morocco cope with the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, the World Bank proceeded with the restructuring of a US$275 million Disaster Risk Management Development Policy Loan with a Catastrophe Deferred Drawdown Option (Cat DDO). The restructuring adds a health-related trigger mechanism to the operation to allow immediate funding under to address emergency measures.”
“Morocco’s economic growth has been on a downward trend for the last two years. Indeed, GDP growth decelerated sharply in 2019 to 2.3 percent, down from 3 percent in 2018. This slowdown was mainly driven by the contraction of agricultural output by 5.4 percent and modest non-agricultural GDP growth (3.3 percent in 2019 versus 3 percent in 2017). On the demand side, private consumption contributed the most to growth, boosted by higher salaries and low inflation. The contribution of net exports remained negative, reflecting the low competitiveness of exports and their dependence on energy imports. Thanks to prudent monetary policies and declining import prices, inflation has remained low and controlled under 2 percent. The unemployment rate remains elevated at 9.2 percent—and is significantly higher among women and youth—while labor force participation has been experiencing a protracted decline to below 46 percent.”
“Following five years of strong fiscal consolidation efforts , the fiscal deficit widened anew in 2019 to an estimated 4.1 percent of GDP, driven mainly by lower than forecasted corporate tax revenue and grants from the GCC, and by increased spending on goods, services and capital expenditures. The proceeds from privatization allowed the reduction of the government’s financing needs to 3.6 percent of GDP in 2019. Consequently, the central government debt-to-GDP ratio has slightly increased to 65.7 percent.”
“The Covid-19 pandemic outbreak and the effects of drought are expected to impact the Moroccan economy negatively in the medium-term, with the economy also expected to suffer a recession this year, the first in more than two decades. Real GDP is expected to recede by 1.7 percent in 2020. The country’s economic outlook remains subject to significant downside risks, including a longer, more severe epidemic.”
“The country’s current account expenditure/balance returned to narrowing its trajectory, after widening to 5.5 percent of GDP in 2018. Preliminary figures at end-2019 reveal that exports grew by 4.2 percent, primarily driven by an increase in automotive and aeronautics exports. This increase was also reflected in a rise of equipment imports, because of growing public and private sector investment. Despite a drop in remittances and in net foreign direct investment, the performance of tourism receipts (7.7 percent) and a reduction in energy imports (minus 7.2 percent, given the decline in oil prices) have supported the decline in the current account deficit to 4.6 percent of GDP in 2019. The exchange rate remains stable following the 2018 widening of the exchange rate band from ±0.3 to ±2.5, which has contributed to improving the economy’s shock absorption capacity.”
“Growth is projected to accelerate gradually over the medium term, mainly driven by more dynamic secondary and tertiary activities. Its outlook is subject to significant risks, however. External risks include weaker growth in the Euro area, geopolitical risks in the region, and the uncertain global trade and capital flow policy environments, as well as potential disruptions to tourism and trade, at least temporarily in light of the recent spread of the corona virus. Domestically, the main risks are clustered around delays in structural and financial sector reforms, including critical tax system reforms which could adversely affect fiscal space and heighten social tensions, thereby affecting growth and external balances. Conversely, lower international oil and butane gas prices could support an attenuation of macroeconomic imbalances, whereas greater regional integration could contribute to medium-term growth.”
International Rankings : The UN Human development ranking in 2019 is only 121 out of 189. The World Bank percentile governance ranking in 2018 is a moderate 44.2. Morocco has moderate corruption by regional standards (80th out of 198 countries), and the World Bank “Doing Business Ranking” rates Morocco “Good” at 53rd out of 190 countries.
Population Pressure in millions: Morocco: 9.3 in 1950, 28.2 in 2000, 31.9 in 2010, 35.6 in 2020, and 42.0 estimated for 2050. Western Sahara: 9,000 in 1950; 336,000 in 2000; 490,000 in 2010; 652,000 in 2020; and 1.2 estimated for 2050.
Total Pre-Coronavirus Gross GNI in $US Current Billions and GNI per capita in $US Current Dollars in 2019: GNI = $116.4 billion; GNI per capita = $3,190.
Five Year Prognosis: Morocco will be dependent on further reform, outside aid, and recovery of tourism.
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
Fahed64, QuickShark et Anzarane aiment ce message
Anzarane Lt-colonel
messages : 1465 Inscrit le : 14/03/2019 Localisation : Fes Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Dim 7 Fév - 16:48
Alors tout dépendra du courage (volonté) de notre etat a appliquer de vrai réformes. Mais je suis assez pessimiste vu que nos partis politique sont incapables de faire passer l’intérêt de la nation avant leurs intérêt personnel.
Invité Invité
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Lun 8 Fév - 12:33
Depuis quand les partis politiques ont leur mot à dire dans les réformes de l'état?
Anzarane Lt-colonel
messages : 1465 Inscrit le : 14/03/2019 Localisation : Fes Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Lun 8 Fév - 15:56
alphatango a écrit:
Depuis quand les partis politiques ont leur mot à dire dans les réformes de l'état?
Et pourtant c'est a eux ( le gouvernement) qu'incombe la tache de mettre en pratique ces réformes. Hormis le nouveau modèle de développement nous avons tout un panel de lois et de décisions.........seulement sur le papier L'exemple le plus flagrant et celui de l’éducation national : le livre blanc ,la loi cadre, les actions prioritaires, la vision stratégique 2015-2030.............rien de ce qui été programmer n'as été réaliser( comme il le devait)
PGM Administrateur
messages : 11677 Inscrit le : 12/12/2008 Localisation : paris Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mar 16 Fév - 21:17
Citation :
]Education : Les quatre leçons d'Asie pour le Maroc, selon Youssef Saâdani
Sara Ibriz
Modifié le 16 février 2021 à 15:28
La réussite asiatique constitue une source d'inspiration pour allier développement éducatif et économique. Youssef Saâdani décortique ce modèle qui repose sur 4 piliers. Explications.
Youssef Saâdani, économiste spécialiste des questions de croissance, de développement et d'éducation a animé le 5ème séminaire de l’université citoyenne 2021 de la fondation HEM, tenu en ligne ce samedi 13 février.
Thématique de cet événement : la réussite de la région asiatique où "miracle économique et miracle éducatif" se rencontrent pour former un modèle inspirant.
Sans en calquer le contenu, Youssef Saâdani appelle à s'inspirer de ce modèle dont il est possible de tirer 4 principales leçons exposées en détail lors de cet événement. Comment les pays asiatiques ont réalisé cette double réussite ? Faut-il en privilégier une sur l'autre ? Par quoi se distingue le modèle asiatique ? Quelles sont les priorités ? Voici les éclairages de M. Saâdani.
Test PISA 2018 : Un élève marocain a 4 ans de retard sur un élève coréen du même âge
“Le développement économique peut être mesuré par le PIB par habitant, la croissance économique, l’indice de développement humain, etc. Pour le système éducatif, il existe des tests internationaux réalisés auprès des élèves”, indique M. Saâdani.
L’un d’eux s’est imposé dans la communauté internationale, il s’agit du test PISA qui est réalisé tous les 3 ans par l’OCDE auprès des élèves âgés de 15 ans et porte sur les mathématiques, les sciences et la lecture. Le dernier test réalisé date de 2018 et place le Maroc à la 75ème place sur 79 pays concernés.
La moyenne mondiale en mathématiques est de 500 points. Le Maroc a un score de 368 avec 150 points d’écart par rapport à la Corée. Sachant que “les experts de PISA considèrent que 30 points constituent l’équivalent d’une année de scolarité”, cela signifie “qu’un élève coréen a 4 ans d’avance sur un élève marocain du même âge”.
Mais ce test ne permet pas uniquement de rappeler l’évidence, c’est-à-dire que le Maroc se trouve parmi les derniers de la classe en matière de système éducatif. Les résultats du test PISA permettent, par ailleurs, de remarquer l’efficacité du modèle asiatique.
“Sur le top 10 en mathématiques, figurent 7 pays asiatiques qui ont connu des développements économiques fulgurants”. Il en est de même pour le classement en lecture sur lequel figure 5 pays asiatiques sur les 10 premiers.
Leçon d'Asie n°1 : Le niveau éducatif, un prérequis au développement économique
Il s’agit notamment de la Chine, de Singapour, de la Corée ou encore du Japon. Sachant que “pas loin derrière, se trouvent des pays asiatiques beaucoup plus pauvres, mais sur le chemin du développement, comme le Vietnam”. Ce dernier a un niveau “supérieur à celui de la France et proche de celui de l’Allemagne, avec un PIB par habitant inférieur à celui du Maroc”.
Ces résultats prouvent que les pays asiatiques ont réussi à développer un système éducatif remarquable, accompagné d’un “miracle économique”, comme le souligne M. Saâdani. Quel élément a permis de développer l’autre ? S’agit-il du système éducatif qui a causé l’essor économique, ou l’inverse ?
En revenant quelques années en arrière, soit dans les années 60 ou 70, l’on remarque que selon des tests effectués sur certains de ces pays dont le Japon, la Corée ou Taïwan, il s’avère qu' “avant même de se développer, ces pays-là avaient un niveau éducatif supérieur à celui des Etats-Unis. On a déjà un indice qui montre que le niveau éducatif est une condition initiale”. Mais est-elle suffisante ?
En effet, selon M. Saâdani “aucun pays ne s’est développé sans avoir, initialement, une base éducative de qualité. Néanmoins, il y a aussi des pays qui ont un bon niveau éducatif mais qui n’ont pas de croissance forte”. Il s’agit notamment des pays de l’Est, dont l’Ukraine ou la Russie où “le niveau éducatif est extrêmement élevé mais qui sont faiblement dynamiques sur le plan économique”.
Pour Youssef Saâdani “il ne suffit pas d’avoir un capital humain, encore faut-il bien l’employer”.
C’est justement la première leçon à tirer de l’expérience des pays asiatiques, qui ont réussi à réaliser la “rencontre miraculeuse entre développement économique et éducation”.
Leçon d'Asie n°2 : Le primaire prioritaire !
La deuxième leçon à tirer du modèle asiatique porte sur un élément prioritaire selon M. Saâdani : celui de “bâtir un système éducatif performant à travers un primaire de très haute qualité pour tous”.
Il convient de préciser qu’au Maroc, on a procédé à la massification du primaire “tardivement”, soit au début des années 2000. Tandis que les pays asiatiques l’ont fait dans les années 50 et 60 et que d'autres l'ont réalisé au 17ème siècle. C’est le cas de la Hollande qui, en 1650, avait un taux d’alphabétisation de plus de 50%, un taux que le Maroc n’a atteint qu’en 2000 justement.
Il s’agit tout de même d’une “réalisation extraordinaire” selon M. Saâdani qui souligne également que “le taux d’achèvement est élevé au Maroc, puisque le décrochage ne commence qu’à partir du collège”.
Néanmoins, “on a mis les enfants à l’école mais ils n’apprennent pas grand-chose”, car “toutes les enquêtes nationales et internationales dont on dispose sur le niveau scolaire des enfants marocains indiquent que près des ⅔ ne possèdent pas les compétences de base en lecture et en mathématiques à la fin du primaire”. Il s’agit d’un taux élevé par rapport à d’autres pays. Sachant qu’en Asie on atteint un taux de 90% pour les élèves qui finissent le primaire avec toutes les compétences.
Pour assurer une bonne construction de “la base de la pyramide” qui est le primaire, Youssef Saâdani explique que l'Asie se démarque par 5 éléments qui peuvent inspirer le Maroc.
Le premier est celui de la place spécifique de l’enseignant. En Asie, l’enseignant a un statut prestigieux et est considéré comme un expert dans son domaine.
“Dans des pays comme la Corée, Singapour ou le Japon, les instituteurs sont issus des meilleurs élèves au lycée. C’est l’une des filières les plus sélectives, au même niveau que la médecine”, indique-t-il.
Le second élément porte sur la méthode d’enseignement adoptée par les instituteurs qui conduisent leurs classes avec des interactions intenses sans recourir aux travaux de groupes.
De plus, le modèle asiatique a développé “la pédagogie de l’erreur” selon laquelle, lorsqu’un élève fait une erreur, il s’agit d’une occasion d’apprentissage pour l’ensemble du groupe.
Contrairement à ce que l’on peut croire d’un point de vue extérieur, les jeunes asiatiques sont poussés à réfléchir et n’agissent pas comme “des robots”. C’est pourquoi ils sont en tête des tests PISA qui sont des tests de logique, comme le rappelle M. Saâdani.
Privatisation du primaire : entre 0% et 2% en Asie, 18% au Maroc
Ces 3 éléments nécessaires à la construction d’un primaire de haute qualité sont réunis dans un espace d’enseignement public, puisque la privatisation est extrêmement limitée en Asie et l'enseignement est considéré comme une “mission régalienne de l’Etat”. Il s’agit du 4ème élément de la construction d’une base solide du système éducatif.
“En Corée, seul 1 ou 2% des effectifs du primaire” sont concernés par le privé. Au Japon, Taïwan, ou encore au Vietnam la privatisation est entre 0 et 1%, autrement dit quasi inexistante. Tandis qu’au Maroc elle est de 18% sur l’échelle nationale et peut atteindre 50% dans les grandes villes comme Casablanca ou Rabat”.
Enfin, M. Saâdani cite le rôle de famille et de la société comme 5ème élément constitutif d’un primaire de haute qualité, faisant référence à l’importance de l’éducation à leurs yeux, puisqu’elle est à la limite du “déraisonnable” et constitue ainsi une pression pour les élèves.
Leçon d'Asie n°3 : Les soft skills
Pour revenir aux grandes leçons à tirer du modèle asiatique, M. Saâdani en compte une troisième relative aux soft skills ou compétences comportementales qui sont enseignées de manière intentionnelle au sein des écoles primaires des pays asiatiques. Il s’agit des aptitudes à la rigueur, au travail bien fait, de la capacité à travailler en équipe, celle de communiquer, mais aussi de l’honnêteté, etc. qui sont des éléments déterminants du développement économique à long terme”.
Ce dernier a des besoins évolutifs auxquels le système éducatif doit s’adapter au fur et à mesure. C’est pourquoi, les pays qui ont réussi sont ceux qui ont “fait évoluer leur système éducatif conjointement avec leur développement économique”.
Leçon d'Asie n°4 : Des lycées techniques et technologiques
En effet, pour répondre à un besoin de compétences de base, ils ont massifié le primaire. Et pour répondre au besoin d’une main-d’œuvre ouvrière qualifiée pour l’industrie, ils ont développé des collèges et lycées avec une très forte proportion de lycées technologiques et techniques.
En Corée, 50% des lycées étaient techniques et professionnels dans les années 80. Aujourd’hui, le Maroc en a moins de 5%.
"Nous avons un développement du système éducatif qui n'est pas forcément lié à notre structure économique", souligne M. Saâdani qui indique, par ailleurs, que "sur 100 étudiants qui s'inscrivent à l'université, 48 en sortent sans diplôme".
Il s'agit bien d'un problème d'orientation, mais aussi du "fardeau de la qualité du primaire qui persiste", ajoute-t-il.
Pour Youssef Saâdani, ce fardeau dont il faudra se débarrasser, nécessite non seulement de se pencher, avec enthousiasme, sur l'expérience asiatique, mais aussi d'inventer une stratégie propre au Maroc qui prend en compte les spécificités de notre pays
Medias24
_________________
Cosa et Anzarane aiment ce message
Anzarane Lt-colonel
messages : 1465 Inscrit le : 14/03/2019 Localisation : Fes Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 17 Fév - 17:31
C'est démoralisant et c'est pas faute d'avoir essayer. Nombreux sont les plan de modernisation (sauvetage) de notre système éducatif mais rien ne marche.
Adam Modérateur
messages : 6300 Inscrit le : 25/03/2009 Localisation : Royaume pour tous les Marocains Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 17 Fév - 18:51
Aucun plan n'a jamais été appliqué ... tous sont restés encres sur papiers .... il y trop de lobbies .. trop de rentes politiques et menaces syndicales pour qu'aucun plan ne soit sérieusement mis en application ..... je ne sais pas si le grand conseiller royal, feu Meziane Belfequih avait rédigé ses mémoires... on y apprendrait des choses sur ce sujet et bien d'autres ... notamment sur l'invention des islamistes loyalistes....
_________________ Les peuples ne meurent jamais de faim mais de honte.
romh General de Division
messages : 4177 Inscrit le : 09/09/2009 Localisation : Royaume Uni Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 17 Fév - 20:02
Adam a écrit:
Aucun plan n'a jamais été appliqué ... tous sont restés encres sur papiers .... il y trop de lobbies .. trop de rentes politiques et menaces syndicales pour qu'aucun plan ne soit sérieusement mis en application ..... je ne sais pas si le grand conseiller royal, feu Meziane Belfequih avait rédigé ses mémoires... on y apprendrait des choses sur ce sujet et bien d'autres ... notamment sur l'invention des islamistes loyalistes....
J'étais un jeune syndicaliste de 2000 à 2007 j'ai assisté au diferentes tentatives de réforme de l'éducation avant de quitter le public après plusieurs années de travail, malheureusement je peux vous dire qu'il n y avait aucune réforme réelle, pire encore au lieux de valoriser l'expérience des années passées et travailler sur les lacunes, on a systématiquement tout détruit, réduction des années de formation professionnelle pour les enseignants, réduction de la masse horaires des matières enseignées en cycle collégiale et secondaire, affaiblissement et réduction des effectifs et des prérogatives des inspecteurs encadrant, augmentation des effectifs dans les classes et réduction du nombre d'écoles...... L'enseignement public est devenu une vache à lait pour les fonctionnaires et syndicaliste corrompu ainsi qu'aux entrepreneurs et importateurs de matériels scolaires et imprimerie..... Ils avaient un objectif bien précis, promouvoir l'enseignement privé un marché juteux pour lbaznassa et les rentiers qui fait les affaires du gouvernement qui voulait affaiblir le rôle de l'enseignement public et ses dépenses ..... Cependant en optant pour cette orientation on a détruit notre système éducatif
Cosa, Adam et QuickShark aiment ce message
Invité Invité
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Mer 17 Fév - 22:15
Merci Romh,
Pourrais-tu entrer plus dans les détails au sujet des points que tu as soulevé ("réduction des années de formation professionnelle pour les enseignants, réduction de la masse horaires des matières enseignées en cycle collégiale et secondaire, affaiblissement et réduction des effectifs et des prérogatives des inspecteurs encadrant, augmentation des effectifs dans les classes et réduction du nombre d'écoles......).
Qu'est-ce qui a changé dans la formation des enseignants, le nombre d'écoles fermées...
Nous savons tous que l'éducation publique gratuite est la condition nécéssaire pour tout développement homogène. Le problème est que ceux qui "ont" au Maroc utilisent l'éducation comme un outil de ségrégation social pour assurer à leur projéniture les privillèges qu'ils ont reçu. Certains chez nous ne veulent pas que l'ascenseur social fonctionne.
Il fût un temps, ou n'allaient à l'école privée que les cancres qui n'étaient pas capable de réussir à l'école publique. Il fût un temps où l'école publique Marocaine formait nos élites sans regard quant à leur nom de famille ou la richesse de leur parents. C'est vers cela que nous devons aller.
La crise du COVID a démontré que nous avons besoin d'un système de santé public fort. Quelle crise faudra-t-il pour que le Palais (car seul le Palais peut prendre cette décision) décide de fermer les écoles privées et les missions étrangères? J'ai bien peur que si nous attendons cette crise, le nombre de morts ne soit bien plus important que les 8000 causés par le Covid.
Il est urgent de décommercialiser le secteur de l'education. L'education est bien un pouvoir régalien de l'etat et Youssef Saadani a soulevé les points qu'il fallait.
romh General de Division
messages : 4177 Inscrit le : 09/09/2009 Localisation : Royaume Uni Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 18 Fév - 0:51
Oui bien sûr alpha, premièrement après l'approbation et le début de mise en application de la première réforme élaboré par le premier gouvernement (tanaoub) lahbib lmalki avec une certaine Latifa laabida comme directrice RH ont voulu réduire le nombre de postes budgétaires. pour se faire on a réduit la masse horaire de trois matières ( français arabe et mathématiques de 6h/semaine à 4h par semaine ) dans le cycle collégial alors que pour le cycle secondaire ça était modifie selon les branches Deuxièmement les enseignants s'occupaient uniquement d'une seule matière celle pour la quelle ils ont reçu une formation hyper spécialisée ( licence ou DEUG en mathématiques plus formation cpr ou ens professionnel en mathématiques = professeur en mathématiques) ils ont modifié ça et l'enseignant désormais devrait enseigner d'autres matières un peu proche de son domaine initial ce qui est complètement contre productif, pire l'enseignant avant il enseigne seulement dans une seule école, après la réforme il est obligé de le faire dans plusieurs établissements à la fois, tout ça pour atteindre le plein emploi et minimiser le nombre de poste budgétaire dédié à l'enseignement ce qui a impacté très négativement la performance des enseignants et a créé beaucoup de désordre dans l'organisation et la gestion des établissements scolaires je me souviens qu'on passait beaucoup de temps à faire la médiation (étant syndicalistes) entre les professeurs et les administrateurs à cause des tableaux de service et des changements continue dans les lieux de travail.... Pour la formation au début on recrutait des bacheliers avec sélection concours écrit et orale ensuite deux ans de formation professionnelle très riche avec 40h par semaine pour les instituteurs du primaire et 4ans pour ceux du secondaire pour le collégiale c'était DEUG plus un ans et demi ou deux ans de formation, après dans tout les cycles tu dois passer un ans comme stagiaire. Après la réforme on a commencé à réduire pour arriver finalement à 6 mois de formation tout cycle confondu bien sûr avec licence (3ans système modulaire QCM etc rien à voir avec les profils des années 90 début 2000). Pour l'organisation du travail avant c'était le prof qui décidait des méthodes d'évaluation de la moyenne de réussite etc mais après il ne décide plus rien il est devenu un simple visiteur au plus bas de l'échelle pour le pousser à se desengager et chercher des alternatives ailleurs. Les crédits de logements et autres ont aussi contribué à dégrader la situation de tout les cadres de l'éducation mal protégé et souvent victime des taux de crédit exorbitant tout le monde a commencé à chercher un travail additionnel chez qui? Devinez ( les écoles privées bien sûr....) Pour les livres scolaires avant la réforme c'était unifiée au niveau national et le programme dure assez d'années avant le renouveler ce qu'était logique et rationnel aussi, après on a imposé plusieurs programmes au même temps avec une distribution assez anarchique et à chaque deux ans on change le programme en échangeant les régions ou les zones où ca va être enseigné tout ça pour permettre aux imprimeries de vendre le maximum possible de livres neufs chaque année, et avec la pagaille et l'escroquerie des écoles privées autorisée à imposer des programmes parallèle en plus de celui du public ( sans contrôle sans normes standards.... je vous laisse imaginer ) les parents ont été livrés à leur sort face aux moul Chkara. Toute cette anarchie a rendu le secteur de l'enseignement sous forme d'un grand souk où l'argent est seul langage.... Les inspecteurs avant joué aussi le rôle d'encadrement ils étaient respectés très compétent avec un effectif très considérable avec des rencontres des formations et des sciences d'encadrement dans un cadre très simple mais très efficace, après c'est devenue des formations avec indemnités des marchés publics et bon de commande de restauration et hébergement....., Un commerce pure et simple avec clientélisme dans la désignation des formateurs etc bref beaucoup de disfonctionnements. Sans oublier une réduction phénoménal dans leurs effectifs l'école de formation des inspecteurs était fermée pendant plus que dix ans continue.... Malheureusement je peux écrire des pages et des pages mais c'est vraiment dommage les diagnostics et les constats c'est pas ce qui manque mais il faut autre chose....
Fahed64, QuickShark, ralek1 et Anzarane aiment ce message
Anzarane Lt-colonel
messages : 1465 Inscrit le : 14/03/2019 Localisation : Fes Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 18 Fév - 10:02
Tu as tout résumer @romh sans parler de la pression quasi constante exercer par les académie régional les directions provinciale sur les directeurs des Etablissements scolaire et par conséquents sur les enseignants pour que la majorités des élèves puissent avoir la moyenne sinon c'est visites d'inspection et mesures disciplinaire. Alors tout le monde gonfle les notes pour ne pas subir les foudres de l'administration. C'est du grand n'importe quoi........
romh aime ce message
simplet General de Brigade
messages : 3188 Inscrit le : 20/05/2012 Localisation : MONTREAL Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 18 Fév - 15:57
Une reforme très simple qui va couter zéro dirhams et qui va améliorer le rendement d'au moins 20%.
- tout ce qui construction et béton et menuiserie etc doit être délégué au Ministère des travaux public. Le ministre de l'enseignement doit ce concentrer exclusivement sur l’éducation et rien d'autre. et voila les mouches ne vont plus roder dans les postes de décisions
.
_________________
.
"Tu ne sais jamais à quel point tu es fort, jusqu'au jour où être fort reste ta seule option."Bob Marley.
.
kolopoi12, romh et QuickShark aiment ce message
Invité Invité
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 18 Fév - 16:24
Merci Romh,
J'espère que "qui de droit" lira ce que tu as écrit.
Les coupes budgétaires étaient demandées par le FMI mais c'est notre éxecutif qui a choisi de sacrifier la santé et l'éducation publique pour atteindre les objectifs d'équilibre budgétaire. Nous devons revoir ces choix. L'éducation doit être exclusivement publique. Tous les Marocains doivent être formés à la même école pour apprendre les mêmes valeurs. Je ne suis pas certain que le message passe lorsque j'entends le ministre de l'éducation dire que le secteur public ne peut pas absorber les élèves du privé.
Fahed64 Administrateur
messages : 25537 Inscrit le : 31/03/2008 Localisation : Pau-Marrakech Nationalité : Médailles de mérite :
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 18 Fév - 16:32
Le problème c'est que notre dette a augmenté, les agences de notation nous surveille, on veut généraliser la couverture maladie et les droits sociaux ( bonne chose) mais j'ai l'impression que les fondamentaux ( impôt, éducation) on changera pas une méthode de perdant ....
_________________ Sois généreux avec nous, Ô toi Dieu et donne nous la Victoire
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume Jeu 18 Fév - 17:06
alphatango a écrit:
Merci Romh,
J'espère que "qui de droit" lira ce que tu as écrit.
Les coupes budgétaires étaient demandées par le FMI mais c'est notre éxecutif qui a choisi de sacrifier la santé et l'éducation publique pour atteindre les objectifs d'équilibre budgétaire. Nous devons revoir ces choix. L'éducation doit être exclusivement publique. Tous les Marocains doivent être formés à la même école pour apprendre les mêmes valeurs. Je ne suis pas certain que le message passe lorsque j'entends le ministre de l'éducation dire que le secteur public ne peut pas absorber les élèves du privé.
Je ne suis pas d'accord, il doit toujours y avoir du secteur privé dans tout les domaines , le secteur privé signifie concurrence et innovation les 10 meilleures universités de monde dans la recherche scientifique sont privées mais au maroc nous devons le réparer car notre secteur privé va malheureusement mal
QuickShark aime ce message
Contenu sponsorisé
Sujet: Re: FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume
FAR-MAROC : Débat autour du nouveau modèle de développement pour le Royaume